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Since the establishment of the Carl Newell Jackson Lectureship, it has been customary to print the text of the lectures in these *Studies*. This year, however, the Jackson Lectures delivered in 1960 by Werner Jaeger, University Professor *Emeritus*, have instead been published, by special arrangement with Harvard University Press, in an expanded form under the title *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*. We are grateful that Professor Jaeger took pleasure in the completed book before his death on October 19, 1961.

Although the chief purpose of the *Harvard Studies* is to publish articles by instructors and graduate students at Harvard, scholars in other institutions are invited to submit articles. Manuscripts should be sent to The Editorial Committee, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 320 Boylston Hall, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

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HYGIEIA THARSO AND IAON: THE PHAISTOS DISK

By HENRY D EPHRON

INTRODUCTION¹

HAPPILY there is no need for a lengthy description of the Phaistos Disk² nor for a full discussion of its history³ since Luigi Pernier discovered it in 1908⁴ in order to explicate the cryptanalytic methods with which I attacked it and with which, I believe, I attained some measure of success. Even for those who are not familiar with the disk a glance at Plates 2 and 3 will obviate the need for much description,⁵ and I can recommend to them the interesting and easily available remarks of John Chadwick.⁶ However, I shall make a few comments myself.

1. The disk was found at Phaistos in a Middle Minoan IIIb context, but the excavator deduced that it might have fallen from a higher level, so that the tendency now is to date it somewhat later, and Spyridon Marinatos, in the latest word on the subject, dates it "after 1600 B.C."⁷ This I consider to be the *terminus ante quem* for the disk from the strictest point of view. How much earlier it should be dated, it is impossible to say. The earliness of its date makes this "most remarkable of all inscriptions found in Crete"⁸ even more surprising for being "a remarkable anticipation of the invention of engraving and printing."⁹ The writing was stamped in the soft clay from movable pictographic type.

2. It may be that this startling anticipation of the use of movable type and rubber stamps has blinded investigators to a far more important point for the analysis and solution of the writing method: *the difficulty inherent therein*.¹⁰ Whatever we may say in derogation of the methods of writing used in Linear B and on the *ŷēson* tablet of Enkomi,¹¹ they are, relatively speaking, models of "economy, economy of time and energy and space,"¹² when compared with that of the disk. For here we have a cumbersome method, one which must have been extremely slow and exasperating. With modern efficient methods one might be able to devise a system whereby the finding, pressing, and returning of each sign could be speeded up considerably, but even modern ingenuity could not without machines make the use of a piece of type for each

sign practical as compared with the drawing of a simple sign with a writing instrument.¹³


At a time when each sign still had to be an accurate picture carefully drawn it might have seemed a clever idea to use dies prepared by a master artist. Once it was recognized that the pictures could be simplified, as in the linear scripts, and that all signs could be rapidly made with a single writing instrument, the use of the older, more cumbersome system would have tended to die out. We are not here faced with a new method like the alphabet, which made all previous writing skill valueless upon its adoption. Since the experience and skill in writing and reading a syllabary would carry over from one syllabic method to another, and since, once commerce was engaged in, every professional scribe would have had to be able to read and write a number of syllabaries, we need not assume the resistance to the new method which may have been offered to the alphabet, as apparently it was on Cyprus. We are, I am sure, dealing with a more primitive writing system, much earlier, at least in its origin, than Linear B.

3. The total number of different symbols represented on the disk is forty-six, of which forty-five are pictorial signs stamped into the clay and one is a "maverick": a slanting line or reverse solidus inscribed with a stylus. When, after reviewing earlier work, I decided that my attempt at solution must begin the work anew, I arranged the signs in what I considered to be a good systematic order and numbered them in that order, as shown in Figure 1. Except where random labels are used in the cryptanalytic portion of this paper,¹⁴ signs will be referred to by these numbers. An obelisk (†) will be used as a distinguishing mark both with these numbers and with the random labels when they occur in connected text.

Figure 1 shows the signs numbered from one to forty-seven. The extra number is due to the assignment of two numbers, †27 and †28, to occurrences of the same sign which were quite obviously made by two different dies.¹⁵ Because I had instinctively assumed that all examples of a single sign were made by one and the same die,¹⁶ the only possible conclusion upon finding similar signs surely made by different dies was that we were dealing with two signs. Once it became certain that different dies could be used for the same sign and demonstrably were so used,¹⁷ it could be deduced, and it became probable after my cryptanalytic study, that I had allotted the two numbers †27 and †28 to a single sign.¹⁸ Not till I obtained *Crete and Mycenae*, however, did I find the visual evidence in the large, clear photograph¹⁹ that only one sign was involved.²⁰



PLATE 1. Side A. The sign-groups of the Phaistos Disk arranged in rows for easy reference. The double line indicates the end of a coil. (Photograph from Christian Zervos, *L'art de la Crète*; see note 5 below.)



Photograph: Max Hirmer

Iraklion Museum

PLATE 2. Phaistos Disk. Side A.



Photograph: Max Hirmer

Iraklion Museum

PLATE 3. Phaistos Disk. Side B.



PLATE 4. Side B. See Plate I.

CLEARING OF THE DEBRIS

4. Work done previously on the disk may perhaps not be better appraised, nor more succinctly, than by quoting the verdict of one authority, Johannes Friedrich: "... decipherment has been attempted several times ..., but always unsuccessfully, even though some attempts — like the most recent one by E. Schertel — donned the scientific trappings of a *mathematical method*, operating with frequency curves for the various symbols."²¹ This appraisal was made before Benjamin Schwartz made his recent attempt to decipher the disk and his claim, substantiated only by his lack of results, that he had succeeded.²² Friedrich's verdict may be extended to include that work too. I shall continue to refer to it, however, but principally to point out important errors of method, since it represents a dangerous type of misleading scholarship with its cryptanalytic methods, inexpertly used, and with its plausibility combined with a determined attempt to prevail over the unwary or inexperienced reader and even to coerce acceptance. The experienced cryptanalyst will not be deceived, and it would be interesting to analyze Schwartz's work step by step, but for reasons of space this cannot be done. To corroborate what I have said, therefore, and to indicate the emptiness of the whole, I shall point out a few glaring instances of lack of substance which invalidate either the methods or the results, or both.

5. Beginning with his attempt to prove the direction of writing which he had decided upon (right to left), I am reminded of two sentences of T. V. Buttrey, appraising a totally different kind of work, which, *mutatis mutandis*, could apply to the articles under discussion: "The complexity of both material and argument overwhelm the reader, and they give the work a circumstantial air. But if one is willing to check references and calculations, the results are disheartening."²³ Schwartz's only proof of direction of writing is that it "is guaranteed by several instances of overcutting."²⁴ If the direction is from right to left, outer coil to inner, this means that the right side of the figure on the left must obviously cross over the left side of the figure on the right. To be proof it must be obvious which lines cross or blot out which; lines which merely approach or touch each other or even coincide cannot help us. Doubtful cases are worthless; how deceptive photographs can be may easily be seen by comparing Plates 1 and 4 with 2 and 3 respectively. Once Schwartz gives as this proof "Face A, Groups 5, 14, 17,"²⁵ which by my numbering system²⁶ are A 4.8; 3.8, 5. When he repeats this proof he gives the references as "Face A 5, 17, 20, 26, 29 and
















































1		S+	13		BE	25		TE	37		XA
2		SA	14		GE	26		NI	38		XE
3		JE	15		WA	27 = 28		GA	39		CA
4		SE	16		RE	28		GA	40		DA
5		FE	17		HE	29		HA	41		MA
6		JA	18		RA	30		IA	42		LE
7		ZE	19		PE	31		NA	43		QA
8		DE	20		ZA	32		NE	44		YI
9		PA	21		ME	33		KE	45		YE
10		BA	22		KA	34		CE	46		YA
11		BI	23		FA	35		VE	47		LA
12		VA	24		QE	36		TA			

FIG. 1. The signary of the Phaistos Disk arranged in numerical order, with the random values used in the cryptanalysis (see §37 below). These values are *absolutely meaningless*.

TABLE I

Random values and numerical equivalents
in alphabetic order*

BA	10	FE	5	KA	22	NI	26	SA	2	XA	37
BE	13	GA	28	KE	33	PA	9	SE	4	XE	38
BI	11	GE	14	LA	47	PE	19	TA	36	YA	46
CA	39	HA	29	LE	42	QA	43	TE	25	YE	45
CE	34	HE	17	MA	41	QE	24	VA	12	YI	44
DA	40	IA	30	ME	21	RA	18	VE	35	ZA	20
DE	8	JA	6	NA	31	RE	16	WA	15	ZE	7
FA	23	JE	3	NE	32	S+	1				

* See Figure 1.

Face B 28,"²⁷ equivalent to my A 4.8; 3.5, 2; 2.2; 1.3; B 1.3. It is obvious that his overcuttings do not stay put.

6. In A 3.5 the two instances of †18 may seem at first glance to overlap fractionally, but they do not. Careful study of the photographs under a magnifying glass shows that the left front leg of the hide on the right did not print in its entirety. In the Hirmer photograph there is a scratch or mark in the clay which makes the leg seem longer than it is; in the Zervos photograph this line *is not there*. Careful measurement of this leg in all occurrences shows that it is not as long as the scratch makes it seem. There is no evidence here for either direction of writing. In A 3.8 there is no question that the left margin of the same leg of †18 coincides with the right margin of †22. I have studied the photographs in both *Crete and Mycenae* and Zervos.²⁸ The coincidence is so perfect that it is not possible to determine which figure overcuts which, and a decision one way or the other would be a product of the imagination. This group cannot be used as evidence for direction of writing either. Yet these two groups provide the only doubtful cases; all the other references leave no room for doubt.

7. A 4.8 furnishes us with our only obvious case of overcutting. The left side of †33 clearly overcuts and blots out a piece of the right side of †44, and the left end of the crest of †43 cuts across the line of the right side of the circle. This has been part of my evidence that the direction of writing was from left to right. The only actual "proof" in all his references "proves" the opposite direction of writing from the one in which Schwartz persevered!²⁹ A 3.2 contains no possibility of

overcutting; all signs are well spaced.³⁰ In A 2.2 the crest of †43 comes close to †33, and in A 1.3 the two instances of †18 come close to each other, but in neither case do the two signs actually make contact. There is therefore no possibility of overcutting. Of B 1.3 Schwartz says, "[Face B 28] shows almost the entire lower half of a sign obliterated by the following sign."³¹ That is simply not true; none of the signs even touch. Nor is there any possibility of an error: there is not a single instance of the sort of thing Schwartz describes on either side of the disk!

8. Making a frequency study was perfectly in keeping with standard cryptanalytic practice, and no one should quarrel with Schwartz because he was keen enough to see that a relationship was possible between the shapes of the signs on the disk and those in Linear B. But any experienced cryptanalyst would have known that with so small an amount of material it would be impossible actually to label the signs by means of the frequency study. And Schwartz seems to ignore the fact that many of the figures show equally good resemblances to several Linear B signs. It would not be possible to assign values to the pictograms and get a start on solution without some technique of limiting the values of each sign more severely than can be done by the methods mentioned.³² Schwartz begins by assigning the value *a* to †43 on the basis of resemblance and frequency, a good experimental assumption³³ and the one I would have made under the same circumstances. But instead of recognizing that he has only an experimental assumption, for he has as yet proved nothing, and without attempting to prove either his new assumption or anything else, he says, "We now have one *sure* entry into the disk."³⁴ On the basis of this one unproved assumption he goes on to say, "It does mean that a genetic relationship exists between the writing of the disk and that of the linear scripts." He then makes a large number of additional assignments of values on the basis of resemblance and frequency, or even on the basis of only one of these, and still without attempting to prove a single assumption says, "With so many *sure* identifications following upon the heels of our *sure* entry, coincidence can *safely* be ruled out."³⁵ He makes this fatal mistake throughout the rest of what he calls his "solution": he accepts every assumption as automatically proved. It became obvious at this point that any further work on his part would be worthless, for any errors made at the beginning of a "solution" lead to an ever-widening circle of errors. It is an elementary rule in cryptanalysis that assumptions are made to test — and throw out.³⁶

9. None of the foregoing would make any essential difference if the

final results obtained by means of the "decipherment" were such as virtually to prove that a valid solution had been effected. I have studied the results and find that their value adds up to zero.³⁷ In other words, I believe that the chance of obtaining such results from about two hundred and forty random running signs by the deliberate assignment of values is one in one. Limitations of space make it impossible to analyze the results in detail, but anyone may judge their sense or nonsense for himself from the translation,³⁸ and perhaps a knowledge of the spelling rules of Linear B and an acquaintance with Homeric and classical Greek would be sufficient to make the test I described in connection with my work on the Enkomi tablet.³⁹

10. Since Schwartz's purported solution appeared before I had made a successful entry into the disk, it became a necessary step in my own study either to prove or disprove it. This disproof, albeit selectively shortened, also was, I felt, a necessary part of this paper, before a convincing demonstration of my own methods and results could become possible.

THE WRITING TECHNIQUE

11. There has been a predisposition to assume that the writing of the Phaistos Disk is to be read from the outside circle inward, clockwise, from right to left.⁴⁰ I was not immune to this predisposition and was encouraged to adhere to it when the frequency study of the signs prepared for both directions showed an immediate and obvious possibility for the syllable *a*, on the assumption of a language related to Greek, only if the text were read from right to left. After reviewing earlier work done on the Phaistos Disk, I knew that any attempt at solution must begin from scratch, and after my study of Schwartz's work, I was more convinced of that than ever. The predisposition, however, did not have to await this decision; in addition to obtaining an inkling that the direction of writing was from left to right from my study of the use of the solidus (†),⁴¹ I soon detected a paradox. The consensus of opinion was that the disk was unique; nothing resembling it had been found anywhere.⁴² How then could the direction of writing be known? Obviously nothing could be known about the disk except what one learned by studying the disk itself or reproductions of it. We cannot approach our study with preconceived notions; we must begin with the assumption that we know absolutely nothing about the writing on the disk.

12. With this in mind let us look at the reproductions to see whether the disk itself can give us any information.⁴³ Probably the first thing

one should notice, when he begins to study it, is the almost miraculous way in which the text was fitted to the tablet.⁴⁴ The skill of the printer, which the scribe really was when using this method of writing, is shown not only in the way the total group of words utilizes the dimensions of the whole disk, but also in the manner in which each group of signs was fitted into each space. At the outer edge the last sign (or first) on each side fits so perfectly and identically that one may well assume that the text could not have ended there. However, a study of the central words shows a perfection of fit leading to the conclusion that the writing must have begun there. Thus any evidence of direction of




FIG. 2. The drawing of the circles (see §13).

writing is nullified for there is only one possible answer to the dilemma. Not only must the scribe have known every word of the complete text he was going to print, but he must have marked off the exact space allotted for every word on a side before printing the first sign.⁴⁵

The almost perfect utilization of space still presents a problem: not even so could it have been easy. What "tricks of the trade" did the scribe use? The widest of the signs occupies approximately six times as much space as the narrowest; the words vary from two signs to seven in length. Even with knowledge of the text it could not have been fitted accurately into the space without the possibility of gauging in some manner exactly how much text and space was left at all times, and more

particularly without the possibility of contracting and expanding the space occupied by each sign and word. This would have been easy for the Linear B scribe, who could draw a sign as large or small as he wished. *But the signs of the Phaistos Disk could not be made either smaller or larger than they were.* Another means, not yet apparent, of contracting and expanding the space occupied must have been used.

13. The drawing of the lines does not show the care and skill of the printing. The circular lines are only crudely circular; the lines waver considerably and are sometimes botched and redrawn.⁴⁶ These imperfections provide clues for the scholar who studies the photographs minutely. Whatever the direction of writing, it is correct to say that




FIG. 3. The division into coils (see §14).

the text runs spirally, but a close inspection of the irregularities will show that the lines are not drawn as spirals. If the reader will look at Plate 2, guiding himself by the deictic letters in Figure 2 (b), he will see that on side A the outer circle *BA* has at one end a distinct rise, *JA*,⁴⁷ which may seem at first glance to have been caused by mere carelessness, for it gains nothing for the space below and considerably curtails the space above. However, if he will look at both ends, sighting from *A* to *B*, the reason for the rise, *JA*, should become apparent. The poorly drawn circle begun at *B* had to bend when it reached *J*: if the circle were completed, *JA* extended must meet *B*.⁴⁸ Without the rise, *JA*, drawn concentric with the rim and extended, would miss *B* by a substantial distance.

With the understanding that the outer circle on each side was drawn counterclockwise from *B* to *A*, it is easy to explain why *JA* was drawn so as to curtail the space above on side *A* and why sharp angles were formed at the junctures *B* and *D*. There was no curtailment of space above *JA* when it was drawn because the circle *DC* and the extension *CB* were not yet there. The sharp angle at *B* guarantees that; for, as shown in Figure 2 (*a*), first *BA* was drawn, then *DC*, which instead of turning to meet itself at *D* was extended in a slanting direction to meet the first circle, as demonstrated by the dotted line *CB*. These "straight" lines joining two circles make it possible for the text to be printed in a spiral. *FE* is similarly extended by *ED* to join *DC* at *D* and in effect we end up with Figure 2 (*b*),⁴⁹ with which the reader should compare the drawing of the lines of sides *A* and *B* in Figure 3.

14. We have thus learned from our study of the disk (1) that the outer circles were drawn first, and (2) that the circles were drawn counterclockwise. We can now take up the division into individual coils shown in Figure 3. It is not arbitrary on my part, as I intend to demonstrate, but something of which the scribe was fully conscious and which was an important part of his technique. This division is therefore the logical one to use in devising a relatively simple means of referring to the individual sign-groups of this tablet, for which a truly simple method of reference is impossible. I have numbered the coils from the center, coil 1, to the outermost, coil 4. Each of the words within a coil is numbered consecutively from left to right, counterclockwise. Thus the reference B 2.3,5 means side B, coil 2, words 3 and 5. The numbers of the coils are shown in Figure 3.

15. The sharp angles at *D* and *B* do not represent carelessness; they are a deliberate part of the writing technique marking off the division into coils. To prove this it is merely necessary to count the number of words in each coil on both sides. We have said that the scribe must have marked off all spaces on a side before printing⁵⁰ without deducing the techniques adopted for perfect utilization of space. Here we have one important device. He apportioned its exact share of words to every coil, adding three words for each succeeding turn. He knew by experience exactly what size clay disk to prepare for text of a particular length; he knew every word beforehand and the exact length of the text in number of words. The trick is clearly demonstrated on this disk. On each side coil 4 has exactly twelve words, coil 3 nine, coil 2 six, and coil 1 the remainder, three on side B and four on side A. The central portion allowed a greater amount of manipulation, and it was there

that an excess or deficiency of words could best be handled and that the extra word of side A was inserted.

16. However, a certain amount of mystery remains. When we count the number of signs per coil we do not obtain the exactness we did in the number of words, but on each side coil 4 has approximately forty-eight signs, coil 3 approximately thirty-six, coil 2 approximately twenty-four, and coil 1 the remainder. To find that an exact number of words is allotted to each coil is not beyond expectation; to find that an almost exact number of signs is allotted to each coil is equally within reason. To find both of these phenomena simultaneously staggers the imagination. Fortunately we have the possibility of a simple test of the likelihood of this as an accidental coincidence. In the *Jēson* tablet every line has exactly five words,⁵¹ and the words vary in length considerably less than on the disk: with one apparent exception, from two to five signs as compared with from two to seven. It would be more likely, therefore, that the lines would always have the same number of signs than that a certain number of words on the disk should always have the same number of pictograms. Instead we find a tremendous variation in lines 1-20, of which we know the length of every line.⁵² The longest line is approximately forty per cent longer than the shortest line, the number of signs per line varies from thirteen to eighteen, and no two consecutive lines have an identical number of signs.⁵³ Comparison of the variation in the *Jēson* tablet with the consistency in the disk leaves no room for doubt: the consistency could not have happened entirely by accident.

17. I do not mean to imply that the scribe deliberately tried to insert an exact number of signs into each coil. The average width of the signs merely lent itself to the inclusion of a certain number *in a given amount of space*. To have worked with a knowledge of every sign to be used and their total number would *not* have been practical; to have worked with a knowledge of the whole text and the total number of words would have been. The scribe allotted an exact number of words to each coil, but he had to use some trick *to make them fit into the space*. By this means he controlled the *approximate* number of signs. He was not himself interested in the *number* — that was accidental; he was concerned only with making the words fit. His device, as I suggested,⁵⁴ was a means of controlling the amount of space occupied by the words, but we may add that it also controlled the approximate number of signs.

18. Because of the varying amount of space and of curve between the circular lines it is not feasible to measure accurately the space left

in each case for a word of a certain number of signs. It is nevertheless possible by measuring to see that the scribe was usually consistent in the amount of space he left for words of two signs or three, or of any particular number, and to recognize that in some cases he left a space larger or smaller than usual for the number of signs involved.⁵⁵ The width of the signs to be used in the particular word was *not* a criterion; the consistency on the basis of the number of signs is too great. This is important in answering the question whether the scribe considered in advance the number of signs he would use in spelling a particular word at a particular point: he did. The answer will become important when I show that words definitely could be spelled with a varying number of signs.⁵⁶

At the end of coil 3 on side B the scribe found himself left with one five-sign word (reading from left to right) and a space large enough for seven signs. Since it was the end of the coil, he marked off the whole space and filled it by using two very wide signs and spreading a little. On the basis of the allotment of an exact number of words per coil and the assumption of a left-to-right direction, this explanation makes sense, as does the fact that, finding himself at approximately the same place on side A with two words and eight signs, the scribe crowded both words and the eight signs into scarcely any more space than that used for the five signs, and ended coil 3 at exactly the same spot as on side B. It would be unreasonable to assume that the direction was right to left and that on one side the scribe crowded the *beginning* of the coil unduly and on the other side, again at the *beginning* of the coil, he spread the first word for no reason at all in a manner not to be found anywhere else on either side of the tablet. On the basis of measurements of the space allotted to each sign-group, we have here definite evidence that the direction of writing was from left to right.

19. There must of necessity be an element of unfairness to the reader as the cryptanalyst or investigator unfolds the solution of his problem step by step, making his deductions on the basis of each step. In actual practice he is aware simultaneously of several different threads of evidence which cannot really be separated from each other because each throws some light on the others. Yet it would be extremely difficult for him to explain his results except by describing one step at a time; and it is impossible to describe the light thrown on the problem by the interacting of the different kinds of evidence in such a way that he cannot himself know whence his knowledge originally came. I have been aware of this unfairness as I prepared the preceding pages: the deductions I have been making so facilely would have been much

more difficult without the light thrown on them by concurrent facets of the investigation. I must therefore intrude a paragraph that more properly belongs in the discussion of the decipherment.

Four repeated words throw light on the problem of space control. They will be listed in full with complete references below⁵⁷ but may be represented here by means of the random labels without the added or changing endings as:

KE-FE-XE	KE-NE-JA	KE-BE-ZA	KE-DE-ZA
PE-FE-XE	PE-NE-JA	PE-BE-ZA	PE-DE-ZA
/-FE-XE	/-NE-JA		

where †KE is used for †33, †PE for †19, and / for the solidus, †1. If we read from left to right it is obvious that †KE and †PE may be assumed⁵⁸ to be interchangeable. In that case the solidus (/) is interchangeable with either †KE or †PE. Alternative spellings therefore represented at least two methods whereby the scribe could contract or expand the space required by a word, for duplicate signs may vary considerably in size, and since the solidus does not occupy a space of its own, we see that at least one method was provided for contracting or expanding a word the width of a sign. We may now assume that alternative spellings were an important part of the writing technique.⁵⁹

20. Continuing our study of the disk, we may easily corroborate the inscribing of the circular lines *before* the printing of the symbols, for the lines were not drawn so as to avoid the end of a sign pressed slightly out of alignment, although such avoidance would not have been in the least difficult. There are a number of clear cases of signs stamped over the inscribed line.⁶⁰ There is less evidence for the word-dividers because each sign-group was very carefully placed within the two dividers. In A 2.6, †43 clearly shows that the crossing divider was inscribed before the printing of the sign, but this is important only if we read from left to right. In B 1.3 the nose of †43 cuts both the circular line and the vertical line below at the end of B 2.6, proving that all the word-dividers were inscribed before any of the printing was done, but again on the assumption that the writing was from left to right. Also in B 1.3 the tops of the heads of †47 and †43 apparently blotted out parts of the original word-divider, which was then partially erased and reinscribed. Then the top of the woman's head was redrawn with the point of a stylus.⁶¹ This additional evidence of a word-divider drawn before the printing is again meaningful on the same assumption. Some apparent evidence may be found that the dividers were inscribed after

the engraving at angles forced by the signs,⁶² but if this were so, the lines would form a variety of angles above and below. One cannot study them, however, without realizing that a constant attempt was made to draw them in a perpendicular or radial manner.

21. A study of the separate sign-groups reveals a tendency to print the signs of a single space in a straight line with little regard to its curvature, and with a *gradual* curve when necessary. A good example may be studied in A 2.4-6. Surely the scribe usually turned the disk so that the space was directly before himself and tended to avoid turning it during the printing of a word, and when necessary, to turn it only slightly. The straight line within a word often necessitated a sharp turn of the disk at the end so that the next group could be printed similarly, as may be seen from the juncture of A 2.3 and 4, A 2.6 and 3.1, A 3.9 and 4.1, B 1.3 and 2.1, B 3.6 and 7, and B 3.9 and 4.1. The majority of these sharp turns are found at the beginning of a coil, and this may possibly be additional evidence that the scribe was conscious of these division points and that my cutting of the entire helix into separate segments was not arbitrary.

22. If the reader will look at the juncture of B 2.6 and 3.1, he will see that the sharp turn of the disk usually found at the beginning of a coil is one sign displaced. The first symbol of 3.1, †35, is included in the straight line formed by 2.6. If we read from right to left the sharp turn at †35 in conflict with standard operating procedure is quite unnecessary and completely illogical. The whole of 3.1 could have been printed in a straight line including †35, and †1 could have been incised underneath †35 in the usual manner. Reading from left to right we can readily see what happened. Because it was possible to continue the straight line of 2.6 the scribe placed †35 prior to turning the clay, whether deliberately or carelessly, and then found it necessary to make one of the sharpest turns on the disk in order to continue in his normal fashion. The scribe's action makes sense reading from left to right only.

The same type of thing is done only once more. In B 1.2, reading from right to left, we find †10 turned far more than necessary, contrary to the scribe's usual method of gradual turning within a sign-group. To read †22 in its customary position one must then make an additional turn of more than a right angle. Yet it would not have been in the least necessary for the scribe to do this were he working from right to left. †22 could have been punched parallel to †10. With the photograph turned toward the reader so that B 1.2 is right side up †22 is almost upside down. If we now turn the photograph for B 1.1 and read from

left to right, we may readily see that the scribe merely continued the straight line begun by 1.1 in adding †22. The sharp turn for †10 then becomes the minimum necessary to continue and that from †10 to †39 becomes logical for †39 and †40. On this evidence we must conclude that the printing was done from the center outward, left to right.

23. I have already explained the impossibility of presenting this study in chronological order.⁶³ In actual practice, when I began to seek evidence for the direction of writing from the disk itself, I was able to find something within minutes which made possible the deduction that the writing must have been done from left to right and that the inscribing of the lines must have preceded the printing. At the end of A 1.3 the signs †33 and †43 were turned so as to crowd them into a space not quite large enough for the two imprinted in the regular manner. Nothing like this appears elsewhere; in only one other place, A 4.8-9, is any exaggerated crowding necessary. If †43 had been printed right side up I might have guessed that †33 had been accidentally omitted and added later.⁶⁴ The deliberate turning of †43, seen nowhere else on the disk, showed that both signs were crowded to save space. This theory was corroborated also by the two †18's, not only crowded together but even turned upside down apparently to save space.⁶⁵ Obviously we had here a case of crowding due to insufficient space *for the completion of the word*, forcing the assumption that the word-dividers had been incised before the printing. We have all had the experience in writing of finding ourselves short of space and of having to crowd. Whatever method of crowding is used, one thing is certain: *the crowding comes at the end*. The two signs in A 1.3 turned at almost a ninety-degree angle and crowded into a space too small for two represent the end of the sign-group, and the writing must be from left to right, running counterclockwise from the center to the rim. No other conclusion is possible.

We have seen that in A 2.6, †43 came too close to the divider; again it is at the right that this happens. In B 1.3 the scribe could have started a little to the left and had sufficient space had he been writing from right to left. If we assume left to right, it was too late to make such an adjustment, and the last two signs, †47 and †43, had to be crowded into the remaining space.⁶⁶ Both cases are therefore additional evidence of a left-to-right direction.

24. A 4.8 is the only other group exhibiting crowding at the end of a word, but since correction of an error was responsible, it must be dismissed as far as this type of evidence is concerned. The last two signs were omitted both in the marking off of the spaces and in the

printing. To make the correction, an erasure, obvious in the photograph, was necessary. Fortunately the original line is still visible after †44; the measurement study ⁶⁷ showed that the space would have been correct for three signs. The two missing signs were then crowded in, giving us our only obvious case of overcutting and its evidence that the direction of writing was from left to right, since the right-hand sign in each case overcut the left-hand sign.⁶⁸

We have noted that the dividers were drawn perpendicularly. The restamping of A 4.9 and the slanting lines added in whatever fashion was possible thus emphasize the error and its correction, and since 4.9 is to the right of 4.8, the left-to-right direction. That the writing moves from left to right is also indicated by the curving of the divider *after* A 4.9 around the last sign to give it clearance.⁶⁹

25. Even after I had obtained a fairly clear understanding of the writing technique, one point continued to trouble me. However carefully the spaces may have been apportioned, with the considerable disparity in the width of the signs, if the scribe simply found and printed the signs one after another, he should frequently have discovered when it was too late that the signs had occupied more space than expected. There would have been a considerable amount of crowding of the ends of words or of the last sign, or a slight overcutting of the word-divider. Yet we have found only one instance of a crowded word, A 1.3, and only one, A 2.6, of a last sign touching the divider. Such accuracy did not seem likely without some method or device for controlling it. Could the device of alternative spellings, already demonstrated,⁷⁰ also have been used as the means of obtaining this accuracy? I thought not — unless the *exact* space actually required for the very signs to be used for a word in its entirety could be ascertained before the first sign was printed. With every sign actually selected for the spelling the scribe could determine without printing whether the word would fit properly into the space allotted for it. If not, there was the possibility of changing the number of signs, and also of exchanging narrower or wider signs of the same or similar value for each other. That seemed the logical explanation of the scribe's skill on this point: all the signs for a word were selected before the first was actually printed.

26. One flaw, however, remained: certain words contained the same sign twice. Did the scribe collect all the signs necessary and estimate the amount of space needed for the second printing of the repeated pictogram? Possibly so, but I was not satisfied. The very simple, perhaps obvious thought finally occurred to me, which solved this

problem, proved my assumption, and was to be extremely important for the solution. The scribe had available more than one die of each sign! When there were two instances of the same sign in one word, different stamps were used to print them. The same sign, the same value, the same syllable was never printed twice in one word with the same die or stamp.

27. Fortunately it was unnecessary to attempt the impossible task of distinguishing between all cases of the use of different types or dies for the same sign. No one could ever determine how many different dies were actually used on the disk for a single sign. Variations in the soft clay caused by pressure and irregularities in the surface of the disk may have made two impressions of the same type look different. One impression might be deep, another shallow; one even, another uneven. Every such difference might give the effect of a change of die. However, all that was at first needed was to find any pair of occurrences of a sign, visual study of which showed that they were unquestionably made by different types. One perfect example of such a pair was my (original) †27 and †28, already discussed,⁷¹ since I had labeled them as two signs because the use of more than one type had been obvious.⁷²

28. To remove the possibility of one or two exceptions we must consider several sure examples of the use of different dies for the same sign. The best method is to study the details separately: such as, protrusions, angles, sizes, inner lines, of signs printed where nothing can be detected which might have caused distortion of shape. When one instance of a sign shows a defect which another does not, finding more than one occurrence with the same defect carries additional conviction. A good example of the latter is †33, of which there is more than one occurrence that is well rounded, and more than one with a flattened side.⁷³ How many different dies were involved it would be impossible to say, but the reader should note a third type with a special defect to be found in A 2.5 and 4.111. An excellent possibility for the study of details is to be found in the examples of †43 in A 3.5 and 3.6, where it is easy to move back and forth between the two signs with a magnifying glass. The reader should note the contrasting noses, the more pointed ends of the plume in A 3.5, the greater dip in the plume at the bottom of the sixth ridge from the right in 3.6, and the last ridge of the plume at the left, which goes straight and complete to the head in 3.6, but is incomplete and runs into the thirteenth ridge in 3.5. For further evidence a study might be made of the occurrences of †23⁷⁴ and of the squarish top of †10, which is definitely more of a rectangle in some cases.⁷⁵ Other signs may be studied with similar results, but this is

sufficient to show that the use of different types for a single pictogram was a regular practice.⁷⁶

29. Of greater significance for the decipherment and for judging its validity was the standard practice of using different dies for signs repeated within the same word. To the best of my ability to observe and judge, every time the same sign occurs twice in one word, duplicate dies were used. In A 1.3, 2.5, and 3.5, †18 is used twice. A detailed study of the separate parts of the hide, angles, widths, lengths, and general shapes, shows conclusively that each of the pairs was made with two different dies. In A 4.9 the two examples of †40 were obviously made by different types, for every detail is different in the two stampings. In B 2.4, since there is some evidence of damage, we must not make a positive statement, but the two occurrences of †32 look different and were probably made with two dies. In B 3.9, †20 may seem to have been made with the same type in both instances, but minute analysis shows valid internal differences. The reader should note, for example, the two fine vertical lines in the center of the dome, which spread at the top in the sign on the left but draw together in the one on the right. In the right-hand sign the right vertical slants slightly to the right and seems to be continued at the same slant in the two sections below. This vertical in the left-hand sign gives the appearance of three straight lines moved a little to the right in each lower section. The same die cannot have been used for the two stampings of †20.⁷⁷

30. It was standard practice, therefore, to use different dies for the repeated occurrences of a pictogram within a single word, and the flaw has been removed from our theory. All the signs for a word were selected before the first was actually printed, and this device was the control used by the scribe in fitting each word properly to its allotted space. It follows that our assumptions concerning alternative signs and spellings have received strong corroboration.⁷⁸ We are justified therefore in feeling that we *know* rather than merely assume, before we begin our decipherment, the following points which are very important for solution. (1) the writing must be read counterclockwise from the center spirally outward to the rim, from left to right.⁷⁹ (2) The same value is not printed twice in one word with the same die.⁸⁰ (3) We must expect to find alternative spellings making use of interchangeable signs and even varying the number of signs used.⁸¹ It is important for the reader to understand that I had made these assumptions and had found much of the evidence already described before I definitely assigned a single value; that is, before I limited a single sign to a one-and-one-only value in my last attempt at decipherment.

PRELIMINARY CRYPTANALYSIS

31. For the most part the methods used in this decipherment of the signary represented by the Phaistos Disk were those of cryptanalysis.⁸² Cryptanalysis is basically a study of coincidences to eliminate those which are the result of mere chance and to interpret those which are not accidental. The process of cryptanalysis is one of making assumptions and discarding those which do not produce a greater number of coincidences than may be attributable to mere accident. The rest of this article will be a discussion of such assumptions and a study of the coincidences obtained. I should particularly like the reader to note that the assignment of a specific value to a symbol is an assumption like any other, and that the obtaining of a Mycenaean Greek word spelled exactly as expected and fitting excellently in context is a coincidence.

32. To describe all my earlier assumptions and experiments, all the attempted steps which failed, would be futile; but I cannot omit all the steps preceding success. Some work with erroneous assumptions produced hidden or not immediately recognizable gains, such as the possibility that there might be no open-vowel row as well as no labio-velar row, assumptions later made with decisive results. It was logical enough to consider a language related to Greek and a syllabary comparable to Linear B as a possible assumption in view of the apparent provenience of the disk. But even if we assumed this and our assumption was correct, because of the scant amount of material the possibility of beginning a solution seemed to be very slight. The main difficulty of beginning a decipherment is that of limiting the possible values of a sufficient number of symbols to the point where coincidences become meaningful. In working with an elastic syllabary comparable to Linear B it is extremely difficult to obtain significant coincidences until one has found a satisfactory method of limiting a certain number of signs to a single value each. Even when they have been limited as they already have in Linear B, we can still find words spelled exactly as expected on the basis of extant Greek which are the result of accidental resemblances. Such chance results must be possible whatever random values are assigned.

33. Although accurate or scientific testing is usually not possible, I have found that for practical purposes and without any attempt at scientific or statistical accuracy certain quick tests, admittedly oversimplified, are possible to show which coincidences are worth experimenting with, which are not, and which when found in sufficient

quantity by their reinforcement of each other become tantamount to proof.⁸³ To remain on the safe side we must estimate conservatively, and assume for testing purposes that our chances of obtaining an exactly spelled Greek word by accident from a two-sign group is one chance in one, $1/1$; and for a three-sign group we might try one in three, $1/3$. Not till we come to a four-sign group does an exactly spelled Greek word begin to have value. We might arbitrarily call four-, five-, and six-sign groups $1/10$, $1/25$, and $1/100$ respectively. In the case of just a few such words, their value is canceled because we are usually dealing with a considerable number of sign-groups so that by the law of averages a number of accidental words is to be expected. We must find some means of increasing the value of the coincidences. This increase may be obtained by finding the exact sort of words sought and especially convincing context.

That we do not know exactly what value to give coincidences matters little if we are conservative in our estimates: we are simplifying too much to obtain accurate results in any event. And when we are dealing with values such as $1/2$, $1/5$, or $1/10$, they are individually of slight importance. What makes them important is that to estimate the value of a group of them we must multiply, thus: $1/2 \times 1/5 \times 1/10$. So a penny has one chance in two of falling heads. The chance of its falling heads four times in a row is $1/2 \times 1/2 \times 1/2 \times 1/2$, or one chance in sixteen. It will seldom fall heads ten times in a row: $1/1024$. We have roughly one chance in a million of throwing heads twenty times in a row. To do the mathematics is not really necessary, but we must realize that a number of such fractions, because they are multiplied, will give us a large denominator.

34. Since it is well known that in Mycenaean Greek many words are found spelled in unexpected ways, why do I emphasize that the coincidences should be exactly spelled? If we are on the right track may not correct results also include such words? May not these words too be significant coincidences? Yes, they may, if we have already *proved* that we are on the right track, if only limited change is permitted, or if sufficient context has been developed to make possible striking or convincing coincidences. But we must be sure that we understand what happens when limited, partially limited, and unlimited change is permitted in the spelling of a sign-group, for the chances of obtaining coincidences may be greatly increased.

With the labels of the signs limited as in Linear B, the finding of *doelos theoiō*, "slave of the god," spelled as expected may be considered evidence of correct solution. Let us assume one chance in a hundred of

obtaining this click by accidental coincidence: $1/100$. A limited possibility of change, such as that the first syllable may be either *bo* or *do*, merely increases the chances to $2/100$. The coincidence may still be significant. But finding this phrase with one wrong syllable and assuming it to be *doelos theoio*, we are allowing an unlimited change for any one syllable. If there are sixty-five possible syllabic values, let us assume twenty-five times as many possible coincidences for each position where the error might occur. Instead of $1/100$ we have $150/100$ and the value of our coincidence as evidence is completely nullified. Similarly, if we have limited only five of the signs to a single label each (*do-e-ro* — *o-jo*), until the spelling rules and label combined permit *the-* for the missing syllable, the coincidence cannot be considered as significant. Suppose that it is obtained when each syllable has been limited to two possible labels ($2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 = 64$): sixty-four chances in one hundred means that the coincidence has been nullified. And again we should note that the exact figures used do not matter: the principle of nullification remains.

35. To make up for our necessary lack of accuracy in testing and for the amount of text, which is bound to produce a number of accidental minor coincidences, it would be well to begin with such as would very rarely happen by accident. And I should add by way of warning a First Law of Coincidences in Decipherment: any single coincidence, no matter how convincing and how unlikely to happen by chance, may be an accidental one. The failure to recognize this is a dangerous trap: it is human nature not to discard an assumption already productive of a convincing coincidence.

36. As already stated, the main difficulty of beginning the decipherment is that of limiting the values of a sufficient number of signs to the point where coincidences become meaningful. The famous grid was the method used by Ventris.⁸⁴ The probable-word method, the most useful of all cryptanalytic methods, the possibilities of which I have indicated in connection with Linear B,⁸⁵ could and would become useful after the limiting of values had been begun, but could not be of help in the original breaking of the syllabary. Two possibilities offered themselves for experimentation, although neither held much hope, for reasons which will become apparent.⁸⁶ One method was the frequency study, almost synonymous with cryptanalysis, whose possibilities no cryptanalyst would neglect. It is extremely important where large quantities of material are involved, and I have shown how by means of an original variation using the order of frequency and including the distribution of the frequencies in initial, medial, and final positions

of the individual sign-groups⁸⁷ it actually broke the syllabary in an experiment made during an independent solution of Linear B.⁸⁸ The second method was a study of the resemblances of the pictograms to the signs of Linear B. There was, however, no reason for any confidence in the latter study. Since many Linear B signs show an apparently direct relationship to the Cretan "hieroglyphs" as far as shape is concerned, it was difficult to assume more than an indirect relationship between the signs of the disk and those of Linear B. Do the Cretan hieroglyphs and the pictographs of the disk derive from a common parent? Such an assumption was unnecessary for my purposes. For the experiment it was necessary merely to assume that the scribes took a new system of writing and gave the signs values according to real or fancied resemblances to the shapes of the signs of their former system of writing. The number of striking resemblances was too small to lend confidence even to this assumption. However, nothing better presented itself, and so I experimented with these two methods.⁸⁹

37. A cryptanalyst begins his task with the very important job of preparing worksheets, but when working with symbols he must first assign labels to them. For these labels it is standard operating procedure to use capital Roman letters. I chose them *at random*, as shown in Figure 1 and Table I, and it must be clearly understood that they are *absolutely meaningless*. I shall use an obelisk (†) with the random values when they occur in connected text just as I have with the numbers given to the signs in Figure 1. The numbers are intended to be the permanent names of the signs; I shall use the random values in Roman capitals solely for the cryptanalytic experiments. The text of the tablet was transcribed in the printed Roman characters on *quadrillé* paper, with sufficient room between the rows for the testing of concurrent sets of assumptions and the addition of any useful information, such as the numerical equivalent and frequency of each sign and the underlining of repetitions. The random text is shown in Figure 4.

The next important task was to prepare a tripictographic frequency table, a sample portion of which is shown in Table II.⁹⁰ Whoever studies this table carefully should be able to see that with its aid it is possible easily to prepare charts showing the frequencies of the individual signs, the frequency distributions in initial, medial, and final positions,⁹¹ all repetitions of two, three, or more consecutive signs, and all repeated sign-groups. With its aid he can find out without delay which symbols precede and which follow every single symbol. The importance of this worksheet in familiarizing the cryptanalyst with the behavior of every sign cannot be overrated.

Side A

Coil 1

A 1.1 CE-LE-PA
 A 1.2 YA-SA
 A 1.3 ME-JE-PE-RA-RA-KE-QA
 A 1.4 CE-LE-PA

Side B

B 1.1 NE-JA
 B 1.2 KA-BA-CA-DA
 B 1.3 NE-BA-PE-LA-QA

Coil 2

A 2.1 S + PE-QE-BA
 A 2.2 YA-SA-KE-QA
 A 2.3 KE-FE-XE
 A 2.4 QE-RE-FA-LA
 A 2.5 RA-FA-XA-VA-RA-KE-QA
 A 2.6 S + FE-XE-KE-QA

B 2.1 NE-FA-GA-MA-NA
 B 2.2 S + VE-NE-HA-DA-IA
 B 2.3 ZA-FA-BA-NE
 B 2.4 S + NE-JA-NE
 B 2.5 PE-FA-NE
 B 2.6 KA-BA-CA-RA

Coil 3

A 3.1 S + YA-BI
 A 3.2 FA-BA-PA-KA-RA-QA
 A 3.3 S + FE-XE-KE-QA
 A 3.4 BA-TA
 A 3.5 ME-JE-PE-RA-RA-KE-QA
 A 3.6 S + FE-XE-KE-QA
 A 3.7 S + YA-BI
 A 3.8 FA-BA-PA-KA-RA-QA
 A 3.9 SE-GA

B 3.1 S + VE-NE-HA-DA-IA
 B 3.2 S + NE-JA-DA
 B 3.3 SA-VE-DA
 B 3.4 S + VE-NE-HA-DA
 B 3.5 YA-RA-NA-QA
 B 3.6 TA-GA-XA-PE-LA
 B 3.7 YA-TA-DA
 B 3.8 FA-VA-WA
 B 3.9 PE-BE-ZA-ZA-DA

Coil 4

A 4.1 [[S +]]CE-BA-XA-KE-QA
 A 4.2 NE-DE-ZE-YA
 A 4.3 PE-QE-ZE-KE-QA
 A 4.4 PE-FE-XE
 A 4.5 [.]FA-LA-KE-QA
 A 4.6 [S +]VE-TE-RA
 A 4.7 KE-NE-JA-RA
 A 4.8 TA-DE-YI-KE-QA
 A 4.9 CA-DA-DA
 A 4.10 S + NE-JA-DA
 A 4.11 KE-DE-ZA
 A 4.12 S + FA-YA-SA-KE-QA

B 4.1 YA-CE-KA-RA
 B 4.2 DE-HA-FE-QA
 B 4.3 PE-DE-ZA-NE
 B 4.4 KA-GE-JE-IA
 B 4.5 FA-YA-SA-NE-HE
 B 4.6 TA-GA-YA-SA
 B 4.7 S + NI-FA-BA-WA
 B 4.8 KE-BE-ZA-TA
 B 4.9 RA-KA-IA
 B 4.10 S + YE-BA-JE-QA
 B 4.11 PE-NE-JA-RA
 B 4.12 NE-DE-IA-KE-QA

FIG. 4. The text of the Phaistos Disk transcribed by means of the random values of Table I. These values are *absolutely meaningless*. (Sample reference: A 4.3 = side A, coil 4, word 3.)

TABLE II

Tripectographic frequency distribution*

RA	YA	FA	PE	BA	DA
KA QA	FA SA	BA	JE RA	TA	CA DA
KA QA	FA SA	BA	JE RA	CE XA	DA
CA	ZE	VA	BA LA	FA PA	CA
JA	GA SA	S+ YA	BE	FA PA	JA
PE RA	S+ BI	YA	DE	FA WA	JA
PE RA	S+ BI	NI BA	FA	KA CA	ZA
RA KE	CE	NE GA	FE	KA CA	VE
RA KE	RA	PE NE	NE	NE PE	HA
JA	SA	RE LA	S+ QE	QE	HA IA
FA	SA	RA XA	QE	YE JE	HA IA
KA	TA	?? LA	XA LA	FA NE	TA
VA KE		ZA BA			
KA					
YA NA					
TE					

* Only a small portion of the complete table (46 columns) is shown. The heading of each column represents the middle sign. The left side shows each preceding sign; the right, each following. Initial occurrences are shown by blanks on the left; final, on the right.

38. For so small an amount of material it is impossible to assign values on the basis of a study of frequencies and frequency distributions. To make such a study, however, may prove of some value because it may show possibilities, whether trustworthy or not, for vowels, for example, and for signs usually appearing in final position, such as *jo*, *ja*, and *que*, should the language be one comparable to Linear B.⁹² The study,⁹³ as illustrated in Figure 5 by the patterns of order of frequency of the most frequent signs, showed not a single pattern likely to be that of a vowel⁹⁴ such as Linear B *a* or *e*. On that basis I assumed that the language was *not* an early dialect of Greek and no language comparable to Greek. Afterwards the thought occurred to me that if at the time of the origin of this syllabary the use of an open-vowel row had not yet been invented by its users,⁹⁵ so that, for example,

s's, j's, or w's had to be used for open vowels, the patterns of frequency distribution for open vowels would have been destroyed by the occurrences of the same symbols as consonantal syllables. In that case an early dialect of Greek was still a possible assumption.




FIG. 5. Patterns of order of frequency (see §38 and Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," Figure 3). T=total, I=initial, M=medial, F=final.

The patterns of order of frequency, when compared with those of Greek, revealed one perfect resemblance of a high-frequency syllable, †DA (†40) to Greek *jo*. Their patterns are compared in Figure 6.⁹⁶ A single pair, although perfect, had to be dismissed as mere chance.



FIG. 6. Comparison of patterns of order of frequency (see §38 and note 96).

Although the method might prove of some help in the decipherment, the possibility of limiting the values of signs by it to the point where coincidences became meaningful scarcely existed. It is not necessary to perform the earlier test to show that mathematically it would be virtually impossible to obtain an entry into the signary by this means.

And it should be obvious that the method would be totally valueless for proof of correct decipherment,⁹⁷ and no attempt should be made to use it so.⁹⁸

39. My experiments with the resemblances to the signs of Linear B did not fare much better. There were very few, such as †KE (†33) and *qe* (Figure 7), which could be *assumed* as certain. In most cases there were two or more possible choices, and even if one of them represented a valid relationship, with resemblances which were not perfect there was no guarantee that the best was the valid one. Except for a few of the closest resemblances it seemed best to assume for testing purposes that there were five to choose from on an average. Thus when I found that †DA, already considered for *jo*, did show a certain amount of resemblance to Linear B *jo* (Figure 7), I could not consider that there



FIG. 7. Comparison of †KE (†33), †DA (†40), and †NE (†32) with Linear B signs. * represents an imaginary step drawn to point up the resemblance. †NE and *ja* illustrate a failure to find any.

was one chance in ninety⁹⁹ of obtaining the coincidence by accident, as would be the case if †KE were *qe*, but rather one in ten or twenty, a considerably diminished value. I learned from a study of the worksheets that †NE (†32) alternated in final position with †DA and seemed an excellent assumption for *ja* if †DA were assumed as *jo*. †NE showed no resemblance to Linear B *ja* (Figure 7), and against this failure to obtain a coincidence, the 1/10 or 1/20 coincidence of finding a resemblance between †DA and *jo* became meaningless. Again the assumption †DA=*jo* had to be discarded.

If there were a number of signs which could be correctly labeled by their resemblances to Linear B signs, if there were a four-sign word entirely made up of these, if the right Greek word were recognizable and worth 1/1000 (one chance in a thousand of obtaining it by accident given the elasticity of Linear B and no more), but if for each sign there were five resemblances to choose from, the possible values of the signs would not be sufficiently limited to make even such a coincidence meaningful. For each of the four syllables there would be five choices,

giving us $5 \times 5 \times 5 \times 5$ combinations or 625. $625 \times 1/1000$ gives us $625/1000$ so that even the most convincing coincidence would be nullified. Again my study showed that mathematically it would be virtually impossible to obtain an entry into the syllabary by this means.

40. When in the spring of 1960, after I had finished my work with the Enkomi tablet and had made my analysis of Schwartz's methods and results, I found myself again interested in the Phaistos Disk and began experimentation anew, I had the benefit of both my experience and results with the *Jēson* tablet. I had no plan in mind to try to decipher the signary; I merely wanted to test certain clues. Testing the resemblances between the syllabaries by a method I had used with some success while working on the Enkomi tablet, I simplified various pictograms in as many ways as possible. In working with †QA (†43), the cristate head, I obtained among other possibilities the results




FIG. 8. An experimental simplification of the cristate head by the cryptanalyst with misleading results (see §40).

illustrated in Figure 8. Starting with the pictogram (1), I have shown a possible simplification of the crest in (2), and two alternatives for the head in (3). When these results are combined we obtain (4) and (5). Those acquainted with Linear B will see that (4) and (5) together provide us with a very real coincidence. The two simplifications, similar but reversed, appear in Linear B as variants of a single sign, *jō*.¹⁰⁰ If, reading in one direction, we have a high-frequency initial sign, reading in the other, we always automatically have a high-frequency final sign. The same phenomenon, therefore, which gave Schwartz a coincidence of frequency on the basis of *a* for this sign,¹⁰¹ automatically gave me, reading from left to right, a similar coincidence for *jō*. I could not resist experimenting with the basic assumption †QA=*jō*. It turned out to be an excellent illustration of the importance of my First Law of Coincidences in Decipherment,¹⁰² and after about two weeks of experimentation I discarded it.

41. A few details of this experiment should be mentioned here. That there was no open-vowel row became a permanent assumption

during it; I also thought of the possibility that there was no labiovelar row. Both items later became important. A certain number of minor coincidences, such as possible Greek words, must always be expected. I obtained the "best" coincidence of this type I have ever come upon when working with values for the most part wrongly assigned in Linear B, the Enkomi tablet, or the disk: B 4.2-4, three consecutive words of four signs each which clicked in their own context: **khruseios* **hippia* [**i-gu-wi-ja*] **basilēwos*, "the golden chariot of the king."¹⁰³ This multiple coincidence is important for the lesson in cryptanalysis it teaches: despite it I soon discarded my basic assumption with all its "results" and began afresh.

One of the most dangerous traps is the first convincing click, for it is comparatively easy to obtain one "by chance" even with the rule that the words must be spelled exactly as expected. No matter how objectively he tries to apply his assumptions, the true cryptanalyst has a sufficient command of his material by memory to influence his assignment of values. However, as more and more values are assigned, the obtaining of "Greek" words spelled as expected becomes increasingly difficult if the preceding work has been based on error, whereas such coincidences become increasingly frequent if the cryptanalyst is on the right track. On the basis of Linear B and the *ḫēson* tablet we may formulate a general rule for the decipherment of Mycenaean syllabaries in order to avoid this trap. If in the early stages we obtain a striking coincidence in the form of exactly spelled Greek words, and if they are not accidental, we will continue to obtain a considerable number of additional words spelled as expected which seem likely on the basis of the earlier words. After "the golden chariot of the king" I did not obtain anything further which was convincing; therefore the coincidence was accidental.

42. When such a "good" click in context is not supported by further clicks, it is often possible to show mathematically that it is of slight value. On the basis mentioned earlier,¹⁰⁴ we may call each four-sign word $1/10$, the contextual click of "golden" with "chariot," $1/25$, and of "of the king" with "golden chariot," $1/100$. $1/10 \times 1/10 \times 1/10 \times 1/25 \times 1/100 = 1/2,500,000$, making the coincidence seem very significant. There are, however, roughly fifty opportunities for a three-word click on the disk: $50/2,500,000$. Honest analysis of the assigned values would show that at least two of the symbols did not have their possible values limited.¹⁰⁵ If we multiply by 25 for each of these, we have: $50/2,500,000 \times 25 \times 25 = 1/80$. The figure 80 can be reduced further, but the exact figure is unimportant: we are oversimplifying and the

figures cannot be accurate. What is important is that there are factors which may nullify the value of an "excellent" coincidence, and that by one simple mathematical test or another the cryptanalyst may expose that nullification and save himself from the trap involved.¹⁰⁶ It is not usually necessary to do the mathematics involved. But especially in the early stages the cryptanalyst should check carefully to see whether the principle of nullification applies.

THE MOMENT OF BREAKTHROUGH: FINDING THE ENCLITIC "AND"

43. Beginning afresh and bringing to bear upon the task the fruits of my study of the Enkomi signary, I found in addition to the Linear B resemblances, *more and better* ones to Enkomi signs. Consideration of resemblances to signs of the classical Cypriote signary was merely an additional step after that. I was struck by the fact that the best Linear B and Enkomi resemblances to the signs of the disk did not overlap much so that in order to experiment with one group I did not need to discard the other. I had thrown out the pair, †DA=*jo* and †NE=*ja*,




FIG. 9. Resemblances of Phaistos Disk signs (P or †) to those of the Enkomi (E), Linear B (B), and classical Cypriote (C) signaries. These abbreviations will continue to be used throughout the article. (1) illustrates valid resemblances; (2), one valid (E *u* [or *wu*]), one not (B *pa*); (3), a valid resemblance, but with a change of value.

because †NE did not resemble Linear B *ja* (Figure 7). I now noted that †NE did resemble Enkomi *ja* very markedly, as may be seen in Figure 9. The classical Cypriote signary has a number of signs easily explained on the basis of derivation from either Linear B or the Enkomi signary or both.¹⁰⁷ The majority of the signs have changed so that it is not feasible to determine the relationship, if any. A few seem entirely impossible to explain on such a basis; one such was the classical Cypriote *ja*. I now found that †NE provided an excellent explanation for it, as may be seen by studying their shapes in Figure 9. These two

coincidences added to those for †DA as *jo* strengthened the case for †DA and †NE as *jo* and *ja* respectively. I so labeled them, but it must be recognized that such labeling was merely an experimental assumption. No professional cryptanalyst would think either that he had obtained a break in the cipher or that he had proved anything.

44. In my work with Linear B and the Enkomi tablet I had found myself able by a study of the text to pick out correctly the final syllable most likely to be the enclitic *qe*, "and."¹⁰⁸ The search for it on the disk led me to the interchangeable pair, †KE (†33) and †PE (†19).¹⁰⁹ The shape of †PE was perfect for Linear B *pa*, and since that symbol had turned out to be *u* (*wu*) in the Enkomi signary, there †PE was perfect for *u* (Figure 9); †KE showed a perfect resemblance to Linear B *qe* (Figure 9). I could not, however, label †KE as *qe*, for the assumptions that it is *qe* and that we are dealing with a Greek dialect are mutually exclusive.¹¹⁰ Omitting all identically repeated sign-groups, I find †KE used medially ten times and thus ranking first in medial order of frequency. This result should be contrasted with the findings for the Mycenaean Greek of Linear B, where in a thousand different sign-groups chosen at random one would not be likely to find ten occurrences of medial *qe*. There, according to my own count of over ten thousand signs, a count including no repeated sign-groups, medial *qe* ranks as number forty-seven in order of frequency. Despite the small amount of material on the disk, to assume at the same time that the language may be a Greek dialect and that this sign of such high medial frequency may be *qe* is impossible.

45. On the disk the best candidate I had been able to find for this value was the cristate †QA, but efforts to obtain coincidences by assuming this had failed. I was led gradually, however, to the realization that side A was composed, at least in part, of a group of parallel phrases, the first six of which contained three words each. Even without knowing the meaning of the words, wherever †QA appeared, it was easy to understand the meaning "and." Experimentally the first word of each triplet could be taken as a nominative, for example, and the pair of words following as genitives or datives combined with the conjunction "and." On the basis that in most cases where I felt an "and," †QA was preceded by the same sign, †KE, I assumed again that the signary did not have a labiovelar row and that labiovelars were spelled with two symbols each. In that case not †QA, but †KE-QA had to be assumed as the enclitic "and." This assumption, that †KE-QA was the enclitic comparable to $\tau\epsilon$ or $\sigma\epsilon$ in Greek, represents the point or the moment of breakthrough. With it the coincidences which the

cryptanalyst must obtain before he may consider himself on the right track began to accumulate.

46. I tried reading the meaningless random text of side A aloud as if I understood the meanings of the words, translating all occurrences of †KE-QA as “and,” and inserting a preposition experimentally wherever I felt one, as, for example:

- 1.1-3 CELEPA for YASA and MEJEPERARA,
- 1.4-2.2 CELEPA | for SPEQEBA and YASA,
- 2.3-5 KEFESE for QEREFALA and RAFAXAVARA,
- 2.6-3.2 and SFESE | for SYABI and FABAPAKA,
- 3.3-5 and SFESE for BATA and MEJEPERARA,
- 3.6-8 and SFESE for SYABI and FABAPAKA,
- 3.9-4.3 SEGA | and CEBAXA for NEDEZEYA and PEQEZE,
- 4.4-5 PEFESE and -FALA . . .

The serious student of methods as well as the curious reader should read the above aloud until it begins to have meaning of a sort for him. Repetitions come alive, and the imaginative reason may come into play. Repetitions are the cryptanalyst’s stock in trade, from those of single letters or signs, through groupings of them, to words and phrases. Those which proved of value will be taken up later, but the reader should note that a whole phrase may be repeated (2.6-3.2 and 3.6-8) or just part of one (1.1-3 and 1.4-2.2). The latter provides an immediate coincidence, for although †MEJEPERARA is exchanged for †SPEQEBA, the change of position of †YASA from the first member of the pair to the second and the consequent shifting of the †KE-QA to it provide excellent confirmation by the internal or combinatory method that our choice of †KE-QA for enclitic “and” is a second assumption.

47. Up to this point the perfect resemblance of †KE to Linear B *qe* (Figure 9) had proved the most serious argument against assumption of a valid relationship between the shapes of the pictograms and the signs of Linear B. On the assumption that †KE was the first sign of a two-sign “*qe*,” the fact that it was *qe* and *qe* only in Linear B provided strong corroborative evidence. That this exact symbol should appear in both syllabaries is itself a coincidence. Once we accept its existence in both, the chance of the other coincidence is one in approximately ninety. The chance when the two are combined might be one in thousands, for the two are multiplied, but since we cannot estimate the value of the first let us call it only $1/2$ ($1/2 \times 1/90 = 1/180$). When in doubt our estimates to be valid should be *very* conservative.

48. I had experimented earlier with possible simplifications of †QA and I now compared these with the signs of the Linear B, Enkomi, and classical Cypriote syllabaries. There were a number of possible resemblances, the most interesting of which are shown in Figure 10. I shall indicate the syllabary to which a value belongs by an identifying letter, P for Phaistos Disk, B for Linear B, E for Enkomi, and C for classical Cypriote. An obelisk (†) will continue to identify undeciphered labels used for signs of the Phaistos Disk. Since the resemblances are not perfect I shall, as I suggested earlier, automatically assume that there are five possible equally good resemblances in each syllabary.¹¹¹ The chance of finding the resemblance I am looking for will therefore be 1/20 for Linear B, 1/10 for the Enkomi and classical Cypriote syllabaries. When there are two totally different symbols in a syllabary for the same value we should multiply by two: 2/20, 2/10.




FIG. 10. Resemblances to the experimental simplifications of †QA (†43), the crested head (see §48). * represents an imaginary step, simplification, or partial sign intended to help point out the resemblance. For CM and B *a* see note 111. See Figure 8 and for abbreviations Figure 9.

As shown in Figure 10, I found the resemblance I was looking for: E *qe*. We now have $1/180 \times 1/10 = 1/1800$. However, there were really two alternatives: the first symbol might have been E *qe* and the second B *qe*. Multiplying by two we obtain 1/900. Even such a spectacular coincidence as that, of the two symbols for the two-sign *qe*, the first virtually is B *qe* and the second resembles E *qe*, when conservatively estimated on paper, does not give astronomical results. Conservative estimating of the odds has a very sobering effect on the first intuitive tendency to assume that something cannot happen by chance because the odds against it are "astronomical."¹¹²

49. What I need, really to "prove" my assumptions to this point, is to find coincidences that point to such actual values for †KE and †QA that their combined equivalence to *qe* would be obvious. What assumption to make for †KE is not immediately apparent because we

do not know the exact state of transition of the labiovelar. But the value *we* for the second sign †QA seems to me the obvious assumption to make. We have already by assumption found the Enkomi resemblance (*qe*), but not the Linear B. If we check *we* there, we find two variants, each of which shows a resemblance to one of the simplifications I made experimentally of †QA (Figure 8 [3] and *P in Figure 10). Since two alternatives appear in Linear B, we may estimate for the first resemblance $2 \times 1/20$. The important point is that *both* alternatives appear in my simplifications of †QA, giving us another startling coincidence for which it is not possible to estimate the true odds. I can only assign $1/20$ for the second resemblance. The coincidences for †KE-QA now stand at $1/900 \times 2/20 \times 1/20$, or $1/180,000$.

One of the classical Cypriote signs whose shape could not be explained on the basis of earlier syllabaries was *ve* (Figure 10). Assuming †QA = *we*, we have an excellent explanation of the Cypriote sign, for, although C *ve* shows absolutely no resemblance to B *we*, it does to †QA. Using the estimate of $1/10$ for the resemblance we now have $1/10 \times 1/180,000$, or $1/1,800,000$. I shall not carry the mathematics any further, but it should be obvious what will happen to our figure when we obtain the evidence that †KE has a value which combined with *we* gives us an acceptable spelling for *qe*. The exact figure does not matter. Someone may discover an error on my part or make different estimates here and there. An expert in statistics might give us a different answer. But for our purposes it makes little difference whether the chance of accidental coincidence is one in ten million or one in five hundred thousand.

50. It is not usually necessary to do the mathematics. With an understanding of it, the bare facts are sufficient. By a study of the text I found two consecutive signs which together seemed to be the enclitic "and"; I assumed it and immediately found two phrases, with the word †YA-SA appearing once as the first of a pair without the enclitic, and then as the second with the enclitic, thus confirming my assumption. Next I found that the first of the two signs which, combined, equal *qe* was *qe* in Linear B. Then looking for resemblances I found that the second sign showed a satisfactory one to *qe* in the Enkomi signary. This sign showed a resemblance also in Linear B to both alternative *we*'s, the value I wanted. In addition it explained the shape of C *ve* although the latter did not resemble B *we*. The values of the individual coincidences are not great, but when a group of them is obtained their values are multiplied and together they have a very high value, which illustrates an important point: it is virtually impossible to obtain by accident a group of coincidences such as I have just described. We have

not, however, solved the syllabary yet; we have not broken it. We have not even proved the language. But we have found evidence that there is a valid relationship between the Phaistos Disk signary and three known signaries: Enkomi, Linear B, and classical Cypriote.

51. I worked from this point on with the assumption that the language was a dialect of Mycenaean Greek. With this in mind I turned to the very important problem of the reverse solidus †S+ (†ɹ), not for the first time. I had already used it successfully as a clue in my study of the writing technique,¹¹³ and I had recognized that, since it occurred at least fifteen times at the beginning of the word, decipherment of the syllabary without first deciphering it was unlikely. It is never used as other signs are: it is drawn instead of printed and appears only with an initial sign. It begins whenever possible at the bottom center of the sign and is slanted as necessary to avoid the line underneath. It must, I decided, affect the pronunciation at the beginning of the word. In what way might that have been affected? We are well acquainted with one apparently analogous use of such a symbol: the lengthwise splitting of eta and the use of the halves above the vowels as the *spiritus asper* and *lenis*, symbols originally resembling the solidus in some measure. Was an answer as simple as this possible for a problem so important it might make the difference between success and failure? Where and when did the idea of such breathing marks instead of regular letters of the alphabet originate with the Greeks? Were the later Greeks influenced by a memory and a tradition reaching back centuries into early Mycenaean syllabic writing? Were they used to the idea of attaching a mark to a sign to indicate a breathing? Or a sibilant? I did not need to assume that it was exclusively a breathing sign. In the *ḫēson* tablet of Enkomi *s* may equal *h*.¹¹⁴ I decided to assume †S+ to be *s* without a vowel,¹¹⁵ and to label it as *s*+ since it is always used with another sign, but to reconstruct it as any sibilant or aspirate.

I had assumed that there was no open-vowel row. If so, the solidus could not be used with an open vowel to indicate that the syllable began with a sibilant or aspirate. Also, if I assumed an *s*-row to exist, any *s*-sign could be used to indicate itself. What possible function could this extra sibilant serve? Clarity, in all probability, I decided. The extra sign might emphasize that a sign which could be used either as itself or as an open vowel had to be pronounced with a sibilant or aspirate. Certainly this would have made reconstruction of the word easier;¹¹⁶ it did reduce the elasticity of the syllabary.

52. We have already seen that alternative spellings were an important part of the writing technique and assumed that †S+ was interchangeable-

able with either †KE (†33) or †PE (†19).¹¹⁷ The four words involved in the latter are shown in the following list.¹¹⁸

KE-FE-XE (A 2.3)	KE-NE-JA-RA (A 4.7)
PE-FE-XE (A 4.4)	PE-NE-JA-RA (B 4.11)
S+FE-XE-KE-QA (A 2.6; 3.3, 6)	S+NE-JA-DA (A 4.10; B 3.2)
	S+NE-JA-NE (B 2.4)
KE-BE-ZA-TA (B 4.8)	KE-DE-ZA (A 4.11)
PE-BE-ZA-ZA-DA (B 3.9)	PE-DE-ZA-NE (B 4.3)

There can be no question on the basis of the repeated words that †KE and †PE are interchangeable, and since they also interchange with †S+, now labeled *s+*, but are themselves regular signs, each of the two signs, in accordance with our assumptions, *must* be labeled *s+* unknown vowel. As may be seen from the †NE-JA-group, these signs may be used with †NE=*ja* (not to be confused with †JA). In A 2.1 †S+ is used with †PE, just shown to be an *s*-sign. If †S+ does not form a separate syllable, but merely indicates that the signs, †NE in one group, and †FE in the other, are pronounced with a sibilant or aspirate, then it follows (1) that †S+ may be used with either an *s*-sound (†PE) or a *j*-sound (†NE), (2) that †KE and †PE must perform an exactly identical function in the †FE-XE- and †NE-JA-words, and therefore (3) that any *s*-sign may be used with an *s*- or *j*-sign to form a single syllable beginning with a sibilant or an aspirate. Two regular signs may therefore be used to indicate one syllable aside from consonant clusters.¹¹⁹ The addition of the *j*-sign is consistent with our earlier assumption that *s*'s, *j*'s, or *w*'s had to be used for open vowels.¹²⁰ We may also assume a corollary: every sign used initially with †S+ is probably an *s*- or *j*-sign.¹²¹ The reader is reminded that, although these assumptions are on a sound basis, all assumptions in cryptanalysis are experimental in nature and remain so until a sufficient number of coincidences have been found to corroborate them.

53. We have seen (Figure 9) that on the basis of resemblances to Linear B, †PE would be *pa*, but to the Enkomi signary, open-vowel *u*.¹²² Since all signs used with the solidus must now be tried as *s*- or *j*-syllables, and especially since we have already labeled †PE as *s+* vowel, *pa* is eliminated. It is in accord with our assumption of no open vowels to label it as *su*. The frequency of interchange of †KE and †PE — in four different words — strongly implies the identity of the two signs, and we may assume †KE also as *su*. But †KE is the sign which followed

by the value *we* replaces the Linear B enclitic *qe*, "and." This gives us for the two signs, *su-we*, or one syllable *s^ue*, as one might expect of a labiovelar in process of transition.¹²³ This enclitic comes down into later Greek with either the consonant sound *t* or *s*, as *τε* or Arcado-Cyprian *σε*.¹²⁴ We have thus found the missing coincidence mentioned earlier for †KE which further corroborates the assumption, already virtually certain, that †KE-QA equals the Mycenaean *qe*, "and."

DECIPHERMENT AND SOLUTION

54. Since I now felt certain that I had proved a valid relationship between the shapes of the signs in the four syllabaries, after a preliminary comparison of the signary of the Phaistos Disk with the others, I made the following basic assumptions. (1) Since the inventor or adapter of the Enkomi signary, starting with the Linear B signs,¹²⁵ had deliberately changed them, and possibly on occasion even ignored them, in order to obtain a systematic pattern of shapes based on the order of the *a-ba-ga*,¹²⁶ and since the shape of †PE and its apparent value seemed to offer a perfect explanation of the reason for the change from B *pa* to E *wu*,¹²⁷ I assumed that whenever I could find a shape in the signary of the disk which seemed to explain clearly the reason for an important change in shape from a Linear B sign to its Enkomi equivalent, this would be the best criterion for my experimental labeling of the Phaistos Disk sign. (2) Generally a good resemblance to an Enkomi sign would be more important than an equally good one to a Linear B sign. (3) On all counts the Enkomi tablet would prove a better point of departure. (4) Next to the Enkomi tablet Linear B would offer the most reliable basis for the assignment of values by a study of resemblances. (5) Since the classical Cypriote signary sometimes showed resemblances to Linear B, at other times to the Enkomi signary, and in some cases revealed shapes of signs unlikely to derive from either, it probably showed descent from a number of different traditions in Greek syllabic writing, all or some of which derived originally from the signary of the Phaistos Disk. Because of the great lapse of time between the classical Cypriote syllabary and the others, most of the signs would prove valueless for my study. But since C *ve* and *ja* had already proved helpful, I assumed that occasionally the resemblances to this syllabary also would prove validly suggestive. (6) For signs in previously nonexistent rows, such as the open-vowel or *q*-row, I expected to find resemblances to logical substitutes in unused rows of the Phaistos signary, usually with the same vowel.

Since I was ready for an attempt to produce words, the possible content became important. The obtaining of a few short "Greek" words, if they were just any words, might be due entirely to chance. I had to find probable context with meaningful words spelled as expected with consistent spelling rules, composed of signs first limited by assumption preferably to a single value each, and including longer as well as shorter words. But the content could only be guessed at; religious material seemed the most probable.

55. I was encouraged to work very painstakingly at the task of limiting as many signs as possible to a single value on the basis of my assumptions by a striking piece of evidence that I was on the right track, something I found before obtaining any Mycenaean words. There were certain resemblances which I felt to offer obvious choices, sometimes because the resemblance was perfect or nearly so, more often because one possible resemblance appealed to me, however subjective the appeal, as better than the others, or because of an *essential clue*. One of the perfect resemblances, †JA (†6) to E and C *zo*, shown in



FIG. 11. Resemblances of †JA (†6), †BA (†10), and †XA (†37), §55.

Figure 11, I labeled *so* because I was labeling all sibilants with an *s*.¹²⁸ If at the time of the origin of the syllabary the change to sibilants, such as from *kj* and *gj*, had not yet taken place, whatever the stage of transition, there was no reason to assume a distinction between the voiced and unvoiced consonant, even though the symbol already represented a sibilant at the time of the printing of the disk. A nearly perfect resemblance and a clear explanation of the reason for the change from the Linear B to the Enkomi sign was the resemblance of †BA (†10) to E *sa* (Figure 11).

An example of the selection of one of the possible resemblances as the valid one is †RA (†18), which at first I limited to B *si* or *e*. Not until I was able by means of the essential clue to find the true match for B *e*, †ZA (†20), doubly corroborated as *je* because it is matched with both E *je* and B *e*,¹²⁹ as is demonstrated in Figure 12 (1), did I

succeed in limiting †RA to a one-and-one-only value, *si*, illustrated in Figure 13. The essential clue to B *e* is the overlong horizontal bar of †ZA, to E *je* all the horizontal lines. Every stroke of E *re* is an essential clue to the choice of †XA (†37) for *re* (Figure 11). The elimination of




FIG. 12. The reversal of E *ja* and *je* (see §§55–56). †VA (†12)=*ja*¹; †NE (†32)=*ja*²; †NA (†31)=*je*¹; †ZA (†20)=*je*².

†ZA as a choice quieted any doubts¹³⁰ concerning the alignment of †VA (†12) with B *ja*.¹³¹

56. With the choice of †NA (†31) for B *je* (Figure 12 [2]), always provided that my assumptions could be corroborated by sufficient evidence, I found the answer to one of the more vexing problems




FIG. 13. The resemblance of †RA (†18) to B *si* (see §55).

encountered in my decipherment of the Enkomi signary. The adapter, starting with B *ja* and *je*, did not change the shape of *ja*, but apparently used only the bottom part of *je* as his Linear B model — not surprising since he frequently did not use the Linear B sign in its entirety. He then *reversed the two signs* in the grid!¹³² I wasted considerable time in my decipherment of the Enkomi signary trying to make *ja* equal *je*, and

vice versa. The spelling of the name *Jēson* hinged on that problem, and to some extent also the use of *ē* for *ā* ("Attic-Ionic eta") in the Enkomi dialect.¹³³ Finally, after my discovery of the Mycenaean "abagaic" order, I knew on the basis of the internal alignment of shapes within the Enkomi grid that the reversal was indeed a fact. Now I had the answer. The adapter always tried to obtain a shape which would fit his purposes, retaining the Linear B sign, but modifying the shape as he needed to. The modification, however, insofar as it was arbitrary, was so only in details; in making his changes he abided by limits imposed by a symbol from another writing tradition used as a model, whether a pictograph of the Phaistos Disk or a sign derived from it. He could not develop a shape suitable for Enkomi *ja* from Linear B *ja*, nor modify B *ja* and *je* to conform to the models of the other tradition he was following. He therefore remodeled his *ja* and *je* as if on the basis of †VA and †NA, Linear B's models, but on the basis of his own models, †NE and †ZA, reversed the two shapes to get the alignment he desired for his own signary.¹³⁴ How perfectly it worked is shown in Figure 12 (3), where E *ja* and *je* are shown in the center column, the original models from the disk on the left in reverse order, and the final models on the right in correct order. The Enkomi shapes match both pairs; since the pair on the right belongs to the row followed by the Enkomi adapter, as will be more obvious when the match for E *jo* is isolated,¹³⁵ he had his justification for the reversal of the two signs. It was not an arbitrary change as I had originally supposed it to be. Although there was no way to estimate mathematically the odds against finding this coincidence as a result of mere chance, I accepted it as a sound basis for my assumption.

57. Another coincidence of this type was more convincing evidence that I was being successful in isolating valid relationships. In my earlier study of resemblances to Linear B I had found fairly good choices for B *da*, *de*, and *di*. These were †HE (†17) for B *da*, †CA (†39) for *de*, and †ME (†21) for *di*, illustrated in Figure 14. In each of these cases the adapter had made a considerable change in shape for the Enkomi signary, as may be seen by comparing the Linear B signs with the Enkomi signs in the figure. In the case of *j*'s, as my preliminary survey showed me would also be true of *w*'s and *s*'s, this meant that the Enkomi tradition followed a different row of signs in the signary of the disk. When I began to compare †HE, †CA, and †ME with the signs of the Enkomi signary, I found that in each case the pictogram explained both the shape of the Linear B sign and the change in shape to the Enkomi sign of the same value, as may be seen by reading each group

of symbols in Figure 14 from left to right. And in each case no other Enkomi sign could be found for which this would be equally true. Linear B and the Enkomi signary had followed the same models for the *d*-row. Or was this coincidence accidental? Fortunately this time I could make a mathematical test with accuracy. There were fifty-six signs available in the Enkomi signary; in each of the three cases there was one chance in fifty-six of obtaining the coincidence by accident. For the whole group — there were no other *d*-sounds available on the disk — the chances were $1/56 \times 1/56 \times 1/56 = 1/175,616$. The odds against mere chance were 175,615 to one. This did not mean, I knew, that every choice so far had been the correct one, but it did prove, I felt, that my methods were valid.




FIG. 14. *da*, *de*, and *di*. The resemblances of †HE (†17), †CA (†39), and †ME (†21) to both the B and E signs (see §57).

58. Since the use of duplicate signs and alternative spellings had already been shown to be a part of the writing technique, I had to assume the existence of homophones, although such an assumption greatly enhances the difficulty already inherent in the work of decipherment.¹³⁶ To prevent the assumption of an unlimited number of homophones I assumed that there had been none in the signary at the time of its origin. Also I assumed not additional signs, but rows. I did this only in those cases where I found evidence for it and where it seemed most logical on the basis of the probable, very early origin of the syllabary. Since I had such evidence among the *j*-signs and it was logical that originally there may have been a row for *j* and another for *j*-slur which came to be used indiscriminately, I assumed two *j*-rows, one with resemblances to the Linear B *j*-row, indicated by a suprascript "1," and a second with resemblances to the Enkomi, indicated by a suprascript "2." I then made an analogous assumption for *w* and *w*-slur. In the case of the *s*-rows I did not try to limit the number of rows. Once I assumed more than one *s*-row, the possibility arose that such

combinations as *kj*, *q^uj*, and *tj* were distinctly different sounds at the time of origin of the syllabary and came to be used indiscriminately for an *s*-sound only afterward.¹³⁷

59. Concurrently with the continued study of resemblances I began to watch for possible words as they appeared. At approximately this point in my work I found the first word of which I felt sure. The following signs, already discussed, had been limited by my assumptions to a one-and-one-only value:

†BA	†10	<i>sa</i> ²	†JA	†6	<i>so</i> ⁴	†NE	†32	<i>ja</i> ²	†S+	†1	<i>s+</i>
CA	39	<i>de</i>	KE	33	<i>su</i> ⁴	PE	19	<i>su</i> ³	VA	12	<i>ja</i> ¹
DA	40	<i>jo</i> ¹	ME	21	<i>di</i>	QA	43	<i>we</i> ¹	XA	37	<i>re</i>
HE	17	<i>da</i>	NA	31	<i>je</i> ¹	RA	18	<i>si</i> ¹	ZA	20	<i>je</i> ²

I had noticed already that all the forms of the †NE-JA-words listed in section 52 could now be transliterated: *su*⁴-*ja*²-*so*⁴-*si*¹, *su*³-*ja*²-*so*⁴-*si*¹, *s+ja*²-*so*⁴-*jo*¹, *s+ja*²-*so*⁴-*ja*², for which an intermediate step within the spelling rules already demonstrated¹³⁸ would be *sa-so-i (bis)*, *sa-so-jo*, *sa-so-ja*, and I had recognized the possibility of reconstruction as *Tharsoi*, *Tharsojos*, *Tharsoja*, "Bold," a name of Athena.¹³⁹ The coincidences of religion and especially of a perfect spelling for the three oblique forms of a stem in *oi*, the *πειθώ*-declension, used chiefly for feminine names, presented arguments in favor of accepting the reconstruction and interpretation. The unknown spelling rule, *s=th*, was reinforced by the confusion of *s* and *t* in the *ḡēson* tablet,¹⁴⁰ and seemed logical enough if a sibilant existed, or had existed after the origin of the syllabary, pronounced *ts*.¹⁴¹ It was unnecessary to assume the pronunciation of *th* as a spirant; it may have been a true aspirated mute at this time.¹⁴² Yet I knew that I was to some extent deceiving myself in thinking of these forms as four-sign groups, since the first two signs contracted to the equivalent of one. And *s=th* would require considerable proof in repeated occurrences. I discarded the equation, for the time being at least, as perhaps more likely than not to be a chance resemblance.

60. A 1.3 finally began to look interesting: †ME-JE-PE-RA-RA-KE-QA, which could now be transliterated thus, *di-†3-su*³-*si*¹-*si*¹-*su*⁴-*we*¹. Only one sign, †JE (†3), was still undeciphered, and I concentrated on that. The essential clue eluded me for a time, but finally, when I discarded its vertical length and studied it horizontally, I recognized the crossing lines along with the head as the clue. This stage of my experimentation I have marked with an asterisk in Figure 15 (2). There

was no question that this symbol was the best choice for E *wo* because once recognized it clearly explained the basis on which the Enkomi adapter had changed the shape of B *wo* to that of E *wo*, as shown in Figure 15 (1). Before my success in finding *wo*², *wo*¹ had become apparent to me because of the resemblance between B *wo* and †LA (†47) in the light of the alternative form shown in Figure 15 (3).




FIG. 15. The two *wo*'s, †LA (†47) and †JE (†3), §60.

61. A 1.3, without the suprascript numbers, now became *di-wo-su-si-si-su-we*, for which I chose the intermediate step *di-wo-u-si-i-s^ue*, abiding strictly by the spelling rules as I have done without exception for these intermediate steps. I thought of Dionysos but discarded that name, for as I have shown previously, the value of a click is greatly diminished by even a single unlimited change, and for an early step in decipherment virtually nullified.¹⁴³ Without an open-vowel row and with the possibility of two *s*- or *j*-signs forming either one or two syllables, this syllabary is somewhat more elastic than either Linear B or the Enkomi writing system, and much more difficult for purposes of reconstruction. The intermediate step points to a name which finally came through to me: *Diwounsii s^ue*, "and for Diounsii." It is possible that the Greeks received the god Dionysos directly from the Phrygians. The Phrygian form of the god's name is fortunately known to be Diounsii.¹⁴⁴ "Since Thrako-Phrygian was a Wiro speech and fairly near akin to Greek, we can say with reasonable confidence that the first member contains the name of the sky-god, who was called in Phrygian Dios."¹⁴⁵ Thus *diwo-* is simply explained.¹⁴⁶ W. M. Calder states flatly, "Diounsii is clearly the Phrygian name of the god worshipped by the Greeks as Dionysos (originally Διόνυσος), and by the Thracians as Zonnyxos."¹⁴⁷ Although I had not realized it for a time, I had obtained a word which, along with *s^ue*, could be considered to be spelled as expected, was connected with religion, and formed a

seven-sign group. And there was no possibility that I had in any way forced the final result in my labeling of the signs.

62. As a cryptanalyst I knew that I had broken the cipher. I had not solved it yet, and as a matter of fact, had proved nothing yet, not even the language of the syllabary. To solve it was a matter of continuing with the same success. Solution might provide its own proof, but not necessarily, for the content might be of such a nature as not to provide the necessary clicks in the scanty amount of available material. What is the minimum I must be able to do? (1) I must obtain more words spelled exactly as expected in accordance with whatever spelling rules I set up and these must be words that fit into whatever context they create themselves. (2) All the more frequent signs must intertwine: the signs in one accepted and interpreted word must be repeated in other similar words.¹⁴⁸ Obviously the least frequent signs cannot do this. (3) And if the language is Mycenaean Greek, I must approach the goal set by the solution of Linear B,¹⁴⁹ in which about thirty-three per cent of the sign-groups which are words rather than proper nouns are spelled as expected and at least seem to fit in context. The percentage is much smaller for the proper nouns.

63. I was lucky. The text contained a certain amount of very convincing material, and from the beginning I began to reconstruct convincing words and names. After obtaining Diounsīs in a seven-sign click, the next word I recognized as I was inserting the values already discussed onto my worksheets was A 4.9: †CA-DA-DA = *de-jo-jo*.¹⁵⁰ It had occurred in line 89 of the *Ĵēson* tablet: (*o-ba*) *de-jo*, reconstructed (*omphā*) *theios*, "the divine voice."¹⁵¹ Since the Enkomi tablet is our point of departure, *d=t* and therefore also *th* by previous Mycenaean spelling rules.¹⁵² Although a short word, it was exactly the kind one might expect to find on the disk and therefore a click in itself. With Dionysos' name it was a striking click in context. With the next word, already discussed, we have for A 4.9-10 *te-jo-jo sa-so-jo* as the intermediate step, and picking Tharso out of the discard, we may reconstruct it as *theioio Tharsojos*, "of the divine Tharso."¹⁵³ Both words are genitive, both may be construed as feminine, and we have the word "divine," or "goddess" if we should reconstruct *theoio*, used of a person whom in later Greek we find identified with Athena. We now have a click so excellent that we must, I feel, retain Tharso at least on probation, pending the discovery of another case of *s=th*. Since alternative spellings have been shown to be an important part of the writing technique, the inconsistency of the spelling for *th* in the two words is not an objection.

64. Our second click has corroborated our first, compounding it. The third click corroborated the first two, again compounding the results. Because of the new techniques forced by the elasticity of the syllabary, I had the word fully deciphered on my worksheets for many days before I recognized it, simple though it was. To begin with, A 2.5, †RA-FA-XA-VA-RA-KE-QA, contained a missing value: *si-†23-re-ja-si-su-we*. The word is the third in its group of three, occupying the same position as *Diwounsii s^{ue}*. The last two signs were obviously *s^{ue}*, “and,” but I assumed in error that this word was also a name. †FA (†23) could not be labeled by the resemblance method, but since it was already limited to an *s*- or *j*-sign¹⁵⁴ and was preceded by an initial *s*-sign, and since I had not yet obtained control of the new spelling rule, I leaped to the conclusion that the two signs became one *s*-syllable. On the basis of my frequency studies, this placed *re* in the position where an *r*-sign is usually the second part of a consonant cluster, in which case the Mycenaean method of spelling made the preceding vowel *e*. It happened that the vowel was *e*, although my reasoning proved to be in error; since there are only five vowels my chance of hitting the right one was fair. I labeled †23, *se*⁴. If coincidences are obtained, the wrong reasoning in no way invalidates them; I had limited the sign to a one-and-one-only value.

si-se-re-ja-si- I reconstructed as **Threiai*, dative case of a personal name. This it remained on my worksheet while I studied other words and other signs. One day, happening to glance at it, I realized that I had before me *i-e-re-ja-i* (or *-si*), the dative singular (or plural), correctly spelled for this syllabary, of the well-known KN and PY *i-je-re-ja*.¹⁵⁵ I later reconstructed it as *hiereiāi*, “to, for the priestess.” There could hardly be any doubt now that the disk was religious in content, that the language was a dialect of Mycenaean Greek, and that the text contained a certain percentage of well-known words and names, just as the *Ḫēson* tablet did, which despite the elasticity and difficulty of the syllabary were clearly identifiable.¹⁵⁶

65. When I was filling in the values of the signs already labeled, I found at B 2.5, immediately following †S+NE-JA-NE=*s+ja-so-ja=sa-so-ja=Tharsoja*, the goddess Tharso in the accusative, †PE-FA-NE=*su+se-ja=se-a*. In view of A 4.9-10, *theioio Tharsojos*, there could be no question this time: *s=th*. B 2.4-5 had to be reconstructed *Tharsoja theān*, “the goddess Tharso.” The preceding word (2.3) was also completely deciphered: †ZA-FA-BA-NE=*je-se-sa-ja*. It was perhaps natural for me to try *je+se-sa-ja*, but it turned out rather *je-se+sa-ja=e-sa-ja=ēthaiān*, “honored,” with which we may compare

Pindar's ὄταν ξείνον ἐμὸν ἡθαῖον ἔλθῃς, "when you come to my trusty friend."¹⁵⁷ We therefore have, B 2.3-5, three consecutive words of extant Greek totaling eleven signs and spelled as expected: *ēthaiān Tharsoja theān*.

Of the three important additional requirements set up in section 62 for proof of correct decipherment and solution, we have obtained the needed words (1), the more frequent signs¹⁵⁸ have begun to intertwine well (2), and we have made an excellent step forward in approaching the goal set by Linear B (3). In addition the two different seven-sign groups (A 1.3 and 3.5; A 2.5) have both been solved as known words, spelled as expected. There are no other sign-groups as long as these.

66. Concurrently I assumed the values of several other signs on the basis of resemblances. Although I had labeled †YA (†46) and †YE (†45) both correctly as *sa*, my thinking at first had included certain errors of detail; however, I shall give here the corrected version. The




FIG. 16. †YA (†46) and †YE (†45), §66.

resemblances may be recognized by the outlines or simplifications of heads, bodies, arms, and legs, as shown in Figure 16. The essential clue lay in the natural resemblance of two figures of men to each other; Linear B *a* and *sa* also show a resemblance, but more to the point, the same difference: the raised arms of B *sa* and †YA. However, only

after I had found a perfect resemblance between C *a* and the simplification of †YA demonstrated in Figure 16 (3), could I recognize the resemblance between †YA and B *sa*. When two signs or pictograms resembled each other, the danger always existed in the present study of matching a sign or pictogram with the wrong one. I fell into this trap¹⁵⁹ because C *a* definitely represented †YA, and I matched the latter also with B *a*. In reality †YE was a perfect match for B *a* (Figure 16 [1]) and is properly labeled *sa*³, while †YA belongs in the Linear B *s*-row and is properly labeled *sa*¹.

†QE (†24) was easily matched with B *wi*, once I thought to turn it upside down (Figure 17), but †ZE (†7) required study. I was able to limit it to either E *wi* or *we*, but only because of the excellent resemblance to C *vi* could I limit it still further to *wi*². †SA (†2) I recognized




FIG. 17. †QE (†24), †ZE (†7), and †SA (†2), §66.

quickly as E *qi*, and on the basis of the same vowel and the pronunciation of the labiovelar as an *s* before *e*, I labeled it as *si*⁴. Figure 18 shows all the signs which had been placed in the reconstruction skeleton at this stage.

67. Some completely deciphered groups I could not immediately reconstruct but eventually understood in the light of the increasing amount of context; others, like A 1.2, *sa-si*, I have not been able to reconstruct at all. The six-sign group, A 4.12, †S+FA-YA-SA-KE-QA, I recognized as soon as I had filled in all the correct values, *s+se-sa-si-su-we=se-a-i-s^ue*. It was obviously to be reconstructed *theāi s^ue*, “and to the goddess,” dative singular.¹⁶⁰ We have seen other datives and have had the word goddess before, B 2.5, *theān*. The final *i*, when included in the spelling, as it usually is, helps to identify the dative, but it should be kept in mind that, as is to be expected from Linear B and the *ḫēson* tablet, it need not be included. This choice is part of the writing technique, the use of alternative spellings, and makes it possible to expand or contract a word by the width of one sign.¹⁶¹

	a	e	i	o	u
d	HE 17	CA 39	ME 21		
j ¹	VA 12	NA 31		DA 40	
j ²	NE 32	ZA 20			
r		XA 37			
s ¹	YA 46		RA 18		
s ²	BA 10				
s ³	YE 45				PE 19
s ⁴		FA 23	SA 2	JA 6	KE 33
w ¹		QA 43	QE 24	LA 47	
w ²			ZE 7	JE 3	
s +					S + 1

FIG. 18. The reconstruction skeleton or grid showing all signs placed before §67.

68. A 4.3, †PE-QE-ZE-KE-QA = *su-wi-wi-su-we*, was immediately recognizable as another dative, *huiwi s^{ue}*, "and to her son," equivalent to the "Homeric short form," *vi̇*. To save repeating I shall anticipate somewhat¹⁶² and mention that the preceding word, with which the enclitic "and" combines *huiwi*, is an unknown feminine personal name. That is proved by the occurrence of the masculine form in B 4.12, also joined by the enclitic to the preceding word, this time the recognizable name Tharso. If one is a person, all four are; *huiwi*, "son," a Homeric word spelled as expected, is therefore corroborated by context.

69. I was able to reconstruct the fully deciphered A 2.1, †S+PE-QE-BA = *s + su-wi-sa = su-wi-a*, into a word which provided one of the most striking and convincing contextual clicks on either side of the disk. On side A in the first phrase of three words the unknown *sa-si* is combined with *Diwounsis*, "Dionysos"; in the second phrase, almost a repeat of the first, *sa-si* is combined not with Dionysos but with another person. Who is this who replaces Dionysos in the repeated phrase? The word is spelled as expected for the reconstruction *Thuiāi*, dative of *Θυία*, believed to have been the first priestess of Dionysos, the first to celebrate orgies in his honor. According to the story women who served Dionysos with orgiastic rites were called Thyiads (*Θυίαι* or *Θυιάδες*) after her.¹⁶³ We have obtained another superb click in context with a properly spelled, extant Greek name.

70. In the first phrase of three words, A 1.1-3, Dionysos and another person seem to be given a †CE-LE-PA; in the fifth, A 3.3-5, he and

another seem to be given a †S+FE-XE. In the first the other is †YA-SA; in the fifth, †BA-TA. †YA-SA is transliterated *sa*¹-*si*⁴; the first syllable of †BA-TA is *sa*². Since we had several *s*-rows, and since the disk made alternative spellings part of its writing technique, I assumed that †BA-TA was another spelling for †YA-SA, giving me the equation †TA (†36)=*si*. Then and only then did I recognize that *E si* may have been the match for †TA, making its label *si*² (Figure 19). This resemblance, worth perhaps 1/3, was acceptable only if the value *si* could be proved. What were the odds against my assumption, †BA-TA=†YA-SA? There were only three cases other than †YA-SA of a two-sign word or one chance in twenty that on the basis of a random scattering of words and signs a two-sign word would couple with the second occurrence of *Diwounsii*: 1/20. The first syllable was *sa*²; since I had assumed an alternative spelling I could not consider †YA (*sa*¹). There was only one occurrence of initial *sa*,¹⁶⁴ not counting †YA, and this was it. On the basis of random scattering there was one




FIG. 19. †TA (†36), †XE (†38), and †DE (†8), §§70-71.

chance in sixty of its landing here. $1/60 \times 1/20 = 1/1200$. I was not dealing with a random scattering, but it seemed safe to assume odds of over a thousand to one against mere chance. Along with the possible 1/3 the doubt became very slight indeed. I had to corroborate it with context, of course, but could feel confident as I placed †TA in the reconstruction skeleton in the space for *si*².¹⁶⁵

71. †XE (†38), the flying bird, had intrigued me from the beginning. It seemed to be the match for *B ku*, but was it? A study of the signs showed that, despite some exceptions intended to save space, heads were designed to face the direction of writing. The correct position for †XE was with its tail down and its beak facing right. In addition I felt that †DE (†8) would make a good match for *E gu* (Figure 19); however, since I had not assumed two *g*-rows, or a *g*- and a *k*-row, I could not label †DE as *gu* without first eliminating the candidacy of †XE. One day — entirely by accident — I happened to notice *E ma* when the page had been given a one-quarter turn; turned in this manner (Figure

19) the sign seemed obviously to represent a flying bird. In its normal position, if this were so, it would be a flying bird upright on its tail, quite comparable to †XE. I assumed the equations, †XE=*ma* and †DE=*gu*.

72. The filling in of the value *gu* for †DE finished the decipherment of another word which I could immediately recognize, B 4.3, †PE-DE-ZA-NE=*su-gu-je-ja*=*Hug^uieia*, "Hygieia."¹⁶⁶ We have another Greek word or name spelled exactly as expected and fortunately even including the expected labiovelar. It is an unexpected prize as a click in context, although to demonstrate that I must anticipate some of my results. In B 4.12 we have the name Aguios and in A 4.2 its feminine, Aguia; the former suspiciously resembles *Ἀγυιεύς*, a name of Apollo. Hygieia is usually said to be the daughter of Asclepius and is thus indirectly connected with Apollo. More important is the actual passage in which the name Hygieia appears on the disk, where it and the word goddess both refer to Tharso: "Yield to the goddess; make obeisance to Hygieia" (B 3.9—4.3).¹⁶⁷ Tharso, as has been indicated,¹⁶⁸ is the name of a goddess identified with Athena. And the word Hygieia "occurs also as a title of Athena . . . , earlier than the introduction of Asclepius to Athens."¹⁶⁹ We have therefore excellent contextual corroboration of solution in the use of two names, both known to have been connected with Athena.

And on the basis of this word, A 4.11, †KE-DE-ZA=*su-gu-je*, may perhaps be reconstructed and interpreted as a paronym. Measurements show that the space in which the word occurs was allotted for one of four signs.¹⁷⁰ One could perhaps assume the omission of *-ja* by scribal error; the word is paired with *theāi* by the enclitic "and" and must be dative. However, the missing letter is more likely the *-i* of the dative, which may be omitted according to our rules and whose omission need not therefore be considered as a true error. The word would then be *hug^uiei*, dative singular, as if of *ὑγιής*, but of a *noun*; the extra space would have been left for an *-i* preferably pronounced as a separate syllable. A 4.9-11 could be translated, "for the *hug^uiei* of the divine Tharso," that is, the quality or attribute of the goddess (whether Tharso or Athena), the possession of which gave her the name or title of Hygieia, which Tharso was called, B 4.3, and Athena, "earlier than the introduction of Asclepius to Athens."¹⁷¹

73. Since we seem to have one *s*-row matching Linear B signs and another Enkomi, and since the Enkomi *s*-signs differ markedly in shape from the linear B *except* for *se* (Figure 20), I decided to look for two different signs which might be matched with virtually identical signs.

Fortunately both were available on the disk and se^2 was easily matched with †GA (†28). se^1 proved more difficult, but I finally decided on †VE (†35). While searching for se^1 and se^2 I decided that †CE (†34) was the probable match for E e , when I recognized †CE's obvious resemblance to C e (Figure 20). I labeled it as se^3 .



FIG. 20. †VE (†35), †GA (†28), and †CE (†34), §73.

74. Filling in these new values I finished deciphering B 3.3, †SA-VE-DA= $si+se-jo=the-jo=theios$ or *theos*, “divine” or “god,” and B 4.6, †TA-GA-YA-SA= $si+se-sa-si=the-a-i=theāi$, dative of “goddess.” At this point I had to pause and take stock again of my decipherment. The text was gradually being deciphered into an unbelievable conglomeration of s -labels, such as A 1.2, sa^1-si^4 ; 2.1, $s+su^3-wi^1-sa^2$; 4.7, $su^4-ja^2-so^4-si^1$; 4.12, $s+se^4-sa^1-si^4-su^4-we^1$; B 2.3, $je^2-se^4-sa^2-ja^2$; 2.5, $su^3-se^4-ja^2$; 3.3, $si^4-se^1-jo^1$; 3.5, $sa^1-si^1-je^1-we^1$; 3.6, $si^2-se^2-re-su^3-wo^1$; 3.7, $sa^1-si^2-jo^1$; 4.5, $se^4-sa^1-si^4-ja^2-da$; 4.6, $si^2-se^2-sa^1-si^4$; 4.10, $s+sa^3-sa^2-wo^2-we^1$; and 4.11, $su^3-ja^2-so^4-si^1$. I had to make some test to determine whether such a conglomeration of s -signs should be expected, because of the elasticity of the writing system, to produce the words obtained by the law of averages if the labeling of the text represented the chance adjacency of random sounds.

I was not troubled that I was obtaining variant spellings; I had known before decipherment that they were a part of the writing technique. I was not troubled that there was a large number of s -signs; with the natural tendency of Greek to open vowels, especially at the beginning of words, and the inclusion of certain iotas normally omitted in Linear B, the labeling of such vowels with an s was bound to produce a large number of s 's in the transliteration. I now know that the excessive number was due also to the lengths to which alliteration was carried, alliteration which played chiefly with *th*- and *s*- or *h*-sounds. We are dealing with relatively primitive, or at least early, Greek poetry of a religious nature, and it should not be very surprising to find the alliteration and assonance overdone.¹⁷² It is shown to be early by the date of the disk, Greek and religious by the results of the solution,

poetry by the metrical scheme shown below.¹⁷³ However, no matter how easily and logically my bizarre-looking results might be explained, it was necessary to test whether the words obtained by the juxtaposition of so many *s*-signs were dependable or not. The occurrence of so many variant spellings of words for "god, goddess," or "divine" gave me the opportunity. For certainty any word needs to be corroborated by context; if these were not dependable, the contextual corroboration would have to be much stronger. If, however, such forms as *theān*, *theios*, and *theāi* could be shown by a test to be dependable, since they were among the most difficult decipherments to accept, there would be no reason to doubt any other words obtained which fitted in context.

75. I must anticipate one sign not yet deciphered in order to give the final results of the test. There were six words involved: three of three signs and three of four:

A 4.9, $de\text{-}jo^1\text{-}jo^1 = theioio$

A 4.12, $s + se^4\text{-}sa^1\text{-}si^4 = theāi$

B 3.3, $si^4\text{-}se^1\text{-}jo^1 = theios$

B 4.6, $si^2\text{-}se^2\text{-}sa^1\text{-}si^4 = theāi$

B 2.5, $su^3\text{-}se^4\text{-}ja^2 = theān$

B 4.1, $sa^1\text{-}se^3\text{-}sa^4\text{-}si^1 = theāi$

For the test I assumed that the labeling above was assigned at random and that the combinations were due to chance. To make it more severe I at first ignored the greater difficulty of obtaining A 4.9 by accident. The counts were made for initial, medial, and final signs, after discarding the enclitic $su^4\text{-}we^1$, and each sign was tested for its own position. The main group which troubled me was the three words of four signs reconstructed as *theāi*, but all were involved and I tested the three-sign words first. Although I was testing the *s*-signs, in this group I allowed for the final syllable any *jo*, *ja*, *so*, or *sa*. Their combined chances¹⁷⁴ of occurring were nineteen in sixty-one: $1/3$. The first sign could be any *s*-sign: $47/60$ or $4/5$; the middle sign could be any sign for *se*: $16/108$ or $1/7$. $1/3 \times 4/5 \times 1/7 = 1/26$. My notes show that the disk contained, as I estimated after removal of the enclitic, eighteen different three-sign groups and the same number of four-sign groups. The chances of obtaining by accident a single occurrence of the words being tested were $18/26$. The chances of finding that three three-sign words were each the god-word were $1/26 \times 1/26 \times 1/26 = 1/17,576$. Since there were 816 possible combinations of three words, I had 816 chances in 17,576 of obtaining the god-word by accident three times: $1/21$. *Without context chance was not eliminated.*

76. In the same manner my notes show for the three four-sign words for *theāi*, taking the signs in order: $4/5 \times 16/108 \times 1/6 \times 14/60 = 1/217$,

and for the eighteen four-sign groups: $18/217 = 1/12$. On twelve similar disks filled with alliterative text playing with *th-* or *s-*sounds we should expect to find one occurrence of any such word. For three occurrences of this word, we obtain: $1/217 \times 1/217 \times 1/217 = 1/10,218,313$. Again there are 816 possible combinations: $816/10,218,313 = 1/14,973$. If we had approximately fifteen thousand such disks, all of them with text replete with *th-* and *s-*alliterations, we should have to expect to find on a random basis three occurrences of this word on one disk. For practical purposes we have succeeded in eliminating the possibility that the three occurrences are due to chance adjacency of random values. When we combine the results for our first group ($1/21$) with this result, we have $1/21 \times 1/14,973 = 1/314,433$ for the six sign-groups under discussion. Since one (*de-jo-jo*) was a combination difficult to obtain by accident (hundreds of times as hard), there would actually be only one chance in millions of obtaining by accident the six occurrences which we have.

77. I shall show later that each occurrence of *theāi* is corroborated by context. B 2.5, *theān*, has contextual evidence in the preceding accusative, *Tharsoja*, the name of a goddess, and in the occurrence of A 4.9, *de-jo-jo*. *de* occurs only once initially; there is another *jo*. My notes for the test of this word, including both possibilities for *jo*, show: $1/60 \times 3/108 \times 13/61 = 1/10,135$, its chance for an accidental grouping of the assigned values in this one place. It is used with the genitive, *Tharsojos*, which appears twice; since the modifier may appear on either side of the word, there are four possible positions. Three-sign words appear in three of them. The chance that *theioio* has of appearing by accident as a modifier of *Tharsojos* is $3/10,135$ or $1/3378$. *theioio Tharsojos* thus fully corroborates *Tharsoja theān* as both of them do B 3.3, *si-se-jo = theios* or *theos*, since it modifies the son of Tharso. We may continue with full confidence despite the bizarre-looking transliteration of the text. Since the variant forms of the god-word are dependable, we need not worry about the other words, if they prove acceptable in context, for they are mostly harder to obtain by accident.

78. The labeling of †KA (†22) as *sa*⁴, anticipated in the above test, gave me trouble because I could find no satisfactory match for it in the three syllabaries. I did finally discover a sound method of labeling it after I had given †IA (†30) the value *jo*² because of its resemblance to E *jo*, demonstrated in Figure 21. The insertion of the latter did not complete any recognizable words; it did reveal an interesting coincidence. B 1.1 and 3, †NE-JA . . . †NE-BA-PE-LA-QA, *ja*²-*so*⁴ . . . *ja*²-*sa*²-*su*³-*wo*¹-*we*¹, and B 4.9-10, †RA-KA-IA †S+YE-BA-JE-QA, *si*¹-†22-*jo*² *s*+*sa*³-*sa*²-*wo*²-*we*¹, although differing by one

in the number of signs and using alternative signs for all except the last one, looked strangely similar. I had assumed B 1.1 to be a personal name but had not known how to reconstruct it. By comparing *ja-so* with *si-†22-jo* I could assume an open vowel for the last syllable preceded by *Ia* or *ja*. The name would be *Iāōn*, which in later Greek would contract to *Ἴων*.¹⁷⁵ The name Ion reappears as that of the eponymous ancestor of the Ionians, son of Apollo in the tradition



FIG. 21. †IA (†30), †HA (†29), †BE (†13), and †FE (†5), §§78, 85, 87-89.

followed by Euripides. Iaon is connected with Aguios, whose name resembles Ἀγυεύς, Apollo, and appears coupled with Tharso's on the disk; Iaon is also linked with Tharso, who is later identified with Athena.¹⁷⁶ The meter shows that the name was pronounced as two syllables, but that offers no difficulty, being paralleled on the *jēsōn* tablet, where *jēsōn* is also shown to be pronounced with only two syllables.¹⁷⁷

79. By comparison of the two spellings of the adjective modifying *Iāōn* we can reconstruct it also. 4.10 *s+sa*³- shows that 1.3 *ja*²-*sa*²- becomes *sa-* (= *tha-*); 1.3 *-su*³-*wo*¹- versus 4.10 *-sa*²-*wo*²- reveals the consonant cluster *sw*, giving us *-swo-* or *-swo-* for purposes of reconstruction: *sa-swo-we* = *tharsuowens* (that is, **thrasuowens*).¹⁷⁸ The word is easily recognized because it twice modifies *Iāōn*, whose conflict with Tharso, Thraso, "Bold," and capitulation to her, are the subject of side B.¹⁷⁹ Its denotation would be "daring, bold,"¹⁸⁰ with a punning, proleptic connotation, "of, belonging to Tharso."

80. It should not be thought that I simply assumed B 4.9-10 to repeat B 1.1 and 3 without evidence, making †KA=*sa*⁴ an arbitrary

assumption. I made my tests in the manner described above for the god-word. The value for finding in 4.9-10 the number of signs needed was nullified to 1/1. Skipping †KA and omitting all occurrences of the enclitic and for each sign the one used in B 1.1 and 3, since we are assuming a variant spelling, I assigned and multiplied the fractions $6/60 \times 13/61 \times 49/60 \times 21/108 \times 47/108 \times 4/108 \times 6/61$. The result was one chance in 186,386 of accidental adjacency of random values. There can be little question that we have a repetition and that †KA (†22) does equal *sa*⁴. The value *sa* is corroborated by two clicks in context, one of which is B 4.1, *theāi*, already discussed. The other, with two occurrences in different forms, is B 1.2, †KA-BA-CA-DA=*sa*+*sa-de-jo*=*sa-de-o*=*Sardeōn*,¹⁸¹ genitive plural, "of Sardis," and B 2.6, †KA-BA-CA-RA=*sa*+*sa-de-si*=*sa-de-si*=*Sardesi*, locative-dative plural, "at Sardis," with which we may compare the genitive and dative *Σάρδεων*, *Σάρδεσι*. Side B therefore begins, *Iāōn Sardeōn tharsuowens*, "Iaon the daring of Sardis."¹⁸²

81. Since Sardis, the chief city of Lydia, was in the small region behind Ionia which was the part originally known to the Greeks as Asia before they began to include in the term the great land-masses beyond, we can reconstruct B 3.5, †YA-RA-NA-QA=*sa*¹-*si*¹-*je*¹-*we*¹=*a-si-e-we*, a dative referring to Iaon of Sardis, as *Asiēwei*, "to, for the man from Asia," a superb contextual click. For our present purpose it does not matter whether *Asieus* is to be translated or taken as another personal name for Iaon comparable to *Agyieus* for Apollo: Iaon *Asieus* of Sardis. Along with B 3.7, discussed below, we have two references to "Asia," preceding by several hundred years the account in the Hittite archives of the defeat of the country called Assuva in the thirteenth century B.C. They click with Herodotus' reference to the mythical royal family of Lydia (*Ἀσίεω*) and his *τὴν ἐν Σάρδισι φυλὴν . . . Ἀσιάδα*.¹⁸³ The value of the contextual coincidence is scarcely diminished by the absence in the texts of the form in -*evs*.¹⁸⁴ This form corresponds to the archaic, distinctive Greek type of which over a hundred examples have been found in Linear B;¹⁸⁵ it is known to have been used for ethnica.¹⁸⁶ The reconstruction is also corroborated by the presence of another Asia-word in B 3.7, †YA-TA-DA=*sa*¹-*si*²-*jo*¹=*a-si-o*=*Asion*, "Asiatic, in Asiatic fashion," a word occurring in Homer, where it refers to a region near Sardis.¹⁸⁷ It can be interpreted as the accusative singular neuter of the adjective, either used adverbially of manner or representing a cognate accusative.

82. The importance of variant spellings and forms as proof of correct solution has already been shown. It would hardly be worth

while to perform the mathematics on these pages in each case; the methods used have been sufficiently illustrated. Far more important, of course, is the superb click. It may be possible, because of the elasticity of the syllabary, to obtain some exactly spelled, extant Greek words like *sa-si-jo* = *Asion*; it may even be possible for the cryptanalyst to force their appearance in the process of labeling. But if spelling rules are set up, however elastic within reason, *if the writing system includes the vowels*, and if the words are spelled as expected, no ingenuity of the decipherer can turn one word after another into excellent clicks in context. My figures show $1/48$ for *Asion*'s occurrence on side B spelled with any *a*, *si*, and *jo*; only the click with Iaon of Sardis would have made it meaningful were it not for the occurrence of *Asiēwei* spelled with a different *si*. With the latter *si* excluded, the fraction $1/48$ is changed to $1/168$. On the same basis my notes show $1/1852$ for *Asiēwei*. As proof of valid decipherment the occurrence of both *Asion* and *Asiēwei* with variant spelling becomes tremendously important. For the scholar who does not accept the decipherment does not throw out only one of these words: *he throws out both of them*. Both, he says in effect, are the chance results of accidental adjacency of random sounds. No one, I think, will deny that these words form a striking click with "Iaon of Sardis" and *Sardesi*. For the chance of both words to be accidental we must multiply $1/168 \times 1/1852$. There is less than one chance in three hundred thousand of obtaining *both* words accidentally on side B. When the odds against obtaining both of these words by mere chance and against obtaining so convincing a contextual click accidentally are considered together, it becomes difficult to conceive of the possibility that the combined coincidence is the result of accidental resemblances of sounds.¹⁸⁸

83. At B 3.6 we have the deciphered word *si*²-*se*²-*re*-*su*³-*wo*¹, giving us another striking coincidence of the kind just discussed. In A 2.5 we had *si*¹-*se*⁴-*re*-*ja*¹-*si*¹-*su*⁴-*we*¹, reconstructed as *hiereiāi s^ue*, "and for the priestess," and fitting perfectly in the over-all context of side A. *si-se-re-su-wo* = *hi-e-re-u-o* fits well into the context reconstructed as *hiereuōn*, nominative singular masculine, present participle active, of the verb meaning, "sacrifice, offer sacrifice, slaughter for a feast," although the exact translation of the passage may remain debatable. I have usually translated, beginning with B 3.3, "The divine Th., preparing a banquet in the Asiatic manner for the man from Asia," but the dative should perhaps be construed with the unreconstructed verb which follows. In that case the participle might mean simply, "offering sacrifice."


However it should be translated, its presence corroborates *hiereiāi*. The frequency of this stem in Linear B is very high.¹⁸⁹ To find that two words of five signs each, having only one sign (*re*) in common, both spelled as expected for well-known Homeric words, each begin *hiere-*, is very convincing additional proof of solution. I passed over the value of finding two of the three occurrences of *re* in words of the right length and in the right position of the five possible in each of them, and also of having the words end with two signs possible for the correct spelling of a Greek word; I tested the words mathematically for only one thing, the possibility of obtaining by chance the needed *i-e-* before each of the two occurrences of *re*. Since I assumed alternative spellings, I accepted every possible *i* and *e* except those that occurred in the other of the two words. The results were, A $2.5, 3/60 \times 17/108 = 1/127$; B $3.6, 4/60 \times 13/108 = 1/125$. Since anyone denying the validity of the decipherment and solution must discard both words, I multiplied $1/127 \times 1/125$, obtaining $1/15,875$, one chance in 15,875 of obtaining both *i-e*'s by accident: there was no need to continue the test any further.

84. I had seen earlier that B 2.1, †NE-FA-GA-MA-NA=*ja-se-se-†41-je*, could be reconstructed *a-e-se-le-je=aethleei*, "contend" in battle or for a prize, "struggle."¹⁹⁰ Unfortunately †MA (†41) is a *hapax legomenon*. Since I had not assigned a value to it, and since *le* was not available on the *ḡēson* tablet,¹⁹¹ I had to treat †MA as an insufficiently limited sign. Thus by the principle of nullification the value of the properly spelled five-sign word was reduced to that of a short word which needed contextual corroboration before it could be considered. I did not assume the word then. When I found that it was preceded by "Iaon the daring of Sardis," *aethleei* again occurred to me, for the idea of a hero engaged in a contest or struggle with a goddess seemed acceptable context, but I did not yet reach a decision.

85. I had recognized early that †BE (†13) explained clearly why the Enkomi inventor changed the shape of B *pi* to that of E *bi* (Figure 21 [3]). The identification seemed certain. But after the decipherment was well begun clues were found with such rapidity that, just as deciphered words remained unreconstructed on the worksheets while I labored over the identification of signs, identified signs remained unlabeled there while I studied possible reconstructions. Once I inserted the value *bi*, B 4.8, †KE-BE-ZA-TA=*su-bi-je-si*, became recognizable as *hu-phi-e-si=huphiēsi*, a third person singular, present indicative active comparable to *ὑφίησι*;¹⁹² and this identification made possible the reconstruction of the much more puzzling form, B 3.9,

†PE-BE-ZA-ZA-DA=*su-bi-je-je-jo*. It was obvious that the same verb was involved, and a study of the text showed that the verb was used in similar context and had the same meaning both times, “yield, submit, give way.” In Greek, *μi*-verbs appear as contract verbs in many forms, and *ἴημι* is one of those for which contract forms are found, especially in compounds. We may reconstruct B 3.9 as *hu-phi-e-e-ho*=*huphieeho*, and interpret it as second person singular, present imperative middle.¹⁹³ The occurrence of a similar form on the *ḡeson* tablet, *uphistaeho*,¹⁹⁴ “you promised,” where I interpreted it as imperfect indicative middle, proved helpful in determining the reconstruction. What we have, of course, is a contract form *twice* uncontracted. The contracted ending *-ō* uncontracts to *-aou*, and the *-ou* to *-eo*, traced back to *-eho*, *-eso*, yielding *-aeho* for *uphistaeho*. Similarly in the present case we may reverse the process and uncontract the ending *-ou̯* to *-eou*, *-ou* to *-eo*, *-eho*, and obtain *-eeho* for *huphieeho*.

86. We have therefore another excellent contextual click yielding good sense in two places, B 3.9—4.1, *huphieeho theāi*, “Yield to the goddess,” and B 4.8—12, *huphiēsi Iāōn tharsuowens Tharsoi Aguiōi s^{ue}*, “Iaon the daring yielded to Tharso and Aguios.” The full meaning of the latter may be that he came to terms, made a treaty or covenant with Tharso, so that the story may represent an important mythological link, the origin of the association between Iaon and Tharso> Ion and Athena: Ion, the eponymous ancestor of the Ionians who regularly in tradition moves on to Athens, whose claim to be the oldest land of Ionia was as old as Solon;¹⁹⁵ Athena, the tutelary goddess of Cretan and Mycenaean princes, who became the patron goddess of Athens:



Whether all this can be proved in the present stage of our knowledge or not, I now considered *aethleei* to be amply proved by a striking contextual click, for I had for the beginning of side B, “Iaon the daring of Sardis resisted, struggled against, engaged in or challenged to a contest the honored goddess Tharso”; at B 3.9—4.1, the command,

“Yield to the goddess”; and at the end of the side and story, “Iaon the daring yielded to Tharso and Aguios.” I could not hope for better contextual proof. I added to the grid †MA (†41) as *le*.

87. In the Enkomi grid there is a certain motif found in both the *j*-row and the *u*-column. †FE (†5), already limited to an *s*- or *j*-sign,¹⁹⁶ if it were *ju*, would provide an obvious explanation for this motif in both the row and column, as illustrated in Figure 21 (4). I labeled it *ju*². The alternative spellings listed in section 52 now became either *su + ju-ma* or *s + ju-ma* and could be reconstructed as *thūma*, “a victim, sacrifice,” fitting into the context as the first word of various phrases on side A; for example, a sacrifice for Dionysos, and a sacrifice for the goddess Tharso.

88. †HA (†29) gave me trouble for a time because I had misunderstood the pictogram and copied it without its essential clue; that is, the line across the bottom. With the aid of this clue †HA explained the change of shape from B *ne* to E *ne* demonstrated in Figure 21 (2), and I assumed the equation †HA = *ne*. This gave me the complete decipherment of the unknown name, B 2.2 and 3.1, †S + VE-NE-HA-DA-IA = *s + se¹-ja²-ne-jo¹-jo² = the-a-ne-jo-jo = Thearneioio*, and B 3.4, †S + VE-NE-HA-DA = *s + se¹-ja²-ne-jo¹ = Thearneios*.¹⁹⁷ At B 2.2 we may translate, “the goddess Tharso, daughter of Thearneios”; at B 3.1 and 4, “the divine Thearneios, son of Tharso, daughter of Thearneios.” I merely assume this reconstruction of the name; it cannot be used as evidence of solution except for the correctly spelled genitive ending fitting in context. The interpretation of the genitives as “son of” and “daughter of” is corroborated by the next reference to the son of Tharso, B 4.5, †FA-YA-SA-NE-HE = *se + sa-si-ja-da = tha-si-a-da = Tharsiadās*, “the son of Tharso,” with the known Greek patronymic ending -ιάδης.¹⁹⁸ We do have an additional striking contextual click, therefore, to add to the proof of correct decipherment and solution.
































89. The only other appearance of †HA, B 4.2, †DE-HA-FE-QA = *gu-ne-ju-we = gu-ne-u-e*, we may reconstruct as *kuneue*, second person singular, present imperative active, “make obeisance to.” Although the verb with which we are familiar is an epsilon contract denominative verb instead of one in -ευō (κυνέω), the context makes both the reconstruction and the interpretation certain enough, “Yield to the goddess; make obeisance to Hygieia.” Since it is not surprising to find many *eus*-nouns in Mycenaean Greek not extant in our Greek texts,¹⁹⁹ *euō*-denominative verbs should also be expected more frequently. Parallel formations, such as *τυραννέω*, *τυραννεύω*, are frequent in -





Greek.²⁰⁰ There may have been a noun in *-eus* not extant in Greek from which **kuneuō* was formed, but some *ευω*-verbs, such as *παιδεύω*, were formed only on the analogy of other *ευω*-verbs.²⁰¹

90. So far every assumption of a value has produced some corroboration from the text, despite the very low frequency of a few of the signs, and all of these values have been placed in the decipherment grid shown in Figure 22a in its final stage but without the inclusion of any of the queried values which follow. More resemblances in shape may be noted which produce possible words, but for which no additional evidence can be adduced. Such resemblances are shown in Figure 22b, and if we add a question mark we may perhaps assume experimentally, †TE (†25) = *so*²?, †GE (†14) = *li*?, †LE (†42) = *wu*¹?, †PA (†9) = *go*?, †NI (†26) = *dja*?.²⁰² Words reconstructed with the aid of these values must be given with a question mark; suggestions are A 4.6, †[S+]VE-TE-RA = [*s* +] *se-so* ?-*si* = *theōi*(?), dative singular of "goddess"; A 1.1 and 4, †CE-LE-PA = *se-wu* ?-*go* ? = *euchos*(?), "vow, votive offering"; B 4.4, †KA-GE-JE-IA = *sa-li* ?-*wo-jo* = *Halioio*(?), genitive singular of a personal name, perhaps a sea-god, "Halios"? Since the genitive *Halioio*(?) is attached to the name Hygieia, "daughter of Halios?" and she is identified with Tharso on the disk, and since both names are connected with Athena, the latter's title Tritogeneia perhaps deserves notice along with the legend of her birth or origin from water of some sort. "They say that Athena was the daughter of Poseidon and the lake Tritonis . . ." ²⁰³ Poseidon and Athena were definitely associated as the two patron gods of Athens.

The context shows that B 3.8, *se-ja*-†15, must be a verb including in its meaning the idea of speaking: it is followed by a second person imperative. B 4.7 seems to be the same verb strengthened with *s* + *dja* ?-, perhaps = *za* ?-, prefixed to *-se-sa*-†15, and should be translated by a similar verb of speaking, but with the meaning strengthened: perhaps, "pleaded with," and "made a passionate appeal."

91. The transliteration (a) of the entire text is shown on pages 62 and 64 with a partial reconstruction (b), given as far as possible, in which I have made some of the choices necessary for greater intelligibility while adhering strictly to the spelling rules. A complete reconstruction and possible translation are given as far as possible on pages 63 and 65.²⁰⁴ Side A is unfortunately not actually translatable because of the failure to identify key words and names, but perhaps my understanding of the text after so long a period of concentration, slight as it is, may prove of help to others. The translation of side B gives us a complete short story, the "original" short story of our

	a	e	i	o	u
b					
d					
g					
j ¹					
j ²					
s ¹					
s ²					
s ³					
s ⁴					
w ¹					
w ²					

	a	e
l		
m		
n		
r		




FIG. 22a. The final stage of the reconstruction skeleton: see Fig. 22b for queried values.



†TE E so

(1)



†LE B u

(2)



†PA B ko

(3)



†GE E li

(4)




†WA B ki * H A B ze

(5)




†NI B ta₂

(6)



†YI C su E du nu

(7)



B wa E a

(8)

FIG. 22b. Omissions from the reconstruction skeleton: queried values and possible resemblances (see §90 and note 202). A=Linear A; H="Hieroglyphic."

TRANSLITERATION (a), PARTIAL RECONSTRUCTION (b)

Side A

Coil 1. (a) 1, se³-wu¹?-go? 2, sa¹-si⁴ 3, di-wo²-su³-si¹-si¹-su⁴-we¹
 (b) e- u?-cho? di-wo- u- si- i- su- e

4, se³-wu¹?-go?
 e- u?-cho?

Coil 2. (a) 1, s+su³-wi¹-sa² 2, sa¹-si⁴-su⁴-we¹ 3, su⁴+ju²-ma
 (b) thu- i- a -su- e thu- ma

4, wi¹-†16-se⁴-wo¹ 5, si¹-se⁴-re-ja¹-si¹-su⁴-we¹ 6, s+ju²-ma-su⁴-we¹
 hi- e- re-ja- i- su- e thu- ma-su- e

Coil 3. (a) 1, s+sa¹-†11 2, se⁴-sa²-go?-sa⁴-si¹-we¹ 3, s+ju²-ma-
 (b) thu- ma-

su⁴-we¹ 4, sa²-si² 5, di-wo²-su³-si¹-si¹-su⁴-we¹ 6, s+ju²-ma-su⁴-we¹
 su- e di-wo- u- si- i- su- e thu- ma-su- e

7, s+sa¹-†11 8, se⁴-sa²-go?-sa⁴-si¹-we¹ 9, †4-se²

Coil 4. (a) 1, [[s+]]se³-sa²-re-su⁴-we¹ 2, ja²-gu-wi²-sa¹
 (b) -su- e a- gu- i- a

3, su³-wi¹-wi²-su⁴-we¹ 4, su³+ju²-ma 5, [.]se⁴-wo¹-su⁴-we¹
 hu- i- wi- su- e thu- ma -su- e

6, [s+]se¹-so²?-si¹ 7, su⁴+ja²-so⁴-si¹ 8, si²-gu-†44-su⁴-we¹
 the- o?- i tha- so- i -su- e

9, de-jo¹-jo¹ 10, s+ja²-so⁴-jo¹ 11, su⁴-gu-je² 12, s+se⁴-sa¹-si⁴-su⁴-we¹
 the-jo- jo tha- so- jo hu- gu-je the- a- i- su- e

RECONSTRUCTION

Side A

- 1.1-3 euchos(?) sa-si Diwounsii s^ue,
 1.4--2.2 euchos(?) | Thuiāi sa-si s^ue,
 2.3-5 thūma wi-†16-se-wo hierēiāi s^ue,
 2.6-3.2 thūma s^ue | s + sa-†11 se-sa-go?-sa-si-we,
 3.3-5 thūma s^ue sa-si Diwounsii s^ue,
 3.6-8 thūma s^ue s + sa-†11 se-sa-go?-sa-si-we,
 3.9-4.3 †4-se | [[s +]]se-sa-re s^ue Aguiāi huiwi s^ue,
 4.4-7 thūma [.] -se-wo s^ue theōi(?) Tharsoi,
 4.8-12 si-gu-†44 s^ue theiosjo Tharsojos hug^uiei theāi s^ue.

TRANSLATION

Side A

- 1.1-3 A votive offering for *sa.* and Dionysos,
 1.4-2.2 a votive offering for Thuia and *sa.*,
 2.3-5 a sacrifice to *wi.* and the priestess,
 2.6-3.2 and a sacrifice to *s + . se.*,
 3.3-5 and a sacrifice to *sa.* and Dionysos,
 3.6-8 and a sacrifice to *s + . se.*,
 3.9-4.3 a †4. and [[*s +*]]. to Aguia and her son,
 4.4-7 a sacrifice and [.] to the goddess Tharso,
 4.8-12 and a *si.* to the *hug^uiei* of the divine Tharso and to the goddess
 (herself).

TRANSLITERATION (a), PARTIAL RECONSTRUCTION (b)

Side B

Coil 1. (a) 1, ja²-so⁴ 2, sa⁴+sa²-de-jo¹ 3, ja²+sa²-su³-wo¹-we¹
 (b) ja- o sa- de- o tha- s- wo- we

Coil 2. (a) 1, ja²-se⁴-se²-le-je¹ 2, s+se¹-ja²-ne-jo¹-jo²
 (b) a- e- s- le- e the- a- ne-jo- jo

3, je²-se⁴+sa²-ja² 4, s+ja²-so⁴-ja² 5, su³+se⁴-ja² 6, sa⁴+sa²-de-si¹
 e- tha- ja tha- so- ja the- a sa- de-si

Coil 3. (a) 1, s+se¹-ja²-ne-jo¹-jo² 2, s+ja²-so⁴-jo¹ 3, si⁴+se¹-jo¹
 (b) the- a- ne-jo- jo tha- so- jo the- jo

4, s+se¹-ja²-ne-jo¹ 5, sa¹-si¹-je¹-we¹ 6, si²-se²-re-su³-wo¹ 7, sa¹-si²-jo¹
 the- a- ne-jo a- si- e- we hi- e- re- u- o a- si- o

8, se⁴-ja¹-†15 9, su³-bi-je²-je²-jo¹
 e- a- hu-phi- e- e- ho

Coil 4. (a) 1, sa¹+se³-sa⁴-si¹ 2, gu-ne-ju²-we¹ 3, su³-gu-je²-ja²
 (b) the- a- i ku-ne- u- e hu- gu-je- ja

4, sa⁴-li?-wo²-jo² 5, se⁴+sa¹-si⁴-ja²-da 6, si²+se²-sa¹-si⁴
 ha- li?- o- jo tha- si- a- da the- a- i

7, s+dja?-se⁴-sa²-†15 8, su⁴-bi-je²-si² 9, si¹-sa⁴-jo²
 za?- e- a- hu-phi- e- si i- a- o

10, s+sa³-sa²-wo²-we¹ 11, su³+ja²-so⁴-si¹ 12, ja²-gu-jo²-su⁴-we¹
 tha- s- wo- we tha- so- i a- gu-jo- su- e

RECONSTRUCTION

Side B

- 1.1—2.3 Iāōn Sardeōn tharsuowens | aethleei Thearneiosjo ēthaiān
 2.4—3.3 Tharsoja theān. Sardesi | Thearneiosjo Tharsojos theios
 3.4—9 Thearneios Asiēwei hieruōn Asion se-ja-†15, “huphiecho |
 4.1—6 theāi, kuneue Hug^uieian Haliosjo(?).” Tharsjadās theāi
 4.7—11 s + dja?-se-sa-†15. huphiēsi Iāōn tharsuowens Tharsoi
 4.12 Aguiōi s^ue.

TRANSLATION

Side B

Iaon the daring of Sardis challenged the honored goddess Tharso daughter of Thearneios to a contest. The divine Thearneios, son of Tharso daughter of Thearneios, preparing a sacrificial banquet at Sardis in the Asiatic fashion, [urged?] the man from Asia, “Yield to the goddess; make obeisance to Hygieia daughter of Halios(?).” The son of Tharso [pleaded eloquently?] on behalf of the goddess. Iaon the daring came to terms with Tharso and Aguios.

civilization in more senses than one, as may be seen from the following rather facetious analysis: Boy meets girl; boy quarrels with girl; girl wins boy. For the classicist the obvious motif of the story is that of the mortal vying with a god. Since Athena is involved, the closest parallel may be the story of the weaving contest between her and Arachne, despite its unhappy ending.²⁰⁵ Since I have interpreted the story as that of a mortal coming to terms with and making an agreement or covenant with a goddess, we perhaps have a parallel here to the story of a covenant between God and a mortal.²⁰⁶

ORTHOGRAPHIC CONVENTIONS

92. The spelling rules of the *ĵeson* tablet,²⁰⁷ differing chiefly from those of Linear B²⁰⁸ in the use of *d* as both *d* and *t*, and of *l* as *l* only and *r* as *r* only, were automatically assumed for the disk as my point of departure along with the original assumptions.²⁰⁹ Insofar as this is corroborated by the small amount of material available on the disk, as, for example, *g=g* or *k* is corroborated by B 4.3, *Hug^uieian*, and B 4.2, *kuneue*, there is no need to go into detail here. Such points will be immediately clear to any who have worked with Linear B. We must rather concentrate now on those points which are at variance with earlier experience and may seem doubtful or unclear without examples to illustrate them. The points specifically made are based on the internal evidence; additional material might provide exceptions and qualifications.

There is *no open-vowel row*; *s*, *j*, or *w*(?) may be used for an open vowel: A 4.12, *s+se-sa-si=theāi*; B 2.5, *su+se-ja=theān*; A 1.3, *di-wo-su-si-si=Diwounsii*; B 1.2, *sa+sa-de-jo=Sardeōn*; B 2.3, *je-se+sa-ja=ēthaiān*. There is no certain evidence for *w* used in this manner: B 4.4, *sa-li?-wo-jo=Halioio*(?).

93. To distinguish an *s*-syllable from an open vowel two *s*-signs may be combined in a sort of orthographic *hendiadys* to form one *s*-syllable; that is, one syllable containing the sibilant or aspirate labeled with an *s*. Counting †1 as an *s*-sign (*s+*) we may say that hendiadys is always used initially for an *s*-syllable. A plus sign (+) is used in the transliteration instead of a hyphen to point out this orthographic hendiadys: B 1.2, *sa+sa-de-jo=sa-de-o=Sardeōn*; A 4.12, *s+se-sa-si=theāi*; B 2.3, *je-se+sa-ja=e-sa-ja=ēthaiān*. A *j*-sign may replace one *s*-sign: A 2.3, *su+ju-ma* (A 2.6, *s+ju-ma-*)=*thūma*; compare B 1.3, *ja+sa-su-wo-we*, and B 4.10, *s+sa-sa-wo-we=sa-s-wo-we=tharsuowens*; the different forms of Tharso, *su+ja-so-* and *s+ja-so-=sa-so-=Tharso-*.

In hendiadys the first vowel did not matter, but when two vowels were used there was some tendency to use the same vowel for the first as for the second. The same tendency to use the logical vowel is found in consonant clusters: B 2.1, *-se-le-* for *-thle-* in *aethleei*; but compare the expected *-su-wo-*, B 1.3, with *-sa-wo-*, B 4.10, in *tharsuowens*.

94. *Variant spellings* have been shown to be an essential part of the writing technique.²¹⁰ Compare A 4.2, *ja-gu-wi-sa* = *Aguiāi*, and B 4.12, *ja-gu-jo* = *Aguiōi*. With the omission of the final *i* in the dative compare B 4.1, *sa + se-sa-si* = *theāi*. Medially before a vowel the *i* of a diphthong is indicated in one way or another: compare A 4.2, *ja-gu-wi-sa* = *Aguiāi* with B 4.12, *ja-gu-jo* = *Aguiōi*. The *s*-syllable may be written with one sign: the choice rested to a large extent on the space available.²¹¹ Medially the solidus (†1) is not used to replace the second *s*-sign: B 4.8, *su-bi-je-si* = *huphiēsi*; B 2.1, *ja-se-se-le-je* = *aethleei*. Initially, whenever only one regular sign is used for *s*, the second sign of the hendiadys is replaced by *s+* without exception: with B 4.1 above compare A 4.12, *s + se-sa-si* = *theāi*. Compare also the variants for Tharso and for *tharsuowens* in the preceding section.

95. In addition to being used for open vowels, *s* may represent any aspirate or sibilant from *h* to *s* and *th*, but *s* reconstructed from hendiadys may never represent the open vowel: A 2.1, *s + su-wi-sa* = *su-i-a* = *Thuiāi*; B 2.6, *sa + sa-de-si* = *Sardesi*. Probably a mere aspirate or *h*-sound was treated as an open vowel, for hendiadys was not used for it, and a *j*-sign could replace this *s*: A 2.5, *si-se-re-ja-si* = *hiereiāi*; B 3.9, *su-bi-je-je-jo* = *huphieho*; B 4.3, *su-gu-je-ja* = *Hug^uieian*. Compare A 4.3, *su-wi-wi* = *huiwi* with *s + su-wi-sa* above.

96. The label *j* may represent, in addition to open and aspirated vowels, consonantal *j*, the *j*-slur, and *i* plus *j*-slur: compare B 1.1, *ja-so* = *Iāōn*, with B 4.9, *si-sa-jo* = *Iāōn*; B 4.3, *su-gu-je-ja* = *Hug^uieian*; A 4.9, *de-jo-jo* = *theiosjo*. The genitive singular may be transcribed as *-oio* (the usual practice for Mycenaean text), but should be considered to represent *-osjo* since the first *o* was still felt as long by position.²¹²

97. *Slurs* are usually indicated with a *w* after *u* and a *j* after *i*: B 3.5, *sa-si-je-we* = *Asiēwei*; A 4.3, *su-wi-wi* = *huiwi*. The *j* is sometimes omitted after an expressed *i*: A 2.1, *s + su-wi-sa* = *Thuiāi*; A 4.2, *ja-gu-wi-sa* = *Aguiāi*. The *u* of diphthongs is included: B 3.6, *si-se-re-su-wo* = *hiereuōn*; B 4.2, *gu-ne-ju-we* = *kuneue*.

The label *d* equals *d* and is assumed to equal *t* although no *t*-syllables are available: B 1.2, *Sardeōn*; B 2.6, *Sardesi*. There is one example of *d* equals *th*: A 4.9, *de-jo-jo* = *theiosjo*; as shown, *s* usually represents *th*.

There is no *labiovelar* row; such syllables, including those no longer pronounced as labiovelars, require two signs: side A *passim* and B 4.12, *-su-we*=*s^ue*, "and"; B 4.3, *su-gu-je-ja*=*Hug^uieian*.

THE METER OF SIDE B

98. Side B exhibits alliteration and assonance. To appreciate the full effect one must read the text aloud metrically. Such reading first led me to a realization of the assonance and alliteration²¹³ and then to the rhythm of the text and a recognition of it as poetry. The religious nature of the material and the over-all effect of reading it aloud led me to the devoutly religious beginning of Hesiod's *Works and Days* with its invocation of Zeus. Referring to "the old poetic form of the hymn," Werner Jaeger says, "Hesiod's proem is one of the few old documents of this genre we possess."²¹⁴ As I read the text of side B beginning at 2.2 on the basis of my study of the meter of the *ĵeson* tablet,²¹⁵ I obtained the following rhythm:

The|arnei|osĵo | ēthai|ān Thar|soĵa the|ān.
 ∪ | - ∪ | - ∪ | - ∪ | - - | ∪ ∪ ∪ | -

Sar|desi The|arnei|osĵo | Tharso|ĵos thei|os The|arnei|os
 - | ∪ ∪ ∪ | - ∪ | - ∪ | - ∪ | - ∪ | - ∪ | ∪

I could scarcely escape the effects comparable to ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε, / ῥητοί τ' ἄρρητοί τε,²¹⁶ and it was apparent that the material was composed in either iambic or trochaic meter. The meter proved to be trochaic, simpler than but similar to the trochaic meter of the *ĵeson* tablet.²¹⁷

99. It was not necessary to make any assumptions unacceptable for Homer and classical Greek poetry. A long vowel or diphthong before hiatus or another vowel in the same word, because it may be partially shortened in pronunciation, is automatically shortened and should be so marked wherever the rhythm calls for a short syllable. Although technically a short, its somewhat greater length would tend to keep a regular rhythm from becoming too monotonous. If used, however, where the rhythm requires a long syllable it retains its length and should be marked long. *Iāōn* retains the long *ā* both times, but possibly the force of a consonantal sound was still felt between the *ā* and *ō*, perhaps a *w*-sound. The diphthong *eu* is shortened once before a vowel and kept long once and cannot be used as proof of meter. There are four cases of vowel plus *i* at the end of a word before one beginning with a consonant; all four are long syllables. There are two cases before hiatus,

both short. Medially there are nine cases of a vowel plus *i* or *j* before another vowel; every single one is short. Fifteen cases used with absolute consistency! Mathematically I estimated that there was one chance in seven thousand that this was a completely accidental coincidence. We may therefore mark these "diphthongs" in the metrical scheme as I have indicated.

100. The complete metrical scheme, a single strophe, is given in Figure 23; it contains forty-three feet.²¹⁸ The predominant foot is the trochee, of which there are twenty-five. There are seven irrational spondees; two begin the strophe, announcing in a slower, more stately measure the subject or protagonist of the poem, *Iāōn Sardeōn*, "Iaon

1-8	Iāōn Sardeōn tharsuo wens a ethle ei The arnei osjo
	- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9-16	ēthai ān Thar soja the ān. Sar desi The arnei osjo Tharso
	- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
17-25	ios thei os The arnei os Asi ēwei hierieu ōn A sion e-a-†15,
	- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
26-32	"huphie eho the āi, ku neue Hug ^u iei an Hali osjo(?) ."
	- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
33-40	Tharsja dās the āi za?-e-a-†15. huphi ēsi Iāōn tharsuo
	- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
41-43	wens Thar soi Agui ōi s ^u e.
	- - - - - - - -

FIG. 23. The metrical scheme of side B. Marginal numerals refer to feet.

of Sardis," with typically Homeric synizesis of the *eō*, scanned as one syllable. Four of the remaining five precede tribrachs, also indicating a studied placement. The remaining eleven feet are all pure tribrachs; the only occurrences of two tribrachs in a row are in the staccato command of the excited exhortation to yield to the goddess and make obeisance (3.9-4.4):

huphie eho the āi ku neue Hug ^u iei an Hali osjo(?)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Since caesura "tends to bind the parts and keep the meter flowing in a way that diaeresis does not,"²¹⁹ it is not surprising to find caesura

favored over diaeresis two to one, approximately as on the *Ĵeson* tablet.²²⁰ Both cases of two consecutive tribrachs begin with diaeresis; out of the eleven tribrachs not one ends with it. Yet the command begins and ends with it, and it marks off both irrational spondees of the more stately measure beginning the poem, so that the only instance of two consecutive spondees accounts for two more of the ten diaereses.²²¹ Although there is less evidence on the disk than there was on the *Ĵeson* tablet of the highly developed art form,²²² there can be no question of the meticulous care shown in the metrical composition of the poem.

101. I have been guilty of inconsistency in the spelling of Mycenaean words because the cryptanalytic portion of the paper presents work completed before the metrical results could be brought to bear upon it. Although I have changed a few details in the earlier part on the basis of the meter, to make all the changes necessary would be to confuse the explanation of my methods. I have written the compulsory *j* of the text as *ĵ* whenever I chose to do so, and *w* as *u*, to help point out the Greek equivalent for the non-specialist. Thus I have written *tharswuwens* as *tharsuowens* to emphasize the resemblance to *θρασύς*. I have given *Ĵāōn* as *Ĵāōn*: the scribe did spell it with an *i* once, but metrically it is only two syllables both times. With this we may compare dissyllabic *Ĵēsōn* on the *Ĵeson* tablet.²²³ I have taken the same liberty with *Tharsĵadās*, which the meter shows to be three syllables. With this we may compare dissyllabic *owjas* on the *Ĵeson* tablet²²⁴ and the dissyllabic *πόλις* of Homer.²²⁵ Within the text shown on pages 63 and 65 I have written the genitive singular as *-osĵo*. This ending may be reconstructed simply as *-oio* according to established convention, as has already been indicated,²²⁶ but since diphthongs in *i*, or vowels followed by *i* or *j*, before another vowel have been shown not to appear at all on the disk in a syllable where the long is mandatory, and to appear on the *Ĵeson* tablet under the ictus only some of the time,²²⁷ and since the first syllable of *-oio* always appears under the ictus on the *Ĵeson* tablet²²⁸ and *always* where the long is mandatory on the disk,²²⁹ there can be little doubt that the syllable is long by position rather than as a diphthong and that regardless of its actual pronunciation at this time the *s* retained enough force to make position before the *j*.

102. A glance at the metrical scheme should be sufficient to show that it cannot be the result of chance. No conglomeration of random syllables and no Greek prose could possibly yield the results I have obtained: anyone who wishes to can convince himself by various simple mathematical tests. Every short which comes between two longs must

fall in the *anceps* of a two-syllable foot. Each one has one chance in two of falling correctly. Omitting any doubtful ones and abiding by the rules I have set up, one may multiply $1/2$ by itself for each such short. What are the odds for the eleven tribrachs against their being all pure tribrachs by chance? There is always some possibility of manipulating a metrical pattern within the rules and elasticity of extant Greek poetry; for example, synizesis, as in B 1.2, makes possible such manipulation by giving a choice of two places for the end of the foot. This possibility may make the phenomenon of the metrical scheme seem greater than it is, but can the value of the scheme be nullified? I shall demonstrate that it cannot by one simple test.

Within the rules I have set up I can find no possibility of any manipulation of the feet from the fourth foot, *-wens*, to the thirty-third, *Thar-*: the position of every bar ending a foot is dictated by the text and the rules. Including *Thar-*, but omitting *-neue* (29) and the unreconstructed foot (25), I find nineteen two-syllable feet, in which the first syllable must be long. Since there are twice as many short syllables in the text as long, each of these first syllables has one chance in three of turning out long by chance. We must therefore multiply $1/3$ by itself nineteen times to estimate the chance of obtaining this by accident: $1/1,162,261,467$. The odds are over a billion to one against chance results for this one item only.

CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE FOR INDIVIDUAL SIGNS

103. I have said elsewhere that it is not sufficient to have demonstrated the validity of a decipherment as a whole: even if proof of decipherment is conceded, it is still necessary to show the relative amount of evidence corroborating the decipherment of the individual signs.²³⁰ Although my own estimate must be subjective in part, I shall endeavor to show as objectively as possible the amount of corroboration we have for each of the deciphered signs. In the list which follows I give them in alphabetical and numerical order followed by their frequencies. The frequency count for this estimate was made after removing from consideration all identically repeated sign-groups and all occurrences of the enclitic *sue* (†33-†43), which was itself counted only once. Zero to three plus signs are next used to indicate my own estimate of the relative strength of the evidence upon which my original assumption of the value was based. *The plus signs do not refer to the words or context obtained*: all important reconstructed words in which each sign appears are listed after the plus signs, but judgment

as to the value of each word listed has been left for each scholar to make for himself. To facilitate checking, a Lexical Index has been added giving all occurrences of each word and references to my discussion of them.

One item of corroboration is the ending *-osjo* in genitives proved by context: I have specified them in the list. Since different spellings of the same words are corroboration of correct solution even when the forms are not identical and the words are unknown,²³¹ I have listed them as part of the proof. Two occurrences of the same sign in a single word are indicated by the word *bis*; the numbers in parentheses after a word identify the citations in the Lexical Index. Identically repeated sign-groups are shown in the index merely by an added reference to the text.

104. The listing of the words after each sign automatically shows the proof by intertwining.²³² The majority of signs are proved by the number of contextually corroborated words in which each appears compared with its frequency. Patently, however, each appearance of a sign in a word involved in one of the major contextual clicks is far stronger proof of its value than its occurrence in a word merely possible or probable in context. These major clicks, discussed in detail throughout the article,²³³ are given here for quick comparison in studying the corroborative words in the list. The appraisal is subjective, but these were among the most helpful to me during the solution: *s^{ue}*, *Diwounsii*, *theosjo*, and *hiereiāi*, the original clicks with which I broke the cipher; *Diwounsii* and *Thuiāi*; *theios*, *theiosjo*, *theān*, and the variant spellings of *theāi*; *ēthaiān* *Tharsoja* *theān*; *Sardeōn*, *Sardesi* and *Asiēwei*, *Asion*; *aethleei* and *huphieeho*, *huphiēsi*; *huiwi*; B 3.2, *Tharsojos*, "the son of Tharso," and *Tharsjadās*; *hiereiāi* and *hiereuōn*; the variant spellings of *lāōn* *tharsuowens* (Ion), the various forms for Tharso (Athena), and *Hug^{ue}ieian*.

bi	2	+++	huphieeho, huphiēsi
da	1	+++	Tharsjadās
de	3	++	theiosjo, Sardeōn, Sardesi
di	1	+++	Diwounsii
gu	6	++	Aguiāi, Aguiōi, kuneue, Hug ^{ue} ieian, hug ^{ue} iei
ja ¹	2	++	hiereiāi, ja ¹ vs. sa ² (B 3.8; 4.7)
ja ²	16	+++	Aguiāi, Aguiōi, Tharsoi (1)(2), Tharsojos, Tharsoja (bis), lāōn (1), tharsuowens (1), aethleei, ēthaiān, Hug ^{ue} ieian, theān, Tharsjadās
je ¹	2	++	aethleei, Asiēwei

je ²	6	++	ēthaiān, huphiecho (<i>bis</i>), huphiēsi, Hug ^u ieian, hug ^u iei
jo ¹	9	++	theios _{io} (<i>bis</i>), theios, Tharso _{ios} , Sardeōn, Asion, huphiecho, -os _{io} (B 2.2; 3.1)
jo ²	4	++	Iāōn (2), -os _{io} (B 2.2; 3.1; 4.4), Aguiōi
ju ²	4	+	thūma (1)(2)(3), kuneue
le	1		aethleei
ma	3	++	thūma (1)(2)(3)
ne	3	+++	kuneue
re	3	+++	hiereiāi, hiereuōn
s+	10	++	Thuiāi, thūma (2), Tharso _{ios} , Tharso _{ia} , theāi (1), tharsuowens (2)
sa ¹	9	+	sa ¹ -si ⁴ , Aguiāi, theāi (1)(2)(3), Asiēwei, Asion, Thars _{iadās}
sa ²	10	++	Thuiāi, sa ² -si ² , Sardeōn, Sardesi, tharsuowens (1) (2), ēthaiān
sa ³	1	++	tharsuowens (2)
sa ⁴	6	++	Sardeōn, Sardesi, theāi (2), [Iāōn (2) = + 's]
se ¹	4	++	theios, theōi (?)
se ²	4	+++	aethleei, hiereuōn, theāi (3)
se ³	3	+++	theāi (2)
se ⁴	11		hiereiāi, theāi (1), theān, aethleei, ēthaiān, Thars _{iadās}
si ¹	12	+	Diwounsii (<i>bis</i>), hiereiāi (<i>bis</i>), Tharsoi (1)(2), Sardesi, Asiēwei, theāi (2), Iāōn (2)
si ²	6	++	hiereuōn, Asion, theāi (3), huphiēsi, [sa ² -si ² = + 's]
si ⁴	5	+	sa ¹ -si ⁴ , theāi (1)(3), theios, Thars _{iadās}
so ⁴	5	++	Tharsoi (1)(2), Tharso _{ios} , Tharso _{ia} , Iāōn (1)
su ³	10	+++	Diwounsii, Thuiāi, huiwi, thūma (3), tharsuowens (1), theān, hiereuōn, huphiecho, Hug ^u ieian, Tharsoi (2)
su ⁴	5	++	thūma (1), Tharsoi (1), s ^u e, huphiēsi, hug ^u iei
we ¹	6	++	s ^u e, tharsuowens (1)(2), Asiēwei, kuneue
wi ¹	3	+++	Thuiāi, huiwi
wi ²	2	+++	Aguiāi, huiwi
wo ¹	4	+++	tharsuowens (1), hiereuōn
wo ²	3	+	Diwounsii, tharsuowens (2), -os _{io} (B 4.4)

LEXICAL INDEX

Together the two sections of this index comprise a complete listing of every occurrence of each word or sign-group on the Phaistos Disk and a glossary of the reconstructed Mycenaean words and proper nouns. In the glossary I have attempted to give the reconstructed word

and an identifying number in parentheses for alternative spellings, all references to the text of the disk, the translation, a grammatical note, my own estimate of the value of the contextual corroboration, references to discussions of the word in this paper, and, in brackets, Mycenaean and Greek parallels. I give my own spelling and interpretation without intending to imply that no other is possible. The abbreviations used for my estimate of the contextual corroboration may be interpreted: C. The word seems to fit in available context. GC. There is excellent corroboration through good context. SC. The context is excellent and the word provides a superior click.

1. Reconstructions

- aethleei** (B 2.1), "contend" in battle or for a prize, "struggle" (3rd pers. sing., pres. ind. act.). SC. See §§84 and 86, and n. 190. [ἀθλέω, ἀεθλέω, Hom., Hdt. +. On the probable *ƒ* see Boisacq s.v. ἄ(ƒ)εθλον, and n. 175 below.]
- Aguiāi** (A 4.2), pers. name, fem. of *Aguiōi*, *q.v.* (dat. sing.). C. See §72, n. 188, and below. [Cf. ἄγυια, Hom. +.]
- Aguiōi** (B 4.12), pers. name, masc. of above (dat. sing.). C. Cf. Agyieus (Apollo). See §§72, 78, and 86; nn. 163 and 188. [Cf. Ἀγυιεύς, Eur. +.]
- Asiēwei** (B 3.5), "to, for the man from Asia" (dat. sing. masc.). SC. See §§81–82 and n. 186. [Cf. ἄσιος, Hom. +; Ἀσία, Pindar +; Ἀσιότης, etc., Aesch. +; Ἀσιανός, Thuc. +; etc.; cf. PY: *a-si-ja-ti-ja* ?]
- Asion** (B 3.7), "Asiatic, in Asiatic fashion" (adj., acc. sing. neuter, used adverbially of manner or representing a cognate accusative). GC. See §§81–82 and n. 183. [ἄσιος Hom. +; see s.v. *Asiēwei*.]
- Diwounsii** (A 1.3; 3.5), "to, for Diounsii"; i.e. "Dionysos," the Phrygian spelling of the god's name (dat. sing. masc.). SC. See §§60–61, 69, and nn. 144–47. [Phrygian Διουνσις (n. 147). Cf. PY: *di-wo-nu-so-jo* (n. 146); Διώ-, Διόνυσος, Hom. +. Cf. also Thracian Zonnyxos.]
- ēthaiān** (B 2.3), "honored, trusty" (acc. sing. fem.). SC. See §65. [ἡθαῖος, Pindar; cf. ἡθεῖος, Hom. +.]
- euchos(?)** (A 1.1, 4), "vow, votive offering" (nom. [or acc. ?] sing. neuter). C. See §90. [εὐχος, Hom. +; "vow, votive offering," Plato. Cf. PY: *e-u-ke-to* = *euchetoi*, not = "prays"; see *Documents*, p. 394.]
- Haliosōi(?)** (B 4.4), pers. name? "Halios," a sea-god? (gen. sing. masc.). C. See §90 and n. 203. For *-osōi* see s.v. *theiosōi*. [Cf.

Ἀλιος (*bis*), *Ἀλίη*, *ἄλλαι*, "the Nereids," Hom.; *ἄλιος*, "of the sea," Hom. +; used of Nereus, etc.; note esp., used of Apollo, Aristotle.]

hiereīāi (A 2.5), "to, for the priestess" (dat. sing. fem.). GC. *-si* (plur.) for final *-i* possible. See §§64, 83, and n. 155. [KN, PY: *i-je-re-ja*; *ἱέρεια*, Hom. +.]

hiereuōn (B 3.6), "sacrificing, offering sacrifice, slaughtering for a feast" (nom. sing. masc., pres. part. act.). GC. See §83. [*ἱερεύω*, Hom. +; cf. KN, PY: *i-je-re-u*, etc.]

hug^uiei (A 4.11), a quality or attribute of the goddess (Tharso, Athena), the possession of which gave her the title or name of *Hug^uieia*, "Hygieia," *q.v.* (dat. sing. as of *ὑγιής*, but a *noun*). C. See §72. [Cf. *ὑγιής*, Hom. +. Cf. s.v. *Hug^uieian*.]

Hug^uieian (B 4.3), "Hygieia," title here of Tharso as it is of Athena (see §72) later (acc. sing. fem.). SC. See also n. 166. [*< IE *su-g^ui-* (see n. 166). *Υγίεια*, Hippoc. +; *ὑγίεια*, etc., Hdt. +. 'Υ. Ἀθηνᾶς, Plut. *Per.* 13. With Athena cf. KN: *a-ta-na*.]

huiwi (A 4.3), "to, for (her) son" (dat. sing. masc., "Homeric short form"). GC. See §68. [*υῖός*, Hom. +; *υῖ*, Hom. +.]

huphieho (B 3.9), "yield, submit, give way, capitulate" (2nd pers. sing. pres. imperative mid.). SC. See §§85–86 and nn. 192–94. On "contract" forms of the *μi*-verb see §85. [*ὑφίημι* (*i*), Hom. +; cf. PY: *i-je-to* and *jo-i-je-si* = *hō hiensi*. Cf. KN, PY: *u-po*.]

huphiēsi (B 4.8), "yielded," capitulated, came to terms with, made a covenant with (3rd pers. sing., pres. ind. act.). SC.

Iāōn (1) (B 1.1), "Iacon," later Ion (nom. sing. masc.). SC. See §§78, 86, 99, 101, and n. 175. [*Ἴων*, Hdt. +; cf. Ἴάονες, "Ionians," Hom. +; and KN pers. name *i-ja-wo-ne*. For absence of *w* see n. 175.]

Iāōn (2) (B 4.9). SC.

kūneue (B 4.2), "make obeisance to" (2nd pers. sing., pres. imperative act.). GC. See §89. [Cf. *κυνέω*, Hom. +; = *προσκυνέω*, Eur. +.]

Sardeōn (B 1.2), "of Sardis" (gen. plur.). SC. See §§80–82 and n. 181. [*Σάρδεις* -εων, Aesch. +.]

Sardesi (B 2.6), "at Sardis" (loc.-dat. plur.). SC. [*Σάρδεις*, Aesch.]

s^ue (A 1.3; 2.2, 5, 6; 3.3, 5, 6; 4.1, 3, 5, 8, 12; B 4.12), "and" (enclitic particle). SC. See §§45–53. [Cf. *-qe*, Linear B and Enkomi; τε, Hom. +. Cf. Arcado-Cyprian *se* and Latin *-que*. See esp. §§53 and n. 124.]

Tharsiadās (B 4.5), "son of Tharso" (nom. sing. masc.). SC. See §88 and n. 198. [See s.v. *Tharsoi* (1). -ιάδης, Hom. +.]

Tharsoi (1) (A 4.7), "to, for Tharso," pers. name of a goddess who was or later became identified with Athena (dat. sing. fem.). C. See §§59, 63, 72, and n. 139. [*Θαρσώ*, Sch. II. 5.2; *Θρασώ*, Lycoph. (iii B.C.). Cf. *θάρσος*, Hom. + ; *θρασύς*, Hom. +.]

Tharsoi (2) (B 4.11). GC. See §86.

Tharsoia (B 2.4), "Tharso" (acc. sing. fem.). GC. See §§65, 77.

Tharsoios (A 4.10; B 3.2), "of Tharso" (gen. sing. fem.). GC. See §77.

tharsuowens (1) (B 1.3), "bold, daring," with punning, proleptic connotation, "of, belonging to Tharso" (adj., nom. sing. masc.). GC. See §§78-79 and nn. 178, 180. [Cf. *θάρσος*, Hom. + ; *θρασύς*, Hom. + ; *θαρσήεις*, iii B.C.]

tharsuowens (2) (B 4.10). GC.

theāi (1) (A 4.12), "to, for the goddess" (dat. sing. fem.). GC. See §§67 and 74-77; n. 160. [Cf. s. vv. *theios* and *theōi* (?). *θεά*, Hom. +.]

theāi (2) (B 4.1). SC. See §§74-77 and 86.

theāi (3) (B 4.6). GC. See §§74-77 and 80.

theān (B 2.5), "the goddess" Tharso (acc. sing. fem.). SC. See §§65 and 74-77.

Thearneios (B 3.4), pers. name of son and father of Tharso (nom. sing. masc.). C. See §88 and nn. 197 and 203. Cf. *Tharsiadās* (B 4.5). [*Θεο-*, Hom. +. For PY: *te-o-po-* [and *ἀρπειός* (Hom. +) see n. 176.]

Thearneiosio (B 2.2; 3.1), gen. sing. masc. C. For *-osio* see s.v. *theiosio*.

theios (B 3.3), "divine" (adj., nom. sing. masc.). GC. See §§74-77 and 88. [Cf. PY: *te-i-ja* and *ḫēson* tablet: *de-jo*; *θεῖος*, Hom. +.]

theiosio (A 4.9), "of the divine" Tharso (gen. sing. fem.). GC. See §§63 and 74-77; n. 151. For *-osio* = Linear B *-oio* see §§96 and 101. Spelling rules permit also *theos* and *theosio*; see s.v. *theōi* (?) and n. 151.

theōi (?) (A 4.6), "to, for the goddess" Tharso (dat. sing. fem. = *theāi*, q.v.). GC. See §90. [KN, PY: *te-o*, *te-o-jo*, *te-o-i*; *θεός*, Hom. +.] Cf. s.v. *theios*, *theiosio*.

Thuiāi (A 2.1), "to, for Thuia," eponym of the Thyiads (dat. sing. fem.). SC. See §69 and n. 163. [*Θυία*, Hdt. + ; cf. *θυιάς*, Aesch. +.]

thūma (1) (A 2.3), "a victim, sacrifice" (nom. [or acc. ?] sing. neuter). C. See §87. [*θῦμα*, Argos, v B.C., Aesch. +.]

thūma (2) (A 2.6; 3.3, 6). C.

thūma (3) (A 4.4). C.

2. Transliterations

$s + dja^2 - se^4 - sa^2 - \dagger 15$ (B 4.7) §90
 $s + sa^1 - \dagger 11$ (A 3.1, 7)
 $[[s +]]se^3 - sa^2 - re -$ (A 4.1)
 $sa^1 - si^4$ (A 1.2); $sa^1 - si^4 -$ (A 2.2); $sa^2 - si^2$ (A 3.4) §70 and n. 188
 $se^4 - ja^1 - \dagger 15$ (B 3.8) §90
 $se^4 - sa^2 - go^? - sa^4 - si^1 - we^1$ (A 3.2, 8)
 $si^2 - gu - \dagger 44 -$ (A 4.8)
 $wi^{-1} \dagger 16 - se^4 - wo^1$ (A 2.4)
 $\dagger 4 - se^2$ (A 3.9)
 $[[.]] - se^4 - wo^1 -$ (A 4.5)

NOTES

1. A small part of this paper was presented in different form at the annual meeting of the American Philological Association at Hartford, Connecticut, on December 30, 1960. I owe a debt of gratitude to Cedric Hubbell Whitman, whose kind efforts made it possible for the articles on both the Enkomi tablet (see n. 2 below) and the Phaistos Disk to appear in print as soon as they did.

2. To save space the following works will be referred to in abbreviated form:

John Chadwick, *The Decipherment of Linear B* (Cambridge 1958 [or Modern Library Paperbacks]). (Chadwick, *Decipherment*.)

Henry D Ephron, "The *Ἰῆσον* Tablet of Enkomi," *HSCP* 65 (1961) 39-107 (Ephron, *ἸΤ*).

Henry D Ephron, "Mycenaean Greek: A Lesson in Cryptanalysis," *Minos* 7 (1961, forthcoming) 63-100 (Ephron, "Cryptanalysis"). I regret that because I do not have a copy of the page proof available I am unable to check the page references to this article.

Spyridon Marinatos (text) and Max Hirmer (photographs), *Crete and Mycenae* (New York [1960]). (*Crete and Mycenae*; but when the name Marinatos or Hirmer is mentioned, the reference will be to this work without further specification.)

Benjamin Schwartz, "The Phaistos Disk," *JNES* 18 (1959) 105-12 (Schwartz I); "The Phaistos Disk II," *ibid.* 222-26 (Schwartz II); "Notes and Afterthoughts on the Phaistos Disk Solution," *ibid.* 227-28 (Schwartz, "Notes").

Michael Ventris and John Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge 1956). (*Documents*.)

Names of journals are abbreviated as in *AJA* 62 (1958) 3-8, of ancient authors as in *OCD* (1949) ix-xix except when lengthened for greater clarity.

3. See especially the comments of Spyridon Marinatos (n. 2 above), p. 142, for the latest published résumé at the time of writing; see also his references.

4. The introductory remarks in Schwartz I (n. 2 above), p. 105, may be of interest to anyone totally unacquainted with the history of the Phaistos Disk. Ignore any claims of solution for reasons discussed above, §§4-10.

5. Anyone desiring to make a detailed study of the disk and of my points may want to consult the originals from which the plates were made. For Plates

1 and 4 I used the reproductions of the Phaistos Disk in Christian Zervos, *L'art de la Crète néolithique et minoenne* ("Cahiers d'art"; Paris 1956), Figs. 433-34 on p. 302. The beautiful photographs are approximately the same size as the copies used for this article. Plates 2-3 are reproductions of Max Hirmer's photographs used in *Crete and Mycenae*, Figs. 72 and 73. The large size of the latter along with their truly amazing clarity will make them a must hereafter for anyone desiring to make a minute study of the disk. With a diameter of over seven inches they are larger than the disk itself (about six and one-half inches). Luigi Pernier and Luisa Banti, *Il palazzo minoico di Festòs I-II* (1935-1951), has not been available to me, but my former student, James A. Barthelme, who has a trained appreciation of art objects, has informed me that its reproductions of the disk are inferior to those I have been discussing.

6. *Decipherment* (n. 2 above) 19-20 and 29-30.

7. See n. 3 above. See also the somewhat more detailed discussion in Schwartz I, p. 105, and "Notes," p. 227. Even if the language of the disk is Mycenaean Greek, however, it is not at all necessary to force the deduction of the excavator into meaning a date as late as Linear B. The writing system of the disk was definitely more primitive than Linear B, lending credence to a quite early *terminus ante quem*. This proves nothing, for, as Marinatos suggests (p. 142), Egyptian practice indicates the possibility of the retention of the use of hieroglyphs for religious documents as a *tour de force* after the development of a linear script. But just as there is no reason on the basis of present evidence for assuming a provenience for the disk other than Cretan, I see no reason for assuming that there cannot be a tablet of Cretan provenience with Mycenaean Greek writing on it considerably older than the Linear B found at Knossos.

8. David Diringer, *The Alphabet* (New York 1948) 78. Marinatos (p. 142): "... one of the most remarkable inscribed objects to be found in Crete."

9. Chadwick, *Decipherment* 20.

10. E.g., *ibid.*: "... so useful an invention . . ."

11. See Ephron, *JT* (n. 2 above) 51, §22.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 52, §24.

13. I have watched the ticket clerk at a railroad station choose three rubber stamps from a group of perhaps a hundred made to fit the hand and clearly labeled in black and white. I watched their use and the care with which they were returned to their places, and I speculated on what it would have been like without modern handles, without labels, without the modern, efficient arrangement, if each stamp represented one letter and all writing had to be done in this manner. I considered the possibility of a hundred symbols and two or more stamps for each symbol. An even better example perhaps is the preparation of the sign on a theatre marquee. One should note the time expended in picking out the letters, the attempt to save time by using letters from the previous show, and the care necessary to place each letter correctly. The writing system of the Phaistos Disk cannot have failed to be slow, cumbersome, and exasperating. Most of the scribe's time was probably spent in hunting the stamps he wanted.

14. This is explained above, §37; see Fig. 1 and Table I.

15. A few occurrences are listed in n. 72 below; see also n. 71.

16. Chadwick, *Decipherment* 20: "Only one of each of the set of punches was needed."

17. See §§26ff above.

18. Similarly the fifty-six signs, or possibly fifty-seven (see Ephron, *JT*, n. 11), of the *ḡeson* tablet were allotted fifty-eight numbers by Ventris (compare the earlier signary, Porphyrios Dikaïos, "A Second Inscribed Clay Tablet from Enkomi," *Antiquity* 27 [1953] 236, Fig. 3, with the later, *Documents* 62, Fig. 11).

19. Fig. 72. See nn. 71 and 72 below.

20. To change the numbering system then would have been to invite error because of the use of the earlier numbering in my own work and to invite confusion because my numbering system was already in the hands of a few other people. Similarly no one would have considered changing Ventris' numbering of the Enkomi signary (see n. 18 above).

21. Johannes Friedrich, *Extinct Languages*, trans. Frank Gaynor (New York 1957) 166. See also pp. 166-67, and Chadwick, *Decipherment* 29-30.

22. Schwartz I, II, and "Notes."

23. T. V. Buttrey, review of Sture Bolin, *State and Currency in the Roman Empire to 300 A.D.*, *AJA* 65 (1961) 84.

24. Schwartz I, p. 107. Cf. also Schwartz, "Notes," p. 228: "... was established by overcuttings."

25. Schwartz I, p. 107.

26. My numbering system for the groups is explained above, §14. Meanwhile the sign-groups may be found on Plates 1 and 4.

27. Schwartz, "Notes," p. 228.

28. See n. 5 above.

29. For an explanation of the cause of the overlapping see §24 above. I did not consider this single ease of overlapping of importance except in combination with other evidence which corroborated the same direction of writing, left to right. See "The Writing Technique," pp. 7-18 above, and n. 79 below.

30. This is probably a mere mistake on the part of Schwartz. Presumably instead of "A 20" he meant the already discussed "A 14," an identical sign-group. None of us is, of course, free from the danger of making mistakes. Perhaps one should reverse the order — and thus the emphasis — of Emmett L. Bennett Jr. (rev. of Michael Ventris and John Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek, Language* 3 [1957] 553-68): p. 564, "Scholars — like scribes — should not make mistakes," and p. 562, "Scribes — like scholars — may make mistakes."

31. "Notes," p. 228.

32. See §§36 and 38-39 above for my findings when I checked these same methods for possibilities in early 1958.

33. Special definitions of "assumption," "break" (a code or cipher), and "click," used as technical terms in cryptanalysis, are given in Ephron, *JT* 103, n. 9.

34. Italics mine. Schwartz I, p. 108.

35. Italics mine. Ibid.

36. On the role of assumptions see §31 above and Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," pp. 63 and 67.

37. One very excellent click was obtained: *wa-tu-qe e-ra-to(s) e-e-si*, "and the town Erato are" (Schwartz II, p. 226, Face A). On the worthlessness of a single good click unsupported by others see my discussion of the problem in connection with my own work at the point where I threw out my click, "the golden chariot of the king," and started over again (§§41-42 above and n. 106 below). Cf. Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," p. 67.

38. Schwartz II, p. 226.

39. Ephron, *JT*, "The Goal Provided by Linear B," pp. 50-51; see also *ibid.*, "The Greek Words," pp. 73-75.

40. See Schwartz I, pp. 105-107. Diringer, *The Alphabet* 78, says without qualification, "The direction of writing is from right to left; it starts from the external line." Even Chadwick, *Decipherment* 19-20, says without qualifying "The direction of writing is from right to left."

41. On the solidus see above, §§19 and 51-52.

42. Diringer, *The Alphabet* 79, "... nothing resembling it ..." Chadwick, *Decipherment* 20: "... nothing like it in form or technique has yet been found anywhere in the ancient world. The possibility of decipherment therefore remains beyond our grasp, ..."

43. To attempt to give each discovery concerning the writing technique in chronological order would waste space. I shall take the liberty, therefore, by a quasi-legal fiction, of presenting this chapter as if it were the result of a single study of the disk. Whatever accuracy I can claim, however, is the result of study and restudy first of available drawings, then of the reproductions in Zervos, and finally of those in *Crete and Mycenae*. For those interested I can offer a brief chronology. My first study of the disk took place in early 1958; I made my frequency study then. I was able at that time to deduce the direction of writing and important details of the writing technique, but I put the work aside in favor of the *Jēson* tablet of Enkomi after I had proved to myself that mathematically a solution was virtually impossible with the methods I was using. My next contact with the disk was my analysis of Schwartz's work in the spring of 1960: I made another exhaustive study of the text of the disk and the writing technique. Once the break came, still in the spring of 1960, almost everything fell into place in a few weeks. To cool the ardor of my "passionate pursuit of passionless intelligence" and enable myself to make a cool appraisal of my own work I put my worksheets aside, returning to them several months later: I still judged my results to be quite valid. My metrical results, demonstrated at Hartford (see n. 1 above), I did not achieve until I was en route to that city.

44. Chadwick, *Decipherment* 20 (with strong understatement): "... the skill with which all the available space is filled argues some practice in the maker."

45. Examination of the *Jēson* tablet also shows evidence of the effort of the scribe "to coordinate the amount of material, the space given to each line, and the size of the tablet in order to be sure that all his text would fit on the tablet" (Ephron, *JT*, §2, p. 39; see pp. 39-40).

46. See A 4.12; B 1.3, and 2.4. The references may be easily located by means of Plates 1 and 4, whose chief function is to make the word-groups easy to find, but should then be studied on Plates 2 and 3 to take advantage of the greater clarity.

47. No evidence is shown in Fig. 2, which is merely a device to show the reader where to look in the photographs. References made to Fig. 2 therefore refer also to Plates 2 and 3.

48. A gap must, of course, be left in the circle large enough for a row of figures to pass through.

49. The rounding at *D* on side A lessens its obviousness, but *D* represents such a juncture; however, it is possible that the preceding part was drawn as a real spiral without a juncture at *F*.

50. See §12 above.
51. Ephron, *JT*, §52, p. 76.
52. Where there is missing text the missing number of syllables was used for the count.
53. The exact count for lines 1-20, given consecutively, is: 14, 17, 16, 17, 16, 14, 18, 15, 17, 16, 15, 16, 17, 15, 17, 13, 17, 16, 15, 13 (*ibid.*, p. 58).
54. See §12 above.
55. I have not included my tables of measurements since they would vary for each different-sized reproduction. I made the measurements across the top, bottom, and middle of each space. Anyone who wishes to check needs only a ruler, but the checking of any word-space should be by comparison with others of the same number of signs in a comparable part of the disk.
56. Measurements of the allotted spaces may prove important for other purposes. The context developed in solution indicates the possible omission of an intended final sign (for *-i?* *-jai?*) in A 4.11, which contains three signs: the measurements show clearly that space was allotted for a four-sign word.
57. See §52 above.
58. N.B. Only *assumed*. See n. 36 above. But this assumption is proved in the cryptanalytic chapters.
59. N.B. The scribe considered in advance the number of signs he would use in spelling a word before marking off the space (§18 above).
60. It is not necessary to consider any uncertain instances. See A 1.1 (†9); 1.4 (†9); 2.2 (†2); 3.2 (†22); 3.8 (†22); B 1.3 (†43, nose).
61. The original top of the woman's head can be made out in the Zervos photograph (see Plate 4). My interpretation of the lines of B 1.3 is based on a study of the reproductions in both Zervos and *Crete and Mycenae*.
62. The lines after A 4.8 and 9 do not apply since they represent the correction of an error. See §24 above.
63. See above, n. 43, and also §19.
64. Accidental omission of †33 was not possible for another reason not then available to me. Since the space for the word had been allotted beforehand, room for an additional sign would have remained.
65. The front end of †18 is one-fifth wider than the already crowded posterior.
66. See §20 above for a complete description.
67. See §18 above.
68. See §§5-7 above, esp. §7.
69. There was an earlier attempt to squeeze in †43, for a few ridges of a plume are shown unerased overcutting the word-divider. Note also that immediately following A 4.9, †32, rather obviously damaged, may have been touched up. The correction of 4.8 and 4.9 was made after the printing had gone beyond that point, and presumably after the side was finished.
70. See §19 above.
71. See §3 above. I have kept †28 to designate this sign.
72. The occurrence in B 2.1 (original †27) should be compared with those in B 3.6 and 4.6. Size as well as shape should be considered.
73. Cf., e.g., A 4.8 and B 4.12 with A 1.3 and 3.3.
74. Note that one die seems to print badly at the top: cf. the clearly printed examples of †23 in A 2.4 and B 2.3 with those in A 2.5 and B 2.5. In the Hirmer photograph the length of the upper arm in A 4.12 when measured is distinctly shorter than the same arm in A 2.4 and B 2.3.

75. Cf. †10, e.g., in A 2.1 and 3.4; cf. also the occurrence in B 2.6.

76. Additional examples are cited in the proof of my next point.

77. Other details may be learned from a visual study of the photographs, not included because they are of no importance for purposes of this paper. The line under initial †34 in A 4.1 may have been intended as †1 or may be a scratch. The first sign of A 4.5 may have been erased; at any rate it cannot be read. There is damage near the rim in the vicinity of A 4.6 so that there is no way of knowing whether †1 was inscribed or not beneath the first sign, †35, the bottom half of which is obliterated.

78. See §§19 and 25 above.

79. Points are made above, §§18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24. For the related problem of the previous incising of the lines see §§12, 15, 18, 20, 23.

80. See §§26–30 above.

81. See §§19, 25, 30 above. This cannot be divorced from space control: §§12, 17, 19, 25, 30.

82. Anyone interested in cryptanalytic methods may find the discussion of them throughout Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," of interest. See especially the introductory remarks *ibid.*, p. 63. Discussions from other points of view are available in many places; e.g., *Documents*; Chadwick, *Decipherment*; Friedrich (n. 21 above); Michael Ventris, "A Note on Decipherment Methods," *Antiquity* 27 (1953) 200–206.

83. See Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," pp. 66f. For a discussion of the possible ways of using simple tests on the final solution see *idem*, *JT*, "The Mathematical Odds against Chance," pp. 86–90. No similar complete discussion will be included in this article, but I shall demonstrate how I used such tests as a mathematical aid in *discarding* some apparent possibilities and selecting others, and, among other purposes, for demonstrating the meaningfulness of certain coincidences and combining them into a lead which broke the cipher.

84. *Documents*, pp. 16–22 and Fig. 4. Other methods could have been used, as I have demonstrated by an independent decipherment (Ephron, "Cryptanalysis"). To attempt to use the grid as proof of solution is to show complete misunderstanding of its purpose. The grid represents the original assumption by means of which the values of a number of signs were limited to the point where such a coincidence as the list of Cretan towns based on Kober's triplets (*Documents*, pp. 21–22) became both possible and meaningful. One cannot validly use an assumption also as proof (see Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," p. 67).

85. *Ibid.*, second part.

86. These two methods, aside from his later use of the probable word, were Schwartz's main reliance.

87. Schwartz I, pp. 107ff, Table I, and Fig. 2, makes much of a study of distribution among initials, medials, and finals of the sign-groups, but later breaks the sign-groups up into separate words as he pleases.

88. See Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," Table I, Figs. 2 and 3, and explanatory text.

89. I did this during my first study in 1958: see n. 43 above.

90. The tripectographic frequency distribution replaces the charts prepared for method 3 in Ephron, "Cryptanalysis" (see Fig. 4).

91. See *ibid.*, Table I.

92. I originally prepared this study for both directions.

93. This study was of so little help that I have decided to omit the details as well as the tables of frequency and order of frequency. My method has been described in detail in Ephron, "Cryptanalysis": see especially Table I. For the serious student of cryptanalytic methods the patterns obtained by plotting the order of frequency on graph paper are given in Fig. 5 above for the nine most frequent signs. He may compare them with those given for some of the most frequent signs in Greek and Linear B in Figs. 2 and 3 of the earlier article. He will see that not only is there no obvious *a* or *e* but that except for one sign (Fig. 6 above) there are no good resemblances at all.

94. An assumption for *a* was immediately obvious from a right-to-left direction (see §8 above) and inclined me to that direction. But in cryptanalysis one must be as ready to discard assumptions as to make them. The worst trap for the amateur cryptanalyst is not the temptation to make false assumptions but the emotional inability to discard an assumption which seems too good to throw away (see §35 above).

95. Responsible for the thought was a sudden memory of J. F. Daniel's implied suggestion that signs for open vowels did not exist in Mycenaean-Minoan syllabaries by his (erroneous) placement of "the invention of characters for unaccompanied vowels at the time of the formation of the Classical syllabary" ("Prolegomena to the Cypro-Minoan Script," *AJA* 45 [1941] 263).

96. On the improvement of the resemblance, obtained by combining the counts for *jo*¹ and *jo*², see Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," Fig. 2, where the same method was used to demonstrate before solution the use of a single row for *l* and *r* in Linear B.

97. Even with the larger amount of material offered by the Enkomi tablet, where this method offered a few clues to the values of signs and was of help in breaking the syllabary, I nowhere used it as part of my proof (Ephron, *JT*).

98. See §8 above for Schwartz's contrary practice.

99. The total number of signs in a syllabary may be given as the nearest round number for mathematical testing.

100. Emmett L. Bennett, Jr.'s Linear B signary may be found either in his *MLB* (*A Minoan Linear B Index* [New Haven 1953]), p. 1, or *PT II* (*The Pylos Tablets, Texts of the Inscriptions Found 1939-1954* [Princeton 1955]), p. 201. I have kept this signary in mind in discussing shapes. A version "after Bennett" is given in *Documents*, Fig. 9.

101. See §8 above, and Schwartz I, p. 107.

102. See §35 above.

103. Cf. Linear B: *ku-ru-so*, "gold, golden," *i-qi-ja*, "chariot," *pa₂-si-re-u*, "basileus." **khru-seios*: adjectives ending in *-ios* were usually two-ending at Enkomi (see Ephron, *JT*, §43, p. 61).

104. See §§33-34 above.

105. It should be kept in mind that the main difficulty of beginning the decipherment is that of limiting the values of a sufficient number of signs (see above, §§32 and 36).

106. Schwartz obtained one good click: *wa-tu-qe e-ra-to(s) e-e-si*, "and the town Erato are" (n. 37 above). Since this too was obtained early and was unsupported by other clicks, the same principle of nullification applies. We are dealing here with only nine consecutive signs, three words of three signs each. If we test them by the same method, each word would be 1/3, the acceptable context formed by the verb and noun might be 1/10, and the superb click,

"the city Erato," $1/100$. $1/3 \times 1/3 \times 1/3 \times 1/10 \times 1/100 = 1/27,000$. Again we must multiply by fifty: $50/27,000$. Just as I was influenced by the possible click in labeling at least two of my signs, so Schwartz, as he clearly says (I, p. 111, col. 1), deliberately labeled several signs to obtain his click. I shall use only one, his *si*: "... *e-e-11*. A form of the verb 'to be' is indicated. Since we have two subjects, the form should be the third plural, ... *e-e-si*." He then sees a possible resemblance, which I cannot. If we multiply only once by twenty-five as I did twice for my own click, we have: $50/27,000 \times 25 = 5/108$, or approximately $1/22$. It is unnecessary to reduce the denominator further; the value of the click has been sufficiently nullified.

107. *Documents*, Fig. 12, shows the classical Cypriote signary. For the Enkomi signary see Ephron, *JT*, Fig. 3 (p. 46).

108. Cf. the probable-word method (§36 above).

109. On this fruitful pair and their interchangeability see §§19 and 52 above.

110. This statement would be valid also if one were reading from right to left! On the omission of all repeated sign-groups in the proof see Ephron, "Cryptanalysis," second part (method 2).

111. See above, §39 and n. 99. One of these "equally good resemblances" (CM) in Fig. 10 is Daniel's C-M 45 on p. 254 (see n. 95 above), suggested to me by Victor A. Berch. Another (B a) was Schwartz's choice (see §8 above).

112. Cf. Chadwick, *Decipherment* 82 (on PY Ta641, the tripod tablet): "The odds against getting this astonishing agreement purely by accident are astronomical." Perhaps so.

113. See §19 above.

114. Ephron, *JT*, §33, p. 55: "*s* may represent a range from disappearing *s* or *h* to *ss*."

115. The reader will recognize that †1 was not labeled †S+ at random.

116. Most certainly it did for me!

117. See §19 above.

118. The triptographic frequency table makes all clues of this nature fully available to the cryptanalyst at all times. See above, §37 and Table II.

119. This helps to explain why the average length of the words is appreciably greater than those of Linear B and the *Jeson* tablet.

120. See §38 above. This was my assumption, but I have found no certain case of *w* so used; nor have I found *s* combined with *w* to indicate the *s*-syllable.

121. The signs used initially with †S+ are: †FA, †FE, †NE, †NI, †PE, †VE, †YA, †YE, and perhaps †CE.

122. The symbol was labeled *wu* in the Enkomi signary on the basis of internal resemblances (see Ephron, *JT* 44-48), but the possibility that it is *u* was not eliminated since no other open-vowel *u* was found on the tablet. The evidence of the disk favors its relabeling as *u*. The question is, of course, a purely academic one; it cannot ever affect the reconstruction or interpretation of a word.

123. I continue to refer to "labiovelars," but a syllable pronounced *s^ue*, for example, may be called a labiovelar only by courtesy.

124. Significant also is L. R. Palmer's suggestion without this added evidence that the labiovelars before front vowels were already assimilated in Mycenaean times, giving us, for example, the possibility of *e-ke-qe* = the future, *hexei*. See his "Observations on the Linear 'B' Tablets from Mycenae," *Bull. Inst. Class. Studies Univ. of London*, No. 2 (1955), p. 43, and n. 19, referring to pp. 53ff of his earlier "Mycenaean Greek Texts from Pylos," *Trans. Philol. Soc.*, 1954.

The spelling *su-we*, however, does not exclude the likelihood of a consonant containing within itself both a *t*- and *s*-sound combined, thus not eliminating the possibility that we are dealing with an ancestor of both the dialects with *τε* and those with *σε*.

125. See Ephron, *JT*, "The Resemblances to Linear B Signs," pp. 82-86, and Figs. 5-6.

126. See *ibid.*, "The Mycenaean Order of the *a-ba-ga*," pp. 40-49, and Fig. 3.

127. I had thought when working on the *Jēson* tablet that the Enkomi adapter in order to obtain the shapes he wanted for his internal resemblances made completely arbitrary changes. I have now found that the majority at least of his changes were not arbitrary, but that the adapting scribe in the final shaping of his signs was adhering to another tradition of Greek writing traceable to the signary of the Phaistos Disk.

128. See above, §54, assumption (6).

129. For the use made of spare parts of the signary by both Linear B and the Enkomi syllabary see §54 (6).

130. I do not refer to doubts of successful solution or decipherment, or even of the value of a sign. These obviously still remained. I am referring only to doubts whether I had made the best choice for experimental purposes in accordance with my assumptions.

131. Schwartz II, p. 224, probably makes the same choice for †VA (†12), but it is hard to decide. His Fig. 2 does show this symbol for *ya* (his label), but on p. 224 he gives the value to "PD 39," which his signary (I, Fig. 1, p. 106) shows to be my †15 (†WA).

132. See Ephron, *JT* 44-45, and especially §8 and Fig. 3, for an explanation of what he was trying to do.

133. See Ephron, *JT*, §36-38 for the complete discussion of the occurrences of *ē* < *ā* on the *Jēson* tablet.

134. It is necessary to refer to the signs of the disk as the models, but there is no way of knowing at what remove from the disk the actual models were.

135. See above, §78 and Figs. 21 and 22a.

136. Ordinarily I would subscribe wholeheartedly to the following limitation: M. D. Petruševski and P. H. Ilievski, "The Phonetic Value of the Mycenaean Syllabic Sign *85," *Živa antika* (= *Antiquité vivante*), 8 (1958) 268, "... when the phonetic value of a sign is being determined, all possibilities of hitherto undiscovered phonetic-syllabic values should first be exhausted, and only then could [*sic*] doublets be supposed." In a writing system, however, in which the use of alternative signs is an important part of the writing technique, in which they are used freely, as a careful study of even the undeciphered text shows, and in which the same die is not used twice in the same word, this general rule patently had to be suspended or modified.

137. I tried as far as possible to place resemblances to each B *s*- in row *s*¹, and E *s*- in row *s*²; to open vowels in either syllabary in row *s*³; other signs in row *s*⁴.

138. The spelling rules are given in detail in §§92-97 above.

139. *Θαρσώ*, Sch. II. 5. 2; but see Lexical Index above s.v. *Tharsoi* (1). On Athena and KN *a-ta-na* see *Documents*, p. 126, s.v.

140. See Ephron, *JT*, §35, and references listed there; also p. 73 on (98). It should also be noted that Linear B, which makes no distinction between

voiced and unvoiced consonants, has separate signs for *d* and *t*. How did the pronunciation of *t* differ from that of unvoiced *d*? Could this difference help to explain the confusion of *s* and *t* on the *ḡēson* tablet, and the spelling rule, *s*=*th*, which really is valid for the Phaistos Disk (see §95 above)?

141. From *s*=*h* and *s*=*ts* to *ts*=*th* to *s*=*th*. See, for a possible example, n. 124 above.

142. See C. D. Buck, *Introduction to the Study of the Greek Dialects* (rev. ed.; Boston 1928) 55: "In general φ, θ, χ remained true aspirated mutes, . . . But the pronunciation as spirants . . ., which eventually prevailed even in Attic, may have existed at a much earlier period in some dialects."

143. See above, §§33-35, and esp. 41-42 and n. 106.

144. H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Mythology* (rev. ed.; London 1953) 149: "In discussing DIONYSOS, we are dealing with a god indubitably foreign to Greece, . . . That he is himself a Thracian deity we are abundantly assured; but we know that the Thracians and Phrygians were closely allied races, and by good luck we know the Phrygian form of the god's name, Diounsīs."

145. *Ibid.*

146. For the spelling of the first member see also PY Tn316: *di-we* (dat.). *Documents*, p. 125: "Zeus is clearly intended." The one-word fragment, PY Xa102, *di-wo-nu-so-jo* [, probably offers us a name, but naturally no evidence of its divinity. See *ibid.*, p. 127. A more interesting development is the finding of another fragment at Pylos, Xb1419, published by Mabel Lang since this article went to press (*AJA* 65 [1961] 162 and Plate 58), in which *di-wo-nu-so-jo* appears with *wo-no-wa-ti-si* on the reverse (cf. PY *wo-no*, probably *woinos*, "wine," and KN *wo-no-qo-so*, "wine-dark," name of oxen).

147. "Diounsīs, Guardian of the Dithrera, and Dionysos Dithyrambos," *CR* 41 (1927) 163. See pp. 161-63, and also p. 163: "It would be contrary to all analogy to treat Διουνίσις [that is, the Phrygian word] as a broken-down form of the Greek word Διόνυσος. To those who incline to this view I would recommend a study of the Imperial religious epigraphy of Phrygia; personally I know no instance of a god's name or title being bowdlerised." The sentence quoted in the text immediately follows this passage.

148. See Chadwick, *Decipherment* 91-92, for an excellent illustration and explanation of this.

149. See Ephron, *ḡT*, "The Goal Provided by Linear B," pp. 50-51.

150. I shall omit the suprascript numbers as a rule, but shall include them sometimes to make a point.

151. See Ephron, *ḡT* 96, s.v., and Commentary, p. 72 (88) and (88-89). The elastic spelling rules permit *theoio*, "of the goddess," but the sure cases of "goddess" on the disk end in *-a*, while *-ios* adjectives are usually two-ending on the *ḡēson* tablet (*ibid.*, p. 63 [Commentary (2)]).

152. See above, §54 (3); see also Ephron, *ḡT*, §28, and *Documents*, p. 44, §4.

153. See §59 above.

154. See above, §52 (corollary) and n. 121.

155. See *Documents*, p. 394. There is no way of knowing, because of the elasticity of the syllabary, which of the *s*'s, if any, were intended; e.g., was the the word plural (*-si*), was the first syllable pronounced with an aspirate (*si-*), or did the assumed *s* still exist between *i* and *e* at least as an aspirate (*ise-*)? See Boisacq, s.v. *ἱερός*.

156. It is ironical that side A, with which I broke the syllabary, was the

poorer side, containing the bulk of the unknown names and words, so that little could be done to interpret the text, while side B, after yielding little at first, made the rest of the solution, as far as I could go, possible and supplied the convincing proof of it.

157. *Isthm.* 2. 47-48.

158. Even omitting all repeated sign-groups, and repeated parts when the form is changed, †NE has appeared in four words, †FA, †KE, †PE, and †RA in three words each, †DA and †QA in two each. Of the signs in B 2.5, †PE-FA-NE=*theān*, †NE has appeared in three other words, †PE and †FA each in two others. †RA has twice been used two times in the same word, †DA once (totals [with mentioned omissions]: †RA five occurrences, †DA three).

159. The illustrations used for my oral paper (see n. 1 above) showed the incorrect reversal of †YA and †YE. This is an academic question, however; since both pictograms were labeled *sa*, the reversal produced no error.

160. Whenever the *-i* of the dative was added (*-si*), there was at first a possibility that the dative was a plural in *-si*. My choices have been made on the basis of the context finally developed.

161. Cf. A 2.1, *Thuiāi*, without the *-i*, §69 above. For another method cf. §§19 and 52.

162. See §72 above.

163. Paus. 10.6.4. She is referred to by Hdt. 7.178.2 as daughter of Cephisus, but cf. Paus. loc. cit., and see also W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford 1928) II 209. She is also considered to be mother of Delphus by Apollo. Cf. Thuia, daughter of Deucalion.

164. At this stage of the decipherment.

165. At the moment †TA occurred in no other completely deciphered words and could not be tested.

166. <IE **su-g^ui-*. See Boisacq, s.v. ὑγίης. 'Υγίεια, see Lexical Index, s.v. *Hug^uieian*. ἀγαλμα τῆς 'Υ. *Aθηνᾶς*, Plut. *Per.* 13.

167. See the reconstruction and translation, pp. 64-65 above.

168. See above, §59 and n. 139.

169. H. J. Rose in *OCD* 443, s.v.

170. See above, §18 and nn. 55-56.

171. See n. 169 above.

172. W. E. Leonard and S. B. Smith, edd., T. Lucreti Cari *De rerum natura* (Madison 1942) 175: "It would seem that alliteration, . . . touches something that is very ancient and abiding in man's esthetic sense." Cf. the *t*'s in the famous line from early Latin literature (Ennius *Ann.* 1. 151): *O Tite tute Tati tibi tanta tyranne tulisti*. Cf. also the nine taus in Soph. *OT* 371: τυφλὸς τὰ τ' ὄπα τὸν τε νοῦν τὰ τ' ὄμμασ' εἶ, and the thetas, taus, and sigmas in a line of poetry of a religious nature, *Hymn. Hom. Merc.* 9: λήθων ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς θνητοὺς τ' ἀνθρώπους.

173. See above, Fig. 23 and "The Meter of Side B," §§98-102.

174. I give my figures as they appear in my notes. Since many tests had to be made, their value rested to a great extent on keeping them simple, and I find that I have rounded off numbers and simplified fractions difficult to handle. Thus 47/60 became 4/5; 16/108, 1/7; 19/60, 1/3. Since I am not a mathematician or statistician, and accuracy of detail would have been of little value for my purposes, I have checked my results only to the point of feeling sure that they are valid and not for mathematical or statistical accuracy of detail. For me to

change my results now, consult expert help, or make new tests, would be to vitiate this report as an exposition of my methods. The validity of the solution does not rest on my tests of individual details but upon my total, final results and their passing of whatever tests other scholars may subject them to.

175. See Lexical Index, s.v. *Iāōn* (1). No emphasis should be placed on the absence of *w*. Although obviously still pronounced in the dialects of the disk, *ḡēson* tablet, and Linear B, it may or may not occur as expected in all three. Since it was a disappearing consonant in some dialects, and there is evidence of confusion in consonants during a period of transition, I do not consider the evidence of the syllabic spelling as fully trustworthy for *w* except when overwhelming. In B 2.1, *aethleei*, strongly corroborated by the over-all context, the *w* does not appear in the spelling. The problem needs a complete study of all examples in the three dialects; meanwhile note the intrusion of an unnecessary *w* on the *ḡēson* tablet (*wē* in n. 194 below).

176. For *Aguios* see §72 above. On the linking of *Iaon-Ion* and *Tharso-Athena* see §86 above.

177. See Ephron, *ḡT* 58-59, 99, and Fig. 4.

178. Equivalent to **θραυόεις*; see Lexical Index s.v. Adjectives in *-εις* are formed with suffix *-φειτ-*. For the shift of the *-r-* in Mycenaean cf. PY *to-no* = *thornos*, "chair," vs. *θρόνος*.

179. See the translation, p. 65 above.

180. Cf. Carl D. Buck and Walter Petersen, *A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives* (Chicago n.d.) 460: "When the primitive is an adjective the derivative does not differ in meaning, e.g. *ὀξύεις* (Hom.) 'having a sharp nature' = *ὀξύς* 'sharp'."

181. Of interest is the synzesis of *eō*, making *-deōn* one syllable (see Fig. 23 above).

182. Cf. the beginning of the *ḡēson* tablet. "The renowned travels . . . of the . . . lord of the wandering Argo," and the first word of strophe 2, *ḡēsōn* (Ephron, *ḡT* 59-60).

183. 4.45.3. See How and Wells (n. 163 above), I 320-21. On the exciting new prospects for illuminating the prehistory of Sardis see G. M. A. Hanfmann and A. H. Detweiler, "From the Heights of Sardis," *Archaeology* 14 (1916) 3-11. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 7: "... Asia; scholars have generally accepted H. Th. Bossert's suggestion that the name must have originated in the Bronze Age and that Herodotus . . . was right when he connected 'Asia' with the name of a tribe 'Asias' still known in his day at Sardis. Sardis, then, was the capital or at least a center of the country Assuva." See *ibid.* on the burning of Sardis (13th cent. B.C.) and the defeat of Assuva. A sounding of the Harvard-Cornell Expedition (1960) produced evidence of a small but steady trickle of imports from Greece reflecting contacts extending back to the Late Mycenaean periods of the Bronze Age (*ibid.*). If the Greeks came from the Troad about 1900 B.C., as J. Mellaart, "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean," *AJA* 62 (1958) 9ff, argues, the likelihood of their *very* early contacts with Sardis is greatly increased.

184. For extant Greek forms see Lexical Index s.v.

185. See the list in *Documents*, pp. 100-101.

186. See Buck and Petersen, *Reverse Index* 27, and their Word List on pp. 28-31. This is part of the main function: to form nouns designating someone connected with the primitive noun.

187. Il. 2.461: Ἀσίῳ ἐν λειμῶνι, Καῖστρίου ἀμφὶ ῥέεθρα.

188. Repetition by variant spelling is part of the proof of solution and of correct decipherment even when the word cannot be reconstructed: the same test applies. The difference is one of degree only; the odds against chance become far greater when contextual corroboration can be added to the coincidence. We have seen (§70 above) how useful the unreconstructed repetition, sa^1-si^4 and sa^2-si^2 , was as proof of the assumption $\dagger TA = si^2$. I may not use the basis of an assumption as proof a second time, of course (see n. 84 above), but as Chadwick has clearly shown (*Decipherment*, pp. 91-92), once a sufficient number of coincidences have been found to prove a point conclusively, it no longer matters which step came first. Since the value of $\dagger TA$ has been proved, the repetition can be used as part of the total proof, insofar as it constitutes proof. We have seen (§§78-80 above) how helpful the repetition of B 1.1 and 3 and B 4.9-10 was as a basis for the equation $\dagger KA = sa^4$. It too has become part of the total proof since the equation has been proved by the further coincidences obtained. The variant repetition, *Aguĩōi* and *Aguĩāi* ($ja^2-gu-jo^2$ - and $ja^2-gu-wi^2-sa^1$; see §72 above), can also be shown by the same mathematical test to be part of the proof of solution. Other instances to which the test has been or could be applied are the god-words (§§74-77 above), the Tharso-words (§§59, 63, 77) along with *tharsuowens* (§§78-79) and B 4.5, *se-sa-si-ja-da* (§88), and A 2.5 and B 3.6, about to be discussed in the text above.

189. See *Documents*, p. 394.

190. ἀεθλέω, commoner form (see LSJ s.v.) of ἀεθλεύω; see Lexical Index s.v. On -w- see Boisacq s.v. ἄ(ρ)εθλον, and n. 175 above.

191. See Ephron, *JT*, Fig. 3 and n. 57. The speculations in the note concerning the missing Enkomi signs were based on the assumption that the adapter's changes were arbitrary. Since they were not, the speculations are more futile than ever. However, it might still be worth turning Y upside down and comparing it with †41.

192. The meter shows that the *i* is short in both occurrences, as it is in Homer. This length is correct since the *i* represents a reduplication.

193. Imperf. ind. mid., had the context demanded it.

194. Line 4, *wu-bi-da-we-so*. See Ephron, *JT* 58-59 and 63 (4). This word occurs in the only place in the metrical scheme of the strophe where a succession of more than three short syllables is required (*ibid.*, §56 and Fig. 4); *huphieehō* with its five short syllables and the following *the-* (of *theāi*) give us one of the two occurrences on side B of two consecutive tribrachs. Obviously a metrical need is supplied by these forms.

195. For references see articles in *OCD* s.vv.

196. See above, §52 (corollary) and n. 121.

197. Cf. Θεο- in Greek personal names (Hom.+) and the fragmentary name, PY An39.19, *te-o-po-*[-], which *Documents* interprets s.v. (p. 426) as *Theo-?* and in No. 50 (p. 181) as *Theopo*(*impos?*). For the second element of the compound name I assumed a connection with ἐπρεῖός (Hom.+), "ram" (for the theories on derivation, which are *only* theories, see Boisacq and LSJ s.v.). The meaning of the two elements of the name would then be "god-ram" or "ram-god." (Unfortunately no reference works on Greek names are available to me.)

198. Hem. + . One might expect *o* before the patronymic ending, but variations occur, especially in poetry, and one of the recognized variations is the dropping of a syllable at the end of the stem (see H. W. Smyth, *A Greek Grammar for Colleges* [New York 1920], §846 and c).

199. See §81 above.

200. See the list in Smyth (n. 198 above), §866.10.

201. See *ibid.*, §607, and cf. §866.4.

202. Fig. 22*b* also shows, (5) and (7), the resemblances of †WA (†15) and †YI (†44); note esp. that to C *su* (7). Since E *a* shows no resemblance to any *sa* or *ja*, we may perhaps assume, on the same basis as B *e* from *je*² > E *je* (see above, §55 and §54, assumption [6]), that its resemblance would have been to the spare **wa* > B *wa* or **wa*¹. Neither **wa* has been identified on the disk, but on this basis E *a* and B *wa* would have been matched with the same pictogram. As shown in Fig. 22*b* (8), this is corroborated by their very close resemblance to each other.

203. Hdt. 4.180.5 (Libya). See the summaries on "Tritogeneia" in Rose (n. 144 above), pp. 108–9, and LSJ s.v. Poseidon as the father vs. Thearneios ("ram-god") on the disk may remind one of the story of Poseidon (in the guise of a ram) and Theophane, and their offspring the golden-fleeced ram, but Rose dismisses it with "all manner of variants" (p. 197 and n. 53 on p. 223; Hygin. *Fab.* 3). ἄλιος is also used of Apollo (Aristotle).

204. In the translation more than one interpretation is sometimes possible even with the context to guide us. My remarks in *JT*, §45, hold true here also.

205. Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* (6 vols., rev. ed.; Bloomington, Indiana, 1955–1958), Index No. A 2091.1. Cf. Nos. Q 457.1 and C 54.

206. *Ibid.*, No. A 185.9; Gen. 17:2ff. Cf. Gen. 9:9ff.

207. See Ephron, *JT*, "Orthographic Conventions," pp. 51–57.

208. See *Documents*, pp. 42–48 and 76–83; also Bennett (n. 30 above), pp. 560–64.

209. See above, §54, assumption (3).

210. See §§19 and 30 above. Examples are scattered throughout the chapter, "Decipherment and Solution," §§54–91.

211. In §19 above the replacement initially of a normal *s*-sign by the solidus was discussed.

212. See §101 above. For *oio* < **ooio* cf. C. D. Buck, *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin* (Chicago 1933), §239, "2. Gen. sg.—IE *-osyo*, earliest Greek, with loss of intervocalic *s*, *-oio*, . . ." Since *j* still existed in pronunciation, at least to some extent (e.g., B 1.1, *Iāōn*; B 4.5, *Tharsiadās*; *Jēson* tablet: line 11, *Jēsōn*; line 13, *owjas* [Ephron, *JT*, §31 and p. 59]), the *s* need not be considered as having yet become intervocalic or lost. Cf. *Documents*, p. 79, "Although we have transcribed this form as *-oio* on the Homeric model, it may be questioned whether *-j-* has not here a consonantal value . . .," but the possibility of the continued presence of *s* does not seem to have been considered in the passage.

213. See Ephron, *JT*, §50. This has been touched upon already (§74 above), and examples were given in n. 172. Cf. also Leonard and Smith's Lucretius, p. 175: "For the effect of alliteration, where it is a part of inherited literary traditions, is the satisfaction of a deep and rudimentary sense of form, the focusing of the attention upon the repeated sounds, and the awakening in the reader or listener of the pleasure that comes from certain spaced reiterations

of the same sound effects." This quotation becomes meaningful as one reads aloud Hesiod's invocation to Zeus or listens to a fluent rendering (*Op.* 1-10). A similar experience may be obtained from side B of the disk.

214. *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture*, trans. G. Highet, I (2nd ed.; New York 1945) 432, n. 24.

215. See *JT*, "The Meter," pp. 75-82, and esp. §54.

216. Hes. *Op.* 3-4.

217. See Ephron, *JT*, §§58-59.

218. A prime number, as in the strophe of the *Jēson* tablet (Ephron, *JT* 82, §60).

219. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82; see also *ibid.*, n. 44.

220. *Ibid.*, §60, p. 81.

221. Only ten out of the thirty words begin with a single short: within the strophe each of the three coils does so. I estimated that there was one chance in thirty-four of this happening by accident, another indication perhaps that the division into coils was not arbitrary on my part (see §14 above).

222. See Ephron, *JT*, §53; also §§50 and 57.

223. Line 11. See *ibid.*, pp. 58-59 and 66.

224. Line 13. See *ibid.*, pp. 58-59 and 68.

225. *Od.* 8. 560, 574.

226. See above, §96 and esp. n. 212.

227. Ephron, *JT*, §54 and n. 38.

228. *Ibid.*, n. 38. See line 2, *alāōio*; line 18, *eueroio*; and probably line 94, *ga-ne-lo-jo- ai-*[-].

229. *Thearneiosjo* (*bis*: B 2.2 and 3.1), *Haliosjo* (?) (B 4.4), and if side A is metrical, *theiosjo* (4.9).

230. *JT*, §77, and see also *ibid.*, "Corroborative Evidence for Individual Signs," pp. 90-92. To show the exact evidence available for each individual sign is especially important because, in view of the relationship between the syllabaries, any evidence accepted by scholars generally as corroboration of the value of a sign must usually be at the same time additional corroboration of the sign of the same value in either Linear B or the Enkomi signary.

231. The words are *Iāōn*, *tharsuowens*, *theāi*, *thūma*, *Tharsoi*, *theān* vs. *theāi*, *theōi* (?) vs. *theāi*, *theios* vs. *theiosjo*, *Asiēwei* vs. *Asion*, *hiereiāi* vs. *hiereuōn*, *huphieho* vs. *huphiēsi*, *hug^uiei* vs. *Hug^uieian*, *Tharsjadās* vs. *Tharsojos* (B 3.2, "son of Tharso"), *Tharsoja* and *Tharsojos* vs. *Tharsoi*, *Aguīāi* vs. *Aguīōi*, and *sa¹-si⁴* vs. *sa²-si²*.

232. See above, §62 and n. 148; also §65 and n. 158.

233. The references are listed in the Lexical Index s.vv.

PARMENIDES AND HESIOD

BY EDWIN F. DOLIN, JR.

PARMENIDES' poem sometimes seems to evoke the same fascination and sense of borrowed glory as his wandering moon, shining with a light not its own (B.14):

νυκτιφαῆς περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς

The assurance and calm with which the poem offers this and other examples of disquieting imagery, particularly in the "proem," has stimulated a search for sources and prototypes, whether in mystery religion or in Hellenic myth, legend, and poetry.

It should be said at once, of course, that the power and brilliance are Parmenides' own and not borrowed from anyone. To assume, as this paper does, that the tradition from which Parmenides drew was the main poetic tradition of Homer and Hesiod is not to imply that hexameter poetry by itself somehow accounts for Parmenides. Rather, the assumption is that the tradition was there, pervasively and ineluctably, in the cultural atmosphere, that Parmenides used its motifs and imagery as freely and naturally as he breathed, counting them as allies in his poetic communication with Hellas, and that he criticized this cultural *donnée* whenever he saw fit, which was not seldom, by the very manner in which he made use of what he liked of it.

The prototypal aspect of Homer in Parmenides, especially of the *Odyssey*, has been discussed by E. H. Havelock.¹ Odysseus, the experienced and knowing traveler protected by the goddess Athena, reaches an ultimate place where day and night meet and where he is told by Circe, goddess and daughter of the sun, what road to take home. In another ultimate place, Thrinacia, he finds the immortal cattle of Helios, the sun, guarded by the sun's daughters. Telemachus, Odysseus' son, makes a chariot journey in search of his father. And, in the *Iliad*, Achilles' famous chariot horses are immortal and wise. So, in Parmenides' poem, the narrator is a knowing man (εἰδὼς φῶς) on a journey to an ultimate place where day and night meet and where he is told what road to take. His chariot is drawn by wise, immortal horses. His guides are goddesses, daughters of the sun. The Homeric parallels and language, Professor Havelock remarked, suggest that

the experience of Parmenides is to be viewed as a new form of traditional epic heroism.

Hesiodic parallels, on the other hand, have been remarked by Werner Jaeger, among others. Jaeger, in fact, suggested that the Greeks saw "in Parmenides' adoption of the verse-form of his venerable theological predecessor an avowed intention to compete with him on his own territory . . . Parmenides present(ed) himself as one who had followed in Hesiod's footsteps and beaten him at his own game."²

This article seeks to extend the comparison with the *Theogony* by suggesting a specific parallel between Parmenides' daughters of the sun and the *Theogony's* Muses and by commenting on the parallel between Parmenides' gates of night and day and those of the *Theogony*.³ Its hypothesis is that Parmenides was deliberately attacking the archaic thought processes represented by Hesiod and wished to present himself as the exponent of a new intellectual approach which would be associated in its spirit with the Homeric ideal of the heroic individual.

I

The similarity between the Muses' message to Hesiod and the goddess' message to Parmenides has been widely noted.⁴

ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.

(*Theogony* 26-28)

ὦ κοῦρ' . . .
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προύπεμψε νέεσθαι
τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἧ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν)
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρέω δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ
ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθής.

(B.1.24, 26-30)

The vocative mood is followed in both by the assertion of the two-fold character of knowledge, a stress on truth, and anaphoric syntax: ἴδμεν . . . ἴδμεν, ἡμὲν . . . ἡδὲ.

Typically, for Parmenides, the blunt didactic presentation of Hesiod is softened by Homeric politeness. The *Theogony's* Muses, as though perhaps shepherds themselves, say straight out, "Rustics, disgraces, mere bellies." The goddess, however, greets Parmenides with elaborate epic courtesy. "Graciously, the goddess received me, took my hand in hers and spoke to me these words: 'O youth, accompanied by im-

mortal guides and these horses which bring you to our home, welcome. For no evil destiny sent you forth . . . ' ”⁵

This fusion of a basic Hesiodic form with Homeric tone is characteristic of the whole poem. It is repeated in the merger of the Muses with the daughters of the sun, the Heliades, who bring the poet to the gates of night and day and thus to the goddess herself.⁶ As a group they are the divinities responsible for Parmenides' instruction in the way of truth. If the goddess is comparable to the Muses (as Jaeger believes), then the daughters of the sun may be also. In fact, like the Muses, *Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο* they are *κοῦραι* (B.1.5, 9, 15, 21) and they have a characteristic patronymic: *Ἠλιάδες κοῦραι* (B.1.9).

The *Theogony* opens with a description of the Muses dancing on Mt. Helicon, then moving away at night, veiled in mist, to sing of Zeus and the Olympians and to instruct Hesiod. Parmenides' poem begins with a chariot journey guided by the Heliades, who have left the house of night and cast off their veils and are bringing Parmenides to his place of instruction beyond the gates.

Μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχώμεθ' αἶδειν

ἀκροτάτῳ Ἑλικῶνι χοροῦς ἐνεποιήσαντο

*ἔνθεν ἀπορνύμεναι, κεκαλυμμένοι ἥερι πολλῇ,
ἐννύχια στείχον περικαλλέα ὅσσαν ἰεῖσαι*

(*Theogony* 1, 7, 9–10)

ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν

*Ἠλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα νυκτός
εἰς φάος, ὡσάμεναι κράτων ἅπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας*

(Parmenides B.1.8–10)

The poetic imagination, molding its memories, moves purposefully toward the creation of a new vision. The didactic song of the Muses came at night, veiled, under Mt. Helicon. The didactic discourse of the Heliades comes in the light, unveiled, beyond the gates of any place or time in this world.⁷

The *Theogony's* song of the Muses organized Hellenic religion around Zeus, chief of the third-generation rulers of a changing universe, whom the Muses sang and served. But in Parmenides, Zeus and the Olympians have vanished without a trace, leaving the *κοῦραι* masterless, daughters of a god almost without cult. Their only function is to bear witness to τὸ ὄν, being itself.

To replace the specific, well-defined Muses of Hesiod, Parmenides has created an abstract blend of the sun-daughters of Thrinacia and Circe.

II

The "gates of the paths of night and day" occur at line 11 of the first fragment of Parmenides and recall *Theogony* 736-57. Hesiod there recounts how the rebellious Titans were confined in Tartarus within a wall guarded by the Hecatoncheires, Kottos, Gyes, and Briareos. The place has gates, beyond which is a huge "chasm," the home of night. In front, Atlas supports the sky near where night and day speak to each other as they pass crossing the threshold. Within are Sleep and Death, Night's children, and Hades' house, guarded by Cerberus, and the loathsome sources and ends of the universe (*Theogony* 736-41, 744-49):

ἐνθα δὲ γῆς δυοφερῆς καὶ Ταρτάρου ἡερόεντος
πόντου τ' ἀτρυγέτοιο καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος
ἐξείης πάντων πηγαὶ καὶ πείρατ' ἔασιν
ἀργαλέ' εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοὶ περ,
χάσμα μέγ', οὐδέ κε πάντα τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
οὐδὰς ἴκοιτ', εἰ πρῶτα πυλέων ἔντοσθε γένοιτο,

νυκτὸς δ' ἑρεβεννῆς οἰκία δεινὰ
ἔστηκεν νεφέλης κεκαλυμμένα κυανέησιν.
τῶν πρόσθ' Ἰαπετοῖο πάρις ἔχει οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν
ἔστωις κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ἀκαμάτῃσι χέρεσσιν
ἀστεμφέως, ὅθι νύξ τε καὶ ἡμέρη ἄσπον ἰοῦσαι
ἀλλήλας προσέειπον, ἀμειβόμεναι μέγαν οὐδὸν

The journeying narrator of Parmenides' poem reaches the gates of night and day. They open revealing a huge "chasm." He passes within and is greeted by the goddess (B.1.11-18):

ἐνθα πύλαι νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματός εἰσι κελεύθων
καὶ σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός.
αὐταὶ δ' αἰθέριαι πληνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτοις.
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς.
τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν
πείσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα
ἄπτερέως ὥσειε πυλέων ἀπο. ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων
χάσμ' ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι . . .

The obvious difference, of course, in these two accounts is that Parmenides asserts that his gates are not in Tartarus, but in the ether (αἰθέριαι), just as the chasm beyond his gates contains not Titans, night and death, but the gracious goddess. The "loathsome sources

and ends of the universe" give place to the goddess' account of "well-rounded truth's unshaken heart," which is "like the bulk of a well-rounded ball," Being without beginning or end. As guardians of the chasm, the hundred-handed giants have yielded to Diké. Compare Hesiod's description of the binding of the Titans by the Hecatoncheires, *Theogony* 717-19:

Τιτῆνας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης
πέμψαν καὶ δεσμοῖσιν ἐν ἀργαλείοισιν ἔδησαν
χερσὶν νικήσαντες . . .

with Parmenides' description of the binding of "becoming and destruction" by Diké (and Ananké) B.8.13-14, 26-27, 30-31, 37-38:

τοῦ εἶνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι
οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδησιν
.
αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασιν δεσμῶν
ἔστιν ἀναρχον ἄπαυστον . . .
.
κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάμηκη
πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει . . .
.
ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέδησαν
οὐλον ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμεναι . . .

Like the Heliades and the goddess, Diké is at best only a very distant relation to the well-defined anthropomorphic figures of Hesiod and the myth in general. In fact, popular religion, if not religion altogether, is gone, and we are not surprised. But Parmenides' treatment has done more than simply ignore religion. By carefully evoking Hesiod's effort at systematic presentation of the myth, while at the same time draining it of individuality and twisting its images of dark to light, he has doubly condemned it.

A new vision of man accompanies this new vision of the universe. He is a traveler on a lonely road — τήνδ' ὁδόν, ἧ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν. He is not taken in by the ἔθος πολύπειρον, the established wisdom of society. His road is straight ahead, not παλίντροπος like that of other people. But, lonely though it is, this road will lead him to all knowledge χρεὼν δέ σε πάντα πυνδέσθαι. For him, Diké, the law of nature,⁸ will yield and open her gates. He will pass within and "judge by reason the strife-encompassed proof spoken" (B.7.5-6) by the goddess (κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον/ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα).

The apprehension of the "unshaken heart of well-rounded truth"

is only for the extraordinary man, the hero. The new, rational Theogony, emptied of myth, presents itself as comprehensible only through the heroic spirit of the epic.⁹

NOTES

1. E. H. Havelock, "Parmenides and Odysseus," *HSCP* 63 (1958) 133-43.
2. W. Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford 1947) 93.
3. *Theogony* 736-57; Parmenides B.1.11.
4. "... the goddess is thus an exact counterpart of the Muses," Jaeger, 94; O. Gigon, *Ursprung der Griechischen Philosophie* (Basel 1945) 246-47.
5. B.1.22-28 ἐπεὶ οὐτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προύπεμψε νέεσθαι may recall *Iliad* 1.418 (Thetis to Achilles) τῷ σε κακῇ αἴσῃ τέκον ἐν μεγάροισι.
6. M. Untersteiner, *Parmenide* (Florence 1958) lxvii.
7. Untersteiner, pp. lxxii-lxxiii.
8. Untersteiner, pp. lxxv-lxxviii.
9. The language of Parmenides is fundamentally epic. In fact, the first notable departure does not come until the end of the "proem," when δόξα and πίστις suddenly thrust the fifth century and its preoccupations into the Homeric-Hesiodic context, as the goddess explains the double character of knowledge (B.1.30): ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνι πίστις ἀληθής. Later, the following nouns characteristic of post-epic language occur: κρᾶσις, κρίσις, μίξις, γένεσις γέννα, ἔθος, ἔλεγχος, ὄγκος, τόπος. One verb and one adverb are notably non-epic: νομίζω and βεβαίως. Parmenides' nearly twenty negative adjectives include several which occur rarely or seldom in epic: ἀγένητος, ἀκίνητος, ἀνόητος, ἄπαστος, ἄσυλος. The numerous compound adjectives include three characteristic of the fifth century: ἐμβριθής, ἐπίσημος, εὐαγής. Six others are of interest because of their rarity: ἀχανής, δίκρανος, ἰσοπαλής, νυκτιφαής, παλίντροπος, περίφοιτος.

GORGIAS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE LOGOS

BY CHARLES P. SEGAL

I

GORGIAS OF LEONTINI spanned with his long life (108 years, according to most versions) almost the entire fifth century and at least the first decade of the fourth.¹ He was probably born about 490, a date that agrees with the report in pseudo-Plutarch (DK A6) which makes him older than Antiphon of Rhamnus (born ca. 480) and Socrates (born ca. 470), and would put him in his middle or possibly late sixties when he came to Athens on the famous embassy of 427 (Diodorus 12.53).² The tradition also makes him a pupil of Empedocles,³ and receives some independent support from the reports of Plato and of Theophrastus (DK B4-5) on Gorgias' holding Empedoclean theories of the illumination of the sun and of optics and color.⁴ His activity in Sicily may also have brought him in contact with the Eleatic school and its theories about *to on* and *doxa*, which are perhaps reflected in his apparently early work, *Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* (B3), possibly, though not certainly, identical with the *Peri physeos* (B2) which Olympiodorus (A10, B2) dates to the Olympiad 444-441; and the latter title may also help place Gorgias' early activity partly in the Eleatic tradition; his own "teacher," Empedocles, is, of course, himself said to have been a follower of Parmenides.⁵ But whatever the influence of Eleatic and Empedoclean philosophy on his early years, his mature work in the later fifth century is not immediately concerned with a systematic philosophy and, if anything, implies a definite denial of such an abstract, systematic approach to problems of being and existence. Whatever early philosophical training he had is thus significant more for the negative impression it left than for the inculcation of any positive doctrine, except for the analytical and critical method of argumentation which Gorgias was to apply to the rhetorical *logos*.⁶ It has even been suggested that in the course of his life he rejected the Eleatic position in favor of a Protagorean practical acceptance of the world of *doxa*;⁷ it is not, however, impossible that he retained some interest in philosophical and physical speculations throughout his life, as Gigon has argued, though his later work is oriented primarily toward practical activity within the framework of the *polis*.

Gorgias' relevance to the present discussion, however, lies chiefly in his rhetorical works and their psychological implications. This discussion will be concerned with the assumptions behind his technical rhetorical innovations,⁸ rather than with the linguistic or purely rhetorical nature of those innovations themselves, and hence it will be necessary to pass over rapidly such much-disputed problems as his relation to the Sicilian school of Tisias and Corax and his treatment of *eikos*, problems which belong more properly to the history of rhetoric than to psychology.⁹

Any study of Gorgias must depend primarily upon the two original compositions which have been preserved, the *Helen* and *Palamedes*, both mythological showpieces of rhetoric, one an epideictic encomium, the other a speech of defense intended for a hypothetical court of law. Blass strongly championed their genuineness in the second edition of his *Die attische Beredsamkeit* (1887), and they are generally accepted as Gorgias' work by most modern scholars.¹⁰ The dating of the *Helen* depends in part upon its relation, if any, to the *Troades* of Euripides (415 B.C.) and the *Helena* (412 B.C.);¹¹ it belongs, at any rate, in the last quarter of the fifth century. On the date of the *Palamedes* there is perhaps less agreement. It has been placed as early as the 430's and as late as the first decade of the fourth century, the latter date on the assumption that parts of it imitate the speech of Socrates at his trial in 399.¹² It is probable, however, that Plato's *Apology* has been influenced by Gorgias rather than the reverse; and in general the stylistic criteria (such as the increasing avoidance of hiatus) favor a date at the very end of the fifth or beginning of the fourth century, in any event after the *Helen*.¹³

A further problem encountered in an interpretation of Gorgias is the question of the seriousness with which the views expressed especially in the *Helen* and to a lesser extent in the *Palamedes* are to be taken. Gorgias himself admits at the very end of the *Helen* that it is a *paignion*, "a plaything" or "trifle." Heinrich Gomperz, following in part Blass, has seized upon this term and combined it with the negative dialectic of the work "On Non-being" (B3) to assert that Gorgias had no positive theories at all,¹⁴ that the work "On Non-being" was not even intended as an ironical parody of the Eleatics (as Windelband had held),¹⁵ but was aimed simply at demonstrating the power of his rhetorical-dialectical method; and Gomperz thus characterizes Gorgias as a "philosophical nihilist."¹⁶ Such a view appears extreme, for although it perhaps correctly takes account of the purely linguistic and rhetorical virtuosity of Gorgias, it omits much else in the tradition:

it looks back upon Gorgias from the point of view of the strictly rhetorical interests of the Isocratean school of the fourth century, and neglects Gorgias' links with the past.¹⁷ It is doubtless true that it was the verbal and argumentative facility of Gorgias, more than any other feature of his work, that chiefly impressed his contemporaries, especially with the increase of rhetorical activity in the later fifth century. His use of Empedoclean theories, however, suggests that at least early in his life he was genuinely interested in the physical and ontological problems of the Sicilian and South Italian philosophical schools.¹⁸ Even Isocrates, moreover, refers to Gorgias as having said that "Nothing of the things that are (*ta onta*) exist," and in his *Helen* (3) speaks of him immediately after Zeno and Melissus, while in the *Antidosis* (268) he includes him at the end of a list of *philosophoi* including Empedocles, Ion, Alcmeon, Parmenides, and Melissus, as if the association between Gorgias and the earlier fifth-century Eleatic and Sicilian physical and philosophical speculation was well-known and generally accepted.¹⁹ In addition, as already mentioned, there exist two well-attested reports of his physical interests (B4-5), that on color and optics (B4) being especially interesting because of the attention devoted to *opsis* in the concluding part of the *Helen*.²⁰ Here at least is evidence of a positive "scientific" speculation of Gorgias which touches upon a theme in his epideictic writing. A combination of interests, moreover — in physics, ethics, and practical morality — is not unusual even for the later fifth century, as is attested for Prodicus, Protagoras, Thrasymachus, Hippias, Antiphon the Sophist, and Critias, and is thus equally plausible for Gorgias, especially because he is among the older sophists and hence was brought up in a period of intense speculation on *ta physika*.²¹ The description of the grave-monument of Isocrates, which contained a representation of Gorgias looking at an "astrological sphere" (A17), perhaps provides a further instance of his physical speculations.²² Plato too, scornful as he is of Gorgias' conception of rhetoric, treats him with respect and gravity as a man holding serious — if Platonically unacceptable — views.²³ And it has further been suggested that his treatment of the Helen story, even though a *paignion*, bears some resemblance to the later Euripidean technique of treating mythological material in a "modern," rationalistic and psychological manner, for the discussion of theoretical ethical or social problems.²⁴

It would, of course, be incorrect to go so far to the other extreme as to make Gorgias a great moral theorist. Obviously he is primarily a rhetorician, but one with broad interests — practical rather than theoretical — and a grounding in some of the ontological and physical

conceptions current in his day. The absence of a systematic ontological theory in Gorgias does not preclude the presence of a real rhetorical-aesthetic theory with some psychological basis. Gorgias' denial of the existence or communicability of true "Being" would not necessarily have hampered his practical activity, for, as Gigon has well noted, the *sophistes* of the fifth century is not so strictly committed to an ethic resting upon theoretical foundations as the *philosophos* of the fourth, nor is he likely to have isolated himself from practical life because he could demonstrate syllogistically that nothing exists.²⁵ Thus W. C. Greene has adopted a balanced view which probably comes close to the truth: while admitting the practicality of Gorgias, he takes note of his physical interests and his attention to "the psychological analysis of motives and . . . the plausible or sufficient appeal to the feelings."²⁶ Hence, as will appear presently, Gorgias' interest in *doxa* and the problem of Being, while admittedly not to be construed as a sign of a systematic metaphysics, may be relevant to a theory of communication and persuasion, with which he was, for purely practical reasons, deeply concerned; and there are, as will be shown, elements of an aesthetic theory in the *Helen*. The speech itself, in fact, is as much an encomium on the power of the *logos* as on Helen herself (Isocrates himself noted that it was not really the latter);²⁷ and thus the *Helen* expresses a view of literature and oratory which touches closely Gorgias' own practice and probably his own beliefs. Hence the speech may even have served as a kind of formal profession of the aims and methods of his art, a kind of advertisement like the *ἐπάγγελμα* of Protagoras or the sample pieces which Plato attributes to Hippias and Prodicus.²⁸

There are, moreover, other elements among the preserved fragments of Gorgias which reveal a more positive cast of mind than that of an absolute sceptic. He seems to have had a political idealism of sorts in his belief in the unity of Greece against the barbarians, in this anticipating his pupil Isocrates. He deplores victories over fellow Greeks (B5b) and is said to have made *homonoia* the main topic of his *Olympikos* (B8a);²⁹ and the topic of good will (*eunoia*) to Greece as a praiseworthy virtue appears prominently even in the *Palamedes* (3; cf. 30), where the whole setting and the subject itself sharply oppose Greeks and barbarians. Plato, it is true, charges Gorgias with an amoral attitude toward his art, and chides him (*Meno* 95c, DK A21) for laughing at those who claim to teach *arete* and limiting himself to making men "clever (*deinous*) at speaking." He also criticizes his supposition of a plurality of special *aretai*, the peculiar excellences of individual persons or *pragmata* (*Hel.* 1); and Aristotle continues this criticism, numbering

Gorgias among those ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς.³⁰ Practicality, however, need not imply amorality or immorality, and Gorgias is hardly to be censured from the point of view of the linguistic or moral generalizing tendency of fourth-century Platonism. Gorgias' usage of *arete* simply follows the common practice of the fifth century before the redefinition of the word by Plato; and the closely parallel phrase γυναικεία ἀρετή is in fact used by Pericles in the Funeral Oration (2.45.2; see DK B19). Yet Gorgias may have given more consideration to educational matters, for his funeral epigram speaks of him as best at ἀσκήσαι ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς εἰς ἀγῶνας. Such evidence, of course, is of doubtful value and may be simply a case of *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*; and the language of the epigram itself is highly conventional.³¹ It is more significant that in the *Apology* (19e) Socrates joins Gorgias with Prodicus and Hippias as aiming at παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους (DK A8a). But although Gorgias did not perhaps regard the teacher as entirely free from all moral responsibility, as Plato has claimed,³² he did probably concentrate upon the purely technical aspects of his art rather than its moral implications.³³ Such a procedure is evident from the treatment of *peitho* in the *Helen*. Plato himself, however, directs his attack upon the potentially immoral consequences of such an attitude and not at Gorgias himself, who soon disappears from the scene of the *Gorgias*; and Gorgias' own reputation remained unsullied after his death (DK A8).³⁴ Like his colleagues, Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, Gorgias seems simply to have accepted the institutions of society as the necessary framework in which the civilized man can live and work.³⁵ Thus in the *Helen* (16) *to kalon* is defined by *nomos*, and *nomos* itself is a kind of "habit" or "accustomation" (συνήθεια). He would seem, moreover, to have shared in some of the more idealistic and rationalistic speculations on *nomos*, for in the *Epitaphios* (B6) he opposes νόμου ἀκρίβεια τοῖς λόγων ὀρθότης in the spirit of Democritus B181, and speaks of doing and saying *to deon* as the θεϊότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον. Finally, his admonition on the duty of a good woman, that her reputation, not her figure, should be known to many (B22), falls within the conventional attitudes of Greek morality, such as that expressed by Pericles (Thuc. 2.45.2); and in the same vein is the statement about the *arete* of man, woman, and child in B19: a man's *arete* is "to engage in the affairs of the city and so doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and take care that he himself does not suffer anything similar." All that Gorgias could be reproached with here is the traditional Greek attitude toward *arete*.

A perhaps more profitable and relevant approach to Gorgias lies in an examination of his preserved fragments rather than a re-evaluation

of Plato's judgment. Gorgias, it will appear, reflects the continued interest of the late fifth century in the internal processes of the psyche, and the application of this awareness of the area of psychic phenomena to rhetoric and a *techne* of persuasion. The *Helen* in particular is based largely upon an analysis of human action in terms of emotional causality, and *eros* is a recurrent theme throughout the work.³⁶ *Eros* and *epithymia* have great motive power, and through the agency of Helen's beauty even cause such large-scale undertakings as the bringing together of the host for the Trojan War (*Hel.* 4). *Eros* is the real cause of Helen's action (15); it is a disease (*nosema*) and has the power of *anankai* (19).

The *nosema* image is especially interesting, for it implies an equation of the psychic-emotional activity with tangible physiological processes. The psyche is thus elevated to the place of physical reality. Gorgias elaborates on this equation with great explicitness in an important passage, *Helen* 14, the section which summarizes his little encomium on the power of the *logoi*:

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει ἢ τε τοῦ λόγου δύναμις
πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τάξιν ἢ τε τῶν φαρμάκων
τάξις πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν.

Here the term used of the psyche, *taxis*, is deliberately concrete; and the psyche is equated immediately with the equally tangible *physis* of the *soma*.³⁷ The next sentence elaborates this physical equation still further and draws out the parallel between the effect of the *pharmakon* on the disease (*nosos*) and life of the body and the effect of *logoi* on the psyche and the emotions. The equation has, in fact, proceeded so far that by the end of the section Gorgias fuses the physiological and psychological senses of the term *pharmakon*, for he returns to this word in the phrase *ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν*, but now in a metaphorical sense and in coordination with the term *ἐξεγοήτευσαν*, which previously occurred in a strictly literary-psychological context (*Hel.* 10). Thus the physiological meaning of *pharmakon* at the beginning of section 14 is equated with its psychological significance at its end; and similarly the *nosos* of 14 recurs with an extended metaphorical and emotional significance in 19. The processes of the psyche are thus treated as having a quasi-physical reality and, perhaps more significant, as being susceptible to the same kind of control and manipulation by a rational agent as the body by the drugs of the doctor. This equation is, of course, already familiar from Democritus B31, "Medicine (*iatrike*) cures the diseases (*nosous*) of the body, but wisdom (*sophie*) takes away the psyche from sufferings (*pathe*).'' It need not be argued that Gorgias is influenced by

Democritus (or vice versa); both men rather reflect, from different points of view, the interest in the extension of a measure of descriptive analysis and control to the life of the psyche. In another important passage of the *Helen*, Gorgias, like Democritus above,³⁸ speaks of the *pathe* of the psyche: in describing the effects of pity and fear produced on the psyche by the tale of another's woes or successes, he concludes that in such cases, ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχὴ (9). The repetition of the idea in both the verb and the cognate accusative heightens the emphasis on *pathos*. In this emphatic repetition, moreover, there is perhaps a further association with the passage discussing the *bia* in Helen's departure shortly before (7), where also the *topos* of pity (*eleos*, *oiktirai*) is connected with the here physical *pathos* of Helen: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινὰ, ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε. "It is just, therefore," he continues, "to pity the one, but to hate the other." Section 7, in other words, presents a purely physical *pathos*, an objective act, which arouses pity; in section 9, however, the psyche and its emotions are discussed, and the application of the same term, *pathos*, to the psyche in a different context thus helps to give to this subjective emotion an objective, physical reality. This reapplication of *pathos* to psychic activity is analogous to the metaphorical reuse of *pharmakon* at the end of 14; and the association of *logoi* with *pathos* in 9 prepares the terminological ground for the more systematic equation of *logoi* with the medical *pharmaka* throughout 14.

The force of the *logoi* thus works directly upon the psyche; they have an immediate, almost physical impact upon it. Hence, in 13, Gorgias speaks of *peitho* as an almost active force, coming into the *logos* and forming or molding the psyche as it wishes.³⁹ In 12, *logos* is said to persuade the psyche directly (λόγος γὰρ ψυχὴν ὁ πείσας), and in 10 the *dynamis* of ἐπωδὴ is described as συγγινομένη τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς and thus persuading and "changing it to another state" (μετέστησε), the last being another quasi-physical term, like the *taxis* of 14, applied to the psyche; and the same physical term *dynamis* is used in 14 of the action of the *logos* on the psyche. Plato in his *Gorgias*, furthermore, describes the aim of Gorgianic rhetoric as "putting persuasion in the psyche of the audience" (452e).⁴⁰ It is thus apparent that Gorgias regarded his rhetoric as having more than a superficial effect on the ear, as actually reaching and "impressing" the psyche of the hearer. All persuasion is thus action upon and manipulation of the psyche of the audience; and the *dynamis* of the *logos* (*Hel.* 14) acts like a real drug in affecting the state of the psyche. Thus the *techne* of Gorgias rests upon a "psychological" foundation: it is at least assumed that the psyche has an

independent life and area of activity of which the rhetor must learn and which to some extent he must be able to control.⁴¹

There is, moreover, even a closer relation between the emotional life of the psyche and the physiological phenomena with which these psychic processes are made analogous, for not only does the psyche have a quasi-physical reality, but it also manifests its affects in physical signs, the "shudder" (*φρίκη*) and "weeping" (*πολύδακρος*) alluded to in 9, where Gorgias shows his interest too in the physiological form by which movements within the psyche are indicated.⁴² The psyche is thus not yet the completely spiritualized or dematerialized entity which it is to become for Plato, though, on the other hand, Gorgias probably did not think in terms of such a consistent materialism as Democritus. His psyche, nevertheless, is in contact with physical phenomena and operates in ways analogous to theirs. In thus treating the emotions as real, almost physiological entities, Gorgias indicates a kinship with the scientific rationalism of Greek medicine, which, as has recently been shown, was soon to apply the physical humor-theory (see *Helen* 14) to a systematic explanation of emotional affects.⁴³

This interaction between the psychic-subjective and physical-objective spheres of activity appears with especial clarity from Gorgias' treatment of *opsis* in the last part of the *Helen*. By its very nature, *opsis* is in immediate contact with the physical world, and, as fragment B4 shows, Gorgias perhaps regarded vision as itself a physical and material process. And yet he treats it in a fashion analogous to the psyche and *peitho*: it is through *opsis* that the psyche is "impressed" or "molded" (*τυπῶνται*, 15), just as *peitho* "forms" or "molds" the psyche as it wishes (13);⁴⁴ but the *opsis* is also subject to emotions of pain and desire, like the psyche itself: οὐτῷ τὰ μὲν λυπεῖν, τὰ δὲ ποθεῖν <ποιεῖν> πέφυκε τὴν ὄψιν (18). It is this same λύπη and *pothos* which are associated with the psyche in 8-10 and 14. Thus just as the affects of the psyche are described in physiological terms, so those of the more immediately physical *opsis* are described in emotional and psychological language (see also *eros* and *pothos*, 18 *ad fin.*).⁴⁵ There is thus no strict demarcation between "subjective" and "objective." The psyche exists on an equal level with the physical world and is closely related to it. Its processes are explicable in terms of physical analogies, and it may undergo a change of state (*Hel.* 10) through the almost physical *dynamis* of *logos* and persuasion.

There thus exists a reciprocal relationship between the psychic and physical worlds, and such a relationship in fact constitutes a basic and necessary assumption of Gorgianic rhetorical practice, which aims at

changing the condition of the psyche by the impingement of an outside force (*peitho*). As has been shown above, *peitho* is usually described as acting directly upon the psyche — it “forms the psyche as it wishes” (13); but, as appears from the discussion of *opsis* in 15, this “forming” does not occur in isolation. It is rather by contact with the physical stimulus transmitted through *opsis* (in this case) that the psyche is moved: διὰ δὲ τῆς ὀψεως ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς τρόποις τυποῦται. Here the physical stimulus affects even the internal “character,” the *tropoi*, of the psyche, a term which may itself have physical connotations like the *taxis* of the psyche in 14.⁴⁶ The *tropoi* probably refer more immediately to the ordinary ethical values upon which the stability of the psyche in society rests, but these values are forgotten under the impact of a powerful *opsis*, just as *phobos* at the end of 16 “drives out” *nomos*. *Opsis* thus serves as the intermediary which transmits the purely physical stimulus to the emotional life of the psyche. This process is described more explicitly at the beginning of this same section (*Hel.* 16): if the *opsis* discerns a fearful sight like the approaching of armored troops, “it is itself disturbed and disturbs the psyche (ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχὴν), so that though the danger is in the future, they flee struck out of their wits (ἐκπλαγέντες) as if it were already present.” The *tarache* which the physical stimulus creates in the *opsis* is transmitted to the psyche, sets that too into a state of *tarache*, and thus causes a total *ekplexis*, a sudden yielding to an emotional and nonrational response. The action of an external stimulus on the psyche is thus not a simple mechanical process, and is perhaps not so systematically physical or material as in the Democritean system; rather the emotional process begins from without, from the objective sense-datum of the advancing host, and then widens in increasing rings to the organ of perception and feeling, the *opsis*, which is itself subject to an emotional movement, and from there extends to the psyche itself and results in total *ekplexis* and the consequent physical manifestation of flight (φεύγουσι).⁴⁷ The pattern is a cyclical one, from physical stimulus to emotional reaction and back to physical manifestation, the last being analogous to the “shudder” and “weeping” described in 9. This cyclical process, moreover, is important for Gorgias’ conception of *peitho* and for the whole basis of his defense of Helen: an external sense-datum — a visual one acting upon the *opsis*, or *logos* having *metron* upon the hearing (9) — creates an impression upon the psyche which in turn results in a physical action. It is thus implied that the psyche itself responds to the physical structure of the word or vision with emotional impulses which, if strong enough, result in a total *ekplexis* and a concrete action of an unexpected, nonrational

type. The *logos*, therefore, if properly calculated, can through its "impression" on the psyche lead the hearer into lines of action hitherto not considered and beyond or in violation of its "habitation" to *nomos* (16). The psyche thus stands in a middle position as the impressionable receiver of new emotions and the initiator of fresh actions resulting from these emotions; and *peitho*, as the art of awakening these emotions, is thus a powerful tool for directing and aiming human action. In Helen's case the tool is perhaps misapplied (*πειθῶ κακῇ*, 14), but it may also be used for good, for instance, to "persuade" a reluctant patient to undergo the proper treatment.⁴⁸

It is interesting to note in connection with the *tarache* and *ekplexis* of *Helen* 15-16 the ease with which these emotional phenomena are applied both to collective groups (the army, 16) and separate individuals. The individual psyche seems to be discussed at the end of 15 and again in 17, while section 16 is concerned primarily with group phenomena. Similarly, while most of the section on the *logos* is concerned with the individual psyche and the specific case of Helen (especially 8-10), section 13 speaks of the "contests of words in which one *logos* persuaded and delighted a great mass (*ochlos*)"; and here the juxtaposition *εἰς . . . πολὺς* emphasizes the collective emotion involved. Gorgias' awareness of the collective implications of *peitho*, used to create a mob effect on a fickle *ochlos*, appears also from *Palamedes* 33, where the defendant says that he will abstain from using the emotional devices of *oiktos*, *litai*, and *φίλων παραίτησις*, which would be suitable in an *ochlos* but unfitting before the small and select jury of aristocratic peers, where his defense is to be strictly rational, based upon *to saphes* and *didaskein*. This *topos* occurs significantly at the beginning of the Melian debate in Thucydides (5.85-86), where it is stressed that the argument will not be *πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος* (5.85) and hence the emphasis is to be upon *didaskein* and not *apate* (see *Pal.* 33, οὐκ ἀπατήσαντα).⁴⁹ Elsewhere too Thucydides shows a vivid appreciation of collective panics, *ekplexeis* or *tarachai*, similar to that described in *Helen* 16 (e.g., 4.125.1; 7.80.3).⁵⁰ Thrasyarchus also seems to have a special awareness of collective persuasion, for Plato describes him as skillful at *ὀργίσει τε αὖ πολλοὺς . . . καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπ᾽ ἄδων κηλεῖν* (*Phaedr.* 267c, DK 85 B6); here the special effectiveness of the rhetor seems to lie in his appealing to the group emotions of the *polloi*.⁵¹ For Gorgias, however, the psyche is the common denominator in both the collective and individual situations (the psyche is mentioned in neither of the two Thucydidean passages just cited), while Thucydides seems to have an appreciation of group emotions as a separate category of psychic

phenomena, not as merely the multiplication of the reactions of a number of individual *psychai*. For Gorgias the processes of individual and group persuasion belong to a unified theory, and in both cases the rhetor is working on the individual *psychai* of his audience, whether in a group or individually. The emotional life and the sensitivity of the psyche to external impressions form a constant whether one or many are involved. There is, to be sure, in *Helen* 16 and *Palamedes* 33 an awareness of the greater susceptibility of an *ochlos* to irrational emotional impulses, but these are essentially of the same type, if of a different magnitude, as individual emotions, and are similarly created by means of *peitho* or *opsis*.⁵² Group persuasion is thus merely an extension of the persuasion of an individual, and operates on the same psychological principles.

Any further investigation of what these principles are can most conveniently begin with a recognition of the importance of *doxa* and the problems of knowledge and communication in Gorgias' attitude toward his craft. It is again not necessary to assume that Gorgias ever wrote a full-blown treatise systematizing ontology, epistemology, and aesthetics into a unified theory; but the *Helen*, after all, contains an encomium on the *logos* which seems to present at least the basis of a theory of *poiesis*, and other fragments too seem to fit into a framework consistent with that theory so as to elucidate the psychological assumptions underlying his rhetoric.⁵³

Of these assumptions perhaps the most basic concerns the nature of communication. According to Sextus' report of the treatise "On Non-being" (B3), Gorgias maintained not only that nothing exists, but that if it did, it could not be communicated. Gorgias, however, does not draw the conclusion that communication is impossible, but rather defines more precisely the nature of this communication and its limitations. It occurs primarily through the *logos*, the word or language. Through language men communicate not the reality of things, but only words: "For that by which we impart information (*μηνύομεν*) is *logos*, but *logos* is not the things that are or that exist; we do not then impart to others the things that exist, but only *logos*, which is other than the things that exist" (B3, Sext., *Adv. Math.* 7.84). Gorgias, in other words, is aware of the peculiar nature of the communicatory medium qua medium. Communication itself, therefore, is a special area of human activity, an invention of society based upon prearranged conventions, and must inevitably involve distortions and rearrangements of the message.⁵⁴ There is no such thing as a purely objective transmission of reality. This isolation of the special nature of the

medium in the communicative process is perhaps analogous to Democritus' emphasis upon the distorting effect of the physical medium in his theory of perception (e.g., A122). In both cases the essentially subjective nature of the processes involved is detached for critical analysis. For Gorgias the significance of this step lies partly in the fact that it frees the *logos* from any ontological implications, such as it has in the Eleatic abstraction of the predicate, *to on* and *to me on*, as a part of the world of metaphysical existence; and Gorgias, as several scholars have suggested, seems to be combatting this Eleatic view directly in B3.⁵⁵ Instead, the *logos* is restricted to its proper area, verbal communication, with full awareness of its limitations. Gorgias' sense of the special mediating function of the *logos* in communication appears from *Palamedes* 6-7, where the defendant points out the necessity for *logos* to be the beginning (*arche*) of the conspiracy, and the difficulty of an exchange of *logoi* between Hellene and barbarian. Hence the *logos*, free from a metaphysical correspondence with a higher "reality," can be treated as an art, a *techne*, where its distortive nature is, if anything, an asset to be exploited in the interests of *peitho*, a tool for persuasion, without any necessary correlations with the world of Being. Gorgias, then, as Rosenmeyer has well remarked, has discovered "the autonomy of speech"; for him "speech is not a reflection of things, not a mere tool or slave of description, but . . . it is its own master."⁵⁶ The *logos* is thus as free from the exigencies of mimetic adherence to physical reality (*apate* is, in fact, an important part of the art of the *logos*) as from an instrumental function in a philosophical schematization of a metaphysical reality. The opposite of these assumptions, of course, underlies the Platonic criticism of Gorgias' rhetoric (as of all rhetoric), for the entire Platonic dialectic supposes as a working premise that the structure of *logos* corresponds or provides access to the structure of true Being.⁵⁷ Gorgias, however, early rejected any such presuppositions, and his art consists in the practical utilization of the communicatory medium, with a full awareness of its imperfections and fallibility, to effect concrete changes in the external world through changes in human attitudes. "Reality" for him lies in the human psyche and its malleability and susceptibility to the effects of linguistic corruscation. Thus his rhetoric, though concerned primarily with a technique of verbal elaboration, rests ultimately upon a psychology of literary experience. These two, psyche and *logos*, lie both within the realm of tangible experience and become for Gorgias the new reality.

Corresponding to this awareness of distortion in the area of linguistic experience is the role of *doxa* in the area of psychic experience. Here

the psyche, like the *logos*, is a distorting receptacle. The most elaborate discussion of *doxa* is in *Helen* 11, and this passage lays the foundation for the treatment of *peitho* as a delusive *pharmakon* and a form of "enchantment" in the following sections, 12-14.⁵⁸ Because the majority have no adequate knowledge of past, present, or future, they are dependent on *doxa*, and they must receive it as the "counselor for their psyche." It is admitted that *doxa* is deceptive and unstable (σφαλερὰ καὶ ἀβέβαιος), but the human psyche has no better guide. It is noteworthy that nothing is suggested as a practical alternative to *doxa*;⁵⁹ *doxa*, rather, is simply and realistically accepted as the ordinary state of human communicable knowledge. Again, the rhetor is not concerned with absolute knowledge, but only with creating "impressions" upon the psyche of his audience and thus somehow directing their actions. In *Helen* 13, therefore, in discussing this "impressing" or "forming" of the psyche, Gorgias describes the *logoi* of the *meteo-rologoi*, who, putting one *doxa* in place of another, "make appear to the eyes of *doxa* what is untrustworthy and unclear." The play on the meaning of *doxa* — both as an external "opinion" which the speakers bandy about and an internal state of mind, a subjective "condition of opinion" — points up the dependence of the psyche upon sources not always disinterested, and reinforces the possibility of the manipulation of the psyche which the flexibility of *doxa* (in both the above senses) makes possible. Gorgias repeats this idea at the end of 13 in discussing the *logon hamillai* of the *philosophoi* "in which rapidity of wit is shown as making the trust (or belief) in *doxa* subject to easy change" (ὡς εὐμετάβολον ποιοῦν τὴν τῆς δόξης πίστιν). In the *Palamedes*, where the process of persuasion is seen rather from the point of view of a defendant undoing slander than of a rhetor praising the powers of *peitho*, the state of *doxa*, now opposed to *aletheia* (24, 35), is again almost assumed to be the normal condition of the dicaeastic mind and, indeed, the cause of the whole trial, which otherwise would be an "easy decision" (35).

This state of *doxa*, however, is the psychological medium in which the rhetor works, the condition of ease of change (εὐμετάβολον, *Hel.* 13) which makes possible decisive persuasion, "for it is necessary to demonstrate to the audience by *doxa*" (*Hel.* 9). But the close relation between *doxa* and the psyche and the changing of the latter by persuasion and deception appears with special clarity from *Helen* 10: "For the power of the magical spell (ἐπωδή) joining together with the opinion of the psyche (συγγινομένη . . . τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς) charmed it and persuaded it and changed it (μετέσθησε) by enchantment (*goeteia*)."

Gorgias then proceeds to speak of the twin *technai* of enchantment and magic (*mageia*), namely the errors (*ἀμαρτήματα*) of the psyche and the deceptions (*ἀπατήματα*) of *doxa*. The deceptive aspect of persuasion appears also in the following sentence, on the necessity for all persuasion, past and present, to take place through the forming of false words (*ψευδῆ λόγον πλάσαντες*, *Hel.* 11); and the end of section 11 brings in still more terminology for deceit (*sphalera kai abebaios*). The instability of *doxa* thus makes possible the deception on which all persuasion must rest. But Gorgias does not regard such persuasion and its concomitant "enchantments" as an immoral deception, but rather as a necessary and practical corollary to his conception of the normal state of the human psyche. It is thus important to note that the basis of rhetorical deception lies within the psyche and is already a potential result of the *hamartemata* and *apatemata* attendant on every *doxa* of the psyche; man's bent is toward error and not, as ultimately in the Platonic view, toward truth. The rhetor is simply adapting to practical use a given psychological fact, just as he accepts the conditions of human communication as the material on which to apply his linguistic tools. His "art" is thus deliberately and explicitly opposed to "truth" and produces a *logos* which is *τέχνη γραφαίς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθείς* (*Hel.* 13); but the rhetor uses the deception of *technē* not because he necessarily spurns truth, but because most men (*οἱ πλεῖστοι*) themselves possess and communicate only *doxa* and would not know truth if they had it (see B3). This *technē*, however, is not entirely negative, for it provides *terpsis* (13); and the *apate* of tragedy brings perhaps through its *terpsis* a wisdom of its own (B23 and *infra*).

The "deception" which the Gorgianic rhetor practices is thus also connected with the *apate* or *pseudos* of the poetic tradition (e.g., Hesiod, *Theog.* 27–28) and is a natural consequence of the above-mentioned autonomy of the *logos* as a separate artistic medium:⁶⁰ the *logos* demands the complete suspension of "rational" belief, for it has a *pistis* all its own; it works through "magic" and "enchantment" rather than the objective factuality of *aletheia*, and its results correspondingly are a poetic *terpsis* as well as the *sophia* of B23.⁶¹ The art of the *logos* for Gorgias in other words belongs more properly to the poet of the sixth and fifth centuries (with the significant difference that Gorgias is aware of *logos* as a communicatory tool that will transmit what the rhetor desires for a specific purpose)⁶² than to the philosophic logician of the fourth.

Pistis, the state of conviction which results from successful persuasion, is thus dependent on *doxa*. In a slightly broader sense, *pistis*

is used of the prevalent conception which the poets have conveyed of Helen and is coordinate with the *φήμη* of her name (*Hel.* 2).⁶³ In *Helen* 13, *logoi* are said to make appear before the eyes of *doxa* even what is without *pistis* (*ἄπιστα*), and the arguments of the *philosophoi* work upon the changeability of the *pistis* of *doxa*. The rhetor must use *doxa* as one of his primary instruments: *δεῖ δὲ καὶ δόξῃ δεῖξαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι* (*Hel.* 9); *doxa* is both the presupposed psychological state of the audience upon which the rhetor must work and also one of the tools by which he molds that state to his own purposes.⁶⁴ *Pistis* also plays a large part in the *Palamedes*, but again from a different point of view, for the defense of Palamedes relies in part upon an attack on the rhetorical conception of *pistis* and *doxa*, which are embodied in Odysseus, who is here, as in the roughly contemporary *Philoctetes* of Sophocles, the type of the crafty orator. Palamedes thus criticizes the factual weakness of the *pistis* of Odysseus (22), contrasts his "trust" (*pistis*) in *doxa* with "truth," and even calls *doxa* itself an *ἄπιστότατον πρᾶγμα* (24). *Doxa* and *pistis* are still associated, though from a hostile point of view; but this negative approach of the *Palamedes* only serves to confirm the importance of *doxa* and *pistis* in the rhetorical theory which the *Helen* adumbrates. There is, further, the epistemological ground for the rhetorical use of *doxa*, that is, the inaccessibility and incommunicability of true Being for men (B3, Sext. 7.65). Hence the rhetor, who is concerned immediately with communication, and that of a specialized kind, namely persuasion, must use *doxa*. "Truth" for men is itself a complex phenomenon which consists in the proper combination of Seeming and Being: "Being is invisible (*aphanes*) if it happen not upon Seeming (*dokein*) and Seeming is weak if it happen not upon Being" (B26). The discovery of "reality" for men involves a necessary subjective element of "seeming"; and here Gorgias indicates his awareness of the importance of the medium of perception in the area of epistemology, parallel to the intermediate function of the *logos* in communication. In neither case do men transcend the medium and reach "pure" Being, but their knowledge of the world inevitably contains an admixture of their own perceptual energies and psychological and linguistic patterns. It is on this basis that the rhetor tries to change their view of reality by manipulating these variable patterns of appearance and language.

There is still no definitive equation of *doxa* with emotion or of reason with *aletheia* requiring a split within the psyche and a corresponding value judgment ranking the former below the latter, although the contrasts between *doxa* and *aletheia* in the *Palamedes* and, to a lesser degree, the conception of rhetoric as "enchantment" in the

Helen, are perhaps steps along the road to the systematic division made by Plato. Gorgias, however, still frankly regards literature as resting upon deception, *apate*. *Apate* is not necessarily immoral, but simply the means which men must use to visualize and communicate τὸ ἀφανές.⁶⁵ The Platonic criterion of mimesis for art separates, as Rosenmeyer has claimed for tragedy, the effect of literature from the means which it employs (among them *apate*), whereas Gorgias in the fifth century still regards *logos* as a whole, as an entity complete within itself, independent of and in a sense above a literal correspondence with the *aletheia* of the phenomenal world.⁶⁶ Thus the deceptive ἐπῳδαί of *logoi* must be present if *logos* is to have its therapeutic effect of "bringing on pleasure (*hedone*) and carrying off pain" (*Hel.* 10). Gorgias, of course, was not primarily a theorist, and he saw clearly the possibilities of applying this principle of deception to practical service in the law court, of utilizing his psychological premisses for nonliterary purposes. It is important to emphasize, however, that these theoretical premisses do exist and, as passages like B23 and *Helen* 9-10 indicate, may have formed part of at least a rudimentary psychological theory of literature.⁶⁷ The existence of such a theory is perhaps supported also by the use of *apate* in a literary context in Aristophanes and the *Dissoi Logoi*, as we shall see; from here it has a long history through Plato's opposition and into later antiquity.⁶⁸

Gorgias' early work in the Eleatic and Empedoclean traditions (even if his approach was hostile and critical) on the problems of Being and of perception (B3-4) may thus have been significant in the later course of his development. He would thus have early been made aware of the element of subjectivity in human perceptive and aesthetic processes. Such an awareness is implicit in the definition of color attributed to him in the *Meno* (76a, DK B4): χρώα ἀπορροή χρημάτων ὅψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. The perception of color is not a purely mechanistic process, but depends upon a corresponding perceptive act in the organ of sight, *opsis*, and there is perhaps a two-way interaction implied in the word *symmetros*. Gorgias' interest in illusion and in the illusive aspect of perception may thus plausibly be dated in the earlier part of his life. It is thus perhaps significant that Sextus assigns a considerable portion of his discussion of the treatise "On Non-being" to the problem of illusion and reality (B3, Sext. 7.79ff).⁶⁹ Still more interesting is the fact that visual illusion plays a large part in Gorgias' discussion of *opsis* at the end of the *Helen*; in 17 he speaks of the μάταιοι πόνοι and δυσίατοι μανίαι which result from the impression which the εἰκόνες τῶν ὁρωμένων have left upon the mind. These visions, of course, are not

strictly speaking illusions, but they do produce an emotional effect on the psyche which is akin to illusion — vain fears, madness, sudden frights (δειματοῦντα). There would thus seem to be some continuity between the early physical and philosophical work of Gorgias and his later rhetorical-literary interests.⁷⁰ In his later life, however, he seems to have become primarily concerned with the possibility of utilizing and directing this illusion for practical ends, of manipulating by *techne* the subjective uncertainty of the human psyche. He thus shares the emerging interest of the later fifth century generally in the hidden processes of the psyche and in perception as a subjective restructuring of the world. In his development of a *techne* to exploit this illusional process he shares too in the rationalistic spirit of the later fifth century, and his work is thus related to that of Democritus (B191) in the assumption that the psyche is an independent entity which, by the proper rational means, can be moved and directed. For Democritus, however, following Leucippian materialism, the problem of illusion was not so crucial as for Gorgias, whose mind was formed in the Eleatic and Empedoclean tradition of the West, where the relationship of *doxa* and *to on* was a paramount issue. Gorgias seems to have combined this interest in subjectivity, perception, and *doxa* with the Sicilian *technai*, such as those of Tisias and Corax, and in the course of his adaptations to have arrived, perhaps without full consciousness or intent, at a kind of psychology of literature.

The sort of emotional *peitho* which the *Helen* describes is therefore also a product of *techne*. It is interesting to note that Plato attributes to Gorgias the definition of the rhetor as *πειθοῦς δημιουργός*,⁷¹ that is, as a craftsman applying a systematic technique. The *Helen* too, despite the strong emotional effect attributed to the *logos*, proceeds in terms of rational argumentation, the enumeration and exclusion of a series of alternatives, in a manner not dissimilar to that of Sextus' outline of the treatise "On Non-being" (B3); and this use of systematic, logical argument is even more marked in the *Palamedes*.⁷² This same rationalistic approach is implicit in the *pharmakon* simile of *Helen* 14, where the image is borrowed from medicine, the one exact and empirical science which had in the later fifth century achieved striking and verifiable practical results in the Greek world. Yet along with these newer usages of words like *dynamis*, *taxis*, and *physis*, which suggest the "scientific" precision of Democritean formulations (e.g., B31, 191), occurs the language of magic and superstition, of *thelgein*, *goeteia*, and *mageia*, which can be traced back to more archaic strata in Greek thought.⁷³ As will appear, however, the *Helen* does not set against one

another these two methods of creating *peitho*; rather the two are part of a single aesthetic process, a rational and emotional tool, wherein the *pharmakon* and *goeteia* are combined to move the psyche. Thus at the end of the section on the *logos*, *Helen* 14, Gorgias combines the two terms: τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν. Here he speaks of their application to evil *peitho* (πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ); but the use of the term *pharmakon* in a medical or "scientific" context earlier in this paragraph, as pointed out above, makes it likely that the combination *pharmakon* and *goeteia* is not meant to be restricted to "evil persuasion" alone. Their combination is simply the tool of the rhetorical-aesthetic process, and may be applied to the more salutary awakening of *terpsis* and *tharsos* just as well as to the creation of *lype* or *phobos*. And similarly even the literally medical *pharmaka* may be used for evil ends, some to put an end to disease, others to end life itself (*Hel.* 14). Gorgias is here concerned with the methodology and psychological-physiological basis of his *techne*; and in establishing the parallel with the *pharmaka* of medicine, he does not conceal the fact that the art of persuasion, like its medical counterpart, can be dangerous as well as beneficial, for anything that extends rational control over an area of human life has negative possibilities. Thus Gorgias cannot be charged with complete moral naivete;⁷⁴ he is aware of the consequences of his *techne* and implies some moral valuation in his choice of the adjective κακῇ. He does not say that this is the sort of *peitho* which he practices, and perhaps leaves it to the audience to infer that it is this *kake peitho*, the application of a powerful *techne* to socially reprehensible ends, of which Helen is the victim.

A similar combination of the use of emotion with a rationalistic *techne* is attested for Thrasymachus, whose rhetorical activity at Athens perhaps precedes that of Gorgias⁷⁵ and whose work left a strong impression on the fourth century and the later rhetorical tradition. Plato (*Phaedr.* 267c, DK 85 B6) describes him as having based his *techne* upon appeals to pity and lamentations on old age and poverty, as a man able to excite many and then to charm and enchant them when excited (ὀργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν). This last phrase, of course, implies essentially the same conception or rhetoric as the *goeteia* terminology of the *Helen*, the use of natural emotion, artificially created, for a specific purpose; and the techniques of arousing and controlling these emotions are now elaborated and formulated into a *techne* of what Plato calls elsewhere in the *Phaedrus* (272a) ἐλεινολογία a rhetorical "Pathologie."⁷⁶ Thrasymachus is also said to have written a work *Eleoi* in which he treated the emotive effects of delivery (ὑποκριτική

DK B5);⁷⁷ and the list of his works includes a *rhētorikē technē* (DK A1) and, on better authority, a *Megale Technē*.⁷⁸ The precise content or form of these works is, of course, most obscure, but the titles alone suffice to indicate that the tradition placed his work in the same category of technical systematization as that of Gorgias. Thus, as in Gorgias, the rhetor has a double aspect: he is both a rationalistic linguistic technician with some knowledge of human emotion and a magicianlike charmer; but again the practical nature of his activity fuses these two aspects into a functional unity; he exploits simultaneously, as the *Helen* illustrates, "not only the emotional force of poetry . . . , (but) also the power which we would call the persuasive force of reason."⁷⁹

If the *Helen* develops the emotional aspect of *peithō*, it is the *Palamedes* which emphasizes the purely rationalistic side of the *technē*. Some of this difference, of course, can be attributed to the difference in genre, the *Helen* being an encomium (21), the *Palamedes* an *apologia* (1), delivered before a select group of judges (33), with an explicit rejection of an attempt to appeal to the emotions. The *Palamedes* presents some of the same awareness of the emotional forces as the *Helen*, but with a significant difference in emphasis. Thus *ekplexis* occurs in the *Helen* (16) as the natural result of a terrifying *opsis* and is offered as an excuse for Helen's action. In the *Palamedes*, *ekplexis* is also a natural result of a groundless accusation, an αἰτία ἀνεπίδεικτος; but the resultant state of *aporia* is to be overcome by *aletheia* and by the quickness of wits necessitated by the *ananke* of the present situation. The emphasis in *Helen* 17 is rather upon the complete vanquishing of the rational powers by the emotive force of the present *phobos*: οὕτως ἀπέσβεσε καὶ ἐξήλασεν ὁ φόβος τὸ νόημα. Similarly, while pity and the emotional excitement and even deception (*apate*) of the *ochlos* have a positive value throughout the *Helen* (esp. 9–10, 13), such methods are strictly rejected in the *Palamedes* (33), where τὸ σαφέστατον δίκαιον and the *didache* of "truth" (*alethes*) is to replace *oiktos* and *apate*.

The treatment of human motivation, which occupies a significant part in both works and essentially forms the basis of the defense, differs in corresponding fashion. The emphasis in the *Helen* is upon the *bia*, the almost physical violence exercised by various external forces upon Helen, against which she is practically helpless. The *Palamedes*, however, exploits the rational and pragmatic, not the emotional potentialities of the *logos*; thus it assumes that reason is in control, that the motivation for an action lies entirely within the powers of the individual will operating through logical choice. Hence of the two parts into which

Palamedes divides his defense, one is that he would not have wished to betray Greece (5), and he assumes that only some rational motive could create such a will, the hope of honor, wealth, safety, benefit to friends (13-18), or the desire to avoid "some fear or toil or danger" (19). He summarizes his belief in the essential rationality of the human will as follows: "For it is for the sake of two things that any man commits any action, either in pursuit of gain (*kerdos*) or in avoidance of harm (*zemia*)."⁷⁹ *Kerdos* especially has from early times an association of rational, even excessively wily, planning. The assumption of conflicting motives or the Euripidean formulation of acting against one's recognized interests, the famous *video meliora proboque deteriora sequor* (see *Hippol.* 38off), is not even admitted as a possibility; and the coexistence of the opposites *mania* and *sophia* is explicitly denied: "You accuse me . . . of two completely opposed things, wisdom and madness, which it is not possible for the same man to have" (25). In the *Helen*, on the contrary, *mania* is a recognized emotional state which sometimes does in fact motivate human action (*Hel.* 17). Palamedes, however, carries on his rationalistic process of excluding opposites from motivation in the almost Socratic formulation of the following section (26): "But if you consider wise men (*sophoi*) to be intelligent (*φρονίμους*), surely it is not fitting for the intelligent (*φρονοῦντας*) to make the greatest errors (*ἐξαμαρτάνειν*) and to choose evils rather than present goods. If then I am wise, I did not err; but if I erred, I am not wise." The disjunctive proposition of the last sentence contains perhaps some intentional "sophistry" which is not to be taken too seriously; but the whole passage assumes a rational view of human motivation which may be more akin to Socrates than to Euripides.⁸⁰ And it is perhaps possible that the *Palamedes* too contains a masked and paradoxical defense of the rhetorical art by utilizing for the purpose of a rhetorical defensive speech those very arguments which might be brought against the conception of rhetoric in the *Helen* as the deceptive manipulation of *logoi*, not *erga* (*Pal.* 34-35); but it is perhaps significant that this opposition of *logos-ergon* is clearly felt as a *locus communis*, a *topos* which must be mentioned, but which, by an act of technical virtuosity, is made to serve just the opposite of its intention, the supposed denigration and undermining of *logos*. Is not Palamedes himself, after all, using *logos* and, in the refusal to appeal to pity, employing a *topos* doubtless already canonized in the practice of the law courts, as Aristophanes satirically attests in the *Wasps* (967ff)? The *Palamedes*, nevertheless, does agree essentially with the *Helen*, at least in the formal method of confronting and analyzing the motivation of the act as the

primary problem of the rhetor; and both works assume the possibility of a classification of this motivation into set categories, each covered by its particular *topos*. In the assumption about the rational nature of this motivation, however, the *Palamedes* contrasts sharply with the *Helen*. The division of human action into inner motivation (*boulesthai*) and external capability (*dynasthai*) still implies, of course, the analytical approach to the psyche which begins in the later fifth century; the area of will is seen as existing in a reality coordinate with the objective factuality of physical power (*dynamis*). But something of the early excitement at the discovery of this realm of psychic activity has disappeared. Instead of being regarded as a fully dynamic unity to which at last analysis can be applied, the psyche is seen as an already completely rational organism, operating with *prim* logic and providing a certain number of convenient *topoi* about truth and appearance, will and power. The development of intellectual tools for its analysis, the problem which occupied Democritus to a certain extent, now has crystallized into a set of formal, pre-established categories. It is at this point that the completely logical and analytical methods of Plato can take over, infusing new life into the rhetorical conception of the *Palamedes*, yet also reducing the psyche to a problem in analytical and logical diaeresis; the independent existence of the psyche is established and taken for granted and its parts are then carefully distinguished and their functions clearly delineated. But their interaction, by being reduced to such analytical explicability, becomes almost mechanical: the sense of wonder and the feeling for the organic complexity of the psyche which accompanied the speculations of Democritus and are even to some degree present in Gorgias' *Helen* have been lost.

II

The difference between the rationalistic approach to persuasion in the *Palamedes* and the emotional approach in the *Helen* can, of course, also be attributed in part to the form and expressed function of each work.⁸¹ The *Palamedes* is concerned with a practical situation which has rather grim consequences; hence the possibilities for theoretical discussion are severely limited and the work concentrates upon the exploitation of the rational possibilities of the *logos*. The *Helen*, on the other hand, is freer. Here appears the full significance of the term *paignion* in the concluding portion (21): the work is not bound to a practical purpose or to an imaginary situation of a trial, like the *Palamedes*. It is a free imaginative creation, with no life-and-death alternative present.⁸² The mythical framework of the *Helen* is thus consciously

literary and artificial, without the sense of reality and immediacy which is introduced into the *Palamedes* and is present, for example, in the *topos* of the *aporia* of the speaker (*Pal.* 4). The *Helen*, moreover, is an encomium, and the personality of the speaker does not obtrude upon or even appear significantly in the work: it has no definite location in place or time; its setting is from the first the literary, poetic tradition: ἡ τε τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκουσάντων πίστις ἡ τε τοῦ ὀνόματος φήμη (2). Thus the work is concerned with literature and aesthetics in a broader sense than would be possible in the *Palamedes*; and it is significant that the generalizing term *poiesis* occurs twice in the work (9, 18), first of literature and then of sculpture. It is thus not unnatural to seek the outlines of an aesthetic theory in the *Helen*,⁸³ for its nonpractical character makes it a suitable vehicle for such theories; and the author's identification of himself with his work at the end (ἐμὸν παλγνιον) renders it still more likely that the encomium on the *logos* does represent Gorgias' own belief in the psychological basis of persuasion and, indeed, of all poetic expression. The *Helen* thus treats the *logos* not only as a practical tool of persuasion — though this too is implicit in the work — but also as an aesthetic medium for emotional release, since the stimulation of pity, fear, pleasure, and pain is the immediate aim of the *logos*. The rationalistic implications of arousing and directing these emotions by a rhetorical-psychological *technē* are, of course, still present; but at the same time appears an element of the unpredictable in the divine power of the *logos* and its control over the psyche. The psyche in the aesthetic process adumbrated in the *Helen* is freer and more impressionable and sensitive than its more rational and fact-bound equivalent in the *Palamedes*.

The emotive aspect of the *logos*, consequently, as a powerful force in its own right — an aspect which the *Palamedes* admits but explicitly avoids (e.g., 33) — is fully elaborated in the *Helen*. Through its compelling power over the emotions the *logos* becomes a δυνάστης μέγας (8) which accomplishes "divine deeds" (θειότατα ἔργα) in arousing pity and fear, pleasure and pain. The association of the *logos* with the divine occurs again in 9, also in connection with the emotive affects of pleasure and pain produced by the ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπωδαί. The significance of the attribution of divine qualities to the *logos* is twofold. First, it continues the line of poetic tradition (e.g., *Iliad* 2.385ff) which regarded the power of artistic utterance as a divine gift and therefore mysterious and, like all such psychic powers, incomprehensible to ordinary mortals.⁸⁴ Gorgias has already drawn upon this poetic tradition, as Norden has brilliantly demonstrated,⁸⁵ in the phrase ἡ τε τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκουσάντων

πίστις at the beginning of the work (*Hel.* 2); and this allusion to the poetic tradition again suits the more detached, literary character of the *Helen*, as opposed to the impression of factuality aimed at in the *Palamedes*. The range of the *logos* is thus expanded and its emotive force given more flexibility when an element of the unknowable and divine is added. The second significance of the divine attribute of the *logos* is the *power* thus assigned to it and the emotions it creates. The association of *to theion* with sheer physical force of irresistible intensity appears in the three other places in the *Helen* where Gorgias refers to the divine. In section 6, he suggests an excuse for Helen in her being overcome by the *bia* of the god, and establishes this helplessness before such power as an absolute law of *physis*: "For it is not a natural occurrence (πέφυκε) for the stronger to be checked by the weaker, but rather for the weaker to be ruled and led by the stronger,⁸⁶ and for the stronger to lead, but the weaker to follow. And a *god* is stronger than a man in force (*bia*) and wisdom and the rest." Later in the work, in the discussion of the power of *opsis* and *eros*, Gorgias excuses Helen's succumbing to the latter on the grounds that "being a god he has godly power" (*theian dynamin*) (19). Finally, near the end of the work, *theios* is associated with invincible *ananke*, for if Helen acted ὑπὸ θείας ἀνάγκης ἀναγκασθεῖσα; then her crime is excusable. Thus *logos* is almost an independent external power which forces the hearer to do its will.⁸⁷ The *logos* works through *ananke* and is itself an active force impinging on the psyche from without;⁸⁸ and thus *peitho* and *ananke* are strongly associated in *Helen* 12.⁸⁹

Yet it is perhaps suggested that the rhetor, though he directs and utilizes this force by *technē*, still does not fully comprehend its nature and control it, for the *logos* is also associated, as shown above, with the incomprehensibility of divine phenomena. The rhetor applies it to a given situation, as he would a drug (14), but without fully understanding the nature of the emotions involved; they remain in the shadow of divine obscurity. There is never an attempt to analyze "pity" or "fear" in the abstract and to relate them to the nature of the psyche or to human nature in general, as Aristotle is later to do.⁹⁰ The *logos* releases powerful emotional energies — pleasure, pain, pity, fear — and can channel them into certain desired directions; but the question of where these forces come from, whether they pre-exist in the psyche or not, is only barely raised in the vague analogy with the "humors" of the body (14). There remains an awareness of a great reservoir of these emotional forces which the rhetor can draw upon with his *technē*,⁹¹ and, as will appear below, some conception of the practical

mechanism by which the *logos* finally persuades; but there is no real theoretical speculation on emotional forces as abstract entities. What the rhetor is interested in is the practical application of this linguistic *pharmakon*, the external physiological effects (*phrike*, *polydakros*, 9), and the final emotional state resulting which will dispose the audience favorably to the matter at hand. Gorgias, of course, still makes significant assumptions about the independence of the psyche as a unified sensitive organism in its own right, but these assumptions serve an ultimately practical aim and lack the theoretical foundation and investigation into the nature of the psychic processes that characterize Democritus' materialistic psychology and the far more developed speculations of the fourth century.

There is, however, the suggestion of greater complexity in Gorgias' conception of *peitho*, that the process is not simply the conquest of a weaker subject by a stronger force, but that the persuaded is himself an accomplice to the act of persuasion, that he *allows* himself to be persuaded, and that persuasion is thus inseparably connected with the emotions aroused by the aesthetic process. The suggestion that *peitho* does operate by such a process appears in Plato's *Philebus* (58a, DK A26), in which Gorgias is said to have distinguished the art of persuasion from the other *technai* by the fact that it made everything its slaves, not by force, but by voluntary action:⁹² πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἐκόντων, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο. This concept of voluntary persuasion seems at first to contradict the connection made between *peitho* and *ananke* in the *Helen*. Plato is doubtless exaggerating here, but the statement need not be absolutely false or in such patent conflict with Gorgias' own words in the *Helen* as at first appears. The connection is made through *Helen* 13, where *terpsis* and *peitho* are combined as the total effects of a single *logos* upon a great *ochlos*.⁹³ Successful persuasion, in other words, works through the aesthetic process of *terpsis* and the emotions connected with it. Here again, in distinction to the *Palamedes*, mere rational demonstration is insufficient, but the fully effective impact of *peitho* involves the emotional participation of the audience, which is made possible by and takes place through the aesthetic pleasure of *terpsis*. Thus in the passage under consideration (*Hel.* 13), *aletheia* (the word associated with logical and factual demonstration in the *Palamedes*) is to be replaced by *technē*. The same combination of *peitho* and *terpsis*, with a similar exclusion of a factual-ratiocinative element, occurs in negative form in *Helen* 5: τὸ γὰρ τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἂ ἴσασι λέγειν πίστιν μὲν ἔχει, τέρψιν δὲ οὐ φέρει. Again what is desired is the combination of *terpsis* and *pistis*; simply *pistis* alone, in the sense of a factual

rehearsing of what men already know (or can be made to know by simple demonstration) is insufficient.⁹⁴ It is, however, perhaps possible to go a step farther in determining the source of this *terpsis*. It would seem to lie at least partly in the deception, the *apate*, of the psyche. Thus not only are *peitho* and *terpsis* contrasted with "truth" or "knowing" in the above two passages (5, 13), but *peitho* is positively associated with *apate* as the correlate of *terpsis* at the beginning of section 8 and with the "invention of false *logos*" at the beginning of 11 (*πείθουσι δὲ ψευδῇ λόγον πλάσαντες*).⁹⁵ The importance of *apate* in Gorgias' aesthetic theory is known from his remark on tragedy (B23) referred to above; and in this context too perhaps belongs fragment B26 on the need for the combination of *einai* and *dokein*, which may perhaps correspond to the *aletheia* and *techne* of *Hel.* 13 or, broadly, to the *pistis* of what men know and *terpsis* in *Hel.* 5. These passages, at any rate, combined with the remarks on *terpsis* and *apate* would again perhaps indicate Gorgias' awareness of the need for freeing the *logos* from the bonds of pragmatic demonstration if it is to have its full emotional, and hence persuasive power. The cold logic of the *Palamedes* brings the *pistis* which appears fleetingly in *Helen* 5 (and on which such a high value is placed by Palamedes himself, *Pal.* 20–21), but not the emotional release of aesthetic *terpsis*, at which tragedy presumably aims (B23). And again, it is fitting for such an emotional theory of *terpsis* to be adumbrated in an epideictic work which is itself a *paignion* and hence free from the exigencies of the practical demonstration of a cause. Gorgias thus claims for his *peitho* some of the magical charm which belongs to poetry, and, like poetry, his *logos* achieves its effect through *terpsis*.⁹⁶

There is thus a unity between the aesthetic-deceptive elements in a work of art, as Gorgias defines it, and its persuasive-emotive effect; and it is through the latter that this aesthetic theory can be applied to the practical situations in which persuasion is needed, the dicastery or the bema. The allusion to the *ochlos* in *Hel.* 13 already implies some practical application of *terpsis*. A still more practical implication appears indirectly in the treatment of *opsis* in *Hel.* 18–19: here the aesthetic *terpsis* and *hedone* (*θέαν ἡδεῖαν*) which result from the successful composition (*poiesis*) of a painting or sculpture creates the emotive *λύπη* and *πόθος* in the beholder and ultimately *eros* (18). Similarly, Gorgias continues (19), Helen's *hedone* (*τὸ . . . ὄμμα ἡσθέν*) at the sight of Paris created the *eros* in her psyche with its divine, invincible power. Hence the emotions aroused by a given work of art can lead the subject ultimately to a real course of action, analogous to the effects of Helen's *eros*. Extrapolating backward now from the *opsis* of *Hel.* 18–19 to the

painting and sculpture and then to its linguistic analogue, the rhetorical and poetic *logos*, it is possible to see how the verbal artist could create a *logos* which, through its *terpsis*, can arouse in the hearer the desired emotions and hence lead him by a "divine *dynamis*," as it were, to the requisite action. In this connection it is worth re-emphasizing that *poiesis*, the word used for the artistry of both language (9) and painting or sculpture (18), is thus the instrument of an aesthetic pleasure which leads, as Gorgias stresses in both places, to an emotional *bia* or *ananke*.

The basis for Gorgias' aesthetic and rhetorical theory is thus the awareness of the emotional effects which the *poiesis* of the arts, guided by the particular *technē* involved, creates in the psyche. It would appear that he conceived of a process in which the psyche moves from the pure aesthetic state of *terpsis* to a more active condition of fear or pity, love or persuasion. A work of art, in other words, creates a passive aesthetic reaction (*terpsis*, *hedone*, or their opposite, *lype*); and under the proper conditions this may develop into a stronger, *motivational* response (fear, pity, and ultimately persuasion). Gorgias seems to distinguish between these two stages in the aesthetic process, a passive, emotional disposition and a more active response, a total "conquest" of the psyche by pity, fear, or love. Thus in section 8 he enumerates both the passive and active states together as the results of a *logos dynastes*: fear (*phobos*) and pain (*lype*) and "joy" (*χαρά*) and pity (*eleos*). The order is perhaps deliberately varied,⁹⁷ for joy and pain belong together as the passive effects, fear and pity as the active ones. "Joy" is here substituted for *terpsis* or *hedone*. The association of *eleos* and *phobos* together and of *lype* and *terpsis* in other passages makes clear this division of the emotional response into a "passive" or purely aesthetic and an "active" or motivational stage. Thus in *Hel.* 9, Gorgias describes the active response: *poiesis* engenders in the *psychai* of the audience "fearful (*periphobos*) shuddering," "much-weeping pity," and "desire that is fond of grief" (*pothos philopenthes*).⁹⁸ Here in speaking of the physiological results of a powerful *logos* and of the total *pathema* of the whole psyche (9, *ad fin.*), Gorgias naturally emphasizes the final active stage which subsumes and takes for granted the prior aesthetic reaction of *terpsis*. In typical Gorgianic fashion, of course, the repetition from section 8 is varied with the addition of *pothos*, a word which occupies a position midway between the passive and active states and takes its definitive coloring from its qualifiers. Here the verbal force of *philopenthes* and the whole active context associate it clearly with the motivational part of the process. At the beginning of section 10, *hedone* and *lype* are joined as representative of

the first stage produced by the *epodai* through *logoi*; the more active phase is described in the following sentence: "The power of the enchantment (*epode*) charmed and *persuaded* and changed (*μετέστησε*) the psyche by witchery (*goeteia*)." In section 14, a more complex reformulation of the same terms recur: "Of *logoi* some give pain (*lype*), some pleasure (*terpsis*), some cause fear (*phobos*), some create boldness in the hearers (*θάρασος*) and some drug and bewitch the psyche by a kind of evil persuasion." The grouping of both the passive and active effects enumerated at the beginning of the discussion of the *logos* (8) recurs as a kind of summary here at its end. *Terpsis* and *lype* are immediately paired by their proximity; *phobos* and *tharsos* go together as the two opposite forms of the active emotional state; and the description of the witchery of the *kake peitho* seems added as a summary of the final stage of the whole process, performing the same function as the *pathema*-language at the end of section 9 and repeating and rounding off the *pharmakon-goeteia* image from the beginning of 14 and 10.

The same division of terminology recurs, as is to be expected, in the discussion of *opsis* in 18–19. The parallel between the aesthetic processes of *opsis* and the *logos* is, of course, emphasized by the application of *poiesis* (9, 18) and the *τυποῦσθαι* image (13, 15) to both areas of artistic activity; and there is perhaps a further connection in that in section 13 persuasion is described as acting upon "the eyes of opinion" (*ταῖς τῆς δόξης ὁμμασιν*) where the visual terminology of the later sections is anticipated and metaphorically transferred to language. In *Helen* 18 then, the *poiesis* of sculpture is said to create *hedone* for the eyes. This is the passive, purely aesthetic reaction, which is further described by the following sentence: οὕτω τὰ μὲν λυπεῖν, τὰ δὲ ποθεῖν <ποιεῖν> πέφυκε τὴν ὄψιν. Here the *pothos* takes its coloring from the *lypein* with which it is associated and is a passive "longing" akin perhaps to the *terpsis* elsewhere juxtaposed with *lype*. The next sentence, however, describes the further, active stage in the process: "But many things create in many men love and desire (*eros* and *pothos*) for many things and bodies." Here *pothos* is associated with the active, motivational *eros* and is not the static "longing" that alternates with *lype* in the purely aesthetic reaction to *opsis*. This active force of *eros* resulting from the *opsis* is described further in 19, where the "eye of Helen, pleased (*ἡσθέειν*) at the body of Paris, inspired in her psyche an eager contest of love (*προθυμίαν καὶ ἄμυλλαν ἔρωτος*). Thus the purely aesthetic reaction of *hedone* leads to a powerful motivational response which immediately and strongly moves the psyche and produces direct action. Gorgias, of course, doubtless did not distinguish abstractly between static and

active, aesthetic and motivational response; but his recurrent grouping of terminology, as has been shown, indicates a twofold process, a movement from a vague mood of aesthetic stimulation, pleasure or pain, to a powerful urge to action out of fear or pity, love or desire. Because the aesthetic response works so directly upon the psyche (as in the effect of *hedone* in *Hel.* 19), it can be used to produce a certain desired train of action. Again, Gorgias leaves somewhat vague the process by which the transfer from mere aesthetic response to a total *pathema* of the psyche occurs; all that is important for him is that such a process does empirically occur and can therefore be utilized by a directive *techne* of the *logos*.

The process of persuasion is thus for Gorgias more complex than a simple conquest of reason by the irrational powers of the *logos*. There is rather a psychic complicity in the emotive action of the *logos*: the psyche participates in and reacts to the artistic composition of the *logos* and thus experiences *terpsis*; it is hence regarded as a perceptive, aesthetically sensitive organ upon which the work of art acts. When the aesthetic stimulus is strong enough, however, as in the case of a pleasing vision or a moving speech, the passive aesthetic *terpsis* becomes a powerful impulse which directs the whole course of action of the psyche. This is the condition of *ekplexis* (*Hel.* 17), which overpowers men's usual sense of duty and consciousness of social obligations.⁹⁹ It is, however, also implied that the potential and capacity for such powerful reactions lie already latent within the psyche, for in *Helen* 8 one of the effects of *logos* is "to increase pity" (*ἐπαυξῆσαι ἔλεον*), that is, it is presumed that some *eleos* is already present in the psyche and the *logos* intensifies this;¹⁰⁰ but again Gorgias does not elaborate much further on the process. Similarly the *τυποῦσθαι* image of *Hel.* 13 and 15 implies a pre-existent psychic material upon which the "impression" or the "molding" works. In the power of these emotional forces, nevertheless, and the ability to release them lie the *theiotata erga* of the *logos dynastes* (*Hel.* 8); the *logos* acts like a divine agent, mysteriously but powerfully, upon a subject which somehow also interacts with it. The difference in point of view from Democritus, who also speculated upon the relation between the divine and poetry (B18, 21) is noteworthy: Democritus' interest focuses upon the *creative* activity, the work of the poet himself; Gorgias is more concerned with the process of *reception* by the audience;¹⁰¹ and even in describing the *poiesis* of painting and sculpture (*Hel.* 18) Gorgias rapidly passes over the process of "creation" itself in order to dwell upon the aesthetic and emotional effect upon the *opsis* of the viewer. This difference is thus perhaps characteristic

of the practical orientation of Gorgias' literary and psychological "theories."

The discovery, nevertheless, that the emotive process of persuasion occurs through a series of aesthetic moods and impressions evoked by the work of art is especially important for Gorgias and is, in fact, the keystone of his rhetorical *techne*, for it implies that through the artistic elaboration of the *logos* as a form of *poiesis* a chain of emotional reactions will occur leading from the aesthetic *terpsis* to the final *ananke* of *peitho*. The aesthetically satisfying *logos*, in other words, does not exist for its own sake alone, but has great practical implications which lie within the form itself. Every artist is thus a potential persuader through the emotive forces which the art-form has the power to evoke.

Gorgias is probably among the first to seize upon the practical implications of such a theory and work out a *techne* in which the persuasiveness of a *logos* derives from its poetic composition. Thus there is seen to be a relation between the formal structure of the *logos* and the aesthetic-emotional effect which it produces. Such a direct relationship between literary form and psychological effect appears in *Helen* 9, where Gorgias defines "all *poiesis*" as *λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον* this definition is followed immediately by an account of the emotions of *phobos*, *eleos*, and *pothos* with their physiological manifestations.

Thus the *metron*, the formal aspect of the *logos*, seems to play a significant part in causing the emotive reactions upon which persuasion rests; and it is, therefore, natural that conscious formalism is so important in the carefully balanced antitheses, rhyming cola, calculated sound-effects, and metrical patterns in Gorgias' own style.¹⁰² Gorgias, in fact, transfers the emotive devices and effects of poetry to his own prose, and in so doing he brings within the competence of the rhetor the power to move the psyche by those suprarational forces which Damon is said to have discerned in the rhythm and harmony of the formal structure of music.¹⁰³ Perhaps following the work of Damon, then, Gorgias presupposes for his technical figures and tropes the responsiveness of the psyche to the formal qualities of the *logos*. Damon too seems to have speculated on a reciprocal interaction between the psyche and music, the movement of the rhythm causing a corresponding physical and psychological *kinesis* in the psyche of the hearer.¹⁰⁴ Damon, moreover, as H. Ryffel has recently re-emphasized, was acutely interested in the practical ethical and educative values of the psychological effect of music, and seems to have exercised considerable influence on Plato's views of education (*Rep.* 3.400a ff, 4.424c ff, DK

37 B9-10).¹⁰⁵ Damon's work represents another, perhaps earlier, phase of the rational systematization and control of obscure psychic processes. Gorgias continues this kind of approach in the area of rhetoric and poetry.

Thus, while admitting the place of emotional and aesthetic factors in persuasion, Gorgias also makes it possible to direct and control these emotions through the tie between the formal aspect of the work and the particular feeling evoked. The rhetor is truly the counterpart of the doctor (*Hel.* 14) in applying a rationalistic *techne* to his subject. It is not possible here, of course, to discuss these technical means which put into practice the theory outlined above.¹⁰⁶ It is, however, worth noting that Gorgias himself stresses that the creative process, the *poiesis* of the rhetor, is based upon *techne*; and he refers to the arousing of *terpsis* by the *logos* as a *techne* (13), while the "enchantment" or "bewitching" of the psyche is also a *techne* (10). The divine inspiration of the poet, though perhaps obliquely alluded to in *Helen* 2, plays little part in the actual *poiesis* for Gorgias, unlike Democritus and later Plato's *Ion* and *Phaedrus*; instead the association of poetry (or poetic prose) with the divine is transferred entirely from the poet or process of creation to the emotive-persuasive effects of the finished *logos*. To Gorgias' development of practical techniques for the attainment of these effects, like the topic of the *kairos* (B13) and the *communes loci* (e.g., B19) only passing reference can here be made. What is significant, however, is the rational principle involved, that the manipulation of the formal aspect of the *logos* can produce a desired emotional effect on the audience; and hence the linguistic *techne* of rhetoric becomes also a technique for directing human motivation.¹⁰⁷

Because the rhetor conceives of his art as a *techne*, he is concerned not so much with its moral implications as with the development of more successful techniques of *terpsis*. There is, of course, a moral problem raised if the responsibility for all action is attributed to some external force, like the four categories enumerated in *Helen* 6: *tyche* and *ananke*, *bia*, *peitho*, and *eros*. Yet the question of who is responsible for the use or exertion of these forces is dismissed in the following sentence: "For it is established by *physis* not for the stronger to be checked by the weaker, but for the weaker to be ruled and led by the stronger." *Peitho* and the aesthetic and emotional forces which accompany it are, of course, among these almost physical *anankai*. It is the function of the rhetor to apply and direct them to arouse the emotions of pity and fear at the appropriate *kairos*; he uses his rhetorical technique to create a defense, by means of *phobos* and *eleos*, of those who,

like Helen, have been caught in one of the trains of *ananke* which are regarded as controlling human life. But of these controlling forces no moral quality is predicated, and it is not the function of the rhetor to raise the question.

Gorgias would seem to have regarded himself as in the poetic tradition, as a creator of *terpsis*,¹⁰⁸ not a moral philosopher; he is an artist concerned with *poiesis* and the techniques of *peitho* rather than an ethical theorist. As has already been shown, moreover, this *terpsis* is an integral part of the emotional process of persuasion. From a Platonic point of view, this concentration upon the purely aesthetic reaction was morally reprehensible; and the Gorgianic emphasis upon *hedone* and *terpsis* is thus subject to the same strictures as that of the poets, while Plato explicitly rejects the whole assumption about the "enchantment" or *goeteia* of poetry and the concept of an emotional release through *hedone* in grief, which applies as much to the Homeric *ἔμπερος γόοιο* as to the Gorgianic *pothos philopenthes* (*Hel.* 9).¹⁰⁹ There are the further complications of the avowed opposition of *techne* to *aletheia* (*Hel.* 13), the reliance upon *apate*, and the agonistic setting, all of which were repugnant to Platonic aesthetics and morality, while the agonistic neglect of *akribeia* is one count in Thucydides' famous criticism of Herodotus (1.22.). Thus the antiemotional elements of the late fifth and the fourth centuries, striving to replace fluid emotional views of human action with precise scientific or ideally moralistic ones, were obviously hostile to Gorgias as in his double aspect as a rhetorician and a poet, and tended to depict him as an immoral artist lacking any earnestness or seriousness.¹¹⁰

The *Palamedes*, however, as has been noted, shows another side of Gorgias, an approach to a more logical and rationalistic definition of *peitho* in which a more severe, traditional morality can appear in statements like, "For those who spend much need much money, but not those who are superior to the pleasures of nature (*physeos hedonai*), but those who are slaves to pleasures . . ." (*Pal.* 15). There is, moreover, no reason to believe that Gorgias thought of his *techne* of persuasion as being used for bad ends. Plato, in fact, represents him as pointing out the positive utility of an art of *peitho* in persuading reluctant patients to follow doctors' orders (*Gorg.* 456b, DK A22). Even the emotional function of *peitho*, moreover, has its practical side in the preservation of the values of the *polis*, as appears from the illustration which Aristophanes gives in the *Frogs* (1040ff), where the martial themes of Aeschylus, in contrast to the erotic subjects of Euripides, create in his hearers "many *aretai*" and arouse (*ἐπαίρει*) the citizen

(ἄνδρα πολίτην) to military valor in behalf of the state. Aristophanes is here thinking probably of Aeschylus' *Septem*, which Gorgias is attested to have admired as μεστόν "Ἀρεως" (B24), perhaps for this very reason; and it has thus been plausibly suggested that this positive valuation of *epairein* in the *Frogs* is Gorgianic in origin;¹¹¹ it would not, at any rate, contradict any of Gorgias' theories. Such a use of the emotional capabilities of the *logos* within the framework of the *polis* is, in fact, attested for Pericles' use of rhetoric. Thucydides describes how Pericles, when the populace was ὕβρει θαρσοῦντες, would κατέπλησσειν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, and conversely how, when the citizens were δεδιότες ἀλόγως he would encourage them ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν (Thuc. 2.65.8). The terminology here is essentially the same as that of Gorgias, who similarly combines *phobos* and *tharsos* in the effects of the *logos* in *Helen* 14. It is not, of course, necessary to suggest that Gorgias directly influenced Pericles (or even Thucydides) or vice versa; but it is important to note that the emotional potentialities inherent in the *logos* were clearly visible to political thinkers in the later fifth century, and that these emotional forces could be regarded as valuable tools for the creation of political *arete* (*Frogs* 1040) and for the uniting of the members of the *polis* in a common cause for its preservation; the recognition of this fact serves to blunt in part the sharpness of the Platonic strictures against the Gorgianic conception of rhetoric and to lessen somewhat the distance between Gorgias and his sophistic contemporaries, Protagoras and Prodicus.¹¹²

It is, of course, true that "deception," *apate*, plays a large part in Gorgias' theories of rhetoric (*Hel.* 10) and tragedy (B23); and in this emphasis upon *apate* he seems to have been followed by Aristophanes in the *Frogs* (909-10), who has Euripides charge Aeschylus with *apate*, and by the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* (3.10ff).¹¹³ That Gorgias, however, did not conceive of such deception as immoral appears from the language of B23, where the artistic deceiver is described as "more just" (*dikaioteros*) than the nondeceiver, and the deceived audience is "wiser" (*sophoteros*) than the not deceived. In the passage from the *Dissoi Logoi* too, moral considerations do not enter, but "in the composition of tragedy and in painting he is best who deceives in the most things, making them like to what is true." Here it is interesting that the author cites tragedy and painting, two of the arts which Gorgias explicitly names in *Helen* 18 and fragment B23. In the *Frogs*, moreover, it is primarily Aeschylus who is associated with the use of *apate* and *ekplexis* (909-10, 961-62), and it is precisely he who represents the moral-educational value of tragedy throughout the second part of the

play.¹¹⁴ Gorgias lives in an age when there is still a coherence between the aesthetic and moral spheres of human life, when the arts can still be felt as reinforcing the communal and moral aims of the *polis*; and even Euripides, whom Aristophanes charges with disrupting this coherence, claims to make men better (*Frogs* 1009f) and to teach them, in almost Protagorean fashion, how to οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον (976-77).¹¹⁵ This communal function of the arts appears in the idealizing view of Pericles in the Funeral Speech (2.38.1), where the need for the relaxation of the mind from toil is fulfilled by the ἀγῶνες and θυσίαι, the former probably referring at least in part to tragic and comic performances.¹¹⁶ *Hedone* and the arts are thus accepted as an integral part of communal life and as serving a valuable communal function through their restitutive effects. It is only in the fourth century and with Plato that morality and the arts are finally divorced and *mimesis* is to replace *apate* as the artistic aim.¹¹⁷ Aristotle, however, characteristically modifies the extreme Platonic position in admitting the cathartic function of tragedy as providing a χαρὰν ἀβλαβή.¹¹⁸ Aristotle thus reverts in part to the fifth-century position, but in confining the area of artistic expression to the category of *paidia*, "entertainment," he definitively separates the educational and aesthetic activity of art and thus widens the gap between it and the moral functions of the community; he splits apart even further, consequently, the unity of the communal-educative and restitutive-entertaining functions of the arts which Pericles and, it would seem, Gorgias too had assumed.¹¹⁹

The *terpsis* or *hedone* which plays such a large part in Gorgias' theories as the proper end of the aesthetic process thus need have no immoral coloring. It forms part of a unified, if not systematically elaborated, aesthetic theory which includes under the heading of *poiesis* (*Hel.* 9, 18) both literature and the visual arts, and regards *opsis* as a coordinate area with language for the stimulation of aesthetic pleasure and the stronger emotions of *ekplexis* or *eros*. The association of *ekplexis* or *kataplexis* with powerful literature appears also in Euripides' characterization of Aeschylus in the *Frogs* (961-62) and thus may possibly derive from Gorgias himself;¹²⁰ at least Gorgias' description of Aeschylus' *Septem* as "full of Ares" (B24) occurs in the *Frogs* (1021).¹²¹ But, significantly, Gorgias uses *ekplexis* as one of the emotional affects resulting from a powerful *opsis* (*Hel.* 17), and thus seems to have expanded his awareness of the emotional force of artistic creation and response to include visual as well as linguistic sensitivity. In so doing he suggests the possibility of generalizing his emotional theory of literature to the arts and thus reaches a breadth of view

toward the emotional basis of all aesthetic sensitivity that is usually said to originate with Plato.¹²²

It has been suggested, first by Süss and later (and more moderately) by Pohlenz, that the language of *Helen* 9, *eleos*, *phobos*, *pothos philopenthes*, ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων πραγμάτων . . . εὐτυχίαις, combined with the medical terminology of section 14, anticipates the later catharsis-theory of tragedy, with the notion of a pleasurable sense of relief from the emotions of pity and fear.¹²³ The parallels in language are striking; and the likelihood of Gorgias' having tragedy in mind in *Helen* 9 is perhaps confirmed by the interest in tragedy attested in B23-24. The *Frogs* (1028) also presents an idea similar to that of the *pothos philopenthes* of *Helen* 9, which shows at least that the awareness of the dramatic "framing" and artistic remoteness of others' sufferings as a source of pleasure was current in the late fifth century: Dionysus says of Aeschylus' *Persae*, ἐχάρην γοῦν τὸν θρῆνον ἀκούσας περὶ Δαρείου τεθνεώτος [Rogers' text].¹²⁴ Gorgias' own fondness for the Aeschylean type of tragedy appears in his admiration of the *Septem* (B24) and perhaps in his interest in *ekplexis* (*Hel.* 17), with which Aristophanes and the subsequent literary tradition associate Aeschylus (*Frogs* 961-62, *Vit. Aesch.* 7 and 14). This interest in Aeschylean tragedy and the powerful emotions it excites may make it possible to arrive at a closer interpretation of what Gorgias means by *apate*: the spectators must be "deceived" by the dramatic, presentational framework to a sufficient degree to associate themselves with the action of the drama so that they feel real pity or fear "at the good fortunes or the mischances of others' deeds and bodies" (*Hel.* 9); but at the same time pleasure results from these emotions precisely because the whole process is one of *apate*, "deception," in which the fictional element of the dramatic framework distances the action enough to make the emotional affects awakened by the performance pleasurable rather than painful.¹²⁵ And it is perhaps possible that in *Helen* 14, where Gorgias repeats some of the emotional terminology of section 9, he wishes to connect the action of a drug (*pharmakon*) in leading off the humors of the body with the emotional "purgation" of pity and fear effected by the tragic *logos*.

While there is thus some likelihood of a fairly well-developed aesthetic theory of Gorgias based upon the direction and release of emotional energies, it is not entirely certain to what extent Gorgias systematized and elaborated it and how much he merely suggested for the future elaboration of later thinkers, primarily Aristotle. He may never have conceived of the process outlined in the preceding paragraph anywhere nearly so systematically as it is there presented;¹²⁶

and yet the medical imagery and the reference to "humors" in the context of the emotional-aesthetic language of *Helen* 14 certainly suggest that the idea was in some form present in his mind. Gorgias remained, of course, a practitioner rather than a theorist, and hence he was more interested in empirical results than in an elaborate psychology. He indicates the emotional character of the aesthetic process, but probably was not interested in a deeper investigation of the precise nature of the emotions involved; his *logos* functions as the emotional catalyst, the drug that produces certain desired affective results, but its chemistry is still obscure. In the contemporary state of Greek psychological theory, it might have been impossible for Gorgias to have pursued the matter further without anticipating the analytical division of the psyche which Plato introduces. Hence from the point of view of fourth-century developments, Plato's criticism of Gorgias, that he practices rhetoric as an art of persuasion without the requisite systematic *episteme* of the psychic processes involved, is perhaps justified; but such a criticism distorts historical perspective. It is Gorgias' achievement to have perceived and formulated as a *techne* that the formal structuring of the *logos* (in qualities such as *metron*) evokes emotional forces, and to have generalized this formulation (at least in terms of the emotional effects, if not of formal analysis) to include both the linguistic and the visual arts. At the same time he attempts a scientific definition of the process by seeking an analogy in the most exact empirical science which the late fifth century could offer, medicine. In so doing, he treats the psyche as a tangible reality and places its functions on a level of reasonable explicability coordinate with other physical phenomena. The rhetor, then, aware of the artificial nature of the *logos* as a mere medium, capable of distortion, and aware of the flexibility of human *doxa*, commands a *techne* which can directly touch the psyche through a process of aesthetic and emotional excitation, and hence guide or control human action. Reason is thus ultimately made the master of emotion, but not, as Socrates taught, by completely overpowering it, but rather by channeling and directing emotive energies to preconceived ends. It is now the emotional potentialities of the *logos* which are exploited, and not the intellectual, though the methods of exploitation are still rational.

The *logos* is no longer only the directive tool of the whole society, the indispensable instrument of communication of the Periclean statesman, but a means of reaching the individual psyche. The emotional conception of the *logos* in Gorgias, moreover, stands in the greatest contrast to the rationalist reaction of Socrates; and the whole

system of Plato rests upon the rational force of the *logos* as the antithesis of emotion. The consequent division of the psyche, with a hierarchical ranking of its parts, represents in a sense a narrowing in the attitude toward the psyche and a relinquishing of the sense of the organic relationship and balance between rational and emotional capabilities that characterized the fifth century and especially the decade before the Peloponnesian war.¹²⁷

Thus although Gorgias may not himself have worked out the systematic consequences, psychological and ethical, of his *techne*, nevertheless his rationalistic approach to an area of human activity that did not admit of easy systematization, namely the emotional reaction to art, suggested and stimulated a line of development which proves highly fruitful in the fourth century and culminates as a full-blown "scientific" theory in the *Poetics* of Aristotle.

The restriction of the directive power of reason and *techne* to the phenomenon of the psyche represents, perhaps, a certain retrenchment from the position of Protagoras in the two or three decades before the Peloponnesian war, for Protagoras conceived of directing and planning whole societies and regarded the social form of the *polis* as the effective organizer of men's emotive energies. There has been, consequently, a loss in the fullness of the integration between the rational and emotional conceptions of the psyche which distinguishes the age of Protagoras and Pericles from the later fifth century. Pericles uses the emotive powers of the *logos* and *ekplexis* solely within a civic context (Thuc. 2.65.9). Damon too, though working over psychological material in a way similar to Gorgias', treated the *kinesis* of the psyche from the point of view of education within a civic framework and perhaps anticipated Plato in equating the *kinesis* of the psyche with the *kinesis* of the *polis*.¹²⁸ Similarly the *antilogiai* of Protagoras were conceived as a tool for discussing and manipulating man's social environment, but they later harden into a set of rhetorical *topoi* like those in the *Palamedes* or even like the rigid categorization of human motivation in the *Helen*. It was perhaps still possible for the elderly Gorgias to conceive of his *techne* in a communal and ethical context, but at least the implications of the opposite, individual-emotional point of view are present. Yet Gorgias' analysis, though it may be more limited in extent, at the same time penetrates deeper into the psyche than was perhaps possible for Protagoras. Gorgias' approach thus presupposes a degree of individuality characteristic of the late fifth century, but regards it as capable of rational direction and control. The seeds of this rational approach to human experience are, of course, already present in

Protagoras, but its transference to the area of personal emotional and aesthetic sensitivity is a substantial achievement which left its mark on the fourth-century theories of Plato and Aristotle and hence on the entire course of Western aesthetic theory.

NOTES

In the following notes DK=Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. 6 (Berlin 1952). Gorgias is number 82.

1. For the length of Gorgias' life, from 100 to 108 years, see DK A1-2, A10-14; also W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Munich 1940) III 57 n. 1. That he lived into the fourth century is attested by his association with Jason of Pherae (ca. 380-370) in Pausanias (A7); and see the accounts of his journeys in Thessaly in Isocrates (A18) and Plato (A19). The funeral inscription, dated to the beginning of the fourth century (A8) was presumably set up shortly after his death.

2. F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, ed. 2 (Leipzig 1887) I 47-48, sets the birth of Gorgias about 490, making him roughly contemporary with Protagoras. Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893) I 172 n. 75, following Porphyry's ascription of his *floruit* to the Olympiad 460-457 (DK A2 and the note *ad loc.*), puts him slightly earlier, 500/497-391/388; he also accepts the tradition of his living to 109 years.

3. For Gorgias as Empedocles' pupil, see DK A2 (Suidas), A3 (Diogenes), A14 (Quintilian). See also H. Diels, "Gorgias und Empedokles," *SBBerl* (1884) 343ff, who, however, admits that there may be not so much "direkten Schülerverhältnisse" with a man only ten years older than Gorgias himself, but maintains at least "ein bestimmender Einfluss," pp. 344-45.

4. For the relation of the "optical" fragments (B4-5) to Empedoclean theory, see *ibid.* 345-51 on B4 (Plato *Meno* 76a); Diels (above, n. 3) finds independent confirmation of Empedoclean influence here in the doxographical tradition (Theophrast. *De Sens.* 7; Aetius *Plac.* 1.15.3), while the mixture of the poetic with the prosaic style of the fragment seems to support Plato's attribution of such a remark to Gorgias. For B5 (Theophrast. *De Igne*) see Diels 353ff. Olof Gigon, "Gorgias über das Nichtsein," *Hermes* 71 (1936) 209-10 and esp. 210 n. 2, accepts Diels' evidence for Empedoclean influence on Gorgias. E. Dupréel, *Les Sophistes* (Neuchâtel, 1948) 107ff, while accepting the attribution of the fragments, doubts that Gorgias is serious here and thinks that he is simply ridiculing these ideas, that his attitude toward the natural sciences is entirely negative and critical. The mass of evidence cited by Diels, however, tells against such an extreme view.

5. For the association of Empedocles with Parmenides, see DK 31 A7 (Simplicius quoting Theophrastus); also Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1957) 320-21.

6. Diels (above, n. 3) 359f accepts the tradition of the early physical activity of Gorgias and divides his work into three periods: (1) an initial period of physical speculation (DK B4-5) into the 450's; (2) a renunciation of physics for eristics in the treatise "On Non-being" (B3) in the 440's; and (3) his rhetorical activity proper, from the 430's on. Diels argues strongly for a succession of

activities, not a simultaneous divergence of interests and remarks, "Es erscheint daher richtiger, die drei verschiedenen Gestalten, in denen uns Gorgias erscheint, als Physiker, als Eristiker, als Rhetor, nicht als ein Nebeneinander, sondern als ein Nacheinander seiner geistiger Entwicklung aufzufassen, welche mit der Umwälzung der gesamten Denkweise in der Sophistenzeit parallel geht" (p. 359); and he finds the division of these three categories in the *meteorologoi*, *logon agones*, and *philosophoi* of Helen 13. Diels, however, does admit the possibility of Gorgias' having drawn on these two earlier activities even later in the "rhetorical" period of his life (p. 368). O. Gigon, however (above, n. 4), accepts Diels' presentation of the scientific interests of Gorgias, but rejects the division of Gorgias' life into the three stages; he regards it as not impossible that Gorgias might have continued his philosophical interests along with his rhetorical work: "Weshalb soll er nicht gleichzeitig über eleatische Philosophie geschrieben und rhetorischen Unterricht erteilt haben können?" (p. 187). He would replace Diels' "Nacheinander" with a "Nebeneinander" of philosophical, scientific, and rhetorical activity (see p. 213). Gigon's view fits the tendency of the Sophists to be engaged in multiple activities — Hippias is an extreme example — but it should be stressed that these multiple activities, even those in philosophy, now contribute to the practical training of the *polites* (see Plato *Protag.* 318d-319a).

7. See Schmid (above, n. 1) 58. There is almost universal agreement that the treatise "On Non-being" belongs early in Gorgias' career, and there is no adequate reason to question Olympiodorus' date of 444-441 (DK B2). W. Nestle, in fact, "Die Schrift des Gorgias über die Natur oder über das Nicht-seiende," *Hermes* 57 (1922) 560ff, did argue for an earlier date, ca. 480-470, or perhaps as "late" as 462; but, although his arguments were accepted by Rosenmeyer, "Gorgias, Aeschylus, and *Apate*," *AJP* 76 (1955) 231 with n. 21, they rest upon the supposed priority of Gorgias to Zeno and have been convincingly refuted by Gigon (above, n. 4) 186-213, esp. 204-5. For Gigon's rejection of Diels' rigid schematization of Gorgias' periods of activity, see the preceding note.

8. For a reappraisal of the influence of the "innovations" of Gorgias on the Athenians in 427, see J. H. Finley, Jr., "Euripides and Thucydides," *HSCP* 49 (1938) 23-68, and "The Origins of Thucydides' Style," *HSCP* 50 (1939) 35-84; he demonstrates that many of the so-called Gorgianic techniques of argumentation and antithesis were actually current throughout the 430's.

9. D. A. G. Hinks, "Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric," *CQ* 34 (1940) 66, suggests that Tisias and Corax had a developed *system* of rhetoric based upon *eikos*, whereas Gorgias offered only examples for imitation. None of his evidence, however, is very strong, and the remainder of this chapter attempts to show the systematic basis of Gorgias' literary-rhetorical practice.

10. Blass (above, n. 2) I 71-72, 75 n. 2, 75-79. In his first edition he inclined toward the spuriousness of the two works. See also his edition of Antiphon, *Orationes et Fragmenta*, ed. 2 (Leipzig 1908) xxviii: *Gorgiae utraque mihi genuina videtur, quoque saepius relego, eo firmitus id apud me iudicium stat.* Heinrich Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik* (Leipzig 1912) 3ff, also attempts to prove the genuineness of the two Gorgianic works by parallels with Hippocrates and Antiphon the orator, and calls attention to the similarity in their style of argumentation with the work "On Non-being" (B3) (see esp. pp. 24-25). Max

Pohlenz, "Die Anfänge der griechischen Poetik," *GöttNachr* (1920) 166-67, accepts the *Helen* as definitively genuine. See also the further references in DK II 288.

11. For a summary of the views of the relations of Gorgias' *Helen* to Euripides' plays, see DK II 288; Schmid (above, n. 1) 72 with n. 7 (who prefers Preuss' date between the *Troades* and the *Helen*, i.e., 414 B.C.); Otto Immisch, *Gorgias Helena*, Lietzmann's *Kleine Texte f. Vorlesungen u. Übungen* 158 (1927) 53, prefers a date after Euripides' *Helen* of 412 B.C. Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 167 would date Gorgias' *Helen* before the *Troades* of 415 B.C., and this view has been again taken up by Maria Orsini, "La cronologia dell' Encomio di Elena di Gorgia e le Troiane di Euripide," *Dioniso* 19 (1956) 82ff, who sees in the *Troades* "una caricatura dell' encomio del sofista" (p. 86), and argues that *Tro.* 981ff is a reply to the treatment of *Eros* as a violent, irresistible force (*bia*) in Gorgias' *Helen*.

12. F. Schupp, "Zur Gesch. der Beweistopik, II," *WS* 45 (1926-27) 173ff, attempts to date the *Palamedes* in 440-430 on the grounds of its similarity of argumentation with the work "On Non-being" and the developed use of the *topoi* of the *kairos* (τόπος, χρόνος, πᾶγμα) and the πρόσωπον; but none of these arguments are convincing, for these techniques could have been applied at any time after their "invention," and Schupp rests much of his "proof" on the rather uncertain assumption that Gorgias is continuing the work of Tisias. Schmid (above, n. 1) 74 argues for the influence of the *Palamedes* on the rhetorical technique of Antiphon and hence would date it considerably before Antiphon's death in 411. But, as Finley has shown (above, n. 8), these rhetorical techniques were probably current in Athens even before the arrival of Gorgias in 427. The soundest dating seems to rest, then, on the stylistic arguments of Blass (above, n. 2) 80-81, i.e., the decrease in hiatus, in poetic words, and in compound formations as compared with the *Helen*, and the increasing use of Attic forms; only some, but not all, of these differences could be attributed to a difference in genre (i.e., dicæastic versus epideictic oratory). These stylistic arguments were also presented by E. Maass, "Untersuchungen zur Gesch. der gr. Prosa: (1) über die erhaltenen Reden des Gorgias," *Hermes* 22 (1887) 571ff, esp. 578-79, and are fully accepted in the recent study by Orsini (above, n. 11) 82. For a convenient summary of the arguments about the chronology of the two works see Orsini, 82-83, 87 n. 1.

13. Blass (above, n. 2) I 80 suggests that the *Palamedes* is Gorgias' last work.

14. Blass, *ibid.* 81, doubtless from the point of view of later rhetorical development, stresses the importance and seriousness of the *Palamedes* over the *Helen*: "Im Inhalt endlich sind die Vorzüge vor der Helena ausserordentlich gross. Diese ist ein *Kunststück der Worte*, hinsichtlich der Gedanken nichts als *leichte Spielerei*; den *Palamedes* dagegen hat J. J. Reiske nicht ganz unverdient einen Katechismus der griechischen Dialektik und Rhetorik genannt." H. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 12 speaks of the "absolute Unsachlichkeit" and "rein scherzhaft" character of the *Helen*; and for the attempt to substantiate this by reference to B3, see pp. 22ff.

15. *Ibid.* 28-29: "Er wollte Zenon weder fortbilden noch widerlegen, er wollte ihn höchstens rednerisch überbieten"; also pp. 32-35. On p. 2, Gomperz cites the views of Windelband and F. C. S. Schiller, who regarded "On Non-being" as a parody of the Eleatics. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 62ff seems to be

reviving to a certain extent the views of Windelband in suggesting that Gorgias is using the arguments of the Eleatics against themselves, perhaps with a deliberate parody or exaggeration implied; Dupréel, however, stresses, unlike Gomperz, the real seriousness of Gorgias' underlying motives.

16. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 35: "Der 'philosophische Nihilismus' des Gorgias ist aus der Geschichte der Philosophie zu streichen. Seine Scherzrede über die Natur hat ihren Platz in der Geschichte der Rhetorik." See also the commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* by E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1959) 8.

17. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 30-31; he accepts as a reliable portrait of Gorgias that presented by Isocrates in the proem to his own *Helena*. He also (p. 29) suggests that Gorgias is referring to himself under the *meteorologoi* of *Helen* 13 who substitute one *doxa* for another in the minds of their hearers. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 80, however, has perhaps with greater acumen warned against the danger of fourth-century polemics against contemporaries hidden in references to older fifth-century figures; in the case of Gorgias' it is, of course, necessary to recall Plato's controversy with Isocratean rhetoric and to consider the extent to which this colors his view of Gorgias, especially in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, as a convenient whipping-post for a contemporary controversy.

18. Gigon (above, n. 4) 209-10 finds also in the exposition of Gorgias' "On Non-being" in the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* evidence for the influence of Empedocles upon Gorgias which supports in part Diels' earlier work (above, n. 3). Blass (above, n. 2) 78 also accepts the tradition of Gorgias' philosophical interests and notes the relatively slight use of *eikos* in the two speeches, an indication, he thinks, of training in the Eleatic tradition rather than in the rhetorical school of Tisias and Corax; and he finds in the two works "genau das, was wir von dem philosophisch gebildeten, der Prozesstechnik des Tisias aber fernstehenden Gorgias erwarten." W. Süss, *Ethos* (Leipzig and Berlin 1910) shares essentially this view and suggests that Gorgias' position is closer to the philosophical "scepticism" of Protagoras than Sicilian rhetoric, pp. 59-61 (and so too Dupréel [above, n. 4] 63-64 on his approximation to the "relativisme psychologique" of Protagoras). Similarly, Diels (above, n. 3) 362ff suggests that the influence of Tisias and Corax upon the rhetorical formation of Gorgias was negligible in comparison with that of the stylistic influence of Empedocles. See, however, Hinks (above, n. 9), who doubts the tradition that makes Empedocles the "founder of rhetoric" (Sext Emp. *Adv. Math.* 1.6; Quintil. 3.1.8) in favor of Tisias and Corax. E. Bux, "Gorgias u. Parmenides," *Hermes* 76 (1941), however, has gone further still and, while doubting Gorgias' relation to Empedocles (p. 407), stresses the similarity between the methods of logical proof in the Eleatics (e.g., *semeia*, Melissus B10; *semata*, Parmen. B8.55) and in Gorgias (pp. 399ff). He regards the treatise "On Non-being" as a youthful exercise in the Eleatic school, with the consequences that it is not to be taken as a statement of utter scepticism (pp. 403-4). He regards Gorgias' chief contribution as the application of the Eleatic logical method to rhetorical themes, so that the two speeches are cast in the form of "philosophischen Abhandlungen" on nonphilosophical subjects (p. 404). The argument in favor of the influence of Tisias and Corax upon Gorgias' rhetorical and argumentative procedures had been taken up also by Nestle (above, n. 7) 558ff, who correspondingly rejects the possibility of Eleatic influence. His arguments, however, are vitiated in part by his chronological assumptions of the priority of Gorgias B3 to Zeno; thus he dates B3 to 480-470

and uses the supposed association with Tisias and Corax to provide a source for Gorgias' techniques of argument independent of the Eleatics. Nestle's view has been rejected by Gigon, 186, and Bux (above), and most recently by Calogero, "Gorgias and the Socratic Principle, 'Nemo Sua Sponte Peccat,'" *JHS* 77 (1957) 16, who firmly denies any connection with Tisias and Corax and regards the work "On Non-being" as neither "a joke nor an exercise, but a highly ironical *reductio ad absurdum* of the Eleatic philosophy (especially of Zeno)" (p. 16 n. 22).

19. For Isocrates' association of Gorgias with physical and philosophical speculation, see in general Diels (above, n. 3) 358, 367-68, and Nestle (above, n. 7) 551-52.

20. For the *Helen* as containing elements of an actual theory of vision, see S. Melikova-Tolstoi, "Une Théorie de la vision chez Gorgias," *Archives de l'Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques* (Leningrad 1935) VII 367-74. This article, in Russian, was unfortunately inaccessible, but see the summary in Marouzeau, *L'Année Philologique* 11 (1937) 48: "Le paragraphe 17 de l'Éloge d'Hélène contient une véritable explication scientifique du processus de la vision."

21. For the associations of the older sophists with physical speculations, see DK 85 A9 (Cicero *De Orat.* 3.32.128 on Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Protagoras); Prodicus in Aristophanes' *Clouds* is also a "meteorosophist" (vs. 360, DK 84 A10). See also DK on 84 A10 (II 310, *ad vs.* 24) and in general Schmid (above, n. 1) 186. Diels (above, n. 3) 358 here cites Dionys. Hal. *Isocr.* 1, to the effect that Isocrates was the first to abandon eristic debate and physical speculation entirely to concentrate upon political subjects only: "Having received the practice of speaking mixed up by the sophists around Gorgias and Protagoras, he was the first to proceed from eristic and physical to political discourses and he continually devoted his studies to that discipline" (Dionys. Hal. *Opuscula*, ed. Usener and Radermacher [Leipzig 1899] 1.55.10ff; Reiske, 5.536).

22. Finley, *HSCP* 50 (1939) 77, however, doubts the tradition that Gorgias wrote on scientific subjects and accepts the view of H. Gomperz that the treatise "On Non-being" is not to be taken seriously. See, however, Diels (above, n. 3) 357 who notes that the tradition reports the interest of some of Gorgias' pupils in *physika* (e.g., Polus, Alcidamas, Critias); and he suggests that some of this interest may be due to Gorgias himself. For Gorgias' acquaintance with current physical and philosophical theories, see also Dodds (*supra*, n. 16) 7.

23. See J. Sykutris, *Gnomon* 4 (1928) 17 (review of Immisch, above, n. 11): "Gorgias, den Denker, bekämpft Plato, so sehr er von der Höhe seines Wissensbegriff als oberflächlich geringschätzte; für den Stilisten hat er nur Spott." See also Dodds (above, n. 16) 9-10.

24. Sykutris (above, n. 23) 17: "Rationalistisch in seinem Prinzip, psychologisch motivierend in seiner Methode, erinnert Gorgias stark an die euripideische Weise, von der er wieder mit seiner ethischen Indifferenz abweicht. . . . Als Stoff ist er (der Mythos) ihm ein *paignion* . . . , aber ein Gefäß bleibt er doch zur Erörterung theoretischer Probleme." Such a view, perhaps itself a bit extreme, would at least credit Gorgias with insight enough to see an ethical problem (regardless of its solution) in the case of Helen, contrary to the view of H. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 25, who thinks that the arguments of the *Helen* demonstrate that adultery is not possible and those of the *Palamedes* that

treason in war is not possible. Such an interpretation goes too far beyond what Gorgias himself says in the two works; he could still regard adultery or treason as quite possible while defending the particular cases of the accused. Süss (above, n. 18) 55 also speaks of the *paignion* as "nicht Witze, sondern Studien"; and for a similar positive view of the *Helen* as a *paignion*, see Nestle (above, n. 7) 553, who admits that the *Helen*, though called a *paignion*, can still "trotz ihres ausgesprochenen rhetorischen Charakters ernsthafte Gedanken ihres Verfassers enthalten."

25. Gigon (above, n. 4) 212 thus warns, "Bloss darf man seinen 'Ernst' dem Ernste eines Sokrates nicht gleich zustellen," and points out that the fifth-century Sophist was not accustomed "mit dem wirklichen Leben im Einklang zu bleiben." For the development of this conflict between *theoria* and *praxis* into the fourth century and beyond, see Werner Jaeger, "Ueber Ursprung u. Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideal," *SBBerl* (1928) 390-421.

26. W. C. Greene, *Moirai* (Cambridge, Mass. 1944) 253.

27. Isocrates *Helena* 14. For Gorgias' *Helen* 8-14 as providing in fact an encomium on *logos* and thus glorifying Gorgias' own art, see T. S. Duncan, "Gorgias' Theories of Art," *CJ* 33 (1937-1938) 404-5.

28. For the *epangelma* of Protagoras, see Plato *Protag.* 319a (DK 80 A5); for that of Prodicus and Hippias, *Protag.* 337c-338b (DK 84 A13, 86C1). It is perhaps noteworthy too that Plato has Sokrates speak in one breath of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias, *Apol.* 19e (DK 82 A8a).

29. For the panhellenic sentiment of the *Olympikos*, see also Philostratus *Vit. Soph.* 1.9.4 (DK A1); for Gorgias' panhellenism in general, see H. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 35-36, Dupréel (above, n. 4) 61.

30. Aristotle *Pol.* 1.13, 1260a28. See Süss (above, n. 18) 101-2 and A. Rostagni, "Un nuovo capitolo nella storia della retorica e della sofistica," *StItal* N.S. 2 (1922) 193, who closely follows Süss in the citation and interpretation of these passages in the direction of "un significato affatto relativo." See also Dupréel (above, n. 4) 81-82 for the multiplicity of *arete* in Gorgias and his "pluralisme moral"; see also below, n. 74.

31. On the conventionality of the language of the expression in A8, see Blass (above, n. 2) I 52, n. 5: "Die Ausdrücke sind von der Gymnastik entlehnt und erinnern an die Parallele, welche Isokrates (*Antid.* 18off) zwischen dieser und der 'Philosophie' durchführt."

32. For this view of the amorality of Gorgias, see also Rostagni (above, n. 29) 155-57. With regard to the *kairos*-theory, however, he does seem to admit a more positive element: "La retorica, così concepita, diventa per Gorgia e per i suoi discepoli arte del ben vivere, centro dell' educazione" (157-58).

33. See Greene (above, n. 26) 257 on Plato's judgment of Gorgias: "Vain, shallow, incompetent in dialectic, but not immoral he paints him; not immoral, but incapable of seeing the potentialities of his art, which was indeed a high explosive, and in the wrong hands a vicious thing." For Plato's criticisms of Gorgias, see also Dodds (above, n. 16) 8-10.

34. For the continued good repute of Gorgias, see Greene (above, n. 26) 253.

35. For a somewhat cynical view of Gorgias' practical acceptance of the values of society, see Süss (above, n. 18) 58: "Die Relativität dieser Wertbegriffe war gewiss niemanden bewusster als gerade dem feinen Skeptiker Gorgias. Man darf annehmen, dass er mit Bewusstsein sie gleichwohl in die Rhetorik eingestellt hat, in der richtigen Erkenntnis, dass eine rednerische

Wirkung so wenig wie überhaupt eine Wirkung mit einer restlos alle Werturteile skeptisch auflösenden Weltanschauung zu erzielen ist . . . , sondern einzig und allein durch eine überzeugte und selbstverständliche Geltendmachung der allgemein bürgerlichen Moral, die es ja gewöhnt ist, je nach Bedarf gewendet zu werden und so im Grunde jedem Handelnden genügt."

36. For *eros* in the *Helen*, see 4 (*bis*), 5, 6, 15, 18, 19 (*bis*), 20. See also the *Epitaphios* (B6) *nomimoi erotes*.

37. Immisch (above, n. 11) 34 notes the strangeness of the repetition *psyches taxis* (in the sense of *habitus, status, condicio*) and *pharmakon taxis*, which he construes as *ἐπιταγή*, "verordnen," i.e., "prescribe" (this usage of *taxis* does, of course, occur: see esp. Plato, *Politicus* 294e). Immisch does well to reject the emendations proposed, but not without some hesitation, and he is still unsatisfied with the passage: . . . *Hebescit et dormitat hoc loco bonus Gorgias*. There is another possible interpretation for *taxis*, suggested by LSJ, s.v., *v* (where read "*Hel. 14*" for "*Pal. 14*"), i.e., the "power" or "effectiveness" of the *pharmaka*. This interpretation would suit the context of the passage and would bring out better the purpose of the repetition of *taxis*, to emphasize the physical analogy between the psyche and the *pharmaka*. The repetition is thus not a careless jingle (as Immisch implies), but a deliberate and meaningful exploitation of language to reinforce the content.

38. For the *pathe* of the psyche in Democritus, see also B176 and 191.

39. The active verbal force of *προσιούσα* was sufficiently striking to Blass to cause him to emend it to a tame *προσοῦσα*. For these active associations of *peitho* and *logos*, see the list in Immisch (above, n. 11) 23. The parallel *εἰσῆλθε* in *Hel. 9* is decisive. For the *τύπος*-image see also below, n. 44.

40. See Dodds (above, n. 16) 202 on *Gorgias* 452e1-8, citing also *Phaedrus* 261a-c. Süss (above, n. 18) 21 well describes the Gorgianic rhetorical aim as "die psychische Beeinflussung des Hörers." Rostagni (above, n. 30) 200 stresses the irrational basis of Gorgias' psychology of rhetoric, founded "non . . . su elementi *razionali*, ma sul principio, *irrazionale*, dell' incanto e della suggestione (*psychagogia*)." Following in part E. Howald, "Eine vorplatonische Kunsttheorie," *Hermes* 54 (1919) 187ff, esp. 198ff, Rostagni attempts to trace this psychological approach back to Pythagorean sources, citing Diog. Laert. 8.32 on Pythagoras, who regarded the greatest achievement to "persuade the psyche towards the good or towards the bad" (p. 170, with n. 2); but despite the similarity of the citation to the phrases in the *Helen* discussed in the text, Rostagni's hypothesis is rather unlikely and hardly capable of adequate demonstration. Immisch (above, n. 11) 30 dismisses the whole theory as *somnia*. See also H. Flashar, "Die medizinische Grundlage der Lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung in der gr. Poetik," *Hermes* 84 (1956) 16.

41. Rostagni (above, n. 30) 149 (also "Aristotele e Aristotelismo nell' estetica antica," *ibid.* 73) plausibly suggests the influence of Damon for this Gorgianic idea of affecting the psyche through *logos* (see esp. *Helen* 9) and remarks, "Gorgia . . . e insegna e spiega dovere il retore scientificamente conoscere le vie dell' anima onde scendono i discorsi capaci d' *incanto* e di *persuasione*." For the possible influence of Damon, see also W. Kroll, *RhM* N.S. 66 (1911) 168-69, who describes Damon as the man "der in den Rhythmen und Tonarten Nachahmungen menschlicher *ῥῆθη* gefunden und ihnen dementsprechend ethische Wirkungen zugeschrieben hat." He further suggests that Gorgias was the first to transfer this musical-ethical theory to the *logos*; and he notes

the musical association of λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον in *Hel.* 9. See also below, n. 73.

42. See especially M. Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 168, who points out that Gorgias' emphasis in *Hel.* 9 lies "nicht nur auf die psychische Seite des Affektes, sondern auch auf die physiologische Form, in der er sich äussert." He explains *pothos philopenthes* by reference to the Homeric ἕμερος γόοιο, and cites passages on the *hedone* or *terpsis* of the release of tears from the fragments of Euripides (nos. 563, 573 in Nauck, *TGF*²).

43. See especially H. Flashar (above, n. 40) who shows how the developed Hippocratic humor-theories explained the shivering of *phobos* by an excess of cold and the weeping of *eleos* by excessive moisture (see pp. 47-48 for his summary); he connects this theory, of course, with the quasi-medical sense of *katharsis* in Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Politics* (but see below, n. 122). Some of the same material was treated independently by Pohlenz, "Furcht und Mitleid? Ein Nachwort," *Hermes* 84 (1956) 49-74, who re-emphasizes the parallel of *phrike* in *Hel.* 9 with Aristotle, *Poet.* 1453b5, and remarks that even in Pindar or Sophocles *phobos* is "nicht bloss ein äusseres 'Symptom,' sondern ein körperliches Phänomen, das mit dem seelischen Vorgang wesentlich zusammengehört" (p. 49). Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 239, on the other hand, stresses the nonscientific attitude toward literature in connection with Gorgias' attitude toward tragedy, i.e., that the usual definition of tragedy makes it "an art rather than a science," and he is certainly correct in asserting that "Platonically speaking, it is the special glory of tragedy that it is analogous to cookery rather than to medicine." It is, however, also the special glory of Gorgias' age that men begin to regard the psychological effects produced by tragedy in a "scientific" way (even though the process of its creation was less susceptible to such analysis) until Aristotle applies the explicitly medical term *katharsis* (following the interpretations of Flashar and Pohlenz) to its chief effects. The work of Aristotle would thus be seen as part of a continuously developing "scientific" attitude toward the psyche and the psychic aspects of literature rather than as an isolated phenomenon.

44. The verb τυπόω can perhaps refer here as much to "molding" as to "stamping" or "impressing." In support of the latter meaning, it is to be noted that the noun *typos* early occurs in the sense of a "die" for stamping (Aesch. *Suppl.* 282) and later of the impression made by a seal (Eurip. *Hippol.* 862). At the same time the word can refer to a carved form or image (Hdt. 2.86.7, 3.88.3) and becomes, then, almost synonymous with ξόανον (Eurip. *Tro.* 1074). The meaning "mold" or "form" occurs frequently with the verb τυπόω, though LSJ cite no early instances of a metaphorical usage of this sense. Plato and subsequent authors use the verb in its physical sense with reference to sculpture. One indication of the fifth-century usage of the verb (which is far less common than the noun) is afforded by the myth of the *Protagoras* (320d) where the gods "mold" (τυποῦσι) the mortal races. The noun, however, occurs in Democritus B228 with a metaphorical, ethical sense approaching "character": τοῦ πατρικοῦ τύπου; the metaphor here would probably be adequately conveyed by the English "stamp." The association of the verb with τρόποις in *Hel.* 15 places the word in an ethical context similar to this fragment of Democritus. The predominant concrete use of the word, however, both as verb and noun, suggests that even if it is metaphorical in Gorgias, the metaphor is still a vivid one and confirms the association of *peitho* with words of move-

ment and action as an almost physical impingement upon the psyche (see above, n. 39).

45. For the association of *opsis* with emotive affects in fourth-century psychological theory, see ps.-Aristotle *Problemata* 886b9ff, where "the signs of the *pathe* through *opsis* create in us the *pathe* themselves"; and see too Aristotle *Poet.* 1453b1ff, and, in general, Flashar (above, n. 40) 41 with n. 4. *Opsis* in these later passages has become more specifically defined as the strictly physical aspect of vision — or even the concrete objects visually perceived: see G. F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957) 233–34, 277–79, 408–10 — whereas in Gorgias *opsis* still includes the emotional processes and subjective reactions attached to the physical act of perception; in the *Problemata* passage, on the other hand, *opsis* is much more simply the medium through which a stimulus is received.

46. Immisch (above, n. 11) 42–43, however, rejects *τρόποις* as corrupt: *Non enim perpetuum morum habitum, sed singularem actus animo ingerere dicit G. τὴν ὄψιν*. He goes on, *Exspectamus potius visus potestatem dici maxumam, eum pro suo arbitrato formare animum non leviter aut ut facile resistatur, sed penitus atque funditus (quod non est idem atque in perpetuum)*. But this is too extreme an interpretation of *tropoi*, and Immisch's own emendation (*τροπιδείσις*) is, as often, far-fetched; the text of the MSS is not even questioned by Blass and DK.

47. For the element of subjective sensitivity in *opsis* and its intermediate role in determining human action, see Sykutris (above, n. 23) 15: "Sie (*opsis*) ist nicht bloss ein Sinn, sie erlebt selbst das Gesehene; neben den Vorstellungen vermittelt sie der Seele ihre eigene Erlebnisse und bedingt dadurch des Menschen Handeln."

48. See Plato *Gorg.* 456b (DK A22). For a "good" and "bad" *peitho*, see also Calogero (above, n. 18) 16.

49. There are, of course, some significant differences between the Thueydides passage and the *Palamedes*. There is no question of a dialogue in the *Pal.*, and the topic of the disadvantages of a *ξυνεχής ῥήσις* where the argument is heard but once (*ἐσάπεζ*) does not occur; on these two points, see Finley, *HSCP* 49 (1938) 55–56 (above, n. 8), who suggests the influence of the *antilogiai* of Protagoras.

50. These passages in Thucydides and the topic of panic are discussed by W. Schmid, *RhM* 50 (1885) 310ff and E. Harrison, *CR* 40 (1926) 6ff. See also Immisch (above, n. 11) 47. Schmid suggests that Thucydides gives a rationalistic, as opposed to a supernatural, explanation; but Harrison combatted this view by arguing that the superstitious associations of the god Pan with a panic first occur in Aeneas Tacticus in the fourth century. But aside from Pan, the idea of supernatural agency in the sudden emotional outbreaks in a large army is probably at least as early as Homer. Even Euripides (*Bacch.* 302–5; cf. *Gorg. Hel.* 16) attributes such "panics" to Dionysus.

51. DK translate the *πολλοὺς* of Thrasy-machus by "eine Masse." See also E. Schwartz, *Commentarius de Thrasy-macho Chalcedonio* (Rostock 1892) 6, who speaks of the utility of the emotions (*affectus*) to the rhetor *qui ad populum, ad multitudinem loquitur*. J. Smerenka, "De Dinosi, I," *Eos* 30 (1927) 233, suggests that Aristotle *Rhetoric* 3.19 (1419b24) also refers to Thrasy-machus where the various *pathe* of the psyche (*diabole, eleos, orge*) are said to be directed *πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν*. *Dikastes* here, however, is doubtless to be understood in a

collective sense, like Hermias' paraphrase of the πολλούς in the *Phaedrus* passage, by τὸν δικαστήν (cited by DK on Thrasyll. B6).

52. On the group emotion of *Hel.* 17, see in general Immisch (above, n. 11) 46-47. Immisch, while probably correct in emphasizing the greater importance of the psyche in Gorgias' treatment of *ekplexis* as opposed to that of Thucydides, tends to overlook Gorgias' own awareness of the application of *peitho* to the group (see *Hel.* 13, *Pal.* 33): *Non iam loqui Gorgiam de eis, qui intersunt in exercitu rebus bellicis, sed de singulis hominibus* (p. 46). He doubts that Gorgias has in mind at all the kind of collective panics which occur in Thucydides 4.125.1 and 7.80.3: *Removenda igitur ab hoc loco ea sunt πανεία, quibus non singuli, sed hominum multitudines bello periclitantes saepe excitabantur, velut agmina castra civitates* (p. 46).

53. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 73ff rightly insists upon the connection between "On Non-being" and the rest of Gorgias' work, and the consequent possibility of arriving at a coherent picture of both the philosophical and rhetorical bases of his activity.

54. For the inability of the *logos* to transcend itself and communicate anything beyond the verbal aspects of reality, see also ps.-Aristotle, *De Meliss. Xenoph. Gorg.* 980b1ff: "For just as neither vision (*opsis*) knows sounds, so neither does hearing hear colors, but sounds; and he who speaks (*legei*), speaks, but not color or a thing (*pragma*) . . ." See also the excellent remarks of Dupréel (above, n. 4) 68-69: "Le discours n'est pas un transport de son objet, il est une élaboration à partir d'un acquis préalable et il ne prend sa valeur que pour ceux qui ont, de leur côté, un acquis de même sorte, suffisant pour comprendre le sens des mots."

55. For the problems of *logos* and its relation to the Eleatics in Gorgias' work "On Non-being," see Nestle (above, n. 7) 551ff, esp. 555ff. He regards the work as a direct attack on Parmenides, citing, for instance, *Parmen.* B8.38ff. Gigon, however (above, n. 4) 204-5, while accepting the Eleatic framework for Gorgias' "On Non-being," suggests that Gorgias is not using Parmenides himself, but rather a later, more "advanced" pupil, like Melissus or Zeno. See also Dupréel (above, n. 4) 73, who supports the view that the Gorgianic treatment of *logos* is directed against the Eleatics to demonstrate the value of the *logos* is not founded "sur l'impérieuse nécessité de l'Etre" and hence is free for purely rhetorical-aesthetic functions as the instrument of art rather than of an ontological philosophy.

56. See Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 231-32, who also traces this sense of the duplicity of *logos* and *epea* back to the archaic poetic tradition.

57. It is apparently from this Platonic point of view that Süß (above, n. 18) 51ff and Rostagni (above, n. 30) 174ff (in general following Süß) connect the attitude of Gorgias to the *logos* with his *kairos*-theory and "relativism." For a more correct appraisal of Gorgias' historical position, see L. Stefanini, "L'estetismo di Gorgia," *AttiVen* 109 (1950-1951) 138.

58. Thus the arbitrary transposition of *Hel.* 13-14 after section 10 which Immisch (above, n. 11) introduces into his text (and see his commentary, p. 30) should be rejected and is, in fact, by his reviewer Sykutris (above, n. 23) 15. Section 14, furthermore, makes an especially fitting close to this whole portion on the *logos* and summarizes many of the preceding points, a tendency to which the *Helen* is prone (see, e.g., 20, 21). Hence it should be retained in its MSS position. Ending with section 12, it is true, does emphasize the defense of Helen

herself more clearly; but, as pointed out above, this part of the work is as much an encomium on the *techne* of persuasion as on Helen, and Gorgias is probably more interested in his *techne* at this point than in his proposed subject and adopted heroine.

59. The opposition *σαφῶς ἐπιστάμενος . . . δοξάζων* does, however, occur in *Pal.* 3. See also *Pal.* 24 and 35 for the contrast *doxa-aletheia*; *Hel.* 13 contrasts *aletheia* and *techne* (not *doxa*) from the point of view of practical *peitho*. See also Schmid (above, n. 1) 66, n. 9.

60. For the autonomy of the Gorgianic *logos* as an independent artistic creation, see L. Stefanini (above, n. 57) 138: "La retorica posteriore sarà indifferenza formale verso il contenuto; la retorica gorgiana consuma ogni contenuto, non lasciando fuori di sé nessun altro interesse o valore." Dupréel (above, n. 4) 110 also describes Gorgias as "soucieux bien moins des problèmes de la vérité que des problèmes artistiques."

61. Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 232 emphasizes the need for a willing suspension of belief in the Gorgianic persuasive and aesthetic process for the sake of a broader truth (which, of course, will not necessarily be identical with the literal truth implied in the *aletheia* of *Hel.* 13). Rosenmeyer affirms "All *peitho*, therefore, is *apatelos*, and that is its great glory."

62. Rosenmeyer, loc. cit., remarks, "*Apate* signals the supersession of the world of the *logos* in place of the epic world of things."

63. The meaning of the phrase *ἡ τε τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκουσάντων πίστις* is settled by the explanation of E. Norden, *Aeneis, Buch VI* (Leipzig 1903) 203-4 (*ad vs.* 264ff). He speaks of a "transzendente Offenbarungspoesie" where the poet "hears" the material of his song from a divine source and this provides the *pistis* for his tale. The tradition can be traced from the poet as *Μουσῶν ὑποφῆτης* in *Iliad* 2.418 and the invocation in *Iliad* 2.485f, through Plato (*Gorg.* 524b, 493a; *Meno* 81a) to Apollonius (4.1379f), Vergil, the Hermetic corpus, and the medieval apocalyptic writings. For the *pistis* and *pheme* of Gorgias *Hel.* 2, Norden compares Verg. *Aen.* 9.79, *Dicite, prisca fides facto, sed fama perennis*. Thus all the suggested emendations of Immisch (above, n. 11) 9-10 are unnecessary, nor is it necessary to construe *ποιητῶν* as genitive of source with *ἀκουσάντων* as Reiske suggested.

64. See Schmid (above, n. 1) 66: "Die psychologische Voraussetzung ist, dass die Seele durch die Sinneswahrnehmungen zunächst in den unsicheren Zustand der *doxa* versetzt ist, aus der sie mit Hilfe der teils logischen, teils sinnlichen Beeinflussung durch den Redner zu der Überzeugung geführt, ja gezwungen wird, in dem vom Redner als richtig Dargestellten die Wahrheit, das Wissen zu besitzen," and see also the passages from Gorgias cited in his n. 9.

65. See *ibid.* 65 with n. 1, emphasizing Gorgias' use of *apate* for the effect of *peitho* alone, without consideration of the moral implications. This view is perhaps correct as far as it goes, but fragment B23 does indicate a wider view of *apate* in a literary theory of sorts.

66. See Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 233-35.

67. For the possibility of a Gorgianic literary theory, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 142-78, *passim*; F. Wehrli, "Der erhabene u. der schlichte Stil in der poetisch-rhetorischen Theorie der Antike," *Phyllobolia f. Peter von der Mühl* (Basel 1946) 13-15, 20-21. Immisch (above, n. 11) 28ff was sceptical about Pohlenz' ideas of a literary theory in Gorgias, but his reluctance to accept

Pohlenz' arguments is criticized by his reviewer Sykutris (above, n. 23) 17. L. Radermacher, in another review of Immisch, *BPhW* 48 (1928) 5-9, supports Immisch' position against Pohlenz' view that the *synkrisis* of the *Frogs* represent a fifth-century literary theory derived in part from Gorgias; his arguments, however, though set out with great forcefulness, are not really detrimental to Pohlenz' view. They are chiefly (pp. 7-9) that (1) a man of Aristophanes' personal genius would not be likely to copy a sophistic model and (2) that Aristophanes lumps all the sophists together without distinction and treats them with scorn. With regard to (1), great personal genius does not exclude the possibility of incorporating or adapting current theories; and, similarly for argument (2), Aristophanes is certainly familiar with sophistic themes and rhetoric (see below, n. 120) and with Euripidean avant-garde intellectualism; and he can use these materials for ridicule (the *agon* of the *Frogs* is, after all, only a parody of a *synkrisis*) without signifying his approval of them, just as traces of the doctrines of Prodicus, Protagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and perhaps Damon appear in the *Clouds* (for specific references see the "Stellenregister" in DK III 578, and below, n. 114) without any implication that Aristophanes believes them. See also E. Skard, *SymbOslo* 27 (1949) 15.

68. For *apate*, see Aristoph. *Frogs* 910; *Diss. Logoi* 3.10ff; Plato *Rep.* 3.414b ff, *Laws* 2.663d-e; Polyb. 2.56.11, 4.20.5. See in general Schmid (above, n. 1) 65 with n. 1; Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 160-62; Rostagni (above, n. 30) 156; Dupréel (above, n. 4) 89ff; and especially Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 233ff. Rosenmeyer classes the passage from the *Diss. Log.* with the fourth century examples (p. 234, with n. 33); Dupréel rather uncritically regards the *Diss. Log.* as "daté sans contestation de la fin du V^e siècle" (p. 94).

69. The ps.-Aristotelian *De Meliss. Xenoph. Gorg.* treats the topics of illusion and *pseudos* less extensively than the summary of Sextus (given in DK B3), but still assigns them significant recognition (980a8 ff).

70. Such a continuity is advocated by Gigon: see above, n. 6.

71. Plato *Gorg.* 453a, 455a (DK A28). This definition is also later attributed to Corax (see Blass [above, n. 2] I 19, with n. 2; and H. Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften," *RhM* 64 [1909] 580-81); but this attribution probably derives from the Platonic passages in the *Gorgias*: see the note of DK *ad loc.*

72. See Schmid (above, n. 1) 61-62: Gorgias practised "eine glänzende Virtuosität apagogischer Wahrscheinlichkeitsbeweissführung, wobei mit Vorliebe eine mehrgliedrige Alternative, die alle Möglichkeiten zu erschöpfen scheint, vorangestellt und dann eine Möglichkeit nach der anderen ausgeschlossen wird bis zum Übrigbleiben der letzten und unwiderleglichen." See also Bux (above, n. 18) 397, with reference primarily to the *Palamedes*: "Der Redner will seine Hörer nicht oberflächlich überreden, er appelliert nicht an ihr Gefühl, er wendet sich an den Verstand, in dem er sie veranlasst, mit ihm in allgemeinen logischen Überlegungen die Situation des Angeklagten immer von neuem durchzudenken."

73. For the divine associations of poetry, see in general Alice Sperduti, "The Divine Nature of Poetry in Antiquity . . .," *TAPA* 81 (1950) 209ff; for the *thelkteria* of poetry she cites (pp. 227-28) *Odys.* 1.337. For the Homeric view of the aim of poetry as *thelxis*, see also J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge 1934) I 12. For Gorgias' association of the divine, poetic *thelxis* with his own prose, see too Duncan (above, n. 27) 405. For *peitho* as acting by *thelgein*, Immisch (above, n. 11) 37 cites Aeschyl. *Suppl.*

1039, *θέλκτορι πειθοῖ* and *Eumen.* 885, where *peitho* is called *γλώσσης ἐμῆς μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον*; add also *PV* 172–73 (*μελιγλώσσοις πειθοῦς ἐπαοιδάζουσιν θέλξει*). Schmid (above, n. 1) 62 speaks also of this emotional element as the “sinnlich-akustischen Reiz der Sprachmusik” and suggests the possible influence of Damon for the notion of the emotive effects of music (see above, n. 41 and below, nn. 103ff).

74. For Gorgias’ supposed inadequate morality, see below, n. 110, and Greene’s defense, above, nn. 25–26. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 81ff emphasizes the *kairos* in Gorgias’ morality and regards Gorgias as the first defender of “la morale de l’occasion.”

75. The date of Thrasyarchus’ rhetorical activity is to be placed before 427 on the evidence of the *Daitales* of Aristophanes of that year (frag. 198.5ff, DK 85 A4) which alludes to him. See Schwartz (above, n. 51) 4, who remarks, *Fuit igitur ante Gorgiam qui sermonem Atticum artis legibus subiceret*.

76. See Schmid (above, n. 1) 191 (who, however, regards Thrasyarchus, after the Platonic portrait of the *Republic*, as using this “Pathologie” for immoral ends, pp. 188–89). For the psychological assumptions of Thrasyarchus, see also Smerenka (above, n. 51) 233: *Observationes enim psychologicae olim a sophistis-rhetoribus perfectae fructum tulerunt uberrimum et in omnia litterarum genera sensim sine sensu irrepserunt*. For the passage in the *Phaedrus* (267c, DK 85 B6) see also Klaus Oppenheimer, “Thrasyarchus,” *RE A* 11 (1936) 589–90, who connects the idea of persuading *epi to enantion* (*Phaedr.* 261c ff, esp. 262a) with Thrasyarchus and Thucyd. 2.65.9, which he then takes to be written after 404 B.C. (but see n. 75 above). For the *orge* and *oiktros* of *Phaedr.* 267c, Schwartz (above, n. 51) 5 cites the discussion of the orator in Eurip. *Orest.* (esp. 702) and argues that *orge* means not simply “passion,” but real “anger.”

77. For Thrasyarchus and the *technē* of *hypokrisis* (delivery) see Schmid (above, n. 1) 191 with nn. 2–3; Quintilian, however (3.3.4), speaks of *actio* as belonging to the sphere of *natura*, not *ars*. See also DK 85 B7 for the association of the work on *hypokrisis* with the title *Hyperballontes*.

78. For the *Megale Technē* see DK 85 B3 and Schwartz (above, n. 51) 5, who suggests that it comprised the *Eleoi*, *Hyperballontes*, and *Prooimia*.

79. Calogero (above, n. 18) 13.

80. For the parallels between the *Pal.* and Socrates, esp. the *Apology*, see *ibid.* 15–16, with special reference to the theme of *ta enantia*. Calogero concludes decisively in favor of the priority of the *Pal.*, which he would date before 410 B.C.

81. For emotional and rational persuasion in Gorgias, see *ibid.* 16. The emotional sense of the *logos* and *peitho* is stressed also by Stefanini (above, n. 57) 138: the magical effects of the *logos* in *Hel.* 10 lead to “l’adesione piena ed emotiva che è persuasione.” This emotional definition of *logos* and *peitho* contrasts sharply with Democritus’ confidence in *λόγον πειθῶ* as the rationalistic antithesis to *nomos* and *ananke* (B181). Thus Calogero (p. 16, n. 24) well observes, “So *peitho*, which was the essential instrument of any democratical opposition to a tyrannical *bia*, becomes the instrument of a new sort of tyranny (*βία δι’ ἐκόντων*) until it is checked by *dialogos*.”

82. For this interpretation of *paignion*, see Gigon (above, n. 4) 190, who suggests that the work is a *paignion*, “weil dem Verfasser am Gegenstand, der Unschuld Helenas wirklich nicht das geringste liegt.” So too Stefanini (above, n. 57) 138 on the self-contained independence of the *Helen*: “L’Encomio di

Elena è 'gioco' . . . perchè possiede la lieve agilità dell' opera che si regge su sè medesima e basta a sè stessa . . ." His claim for the seriousness of the work, however, "perchè l'innocenza di Elena vuol essere per Gorgia il simbolo dell' innocenza della retorica," is highly dubious and rests in part upon a conjectural reading of the hopelessly corrupt passage at the beginning of *Hel.* 12. It is perhaps worth noting that Suidas attributes a *paignion* to Thrasymachus also (DK 85 A1), which Schwartz (above, n. 51) 5 takes to be an *exemplum* similar to the *Helen*. For a more sceptical interpretation of *paignion*, see Duncan (above, n. 27) 404.

83. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 110ff stresses the importance of the aesthetic sensitivity to beauty in Gorgias' thought with special reference to the *Helen*, and notes that Isocrates also uses the theme of Helen to praise the value of beauty (Isocr. *Helen* 54). He thus emphasizes the purely artistic or aesthetic component in Gorgias' work and attitudes, and suggests that "Gorgias pourrait avoir été l'un des premiers à porter une réflexion systématique sur l'idée du beau" (p. 111).

84. For the associations of poetry and the divine in Gorgias, see above, n. 73.

85. See above, n. 63.

86. For a later application of the image of the psyche being led (*ἄγεσθαι*), see ps.-Longinus *De Sublim.* 26.2.

87. For the later images of the divine power of the *logos*, see Isocrates *Nicocles* 9; Alcidas *Soph.* 9; Süss (above, n. 18) 51. For *peitho* as a tyrant, see Euripides *Hecuba* 814ff and Immisch (above, n. 11) 23-24. Süss, 22, speaks of Gorgias' treatment of the *logos* as if of "eines lebenskräftigen Organismus, als eines gewaltigen Tyrannen, als eines in Ebbe und Flut gleich der Menschenseele hin und her bewegten Lebewesens."

88. Orsini (above, n. 11) 83ff suggests that it is precisely Gorgias' treatment of the *peitho* of Helen as an external force, an irresistible, compulsive *bia*, to which Euripides replies in Hecuba's denunciation, *Tro.* 969ff. Orsini contrasts especially the "externalized" treatment of Helen's action in Gorgias with the internal emphasis of *Tro.* 988, *ὁ σὸς δ' ἰδὼν νῦν τοῦς ἐποιήθη Κύπρις* (p. 84), and compares also the argument of Gorgias founded upon *bia* with Hecuba's accusation, 998-1001. Orsini's contention that Euripides is replying to Gorgias is attractive when the passages are compared; and yet Hecuba's arguments about *kypris* and *bia* may be simply a reply to Helen's previous defense (see 928ff, 959ff) rather than to a preceding work of Gorgias. The chronological relationship must then remain unsettled, though the parallels certainly indicate that the moral implications of persuasion and impulsive action were under consideration in contemporary intellectual circles.

89. See Immisch (above, n. 11) 37, who describes the forces of *eros* and *peitho* as follows: *Extrinsecus enim et machinae adventiciae instar operantur apud Gorgiam magicae quam Amoris potestates in animum se insinuare cupientes*. For the association of *peitho* and *ananke*, see Immisch, 39, who cites Hdt. 8.111, where the two appear together as the two greatest gods of the Athenians. It is possible too that the *ἀναγκάιοι ὄντες* refer to this power of *ananke* which *peitho* exercises over the psyche. Such, at least, is the interpretation of S. Melikova-Tolstoi, *BP&W* 49 (1912) 29, against the interpretation of Diels that the phrase refers to the time-limit set by the clepsydra. The parallel which she draws with Thucyd. 4.60.1 is not, however, very close, for *ananke* there has the almost

purely physical sense of *bia*. See, however, W. Schmid (above, n. 1) 61, who notes that the word *πειθανάγκη* actually appears as a rhetorical term in the third and second centuries B.C.

90. For Aristotle's analysis of pity and fear with regard to human action in general, see *Rhet.* 2.5 (1382a20 ff) and 2.8 (1385b11 ff); *Poetics* 1449b27, 1452a2 ff, 1453a1 ff, etc.; also Else (above, n. 45) 228ff, 371ff, with n. 22; G. K. Gresseth, "The System of Aristotle's Poetics," *TAPA* 89 (1958) 321-23.

91. For the power of the *logos* over the hidden emotional forces of men, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 174: "Er (Gorgias) fühlte, dass das gesprochene Wort als solches eine gewaltige Macht sei, dass in dem Logos unabhängig vom Stoffe Kräfte beschlossen wären, die man nur zu wecken brauchte, um die Menschen wie mit Zaubermacht zu beherrschen und durch göttliche Überredung dem eignen Willen untertan zu machen. Diese Kunst der *Psychagogia* zu erreichen und zu lehren, das war sein eigentliches Ziel." For *psychagogia* and its relation to the *terpsis* of Gorgias, see Wehrli (above, n. 67) 20-21. It is to be noted, however, that the term *psychagogia* is not attested for Gorgias; its earliest occurrence would seem to be in Plato *Phaedr.* 261a, 271c-d, and Xenophon *Mem.* 3.10.6. The verb does occur in Aristoph. *Birds* 1555, but it is doubtful if it has there any more than its literal meaning of "leading souls," though LSJ s.v. (11, *ad fin.*) suggest that a play upon the metaphorical meaning is intended. A striking fourth-century example occurs also in Timocles, frag. 6, cited by Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 168-69 and Süß (above, n. 18) 97, n. 1.

92. See Calogero (above, n. 18) 16 with n. 24.

93. The reading of the MSS *ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε* is certainly correct. Immisch (above, n. 11) "emended" the text to read *ἔτρεψε καὶ ἔτερψε* on the basis of the form *ἔτρεψε* (sic) in A¹ (corrected to *ἔτερψε* in A²). He then regarded *ἔπεισε* as a gloss on the "original" *ἔτρεψε*. Such a supposition is purely hypothetical, and his explanation of the "restored" text, i.e., *delectare et movere, non concedit docere* (p. 32) does not seem to bring any worthwhile improvement. The reading of the MSS is successfully defended by Melikova-Tolstoi (above, n. 89) 29-30; and Immisch's conjecture is not accepted by his reviewer, Sykutris (above, n. 23) 13-14, who, however, would read *ἔτρεψε καὶ ἔπεισε* (p. 14 n. 3). Melikova-Tolstoi's parallels, however, esp. *Hel.* 5, seem decisive for *ἔτερψε* (the reading of A² and, presumably, of X), which is printed both by Blass and DK.

94. For the *topos* of *Hel.* 5, see Pericles' Funeral Speech, Thuc. 2.36.4.

95. For *peitho* and *apate*, see Melikova-Tolstoi (above, n. 89) 30.

96. See Stefanini (above, n. 57) 139, who emphasizes the poetic-aesthetic quality of Gorgias' *logos*: "È un mondo di poesia che resiste alla riflessione e diventa per un istante filosofia, prima che gli strali di una più matura riflessione intervengano a rompere l'incanto, svelando agli uomini un'altra verità oltre la verità dell' arte." For the association of *apate* and the poetic tradition, see also Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 225ff. For Gorgias' association with poetic technique, see the famous statement by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.1 (1404a24), and Blass (above, n. 2) I 63, with n. 1, cited more fully below, n. 103.

97. For a similar instance of an artificial interlocking word-order, see also *Hel.* 19 *ad fin.*: (1) *τύχης ἀγρεύμασι*, (2) *οὐ γνώμης βουλευμασι*, (3) *καὶ ἔρωτος ἀνόγκαις*, (4) *οὐ τέχνης παρασκευαῖς*, where items (1) and (3) and (2) and (4) correspond in meaning, but are linked to their opposites by the double homoeoteleuton and the antithetical balancing. For this kind of "false parallelism," see

the discussion and instructive examples in J. D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford 1952) 130-31.

98. Immisch, however, (above, n. 11) 26-27, has a rather artificial interpretation of the categories of emotion referred to in *Hel.* 8-9. He thinks that Gorgias means two categories of poetry (*duo . . . genera poeseos*), one arousing pity and fear, the other pleasure and joy; Immisch refers the first category to heroic poetry, i.e., tragedy and epic, but can find no satisfactory explanation for the second (*Quale sit ex Gorgiae mente intellegendum certe scire non licet*, p. 26), though he hesitantly suggests didactic poetry. The difficulty of such an interpretation is evident from the hesitation which Immisch himself feels for his second classification; and the whole suggested is rejected by Sykutris (above, n. 23) 15. Gorgias doubtless conceives of poetry here as a unity, as the expression *τὴν πολλήν ἀπασαν* in *Hel.* 9 testifies. Thus it is more likely that the emotional classification in 8-9 refer to stages in the emotive-aesthetic act for all poetry (or for all artistic forms of the *logos*, which is Gorgias' definition of *poiesis*) than to separate kinds of poetry.

99. For *ekplexis*, see also Aristoph. *Frogs* 962. Gorgias may thus be one of the founders of the *ekplexis*-theory of later rhetoric. See Wehrli (above, n. 67) 13-15. For the rhetorical use of the related term *kataplexis*, see Thrasyarchus A4 (Aristoph. *Daitales*, frag. 198).

100. For the "increasing of pity" in *Hel.* 8, see Immisch (above, n. 11) 24, *ad loc.*: *Exspectas enim excitari, non augeri commiserationem*.

101. Immisch, however, *loc. cit.*, refers the *theiotata erga* of Gorgias to the creative rather than the receptive process, and regards the *logos* as producing divine *erga*, *quia ea non tam mentis quam animi sensusque arcana agitat divini instinctus sedem*. Such an interpretation is difficult if not impossible in the context, where the entire discussion of the *logos* deals with its effect upon the audience, and seems to result from an indiscriminate use of parallels from Democritus.

102. The term *metron* in *Helen* 9 probably does mean "meter," as the parallel usage of the word in Aristoph. *Clouds* 638ff attests. See also the passages from Xenophon and Plato cited in LSJ s.v., II. It is equally possible, however, that the word in the *Helen* has a wider range of meaning, referring to all the measured formal qualities of which Greek poetic expression, which Gorgias develops for prose, is capable.

103. For the relation between poetry and prose for Gorgias, see the remark of Wehrli (above, n. 67) 15: "Das Interesse für die Dichtung, welches Gorgias durch seine Poetik beweist, ist vollauf gerechtfertigt durch seinen rhetorischen Prozastil, da dieser ja nach Form und Wirkung neben die hohe Dichtung treten sollte." See also Blass (above, n. 2) I 63: "Gorgias wollte der Prosa einen ähnlichen Reiz verleihen, wie ihn die Werke der Dichter hatten, und da er das Gesetz noch nicht anerkannte, welches Isokrates für jene aufstellt, dass sie sich nur der gewöhnlichen Worte bedienen dürfe, und nur das Metrum als ihr nicht zukommend betrachtete, so schmückte er seine Rede mit poetischen Worten und ferner, als Ersatz für das Metrum, mit künstlichen Figuren." For Damon, see n. 73 above and DK 37 B6, 9-10 (I 383-84). Damon has been the subject of several recent studies. A. E. Raubitschek, "Damon," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 16 (1955) 78-83, re-evaluates the evidence for the date of his ostracism and suggests a later date for his activity, in the last third of the fifth century; he notes, for instance, that Damon is apparently thought of as living

in ps-Plato *Axiochus* 364a, i.e., about 405 B.C. Such a redating would make Damon Gorgias' contemporary rather than his predecessor. There is a further link between the two men in the *metron*-terminology of *Hel.* 9 and Aristoph. *Clouds* 636ff, which C. Del Grande, "Damone Metrico," *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 1 (1948) 3ff, thinks refers to Damon. For the earlier dating and association with Pericles and Ephialtes, see Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 14 (1879) 318-20. There may be still another link, admittedly weak, in the possible medical interests of Damon, for Aristotle at least associated music with a quasi-medical *katharsis* (*Pol.* 8, 1341a23; 1341b38 ff; 1342a1 ff: see H. Abert, *Die Lehre vom Ethos in der gr. Musik* [Leipzig 1899] 13ff and W. Vetter, "Musik (Ethik)" *RE* 31 [1933] 839). How far back this therapeutic attitude goes, however, is difficult to determine, but it is not impossible that it formed a part of Damon's teaching. Rostagni, on the other hand (above, n. 30), 72 and 200, perhaps goes too far in attempting to trace a connection from the supposed "epideictic" *logoi* of the Pythagoreans to Damon, Gorgias, and the *katharsis* of Aristotle. For the Pythagorean *katharsis*, however, see J. A. Cramer, *Anecdota . . . Paris.* (Oxford 1839-1841) I 172; Kirk and Raven (above, n. 5) 229, n. 4.

104. For the effect of musical *kinesis* upon the psyche, see Damon B6 and Karl von Jan, "Damon" (no. 17), *RE* 4 (1901) 2072, who describes as Damon's contribution "die Bewegungen des Rhythmus und der Melodie in Zusammenhang zu bringen mit entsprechenden Regungen in der Seele des Hörers." See also Abert 48-49, 128-30 and the passages cited there from Proclus, and Vetter 841 (both cited above, n. 103). In addition, see H. Ryffel, "Eukosmia, ein Beitrag zur Wiederherstellung des Areopagitikos des Damon," *MusHelv* 4 (1947) 27-28.

105. For the ethical and educational applications of Damon's musical theories, see Ryffel, *ibid.* 23-38 *passim*, esp. pp. 25ff. Ryffel finds in the *Areopagiticus* of Isocrates the concern for *eukosmia* and *sophrosyne*, the ethical well-being of the state, which he thinks characterized the like-named work of Damon; this view would fit Damon into the context of the sophistic concern for the values and coherence of the *polis*. The "Polis-Ethik" or "Polis-Erziehung," as Ryffel calls it, which occupied Protagoras and his contemporaries in Periclean Athens. It would be this very sympathy with Pericles which caused his exile; see Raubitschek (above, n. 103) 83. Vetter, however, (above, n. 103) 839, suggests that this ethical interest in music characterized the Greeks of all periods and derives it from the Pythagoreans; see also Abert (above, n. 103) 2ff and Ryffel 24. Regardless of the source of this ethical view of music or its place in the nature of the Greek mind, it would naturally receive stress and elaboration at a time of increased educational speculation and social consciousness such as the mid-fifth century.

106. For the technical rhetorical aspects of Gorgias' work, see the recent article by F. Zucker, "Der Stil des G. nach seiner inneren Form," *SBBerl.* 1956, no. 1 (dealing largely with the problem of the periodic style); see also, of course, E. Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa* (Berlin-Leipzig 1915) I 15ff; and F. Blass (above, n. 2) I 63ff. See also the brief remarks of Denniston (above, n. 97, 10ff).

107. For Gorgias' conception of the rhetorical art as a *technē*, subject to rational rules and improvements, see Süß (above, n. 18) 21ff, esp. p. 30: "... Es habe Gorgias die Redekunst als eine *δοξαστική καὶ στοχαστική* (sc. *τῶν καιρῶν*) *τέχνη* bezeichnet." Whether, however, he actually used the term

γυμνάζεσθαι for his art, as Süss, 24-25, tries to show from fourth-century parallels, is unlikely. Kroll (above, n. 41) 165ff, while rejecting much of Süss's theorizing, does agree on the importance of rhetoric as a *technē* for Gorgias, as part of the general sophistic movement: "Daraus ist vielleicht so viel richtig, dass erst die sophistischen *Technai* Regeln auch für den sprachlichen Ausdruck und die Erregung der *Pathe* zu geben begonnen" (p. 166). Blass (above, n. 2) I 57 doubts, perhaps rightly, that Gorgias ever wrote out a systematic account of a "vollständige *Technē*," but such an argument, if demonstrable, would still not vitiate the possibility of the embodiment of a psychological theory of rhetoric in the *Helen*, which perhaps (esp. in 8-14) is the closest Gorgias may have come to setting down in writing the assumptions and bases of his *technē*. Zucker too (above, n. 106) has stressed the kinship of Gorgias' rhetoric with the logical and rational spirit of the other sophists: "Es ist 'alles durchdacht.' Die reflektierende Betrachtung und das konsequente Durchdenken, von den Sophisten erstmalig der Sprache zugewendet, haben sie nach verschiedenen Seiten betätigt: sie haben die Ausdrucksformen der Sprache festzustellen begonnen (Protagoras), sie haben die lautlichen Mittel . . . vollends in Bewusstsein erhoben und ihre Anwendung gewissermassen systematisiert (*Gorgieia schemata*) und . . . die logischen Beziehungen durch sprachliche Formung heraustreten zu lassen und bewusst zu machen" (p. 8).

108. For the association of the poet and *terpsis*, see Homer *Od.* 8.44; also Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 150; W. Schadewaldt, "Furcht und Mitleid?" *Hermes* 83 (1955) 159, who emphasizes that Homer never connects the effect of poetry with moral ideas, but only *terpsis*, i.e., "das kräftige, den ganzen Menschen ergreifende, von Dichtung u. Gesang hervorgerufene Ergötzen." See also Schmid (above, n. 1) 68 with n. 9 for the significance of *terpsis* in Gorgias.

109. For Plato's criticism of poetic *goeteia*, see *Rep.* 10.602d, and for his criticism of pleasure in *allogria pathe*, *Rep.* 10.605a and Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 169, who points out that Plato's rejection of "die gorgianische Lehre von der affekterregenden Wirkung der Tragödie" rests upon the division of the psyche and the superiority of its rational part, τὸ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν. See also below, n. 118.

110. For this view of Gorgias as the frivolous, morally irresponsible artist, see Schmid (above, n. 1) 70, who regards him as opening the way to "einem je nach Umständen schwächlich ästhetischen oder skrupellos gewalttätigen Individualismus," and regards him as morally inferior to Protagoras or Prodicus, in whose outlook and teachings "noch weit mehr Kraft und sittlich-politischer Ernst liegt." See also above, nn. 32-35.

111. For the possibility of the Gorgianic affiliation of the *epairein* of Aeschylus in the *Frogs*, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 150ff. For Plato's negative attitude to this idea of an emotional *epairein* through poetry, see, e.g., *Rep.* 10.608b: οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασι οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ, οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ.

112. For the attempt to separate Gorgias from the moral "earnestness" of the other Sophists, see above, n. 110.

113. For the place of *apate* in a late fifth-century aesthetic theory, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 160ff; Schmid (above, n. 1) 65 with n. 1; Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 233ff.

114. For the association of Aeschylus with the moral values of the *polis* in the *Frogs*, see the author's essay, "The Character and Cults of Dionysus and

the Unity of the *Frogs*," *HSCP* 65 (1961) 207-42. On the value of *psychagogia* as bringing both *hedone* and *paideia*, see Timocles, frag. 6 (above, n. 91) with the discussion by Pohlenz and Süß. This combination, however, belongs perhaps more properly to Plato and the fourth century than Gorgias and the fifth; see, e.g., Plato, *Rep.* 10.602b for the *paidia-spoude* dichotomy and Aristotle *Pol.* 8.1339b10 ff.

115. For *oikein ameinson* see Plato *Protag.* 318a. See in general L. Radermacher, "Aristophanes' *Frösche*," *SBWien* 198 (1922) 284, *ad loc.* For the sophistic associations of the idea of teaching men to *oikein ameinson*, he cites in addition Xenoph. *Mem.* 2.1.19 and *Oec.* 9.15.

116. So Schadewaldt (above, n. 108) 162. See also Pohlenz, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 71ff (above, n. 43) on the incorporation of the aesthetic ideal into the *polis* as part of the democratization of *to philokalein*.

117. For *mimesis*, see Aristotle *Poet.* 4.1448b4 ff and Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 160-61, who argues that the *apate*-theory continues in the Isocratean school, e.g., in the historian Ephorus (*apud* Polyb. 4.20.5). For this much-discussed question of the Isocratean blending of history and tragedy, see the review article by B. L. Ullman, "History and Tragedy," *TAPA* 73 (1942) 27ff.

118. See Aristotle, *Pol.* 8.1342a14 ff and 1339b15 f and in general Schadewaldt (above, n. 108) 157ff, 162-63. For Aristotle's answers to the Platonic objections against the emotional in tragedy, see also Else (above, n. 45) 374-75 with n. 37, and 433ff.

119. For Aristotle's relegation of the arts to the sphere of *παιδιά*, see Schadewaldt, 165-68, and also Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 177-78, who cites as belonging to the spirit of the fifth-century view of literature Lessing, *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*, LXXVII *ad fin.*: "Bessern sollen uns alle Gattungen der Poesie: es ist kläglich, wenn man dieses erst beweisen muss; noch kläglich ist es, wenn es Dichter gibt, die selbst daran zweifeln."

120. For the Gorgianic influence on the *ekplexis* of the *Frogs*, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 161, who also cites *Vit. Aesch.* 7 and 14, which interestingly connect the *opsis* of Aeschylean stage-production with his *ekplexis*; see here Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 234-35 and Else (above, n. 45) 410 nn. 9-11. For *ekplexis* in visual phenomena, see also Aristotle *Poet.* 17.1455a22 ff and ps.-Longinus *De Sublim.* 15.4 and 26.2. In *Poet.* 1453b8 ff, Aristotle even attempts to separate the effects of "the fearful through vision (*opsis*) from the proper *hedone* which tragedy should produce": see Else 410-11, and A. Gudeman's commentary (Berlin-Leipzig 1934) *ad loc.* (p. 254): "Endlich beweist die Vorschrift οὐ . . . οἰκεῖαν, dass das an sich zwar eine *hedone* hervorruft, nur nicht, falls sie allein erstrebt wird, die der Tragödie eigentümliche." It is not impossible that in seeking to detach visual and linguistic *ekplexis*, Aristotle is polemicalizing against Gorgias, if indeed Gorgias' admiration for Aeschylus (B24) is behind the ekplectic view of Aeschylus in *Frogs* 961-62.

121. So Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 157-58. Immisch, however, (above, n. 11) 29-30, thinks that Gorgias is quoting Aristophanes rather than the reverse and that thus Gorgias lacks any systematic literary theory. Radermacher (above, n. 67), while upholding the view of Pohlenz against Immisch that Aristophanes is in fact quoting Gorgias and not the reverse, rejects the broader implications which Pohlenz draws. But, as Pohlenz' whole essay shows, some systematic literary theory is implied in the *Frogs*, and who but Gorgias is a likely source in the late fifth century? Gorgias is the older man, and his *Helen*,

which certainly adumbrates an aesthetic theory, was probably in circulation within the decade before the *Frogs* of 405 B.C. It is thus likely that his speculations on tragedy too (B23-24) also precede the *Frogs*, especially as the *apate* fragment (B23) is similar to the assumptions about *apate* in *Helen* 10. Hence the statements of B23-24 are most plausibly to be set in the period of the *Helen* itself or perhaps earlier; but at any rate the coincidence of B23 with the *Helen* (and perhaps of B24 with *Hel.* 17) would suggest that these ideas were in Gorgias' mind at the time when he wrote the *Helen*, i.e., in the decade before the *Frogs*. Whether they were promulgated by oral teachings or by a written treatise is, of course, uncertain, but the former is the more likely.

The careful study of C. T. Murphy, moreover, "Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric," *HSCP* 49 (1938) 69-113, proves conclusively Aristophanes' familiarity with the rhetorical activity of his day. Murphy concludes cautiously, "I will not venture to say that I have proved that he (Aristophanes) actually studied rhetoric or was acquainted at first hand with one of the early *technai*, but the clear and logical organization of the speeches treated above and the frequent appearance in them of rhetorical commonplaces, in my opinion demonstrates his interest in and knowledge of the principles of the art" (p. 110). The earlier plays, it is true, show little or no direct influence by Gorgias (p. 111); but on the other hand the *Ecclesiazusae* 171-240 parodies the Gorgianic antithetic style (393 B.C.). It is thus not impossible that Aristophanes would have been familiar with Gorgias' work 12 years earlier, since Gorgias' reputation was well established all through the last quarter of the fifth century. Radermacher himself, moreover, in his commentary on the *Frogs* (above, n. 115, p. 284) noted the Gorgianic touch of the repeated interrogative of *Frogs* 977ff (πῶς, ποῦ, τίς) and compared Gorg. *Pal.* 22.

122. For Plato as the originator of a unified aesthetic, e.g., covering both tragedy and oratory in the *Phaedrus*, see G. Finsler, *Platon u. die Aristotelische Poetik* (Leipzig 1900) 181. See also Süss (above, n. 18) 87ff, who tries to show that Gorgias is the source for the σύστασις image in *Phaedr.* 264c, 268d, and Aristotle *Poet.* 7.1450b22 ff, esp. b33 ff; but he describes as Plato's creation "ein neues, Poetik und Rhetorik gemeinsam umschlingendes Band" (p. 90).

123. See Süss (above n. 18) 85ff, with his parallels from Plato (*Phaedr.* 268c) and Timocles (frag. 6). Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 171-72 cites also *Ion* 535b, *Rep.* 3.387c, as well as Aristotle *Poet.* 19.1456a36 ff. See also Schadewaldt (above, n. 108) 144ff with n. 5, who reviews many of the same passages and notes a possible reference to the emotional tone of tragedy in Gorgias B27: ἀνεμίλογοντο δὲ λυταῖς ἀπειλαῖ καὶ εὐχαῖς οἰμωγαῖ. G. Freymuth, "Zur Miletou Halosis des Phrynichos," *Philologus* 99 (1955) 53ff notes also an anticipation of the *allotria pragmata* idea of *Hel.* 9 in Herodotus' description of the effect caused by the viewing of the οἰκῆμα κακά presented in Phrynichus' play (Hdt. 6.21.2), where tears are also present. Freymuth suggests that the fining of Phrynichus was due as much to a psychological as a political reason (cf. pp. 60ff). The association of Aristotelian *katharsis* and Gorgias *Hel.* 9 has, of course, frequently been made, notably by Howald (above, n. 40) and Rostagni (above, n. 30). The interpretation of *katharsis* itself is, of course, a matter of endless dispute, but the medical interpretation (which would help make the connection with Gorgias through *Hel.* 14) is strongly upheld in the recent articles by Schadewaldt (above, n. 108); Pohlenz, *Hermes* 84 (1956) (above, n. 43); and especially Flashar (above, n. 40). All of these scholars assume the connection of the *katharsis* of the *Poetics* with

that of the eighth book of the *Politics*; but see *contra* Else (above, n. 45) 224-32 with n. 36; 423-47, esp. 440ff; and Gresseth (above, n. 90) 329 n. 31.

124. Rogers' constitution of the text of *Frogs* 1028 is fairly satisfactory for the sense, though rather remote from the unmetrical MSS reading, . . . ἡνίκ' ἤκουσα περὶ . . . See the discussion in his *Comedies of Aristophanes* (London 1902) V 157-58. V. Coulon's suggestion in the Budé edition, IV (Paris 1946) . . . ἡνίκ' ἐκώκυσας περὶ . . . gives essentially the same sense and has the further merit of greater palaeographical plausibility. For other, more conjectural restorations, see J. van Leeuwen, *Aristophanis Ranae* (Leyden 1896) 158 and Radermacher (above, n. 115) 291-92, who inclines towards an emendation of Fritzsche.

125. For dramatic "distancing" through *apate*, see Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 236ff.

126. Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 172-73 doubts Süss's theory that the *pharmakon* image of *Hel.* 14 is to be taken literally. Similarly, Schadewaldt (above, n. 108) 165 n. 1 suggests that the comparison is purely analogical and that "was er (Gorgias) zeigen will, das ist die Allmacht des *logos*, und dazu dient ihm die Analogie der sowohl heilsamen wie todbringenden Gifte."

127. For this balance between reason and emotion, felt as much as an aesthetic as a moral attainment, see Eurip. *Medea* 824ff: Athens is the place of clean air and *sophia* where Harmonia begets the Muses (826ff), but Kypris also "breathes over the land temperate (*metrias*) sweet-blowing breezes"; and the presence of the Eroses with Sophia creates every sort of *arete*.

128. For Damon's applications of his psychological theories to the education of the *polis* as a whole, see Ryffel (above, n. 104) 32.

EURIPIDES' *ORESTES*: AN INTERPRETATION

BY NATHAN A. GREENBERG

"THE end of *Orestes* is less satisfying than that of any other extant play."¹ This blunt statement is challenge enough for any would-be interpreter of the play. The statement refers, of course, to the sudden appearance of Apollo at line 1625. Orestes, Pylades, and Electra have attempted to kill Helen; Orestes holds his sword at Hermione's throat while Menelaus expostulates helplessly. Then the god appears and, among other arrangements, makes peace between Orestes and Menelaus, and sees to it that Hermione is betrothed to Orestes. Arrowsmith speaks of an "insane *pas de deux*" of Hermione and Orestes.² "It is, or should be, needless to expound the nature and spirit of such a finale. Of all like scenes in Euripides it is perhaps the most prodigiously absurd, unreal, meaningless, impossible."³ "The plain fact is, that, in connexion with this play, an epiphany such as that of Apollo and Helen is absurd and can serve only to announce that we have done with serious imagination."⁴ Grube is not quite so eloquent: "The future he [Apollo] foretells is unsuitable for the characters as we have come to know them: one shudders to think how these people, Hermione and Orestes in particular, are going to live together hereafter."⁵ "It would seem that Euripides set out to dramatize a situation, and that it got the better of him, so that the end of the story, fixed beforehand, was made unsuitable."⁶

These are criticisms which any defender of the play, as I am, must consider very seriously. What is more, they are criticisms which cannot be met head on. If we are going to accept the critical hypothesis which places prime importance upon the organic and orderly depiction of character, then we must admit that the ending of *Orestes* is wrenching, indeed even senseless. But must we accept that hypothesis? Is it not open to the same objections that can be aimed at all hypotheses entailing presuppositions concerning propriety? The ending of *Orestes* is "unsuitable for the characters as we have come to know them." So be it. Why then did Euripides write that ending? We must, therefore, reject the hypothesis that orderly depiction of character was of prime importance to Euripides, at least so far as the ending of *Orestes* is concerned. We must, in fact, supply some other hypothesis, and, of course, all

critics have done just that. Now it is in the nature of critical hypotheses that they cannot be absolutely proved, for it is possible to supply many hypotheses which will account for identical sets of data. One can only submit that some hypotheses are more elegant, neater, more satisfying aesthetically, than others. We restate the problem briefly: why did Euripides write an ending to *Orestes* which does violence to the orderly presentation of his characters? A number of answers are possible, and I cannot dare to say here that Grube is wrong, or Arrow-smith, or even Verrall. Perhaps Euripides was pressed for time but still found it necessary to force the situation back into its legendary framework (Grube). Perhaps the ending is a not-so-covert attack on Delphi and religion (Verrall). No one can deny the possible truth of these and all the other proposed solutions. I only point out the common quality of uneasiness in all these solutions, for all suggest that Euripides found it necessary, in a sense, to ruin the internal order of his play because of circumstances external to the demands of the play itself.

I shall, instead, propound an hypothesis which is not necessarily closer to the truth, only, in my opinion, more elegant. I shall, in fact, argue, not prove, that this is a good ending artistically, not a bad one, that while the ending is not in harmony with the character development of the play, it is indeed in fitting harmony with certain basic themes and contrasts in the play. I assume, in fact, that Euripides wrote this ending to the play because he found it artistically satisfying despite the violence it did to the consistency of his characters — because it fulfilled aesthetic demands which overrode this violation of traditional notions of character depiction — and that, in fact, the orderly preservation of character was at most secondary to Euripides' artistic purpose. The reading I shall propose finds the play a harmonious whole, of which the final theophany is an integral part. It may be that such reading of the play will be unsatisfactory — many critics have found it so — but one must reply: unsatisfactory from what point of view? For, as already stated, the play can only be unsatisfactory according to preconceived notions of what the play or a play should be or accomplish. A play is a statement, but it may well be the statement of a question or problem to which no answer is given. There is no reason to transfer the unfortunate sense of omniscience of critics to playwrights, who may well have a greater insight into the uncertainties and insolubilities of the human condition. It should, therefore, be no cause for dismay if I shall conclude that *Orestes* and particularly its ending states problems and not solutions.

To begin with, I believe it is necessary to formulate explicitly a

number of postulates. These are the basic preconceptions according to which I read the play. One need not agree with them, but I think they are reasonable and I am certain that they cannot be disproved.

First, the sympathies and opinions of Euripides himself are hidden. The *dramatis personae* do not consist of "good guys" and "bad guys." In reply to Krieg's central critical principle that Orestes is to be viewed sympathetically throughout,⁷ it is sufficient to quote the argument attributed to Aristophanes concerning the people in the play: *πλήν γὰρ Πυλάδου πάντες φαῦλοι ἦσαν*. This is, to be sure, only one man's opinion, but it is that of a man considerably closer to Euripides' time than anyone else we can summon. It is common knowledge that in the *Poetics* Aristotle twice (chaps. 15 and 25) criticizes Euripides' characterization of Menelaus, but this in no way implies endorsement or moral approval of Orestes. It need hardly be added that few would agree with the scholiast's opinion of Pylades. In fact, Hermione is the only character not immediately open to criticism, but her part is small. "Of the chorus," to quote Verrall,⁸ "we need say little, and would gladly say nothing."

Second, in presenting divinity upon the stage, Euripides was honest enough and truly religious enough to present an entity whose motives transcend human reason. This is, however, a complex issue to which we shall devote much space below.

Third, Euripides presents events which are inexplicable in terms of ordinary human experience. Such, of course, is the final appearance of Apollo, but there are others, to be discussed below. That they are reported or indirectly indicated is not an implicit attack upon their validity or actuality, only a matter of dramatic craft: within the confines of the ancient stage it is easier and more convincing to describe a miracle than to depict it.

Fourth, the major characters of the play, specifically Orestes, Pylades, and Menelaus, despite the realism of Euripides, are representatives of types of human motivation. The apparent senselessness of the ending is not meant to ridicule their personalities but rather their ideals and motivations. This again is a complex issue which will be treated below.

Fifth, we must believe that the characters really believe what they say. This would, in any case, be standard procedure except where there are compelling circumstances to the contrary. There are, in this play, no such compelling circumstances, save for the short scene (1321-44) where Electra transparently dupes Hermione. This postulate is aimed especially at an analysis of Menelaus' character, which again must be discussed below.

Finally, despite the presumably free invention of the entire plot, the play is closely relevant to the traditional myth concerning Orestes. It is not, as Verrall⁹ would have us believe "purely conventional" that Euripides has chosen names from the Orestes legend for his characters, nor is it, as Grube¹⁰ would have it, simply "new variations in a well-known story." It is rather the same story retold in a new, most ironic, and fascinating manner. To make this point more clear, it is useful to consider Grube's final note to his discussion of the play: "It is significant to note that from 1098 to his appearance, Apollo is not mentioned by anyone, not even in the prayer at 1240."¹¹ This is quite true, but one may well doubt that the significance of such omission is merely to forestall interpretations of the play as an attack upon Apollo, although this is apparently the purpose of Grube's note. If, however, we accept the hypothesis that Euripides' *Orestes* is a retelling of the Orestes story in which the murder of Clytemnestra is repeated in the attempted murder of Helen, then we note with relish the following ironic contrast: the murder of Clytemnestra is justified or rationalized solely on the grounds that Apollo commanded it, and yet in the sequel the same trio of agents attempt another murder for which the pointed absence of Apollo from 1098 to 1625 allows no such divine justification. This seems to me a more satisfying explanation for the notable omission.¹² Thus it is not "purely conventional" that Euripides has named his characters Orestes, Pylades, and Electra, for in *Orestes* they re-enact their story in a most striking manner. It may, however, be argued that it is presumptuous to equate the attempted murder of Helen with the accomplished matricide of the traditional legend. The argument will be dealt with below.

PROLOGUE (1-70): ELECTRA

Nothing there is so terrible to tell,
Nor fleshly pang, nor visitation of God,
But poor humanity may have to bear it. (1-3)¹³

With this gnomic beginning, Electra recounts the repeated misfortunes of the family. We are interested not so much in the details as in the attitudes of Electra herself. Verrall claimed¹⁴ that *ὥς λέγουσι* (5) and *ὥς μὲν λέγουσιν* (8) imply Electra's disbelief in the miraculous. This is simply not so. Logically, perhaps, there is no middle ground between belief and disbelief, but, in fact, doubt or ignorance in various degrees forms a real continuum between the extremes. One must not press too far the fact that the phrase *ὥς μὲν λέγουσιν* (8) has no answering

δέ, for the suppressed clause need imply no more than that Electra will not vouch for the specific details of Tantalus' fate.¹⁵ It is possible that Electra leans slightly toward scepticism, but she is certainly neither an atheist nor a rationalist. She is theist enough to put forth the notion that *συμφορὰ θεήλατος* (2) brings about human woe. In fact, Electra is not at all reluctant to express views she is sure have the concurrence of the gods, as when she states that Helen is hateful to them (19). It is at this point that Electra's animosities emerge, and one may imagine a sort of crescendo of emotionalism in this speech, beginning with the almost philosophical calmness and slight scepticism of the opening. The emotional pitch changes with the mention of Helen and reaches its climax with her reference to her mother as *μητρὸς ἀνοσιωτάτης* (24). I find the mention of Helen and Clytemnestra in the same line (20) noteworthy, for according to the outlined hypothesis Helen will play the role of Clytemnestra in this new version of the Orestes story. A long recounting of Clytemnestra's career is avoided with Euripidean nicety by the device of lines 26-27:

— a shame for maid to speak! —
I leave untold, for whoso will to guess.

The sudden influx of virginal modesty effectively damps the emotional pitch. At a stroke, the contrast and conflict between Clytemnestra and Electra is drawn, and more remotely between Helen and Electra. At the same time, the sudden change of tone allows Electra to turn to other matters vital to the exposition.

The next lines (28-33) are crucial, since they contain Electra's own attitude toward the murder of Clytemnestra.

What boots it to lay wrong to Phoebus' charge
Who thrust Orestes on to slay the mother
That bare him? — few but cry shame on the deed,
Though in obedience to the God he slew.
I in the deed shared, — far as woman might, —
And Pylades, who helped to compass it.

She has no doubt that the fault is Apollo's. He persuaded Orestes to kill the mother who bore him, a deed *πρὸς οὐχ ἅπαντας εὐκλειαν φέρον* (30). The accusation of Phoebus is clear. With the complete transfer of guilt to Apollo, the words *οὐχ ἅπαντας* (30) seem to have a rhetorical color. The implication is that the deed has the approval of no one. The words *ὁμῶς δέ* (31) reinforce this notion. Orestes was impelled to a deed neither he nor anyone else would approve. Nevertheless, he did not

disobey the god, and Electra and Pylades helped him. This, then, is Electra's considered opinion of the matter: they had to follow the god's command.

Electra goes on to describe Orestes' illness (34-45), the decree of the Argives (46-51), and their last hope, Menelaus (52-56). This last leads gracefully to a longer reference to Helen (56-66), which prepares for her entrance at 71. Despite its length, this opening speech is quite compressed, considering the number of its accomplishments. The legendary background is conventional, but the recounting of it nicely expresses Electra's conventional mild scepticism. The necessary reference to Clytemnestra is cleverly abbreviated by the assumption of girlish modesty. Perhaps most impressive is the brevity of 46-51, concerning the Argives' decree, for the anachronism of a public trial is Euripides' most striking innovation.

PROLOGUE (71-135): HELEN AND ELECTRA

To pass mid throngs beseemeth maidens not. (108)

The utter tactlessness of 108 is the high point of a scene which is generally regarded as one of Euripides' masterpieces of characterization. Helen is vain, self-centered, and superficial. If, as Perrotta suggested¹⁶ and I agree, the play is a retelling of the Orestes story, then Helen is a doublet for Clytemnestra. The burden of the play is a re-enactment of the crime, a new killing by the same team of Orestes, Pylades, and Electra, and it is in this scene that Helen is set up for slaughter. It is most important that she be portrayed in person and that she convict herself out of her own mouth as the sort of person who would never be missed. More than that, her conduct can be construed as a crime against humanity, as the cause for the loss of many human lives. "I fear the sires of those at Ilium dead" (102). Her death can be conceived of as a public benefit, a killing to be commended, just as the killing of Clytemnestra could be so justified. However, in this play there is no Apollo to command and thus justify the killing. The central irony of the play, drawn with telling artistry, is that the same killers who claim that the fault is solely Apollo's can bring themselves to commit a most similar murder without that excuse. To this extent then, and this is as far as we go with Perrotta, the play is a secularization of the Orestes story. Does this then imply that Apollo was really not implicated in the killing of Clytemnestra? Was this Euripides' intent? Was it his purpose to expose in truly Verrallian manner that reliance on Apollo's word was mere self-delusion? I do not think so, for such interpretation sets

aside the finale, and so leaves incomplete the underlying symmetry of the play. It is a case of chiasmus: the former crime, at divine behest, is accomplished by human agency; the latter crime, at human behest, is blocked by divine agency. Euripides' message is ironic, not realistic or rationalistic. Viewed structurally from this point of vantage, the play takes on a new and startling unity. It is a retelling of the Orestes story which, in a curious way, both does and does not remove the element of Apollo's participation. Euripides could have told it without Apollo, but he didn't. He preferred to preserve a sort of senseless symmetry in human affairs.¹⁷

EPISODE (208-315): ORESTES AND ELECTRA

Unhand me! — of mine Haunting Fiends thou art —
Dost grip my waist to hurl me into hell! (264-65)

The single justification for this scene is the madness of Orestes. To be sure, we are given a picture of true sibling affection (it sounds better in German: *treue Geschwisterliebe*), and Orestes repeats the accusation of Apollo; but the scene revolves about the single brutal fact of insanity.

The fit of madness begins at 253, presumably brought on by the mention of Helen in 246 and the significant association of that name with her sister, Clytemnestra, in 249-50. Electra notes the symptom:

Woe's me, my brother! Wildly rolls thine eye:
Swift changest thou to madness, sane but now! (253-54)

Orestes begs his mother to call off the Furies. Attempting to soothe and subdue her brother, Electra says:

ὁρᾶς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν δοκεῖς σάφ' εἰδέναι.
Nought of thy vivid vision seest thou. (259)

But, of course, despite all this, Orestes *is* seeing the Furies. Madness to be sure, but madness is a mystery, a reality, and a source of action. People do go mad, and for them madness and hallucination are frightening actualities. Electra attempts to hold her brother down by force. Orestes replies:

Unhand me! — of mine Haunting Fiends thou art —
Dost grip my waist to hurl me into hell! (264-65)

In the light of the subsequent course of the play, one might well remark on the astonishing insight of the line, for, in a way, Electra is

indeed one of the Furies who causes Orestes' sufferings. Certainly the lines are highly suggestive, and to an audience fully aware of the bloodthirsty propensities of Electra on the stage, they were assuredly effective. Electra's response is worth noting. She can do nothing ἐπεὶ τὸ θεῖον δυσμενὲς κεκτῆμεθα (267). Someone upstairs does not like them. The vague τὸ θεῖον is in sharp contrast to the vivid and specific Erinyes of Orestes. Electra does not have visions; that entire realm of sense experience is closed to her as it is closed to most men. But madness is a fact which none of us will gainsay. For her τὸ θεῖον is responsible — which is no answer at all. One may well prefer the specifics of Orestes, which are at least attested to by an individual perception.

At this point, Orestes asks for a bow:

Give me mine horn-tipped bow, even Loxias' gift,
Wherewith Apollo bade drive back the fiends,
If with their frenzy of madness they should fright me.
(268–70)

According to Arrowsmith's stage direction, Electra hands him the bow and quiver. Orestes notches an arrow and draws the bow. He rants on insanely for seven lines, then suddenly stumbles, dropping his bow, and sanity returns. Thus ends the only formal mad-scene in the play.

The question I propose to consider here is whether or not there was such a bow. According to the scholiast, tradition stemming from Stesichorus had it that Orestes got a bow from Apollo. It is added, however, that actors contemporary to the scholiast simply pretend to use a bow. Then the scholiast demurs: εἰ δὲ καὶ μαινόμενος ἐπ' ἐνίων ὑγιαίνει, μὴ θαυμάσωμεν. ἡ γὰρ νόσος ποικίλη τῶν μεμνητότων. In other words, the scholiast rightly notes that madness is a funny thing. Orestes could be mad otherwise and yet be using a bow quite sanely. There are, in fact, three alternatives. First, Orestes could simply imagine the bow. Second, Electra could hand him an ordinary bow conveniently at hand in order to soothe him. Third, he might really have a bow given to him by Apollo for the purpose described. There is no way of knowing which is correct; all three would play on the stage. I am sentimentally committed to the third alternative, but I cannot prove it. One can note the unusual adjective *κερουλκά*, "horn-tipped" (268). The word is exceedingly rare. It occurs here and in a fragment of Sophocles, and it is cited twice in Hesychius (*LSJ*). In other words, if there was a bow, it was a quite distinctive bow. The use of the rare adjective, however, is no more than suggestive. Krieg objects strongly: "quem arcum

aeque atque Erinyes in opinione tantum Orestis esse elucet," and adds in his note: "Phoebus si revera Oresten arcu, quo a Furiis se defenderet, armavisset, nullo pacto posset accusari, quod illi in summum periculum adducto deesset (286 sq., 419 sq.); quin etiam omnia, quae in Oreste geruntur inania essent, si Apollo Oresten iam adiuvisset."¹⁸ This would seem to be quite compelling were it not for the finale of the play where Apollo himself notoriously seems to make the whole play inane. It has been almost a canon of Euripidean criticism that if one simply ignores the embarrassing endings, one is left with a play that is usually not objectionable on strictly rational grounds. This, in fact, was the kernel of Verrall's magnificent attempts upon the Euripidean problem. The procedure is to ignore the ending, form a rationalist interpretation of the play, and then explain away the ending as necessary on various external grounds. But what if one were not to do so? What if one were to welcome possibilities for nonrational interpretation rather than the opposite? There are, in *Orestes*, three such. The first is Apollo's bow which we have just discussed. The second is the appearance of Glaucus to Menelaus:

For touching Agamemnon's fate I knew,
And by what death at his wife's hands he died,
When my prow touched at Malea: from the waves
The shipman's seer, the unerring God, the son
Of Nereus, Glaucus, made it known to me.
For in full view he rose, and cried to me:
"Thy brother, Menelaus, lieth dead,
Fall'n in the bath, the death-snare of his wife!" —
So filled me and my mariners with tears
Full many. (360-69)

Verrall's verdict is: "They spoke with some wanderer of the beach, transfigured by superstitious imagination."¹⁹ I do not believe this; Menelaus does not suffer from "superstitious imagination" anywhere else in the play.

The third is the disappearance of Helen, which is told in the culmination of the Phrygian slave's account to the chorus:

They rushed on her — grasped — turned back to the slaughter
Of Helen — but vanished was Zeus' daughter
From the bowers, through the house, gone wholly from sight!
O Zeus, O Earth, O Sun, O Night!
Whether by charms or by wizardry,
Or stolen by Gods — not there was she! (1494-98)

For a rationalist interpretation of the account we need go no further than Menelaus himself:

In sooth I heard a rumor that my wife
Is slain not, but hath vanished from the earth:
An idle tale I count it, brought by one
Distraught with fear. Nay, some device is this
Of yonder matricide — a thing to mock! (1556-60)

Yet Orestes denies this (1580, 1614) and confirms the Phrygian's account. It is still possible to take Menelaus' rationalistic view of it, and the fact that Menelaus is put forward to make such an interpretation a scant sixty-five lines before the appearance of Apollo himself shows Euripides' awareness of such a possibility. But he did not choose to make it crystal-clear that such is the procedure one should follow. Far from it. He brings up the possibility but pointedly does not confirm it — rather the opposite in Apollo's speech.

What is one to do, then, with such irrational occurrences? The subtle aspect of Euripides' presentation is the ambiguity with which it is presented. Most, if not all, of the occurrences in this life can be explained in a rational manner. But what assurance have we that such explanation is the correct one? In the introduction to his fine translation of *Orestes*, Arrowsmith uses the striking phrase, "the aching disparity between the ideal and the real," signaling something of real importance in at least the later plays of Euripides. Recent interpretations of *Helen* and *Bacchae*²⁰ point up the extreme difficulty of transforming Euripides into a rationalist. Yet it is the very ambiguity of Euripides' presentation of the miraculous that precludes transforming him into whatever distorted notion we would form of a "pious" Athenian of the late fifth century. To be sure, the endings would indicate "piety" of a sort, but it is not the piety of a contemporized and systematized, in fact fully rationalized, theology. It is, rather, the piety of the honest artist who discerns paradox in the fabric of things. The endings affirm a shadowy, inscrutable reality which lies beyond the reach of normal human reason, and it is an affirmation which can come to normal people only at the end. What of the abnormal, or the insane? Would it not be an irony of the supreme sort that the insane really see, and that the rest of us are blind? What is more, the notion is not extremely far-fetched. "Yet if the insane were shunned, they were also regarded (as indeed they still are in Greece) with a respect amounting to awe; for they were in contact with the supernatural world, and could on occasion display powers denied to common men.... The

dividing line between common insanity and prophetic madness is in fact hard to draw."²¹ Dodds' words carry considerable authority. Again, Arrowsmith has remarked, "By a forceful irony he [Orestes] is most sane when apparently most mad, and maddest when he is at his most lucid."²² Consideration of the extensive irony underlying the play bears this notion out. The final theophany attests that Apollo really did command the murder of Clytemnestra and it was carried through. It is the "sane" Orestes who attempts the murder of Helen only to be forestalled by that same Apollo. And yet in a way that cannot be fully justified to human reason, Orestes must pay the price of heightened perception of divinity. He murders at the command of Apollo, but the Furies come. It is significant to note that there are no Furies to plague Pylades — but then Clytemnestra was not his mother. What then shall we say in the case of Electra, who also cannot perceive the Furies? The insanity of Orestes is a riddle, but it is also a fact. Madness and Bacchic frenzy were and are realities with which one must deal as best one can.

Shall we argue, then, that Orestes' madness is a complete vindication of his matricide? Again, no — for it is again a basic irony of the play that the young man who murdered at divine command can bring himself to do it again for motives which can crudely be termed secular. Such motives were not lacking in the killing of Clytemnestra. *Post facto*, Orestes may claim (288-93) that only a divine command could have induced him to the matricide, but there is no way of knowing that this is true.

Real and seeming worlds collide, then, in *Orestes*. Menelaus has seen Glaukus; Helen disappears into the air; Orestes shoots at invisible Furies with a bow given him by Apollo. Euripides has made his point. The whole question is now dropped, not to be taken up again until the final theophany. Euripides has set himself the task of recreating the crime on a "secular" but no less mysterious level. Be it noted, however, that he does not thereby repudiate the version given of the first crime and its motivation. Apollo will return.

EPISODE (348-806): MENELAUS, TYNDAREUS, PYLADES

How mean'st thou? Clear is wisdom, not obscure. (397)

But, all I can, will I stand up for Law. (523)

Mine o'erthrowing shall thy fall be: one are friends in woe and bliss.
(735)

The entrance of Menelaus marks the beginning of conflict in the play. Menelaus will be found to be in strong contrast not only with Orestes, but also with Pylades. At the same time, he contrasts strongly with Tyndareus, but in a somewhat different fashion. The strongest characterizing feature of Menelaus is what we shall call here *sophia*. *Sophia*, of course, means wisdom — but this translation is completely inadequate for our purpose, for it is a wisdom which lacks completely the transcendent insight which can be associated with Orestes' insanity. It is a wisdom which is confined completely to this world of seeming, which pays little or no notice to the signs that betray another underlying world of reality. Not that it denies the existence of this other world: Menelaus can see Glaucus; but this other world can have no effect upon his activities. The *sophia* of Menelaus is a type of human reasoning that operates according to externals and the apparent. It manipulates these externals where it can, and its only criterion is success. In sum, its goals are survival and self-seeking satisfaction, with all that the latter term implies. Thus Menelaus can respond to the plea of Orestes, for Orestes has a conventional claim upon him. If he can help Orestes at no cost to himself, then the rewards in terms of self-esteem are great. However, the conventional claim must, according to the tenets of *sophia*, take second place far behind the ever-present prerequisites of survival, self-seeking, and success.

As proponent of *sophia*, Menelaus comes to Orestes with no pre-judgment. He has jumped to no conclusions, but will act as the situation and his own purposes and desires demand. When he tells us (362-67) that Glaucus rose from the waves and told him of Agamemnon's death (note that he uses the term *τύχας* and *θάνατον* in 360-61, not *φόνον*), we can believe him. He cried at hearing the news, but there is no hint of vengeful anger directed at Clytemnestra. He was still hoping to embrace Clytemnestra and Orestes (371-72) and expecting, presumably, to hear the mitigating circumstances connected with the killing of Agamemnon. Then he heard of the *άνόσιον φόνον* (374) of Clytemnestra. Now he looks for Orestes *ὅς τὰ δειν' ἔτλη κακά* (376). There seems to be a change of attitude here, but no firm impression is made. Instead of enlarging on the implications of the deed, we get the turgid reasoning in 377-79 explaining why he could not be expected to recognize Orestes. This leads one to believe that his reference to "unholy murder" is purely conventional, a belief which is reinforced by his subsequent remarks to Orestes.

Orestes breaks in with an impassioned plea for help (380-84).

Menelaus, in turn, exclaims at Orestes' condition and external appearance, at his hair and his eyes. Orestes replies:

οὐχ ἡ πρόσοψις μ', ἀλλὰ τᾶργ' αἰκίζεται. (388)

Menelaus ignores this and continues to concentrate on the exterior surface, the part that can be seen. Orestes blurts out that he is a matricide (392). Menelaus knows all about it and would just as soon not discuss it (393). Still emphasizing the external and material, he asks the nature of Orestes' disease (395). Orestes, still emphasizing the internal and, shall we say, spiritual, answers:

ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος. (396)

Menelaus replies:

πῶς φῆς; σοφόν τοι τὸ σαφές, οὐ τὸ μὴ σαφές. (397)

Orestes says his sickness is knowledge, the consciousness of his crime. It is a restatement of 388, that it is not his *πρόσοψις* but his *ἔργα* that cause him suffering, with the notably ironic addition of the term *σύνεσις*. For it is indeed knowledge of a sort that harms him, the sort of knowledge that can comprehend both the command of a god and the coming of avenging Furies. The *sophia* of Menelaus can only find this obscure. *Sophia*, if not *σύνεσις*, has to do with τὸ σαφές, the clear, the visible, the external. Somewhat exasperated, Orestes specifies *λύπη* (398). This Menelaus understands: "Dread Goddess she: yet is there cure for her" (399). Pain is a *θεός*, inexplicable perhaps, but a matter of common experience. Orestes hastens to add *μανίαι* (400). This, too, Menelaus comprehends, but he must have details until he can certify that these are indeed the furies that punish matricide (401-9). He is callous and matter-of-fact about it, for what can one do? Matricides presumably must suffer (413). Orestes' reply:

ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἀναφορὰ τῆς συμφορᾶς (414)

is couched in ambiguous terms so as to bring forth Menelaus' most characteristic response:

μὴ θάνατον εἴπης· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐ σοφόν. (415)

The survival of self is the primary goal of *sophia*. Orestes, however, makes it clear that the *ἀναφορά* is not suicide but Apollo. Menelaus is dubious concerning Apollo's sense of justice (417), but Orestes' response is categorical: "The God's thralls are we—whatsoever gods be" (418). There can be no direct rejoinder to this. Menelaus takes the circuitous route of drawing an invidious comparison between the

promptness of the Furies and the tardiness of Apollo (419-23). Orestes' reply is characteristic indeed:

οὐ σοφός, ἀληθής δ' ἐς φίλους <ἔφυν φίλος.> (424)

It is unfortunate that the reading is in doubt, for the line sums up this section of the dialogue between Orestes and Menelaus.²³ It is in any case clear that Orestes rejects completely Menelaus' line of argument. It smacks of *sophia*; it deals with the petty externals of measuring the speed of divinities, for whom time may mean something quite other than for us. On the other hand, it should be noted that the opposition drawn is not that between worldly *sophia* and the superior insight of prophetic insanity. The notion opposing *sophia* is what I shall call *philia*. Orestes claims that he is a φίλος, not a σοφός. It is most significant that in the subsequent course of the play it is this aspect of Orestes' character rather than his propensity to madness which is emphasized. Nonetheless, Orestes remains a composite personality, unlike Pylades, who, as we shall see, is *philia* incarnate.

A full excursus on the nature of *philia* would be lengthy indeed. Reference to Plato's *Lysis* and to Books 8 and 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is sufficient to indicate that this complex notion was the subject of considerable investigation in the fourth century. It need occasion no surprise that the topic is of great importance in *Orestes*. No single translation of *philia* is adequate: it comprises the relationships of friendship, loyalty, and love. As an interpersonal relation, it involves problems of self-interest: who is the true φίλος, the φίλων or the φιλούμενος? Does one aid a friend only because of benefits received in the past or to be received in the future? Again, the traditional imperative, "Help your friends and harm your enemies," was under examination. May one do anything for a friend, or are some acts per se forbidden? The moral aspect of identical acts takes on a changeable hue if viewed with the relativism of *philia*. Finally, no discussion can overlook the extreme importance of the emotional overtones or connotations of *philia*, for friendship or love comes to be a quality or entity to be prized in itself as a value of transcendent importance. These three aspects of *philia* are sufficient for our consideration of the present play: the motives of *philia* can be questioned—it may actually be self-serving; *philia* comes into direct conflict with any absolute moral judgment of specific actions; *philia* can be considered, and generally is considered, an overwhelming value in itself. The connotations of the term "love" are unfortunate for the present discussion, for no one is against love, just as everyone is against sin. Yet if we elevate *philia* from its fairly

simple status as the description of a relation and make it an entity in itself, it becomes a most complex and even mysterious thing. One lives for love, one dies for love, but where does it live, where doth it dwell? Hence, we need not wonder that it is in this last aspect that *philia* comes into eternal conflict with *sophia*.

To return, the contrast between Menelaus and Orestes has been swiftly drawn, and interestingly enough it has been drawn with the help of theology. Not that Menelaus and Orestes differ absolutely. So far as we can tell, they both "believe in" Apollo, and in other divinities as well. They do differ greatly in their attitudes toward these divinities. For Menelaus, men must operate by means of *sophia*; one simply cannot count on the gods for positive support. The proponent of *sophia* will avoid offending conventional notions of divinity, and will take this into account in making his decisions, but otherwise all decisions must be made on the bases of the external, the clear, and the visible. The youthful Orestes continues to trust in the eventual beneficence of Apollo. In opposition to *sophia*, he has sounded briefly the keynote of *philia*, a note which will resound in the subsequent course of the play.

At this point, the conduct of Apollo is dropped as an issue between them, and is, in any case, not a substantial bone of contention. They have, in effect, agreed to disagree. But the same sets of attitudes are now to be applied to a new issue, where the resultant conclusions will be tragically opposed. This issue is what I term the problem of society, as contrasted with the problem of theology. The notion of a public trial associated with the Orestes legend goes back at least as far as the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus. Euripides has preserved this notion while standing it upon its head. In *Orestes*, the public trial becomes a startling anachronism, a social institution of accepted standing. Unlike Aeschylus' superb vision which saw secular justice rise as the only possible answer to the conflicting claims of divinity, Euripides deals not with the origins of public justice but with its processes.

Beginning at 425, Menelaus examines Orestes' position vis à vis society at large. There has, up to this point, been scant reference to this material — only Electra's brief announcement in the prologue (46-51). Menelaus begins by asking about aid from Agamemnon (425). Presumably, this means aid from friends or followers of the dead king. Orestes' reply is in the negative. He is hated by the city (428) and has not been allowed purifying rites (429-30). Menelaus then asks which of the citizens are particularly hostile (431). Orestes specifies Oiax, brother of Palamedes (432). Now, this is the only mention of this person in the play. He does not figure elsewhere. Verrall has correctly

noted the irony in Orestes' suffering for a murder brought about by his father.²⁴ But there is no reason to doubt the real hostility of this citizen, who will presumably do his utmost to secure the conviction and death of Orestes. In the light of Tyndareus' role, to be discussed below, I believe that the point to be made, besides the welcome irony noted by Verrall, is that Oiax, as a citizen of Argos, will be voting for Orestes' condemnation not because it is just. His motives can be impugned and his presence on a modern jury would certainly be challenged. The nice point about the ancient trial is that it is public, that it is a mass affair and can thus be taken to represent the workings of society as a whole. For one might ask a more general question: society being to a large degree made up of just such individuals as Oiax, how can one be certain of the validity or justice of mass decisions? The political theory of democracy remains just that, no more than a theory. It is a form of faith which, like any faith, can be, was, and is subject to sceptical examination.

To resume, Orestes believes that Oiax' vote will be vengeful, and Menelaus agrees (433). Then Menelaus suggests that Aegisthus' friends may be of some import (435). Orestes confirms that they wield strong influence (436). According to our analysis, the word *φίλων* (435) is important. It is to be expected that the bonds of *philia*, a powerful social motive, will also be acting to influence the mass decision. Menelaus explores other aspects of the situation: the royal status of Orestes (437) and the possibility of flight (443). All avenues are closed, and Menelaus, having examined the situation from every side, agrees that it is serious (447). Orestes now turns to Menelaus and attempts to enlist his aid on grounds of *philia*:

μετάδος φίλοισι σοῖσι σῆς εὐπραξίας, (450)

and cites the proverb, "A friend in need is a friend indeed" (454-55). Note, however, that it is not the abstract *philia* which is appealed to, but rather its *quid pro quo* aspect. In 452-53, Menelaus is asked to repay the debt owed to Agamemnon. It is the aspect of self-interest which is directed at Menelaus, for it is only on this basis that *sophia* can comprehend *philia*. We shall find that it is the Orestes-Pylades relation which typifies *philia* of the quasi-disinterested and abstract sort, and it is this *philia* which, contrasted with the *sophia* of Menelaus, forms one of the major currents in the play.

It is most significant that Menelaus is given no opportunity to reply to Orestes' direct appeal, for it is at this point that Tyndareus' entrance is announced (456-58). Menelaus will not be given a chance to reply

until the problem of society has been examined at greater length. This is the major *raison d'être* of Tyndareus' role: he is inserted in the play to enunciate the ideal claims of society. This is the view, set forth in *Eumenides*, that the body social cannot tolerate the cruel succession of crime begetting crime. This issue is certainly a serious one, but in *Orestes* the fabric of society itself is under examination, while the issue is at the same time introduced as a subsidiary to the major purpose of the play. The whole nexus of society is employed in order to place Orestes in a situation of desperation, but also of some ambiguity in that Orestes can persuade himself that Menelaus can help him, while Menelaus can equally well persuade himself that he can be of no forceful aid. Society and its claims, then, play a crucial part in the play in conditioning the complex relationship between Orestes and Menelaus, and it is precisely for this reason that Euripides forged the striking innovation of the public trial before the Argives. To my mind, the aspect of this relationship which was essential to Euripides' purpose and to the tragic character of the work is the aspect of helplessness with its conjoint air of inexorability. The characters, given their personalities and situation, cannot help feeling the way they do, and they are at cross-purposes. There can be no compromise, for the catalytic agent bringing about this conflict of purpose is society in all its amorphous aspects. We must not idealize society, nor give it an individualized personality, and this point is stressed by Euripides. Tyndareus may well act as the individual proponent of society, but he is not in himself society, that is, his individual motives may be impugned. But setting this aside for the moment, the social organism itself is too complex to submit to any individual representation. Other views of the social body are given: Menelaus remarks on its susceptibility to mob psychology (696ff), while Orestes brings up Oïax as representative of those individuals in society who desire vengeance rather than justice. One can indeed posit ideal goals for the social process, but there can be no assurance that these goals are attainable. We get an account of the social process itself in the messenger's speech (852-956), where it is seen that society's verdict is by no means subject to confident prognosis. Finally, one cannot pass over the picture of an Orestes taking a public stand which is unrealistic but completely justified in his own eyes — an unrealistic stand which by the irony of history a Socrates was actually to assume in 399, only to be similarly convicted.

In the light of the above, we see a new and characteristically Euripidean aspect in the role of Tyndareus and what he represents.

Tyndareus, representing society's claims, is a dramatic tool to create a peculiar and tragic antagonism between Menelaus and Orestes. Going a step further, it is the complex claim and demand of the amorphous and variegated organism we call society which causes the attempted murder of Helen. In a strange and ironical way, then, the previous complex imperatives of Apollo are now replaced by those of society. In either case, there is no way out except that of theophany, which remains mysterious and inexplicable.

The initial reaction of Orestes to the entrance of Tyndareus is characteristic, for his speech (459-69) expresses not so much shame at having killed his mother, as shame at having betrayed the relationship, the *philia*, which existed between himself and his grandfather. For despite the fact that the matricide has been justified quite fully for Orestes by the command of Apollo, the deed conflicts with the ties of *philia*, that complex of the various types and degrees of relationship impinging upon any one person. No man can be without a series of social ties, of loyalties of various sorts. These may well be in conflict. The issue is further complicated by the consideration that specific actions must be weighed against the ties of *philia*. Some deeds are divinely ordered, others may be urged by *sophia*; in either case, conflict, the essence of tragedy, must occur.

Tyndareus apparently does not hear these words of Orestes. He is present, as we have said, to enunciate the ideal claims of society, but he is, at the same time, an individual, with all the claims and prejudices of the individual. He tells us that he has come to decorate his daughter's grave (611), but having heard of Menelaus' presence, he wishes to embrace him after his long absence (474-75). He catches sight of Orestes, and immediately voices hostility and disgust: "Yon serpent matricide before the halls / Gleams venom-lightnings, he whom I abhor!" (479-80). He wonders that Menelaus can speak to the wretch (481).²⁵ Menelaus' reasons are those of conventional *philia*. There is a personal tie: *φίλου μοι πατρός ἐστιν ἔκγονος* (482). Tyndareus finds this barbaric (485), but Menelaus claims that such *philia* is Greek. The chauvinistic contrast of Greek with barbarian is not new in Euripides. It is used with some point, for instance, in *Medea* 536ff, since Medea is, after all, a barbarian. It is not nearly so apposite here and seems, in fact, to be introduced so as to lead to Tyndareus' central and most characteristic reply:

Yea, and to wish not to o'erride the laws. (487)

Interestingly enough, the same association of being Greek with obedi-

ence to law is found in *Medea* 537–38. It is apparently a conventional claim, to be treated with no more respect here than in the speech of Jason. In any case, the transition to Tyndareus' central claim has been swiftly made. Menelaus' reply is also central to our characterization:

πάν τοῦξ ἀνάγκης δοῦλόν ἐστ' ἐν τοῖς σοφοῖς. (488)

Sophia, then, is Menelaus' criterion. We are not surprised. The same note is echoed in 490. The contrast has been swiftly drawn, and Tyndareus' long speech follows (491–541).

The reading of 491 is in doubt, but some sort of reference to *sophia* is there. Again, it is most ironic when Tyndareus claims that Orestes has been ἀσυνετώτερος (493) in the light of Orestes' credible claim that it is σύνεσις which ails him (396). Tyndareus argues that the proper course for Orestes was to have brought his mother to trial, and to have had her banished (500–2). Now, he is more guilty than his mother, having indulged in matricide (506). The argument is sophistic, as it should be, since it is addressed to Menelaus (cf. 507). In fact, the lines that follow can be nothing less than a travesty of the theme of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*: murder cannot be an antidote to murder. It is clear that the fabric of society cannot endure such a process. He sums up by reaffirming his faith in the law (523).

At 526, he turns to address Orestes, and the tone changes abruptly but suitably to one of high emotion. He is certain that Orestes' madness is a penalty for his crime:

Thou art loathed of Gods, punished for matricide
By terrors and mad ravings. (531–32)

The theological aspect has entered again. Tyndareus is sure that the gods are on his side. He turns again to Menelaus (534) and, thundering in the name of the gods, warns him not to oppose. Either let Orestes be stoned to death, or dare not to return to Sparta (536–37).²⁶ The final threat, be it noted, is not theological. Presumably, Tyndareus wields some little influence back home.

Orestes' rebuttal (544–604) is in direct reply to the arguments of Tyndareus — that the good of society was contravened by the killing, and that his madness is a sign of the gods' displeasure at the deed. We already know that Orestes' sole justification was the command of Apollo, for he has claimed (285ff) that otherwise he would not have committed the crime. The assertion that Apollo is responsible is repeated here (591ff), but it is not put forward as sole justification. Orestes points out the conflicting claims of mother and father, and

argues, like Apollo in *Eumenides*, that the father is the true parent, that the mother committed adultery as well as murder (551ff). He goes on to argue that the murder was a public service: ἄκουσον ὥς ἅπασαν 'Ελλάδ' ὠφελῶ (565). Here, then, is an ironic and twisted answer to the champion of society's claims. One must punish the adulterous wives of soldiers away at the front fighting for all Greece (574). On the theological side, he argues that the Furies, his own madness, are no clue to divine attitude, that his unavenged father would have sent Furies too (582), that madness was inevitable in any case. Finally, he repeats that in any case the fault is Apollo's (591ff). Tyndareus does not continue the debate. His exit speech says, first, that he will urge the Argives to convict (601-14); second, he injects a heavy condemnation of Electra, which is a new element in the play (615-21); and third, he repeats his warning to Menelaus not to help (622-28).

The net result of the scene has been to make the situation of Orestes even graver. He is really going to need his friends, while an additional factor has been added to make the *sophia* of Menelaus hesitate to give aid. As for Orestes' and Tyndareus' speeches, not much need be said. They have been at cross-purposes, and neither has taken any cognizance whatsoever of the other's chief claim. Apparently Tyndareus claims, in opposition to Orestes' plea of divine sanction, that his madness is proof of divine displeasure, while Orestes claims, in reply to the ideal position of the state, that his act has been patriotic. Both, however, miss the point, as indeed they must. Tyndareus' religiosity is conventional; he can have no inkling of the special *σύνεσις* of Orestes. Orestes, on the other hand, motivated on the secular level solely by the claims of *philia*, simply ignores the postulate that society cannot tolerate private murder because it is dysfunctional and leads to anomie. The contrast is symmetrical: the extreme claims of sociology are no more ascertainable or justifiable than the extreme claims of theology.

With the exit of Tyndareus (629), Orestes can resume his appeal to Menelaus. It is an appeal based on *philia*, but on *philia* of the *quid pro quo* sort. Orestes wants repayment for the services of Agamemnon to Menelaus. He points out that Agamemnon's help was based on *philia* of a more sublime sort:

He verily sold his life for thee, as friends
Should do for friends. (652-53)

Such *philia* cannot be expected of the *sophia* of Menelaus, but business is business and some payment is owing. Orestes hastens to add that it is not money he wants (644). But since business is business, the question

of morality may be safely omitted (646–50). He offers Menelaus a favorable exchange: one day's labor for ten years (656–57). The bargaining becomes grotesque as he throws the death of Iphigeneia in for nothing, and with a nice touch of ironic foreshadowing does not claim the life of Hermione in return (658–59). One might almost say, in fact, that every time Orestes attempts the ways of *sophia*, his reasoning tends to become grotesque, a mockery and, in a way, a criticism of *sophia* through its excess. Thus, in attempting to meet the charges of Tyndareus, he not only interpreted the murder of Clytemnestra as an act of patriotism, he went on to blame Tyndareus as the author of his misfortune: "Thou, ancient, in begetting a vile daughter, Didst ruin me" (585–86). The comparison with Telemachus also seems excessive (588–90). So here, the attempt to justify *philia* on grounds of *sophia* is excessive. Even Orestes realizes this:

. . . woe for mine affliction!
To what pass am I come! Why grovel thus?
(671–72)

Presumably he finds the pose unworthy of himself. Nonetheless, he completes his plea with supplication in the name of Helen and of Agamemnon.

Menelaus responds with his longest single speech in the play (682–716). At last we shall see how *sophia* will apply itself to the situation. The speech is expert, for sophists know how to handle people, or at least they think so. That they are not always successful is as clear as anything else in the play. Menelaus begins by saying that he really does wish to help Orestes (682–83). He admits Orestes' claim to the strongest aid conceivable. But for Menelaus, as for any proponent of *sophia*, only that aid which is calculated to succeed is really aid. All else is a useless gesture. The use of force is out of the question (687–92). Sophistry, *μαλθακοῖς λόγοις* (692), is the only hope, albeit a slim one. Mobs can be handled, but one must bide one's time (696–703). Only *sophia* (710) can possibly help in the present situation. Menelaus will try to placate Tyndareus and the Argives (704–5), but, as in sailing, one must not set the sails too taut (706–7). Again, with the conventional and assured theology of all the characters save Orestes, he knows that the gods do not like excesses, and neither do citizens (708–9). Menelaus exits to act in the ways dictated by *sophia*.

Orestes, of course, has no trust in *sophia*. The speech of transition (717–28) reemphasizes *philia*. He feels deserted and then he sees *τόνδε φίλτατον βροτῶν* (725), Pylades. The contrast is great; *sophia* has exited

with Menelaus and it is now *philia*'s turn. The structure of this section (729-806) is noteworthy: there are forty lines of alternate one-line speeches (734-73). The pacing is swift, and at the end of this segment the proposal to address the assembly is made. The decision is sealed in a passage of twenty-five lines (774-98) where the pace is even more swift with each line divided by the speakers. The keynotes here are excitement, camaraderie, and the infusion of the buoyant, but also deceptive, optimism which characterizes the discussions of young friends, for whom friendship is intoxicating. Such *philia* becomes a value which transcends all others. It entails the mystery of *esprit de corps*, that irrational mode of mutual reinforcement. Such *philia* is an extremely powerful motive in its own right. It sends men over the top to ridiculous deaths for ridiculous ends. It is, in fact, a worthy opponent of *sophia*.

The note of *philia* is established early. Line 735 rings out with *κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων*. Orestes goes on to castigate Menelaus' attitude, which is in such contrast to that of Pylades. The latter, as a good friend would, simply accepts this opinion. Menelaus is treacherous (736-40). He is dominated by his wife (741-43). When asked for aid, he temporized as false friends do (748). Then comes a most interesting development. Pylades wishes to know what excuse Menelaus employed (749). At this crucial point, Orestes misinforms. He states that they were interrupted by the arrival of Tyndareus, whose part Menelaus took (750-52). In other words, as this conversation indicates, Menelaus and the arguments of *sophia* have simply not registered with Orestes. We have already seen this complete incomprehension of another's point of view in the debate with Tyndareus. The criterion of *philia* is immediate action. It assumes that he who does not immediately put forth all conceivable effort is no real friend. For Orestes, Menelaus' proposed course of action is not wisdom; it is simply cowardice. While Menelaus and *sophia* await the opportune moment, *philia* must act. The ensuing transition and modulation in the swiftly paced dialogue are masterfully done. The friends decide to act. From the point of view of *sophia*, the proposed action must fail, and so it does. Orestes' decision to address the assembly is disastrous, and seals his fate. This, however, only goads *philia* on to action of a more grisly sort. For untempered *philia* must act until it is destroyed, or until there is a theophany, while *sophia* cannot penetrate the mystery of either contingency.

The stichomythia goes on. Pylades asks about the trial and is told that it is inescapable (755-62). Then there is a sudden switch of interest while we are told of Pylades' troubles (763-72). Orestes fears that

Pylades is also endangered by the Argives (770), but Pylades replies that he does not come under their jurisdiction (771). This is a curious intrusion of legalism, despite the tone of 766. Its whole purpose is to lead into the next two lines:

Fearful is the people's rage, when evil men its course command.
Nay, but when they take them honest chiefs, they counsel honest rede.
(772-73)

These lines complete the stichomythia, and at this point the pace changes to the swift exchanges of *antilabe*. It is at this point that Orestes takes the decision to act, to address the public assembly of the Argives. It is a point of high tension and the decision is arrived at by a most tortuous reasoning, if it can be called reasoning at all. It is a decision arrived at by *philia*, rather than by *sophia*. It is caused by Orestes' concern not for himself but for Pylades. *Sophia*, as we know from Menelaus, has cautioned silence, but *philia* demands speech. Silence is quickly equated with cowardice, not with *sophia* (777, 782, 786). One must not seek logic in this train of thought. Logic is just what should be missing. Instead we have *philia*'s thirst for action and a mutual bolstering of optimism and daring. The decision has, in fact, been taken upon the astoundingly irrational and aristocratic assumption implied in lines 772-73 that the mob will adopt them as the *χρηστοὺς προστάτας* who will point out the path of righteousness. The decision conditioned by this dream of glory is swiftly justified according to the code of *philia* in the ensuing exchanges. Win or lose, no one can term their decision cowardly (777, 781), and lack of *sophia* convinces them that there is a chance of success (780); they are convinced of the justice of their cause (782), and perhaps the mob will pity Orestes because of his high birth (784) and the death of Agamemnon (785). One might defend this reasoning if it preceded the decision, but it does not. The decision would stand in any case. The reasoning is the weak product of *philia*'s characteristic and delusive optimism.

Following their masculine code of behavior, they decide to keep Electra out of it (787-89) with the strikingly ironic remark, *δηλαδὴ σιγᾶν ἄμεινον* (789). One last ironic consideration: Orestes is worried about a possible fit of madness. This gives Pylades a chance to express his complete devotion to his friend, even at the risk of suffering that same madness (793). This is ironic, for in a sense they are already in the grip of that madness which can be called *philia*. The scene ends with a paean to disinterested, true *philia* (*φίλοις* 794, *φίλα* 795, *φίλος* 802, *ἐταίρους* 804, *φίλος* 805 — the last word before their exit).

The episode has been inordinately protracted and constitutes more than a quarter of the play. The reasons for this lengthy treatment are not far to seek. The episode has been crucial and, from our point of view, the most important in the play, for it is there that the conflicting motives underlying the secularization of the murder are laid bare. *Philia* and *sophia* have been contrasted most strongly, but the nature of Tyndareus' role is also of supreme importance. The remainder of the play depicts the course of *philia* in its conflict with society and *sophia*.

EPISODE (844-959): THE MESSENGER

And none spake after. Then thy brother rose. (931)

Time must pass, and does by means of a choral passage (807-43). Electra enters (844) and the messenger quickly follows (852). He tells Electra and us what happened at the Argive assembly. It is quickly apparent that the messenger is partisan and a loyal follower of the family (868-70). This is all to the good, for Euripides' view of society is somewhat jaundiced. A neutral observer would not emphasize so clearly those aspects of the social process which preclude the viewing of society as an abstract or idealized individual. Ideally, society operates on the basis of *nómos*, but we are here given a biased and perhaps more realistic view. For it can be argued that *sophia* and *philia* are ever-present factors of such a complicating sort that the social process cannot be subjected to facile analysis. While the messenger's report of the assembly is certainly partisan, it may also be correct. His account is never challenged, and in any case no one can know. Men's words are heard, their actions perceived, but motives ever remain hidden. The issue is further complicated by that aspect of *sophia* which can demand silence and resolute waiting for the proper opportunity, but must appear from the outside as a skulking and weak-minded fear of meeting the issue. And this too may well be correct. The motives of *philia* can be impugned: its altruism may be no more than inverted egoism. Nevertheless, *philia* acts; the inactivity of *sophia* is always ambiguous.

The course of the trial is quickly sketched out. We are told that Talthybius' speech was two-faced (887-97). Diomedes called for banishment, not death (898-902). Another called for stoning and was seconded by Tyndareus (902-16). Then another termed the matricide a public benefit, and said that Orestes should be crowned (917-29). The alternation of speakers is schematic, and so is the crescendo of claims and counterclaims. The alternatives of death or exile quickly become the ignominy of stoning or the extravagance of public acclama-

tion. This point is the crisis of the public assembly: *κοῦδεις ἔτ' ἐλπ* (931). *Sophia* might, at this point, advise a compromise to be proposed by a person of neutral appearance. Again, a strategic silence might be advisable, a waiting to see how the mass will bend, particularly since the last speech has been so violently in Orestes' favor. Menelaus, if he was present, chose silence, but we do not know. The messenger does not mention Menelaus. Later on, Electra asks what Menelaus did (1056–57). Orestes' reply is ambiguous: *οὐδ' ὅμμ' ἔδειξεν* (1058).²⁷ Does Orestes mean that Menelaus was not present, or simply that he took no part? We cannot tell, since Menelaus' connection with the assembly is never again referred to. It is quite conceivable that in the final analysis the *sophia* of Menelaus may have directed him to absent himself and abandon his relatives to their fate. It is, as we have said, one of the weaknesses of *sophia* that when not translated into immediate action, as it often must not be, it is open to serious misunderstanding.

In any case, Menelaus would have been given no opportunity to act. We have claimed that the course of the meeting at this point calls for moderation or strategic silence, that the meeting has reached an emotional climax at which point anything can happen, that the slightest nudge, or even no nudge at all is needed to get Orestes off lightly. It is most characteristic of Orestes that he does not sense this, that he has himself been carried away by the emotion of the occasion and will go on to enunciate claims even more extravagant. Quite consonant with this is the fact that Orestes arrived at the trial with the intention to speak. The slightest bit of *sophia* might have told him that what he had to say was opportune neither in time nor in content. The quasi-heroic code to which Orestes adheres, however, can allow no trimming of sails, no deviation from an announced course of action. Orestes rises to speak and comes forth with — an antifeminist tirade. Only the absurd conclusions of a mind buoyed with *philia*, exhilarated by the delusions of youthful, male, and aristocratic optimism could suppose that such a speech would be successful. It is again madness of a sort, and the result is foregone. A plea for suicide in place of stoning is of course allowed (946–49). The mob will allow such small favors once its supremacy has been solidly established.

So ends the speech of the messenger. *Philia* has made its first characteristic attempt to solve the situation and has failed. The next step is murder — again. The last two lines of the messenger's speech are noteworthy: Apollo has destroyed you (955–56). The recurrence of Apollo is not accidental; it is ironic, for it is only Apollo that can save them.

EPISODE (1013-1352): ELECTRA, ORESTES, PYLADES

Might we gain one thing, fortunate were we
 If, past hope, unto us deliverance chanced,
 To slay and not be slain. For this I pray. (1172-74)

Time again must pass and is conveniently filled by the lengthy lamentation (960-1012) of Electra, the maid who has no part in the *philia* of young men. Orestes, at least, believes she is carrying on in rather womanish fashion (1022-24). Orestes has returned from the trial, rather grand in his defeat. It is a comment on our own values that we find *philia* magnificent in defeat, while *sophia* whether successful or not tends to leave us cold. Orestes has remained constant to his code, just as Menelaus has undoubtedly remained faithful to his. The unavoidable conflict will come. The interchange between Orestes and Electra (1017-64) is terminated by the reference to Menelaus (1057); that between Orestes and Pylades (1065-99) is again terminated by reference to Menelaus (1099). The pointing is clear.

The Orestes-Electra exchange is quickly dealt with. The major purpose for its inclusion is its strong contrast to the segment that follows it. Electra is essentially selfish and fearful. She wants to live and then she wants Orestes to kill her (1037). Her relationship to Orestes is far different from the *philia* of the young friends. Clinging and feminine, her lament has erotic and quasi-incestuous overtones (1050, 1053). Orestes prepares to die like a man and bids his sister do likewise. Pylades is to bury them (1060-68). This gives Pylades his opening, and the reaction is in strong contrast to Electra's. He too will die, for this is the apotheosis of *philia*:

τί δὲ ζῆν σῆς ἐταιρίας ἄτερ; (1072)

The strong contrast with Electra's reaction is most instructive. Many generations of critics have been deeply touched by the *Geschwisterliebe* evinced in the early parts of the play. It would appear most callous and unfeeling to cast any aspersions upon this tender relation. And yet, one can argue that the contrast given must have some purpose. Tender as is the sister-brother relation, it cannot approach the sublime or, if you like, the insane heights of the *philia* of Pylades and Orestes. Faced with the ultimate prospect of death, the feminine element in Electra shows forth, though she can be quite masculine (1204ff) when there is the least chance of survival. It is only the *philia* of young men that can withstand all. Pylades will die too, and greater love hath no man. The decision has been made. It is now followed by the characteristically weak rationalization after the fact, the self-delusive rational justification

of purely emotional claims. It is not real debate; it is the ritual argumentation which makes up the now familiar process of mutual bolstering of resolution. Orestes protests that Pylades has not committed matricide (1073), that he still has a city to which he can return, that his whole life lies before him (1075-84). Pylades replies that he will not forsake Orestes, that he took part in the crime, that he planned it, that he is practically a member of the family, and besides, what could he tell them back home (1085-97). It is typical of the irrational and ritualistic nature of this exchange that neither remembers that Pylades no longer has a home to return to (cf. 763-73). Despite the extremely serious aspects of the situation, one detects a note of *Schwärmerei*, of exultant savor and delight in the noble pose that each is striking. From the point of view of *sophia*, the entire situation can only make a slight bit of sense if Pylades' sacrifice will indeed give Orestes a chance of survival, but even this element is lacking. Pylades will die, not to save his friend, but simply to share his fate. One is tempted to delve slightly deeper. Pylades, the extreme exponent of *philia*, has no identity apart from Orestes; his life is meaningless without Orestes. While we have seen a number of facets of Orestes' character, particularly that of *σύνεσις*, which endow him with a free-standing personality, the same is not true of Pylades. One is tempted to find here the motives for Pylades' initiation or larger partaking of those acts which will tend to strengthen the *philia* which is the sole root of his being. In any case, Orestes does not reject Pylades' sacrifice. Presumably he would like to think that he would do the same if the situation were reversed.

It is most important to recognize the emotional pitch and intensity of this moment in the play. It is the culmination of *philia*'s power. Pylades has just evidenced as much disinterested *philia* as any human can show for another. Orestes is gripped, held fast, as he should be. No suggestion of Pylades can be rejected at this point. Despite Pylades' claim (1090), we cannot know to what extent he participated in the murder of Clytemnestra. There can be no doubt that he initiates the murder of Helen, doubtless for the reason outlined above:

But, since we needs must die, debate we now
How Menelaus too may share our woe. (1098-99)

Now of course harming Menelaus will not do the friends any good at all, from the point of view of *sophia*. Not that *sophia* has anything against vengeance if it can be carried out with any chance of survival for the avengers, but for *sophia*, survival must come first. At this point in the play, however, the friends have given up all hope of survival.

The first half of the dictum "help your friends and harm your enemies" is no longer possible, and so the second half comes to the fore. Vengeance, the mirror-image of *philia*, becomes the driving motive, and Pylades proposes that they strike at Menelaus through the murder of Helen. Unlike *sophia*, which must seek a way out or lie dormant until such opportunity appears, *philia* is an explosive force with a characteristic logic of action; it is a hungry emotion which demands continual sustenance in an active goal. The play has come full circle. Murder is to be committed again, this time without the sanction of Apollo. True, it is not matricide, but Orestes can have only one mother, and for Pylades, the perfect friend, the two crimes are equivalent. At the same time, we must face squarely the possibility that neither Euripides nor his audience found the plot against Helen morally objectionable. It must be said at the outset that I can do no more than deny this; I have no proof of any sort. It is quite clear that killing within the immediate family held a peculiar horror for the Greeks, but this is not to say that they condoned other kinds of murder; the reconstruction of mores is difficult at best. On the other hand, while there are few continuous verities in human experience, death is one of them, and, save under very special circumstances which do not hold here, death was an absolute evil. That the friends intend to harm Menelaus and Helen is indisputable.

Again, the plea of Orestes (288-93) that, given the opportunity again, he would not have killed his mother even at the behest of his father is at most suggestive, for that was matricide, not simple murder. Somewhat more helpful are the following remarks of Pylades:

For, if we loosed the sword against a dame
More virtuous, were that slaying infamous. (1132-33)

To be sure, Pylades' conditional objection is not on strictly moral grounds, but still it is a rationalization after the fact. They have already decided to harm Menelaus by killing Helen, a deed that would be *δυσκλής* were the victim any other woman. Menelaus' views are emphatic —

He would add blood to blood — this matricide! (1587)

— but he is a biased witness.

The above citations are suggestive, but not conclusive. In the end, I must return to the central hypothesis that the play is an ironic retelling of the Orestes story, and that this is the reason for the title of the play. The proposed ironic symmetry demands another matricide

or its equivalent, and I can only claim that Euripides has come as close to this as the exigencies of the mythical framework permitted. I might add that it was inspiration on his part that the actual non-performance of the murder admirably suited both the ironic symmetry outlined and the lack of any such end for Helen in the tradition.

To return to the course of the play, Orestes, completely caught up and entranced by the *philia* of Pylades, accepts the notion of murder readily. He hesitates not on moral but on practical grounds (1106). The stichomythia (1100-30) is closely analogous to the exchange following the decision to address the Argive assembly (774ff). The tone is that of bravado and a crescendo of exuberant heroics. Pylades asks the whereabouts of Helen and is told that she is in the house setting her seal on all (1106-8).

She seals no more, when Hades hails her bride. (1109)

So answers Pylades. The tone of the line is interesting. Wecklein calls it *diese sarkastische Wendung*,²⁸ but sarcasm does not seem to cover it. The expression has a slightly picturesque quality, and it has a level of bravado in it that Orestes has not yet quite attained, for in the next line, he still worries about the attendants of the queen. Pylades retorts:

Whom? Phrygians! — 'tis not I would quail for such. (1111)

This remark breaks the back of Orestes' reluctance. Bravado is contagious under such circumstances, and Orestes hastens to be as brave as his friend:

Ay, — chiefs of mirrors and of odours they. (1112)

He goes on to say that Greece is not big enough for Helen (1114) and that he would not fear to die twice with Helen dead (1116). All reluctance is gone. The man who suffers madness because of one murder is completely ready and even eager to commit another. The familiar effect of increasing exuberance takes place. The friends buoy each other up as they revel in the joys of deceit: how they will moan of their plight as they accost Helen (1121), how delightful the irony in that she will not really be sympathetic, but then they will not really be sorrowing (1122-23). Then follow lengthy statements by Pylades (1131-52) and Orestes (1155-76). These deserve particular attention since they are the last statements made in the face of certain death. For it must be noted that it is only after these speeches are concluded that Electra (1177ff) proposes the use of Herminione as a hostage, thus offering at least a slim chance of survival.

In the first statement, Pylades brings in the notion that the murder of Helen will be a glorious deed that all Greece should approve (1131-42). It sounds suspiciously like Orestes' apology for the murder of Clytemnestra (564ff; 934ff), in case any member of the audience has missed the parallel of the two killings. Pylades then goes on to repeat the vengeance motif (1143-48).²⁹ Orestes' speech is in full accord. Aristocratic *philia* is praised (1155-57), and Pylades' full participation in all deeds, past and future, is fully acknowledged (1158-62). The aristocratic note continues as Orestes claims that he will die in a manner worthy of Agamemnon's son, with vengeance upon Menelaus (1163-71). The final five lines of Orestes' speech (1172-76) are of crucial importance to my interpretation of the play. Wedd has suggested³⁰ that in these lines Orestes might better have expressed a pious appeal to Apollo if he really believed in him. This is to miss the point completely, for the murder of Helen must not have about it the slightest tinge of divine guidance or sanction. Apollo's role is to stop this killing, not help it along. It is also most important to note that this crime is to be committed without any hope of survival thereby, for the killing must not have about it the slightest tinge of *sophia*. The motives are those of traditional *philia*: to harm one's enemies, that is, revenge, combined with the aristocratic notion of a glorious death, the last gift of two friends to each other. The complete lack of *sophia* is stressed in the last five lines of Orestes' speech:

Might we gain one thing, fortunate were we
 If, past hope, unto us deliverance chanced,
 To slay and not be slain. For this I pray:
 For sweet the wish is — sweet through sighing lips
 To cheer the heart with winged words costing naught.
(1172-76)

This is acknowledged wishful thinking. It is the daydream of the boy who would like to be a pleasantly sorrowful mourner at his own hero's funeral. The reasoning is faulty, as it must be, for the deed has come to be considered as the last fillip of glorious action before a heroic death. But alas, for the wishful thinking of our young boy to be really successful, he must actually both die and not die. If somehow he is saved, the hero's funeral cannot be his. This, then, is the hideous sequence of affairs, again ironic in that once the plot to use Hermione as a hostage is set forth, the murder of Helen is no longer quite the glorious venture it was when first conceived. This is the nightmare: action proposed under one set of circumstances is to be carried out

under another, and this is, in a sense, tragic. The dynamics of *philia* cannot be otherwise. Carried through, they cannot stand the test of *sophia*. If, however, *philia*'s dynamics are suddenly tempered by *sophia*, by the notion of survival, then its course becomes truly grotesque. At this point, Orestes is in the absurd world of wish-fulfillment; the wish expressed in 1172-76 has suddenly become possible, but there cannot really be both a glorious death and a glorious escape from that death. Of course, our heroes do not think of this, nor is there any point in attacking the logic of their course. They are beyond logic, and Euripides' task has been accomplished. The young man who, at the behest of Apollo, has committed matricide and has therefore been afflicted by madness will now reverse the process: completely enthralled by *philia*, which if not madness is at least the diametric opposite of *sophia*, he will attempt another murder, which only Apollo keeps from completion. The program seems absurd, and only the art of Euripides has made it seem at all plausible, although, as we have noted, few would claim that Euripides has been completely successful.

The remainder of the episode may be dealt with summarily. The Electra of 1177-1203 is no longer the wailing female of 960-1064, and accordingly she is credited with a man's mind (1204). The plot is ready for execution and, as in all versions of the Orestes story, the plotters exhort themselves to the kill by prayer to Agamemnon (1225-45). Orestes and Pylades enter the palace while Electra and the chorus await the return of Hermione. The air of expectancy and suspense is cultivated until Electra must shout out:

Within, ho! — why do ye tarry, and no foe nigh,
Your hands with the slaughter to dye? (1282-83)

Then the cries of Helen are heard (1294, 1301) with a bloodthirsty obligato by Electra (1302-10). Hermione enters and the contrast with Electra is great and effective. Electra deceives Hermione mercilessly, and shows herself to be the same old Electra. Hermione enters the palace and is seized and Electra exits.

FINALE (1353-1693) AND EPIPHANY

Hail, Prophet Loxias, to thine oracles!
No lying prophet wert thou then, but true.
And yet a fear crept o'er me, lest I heard,
Seeming to hear thy voice, a Fury-fiend. (1665-69)

The appearance of the fleeing Phrygian slave (1369) begins one of the
7 + H.S.C.P.

great scenes in Euripides. Verrall's commentary is so good that it must be quoted in part:

The scenes which follow, those in which the eunuch takes part, are of that perilous kind . . . in which a dramatist, having, as he thinks, brought the spectators to an excitement of the graver feelings — pity, horror, and above all suspense — strong enough to stand any strain whatever, deliberately strains it for the purpose of strengthening, by showing them what in ordinary circumstances would arouse inconsistent emotions, such as contempt, ridicule, or disgust. The sense that *we cannot smile*, that we do not, even though we perceive a call, is the supreme test and confirmation of gravity; and to excite this sense by art . . . is a supreme, though hazardous resource.²¹

The scene is superb. The cringing foreign slave, crazed by fear, is a most suitable messenger to recount a scene that is to have little rationality about it. His excited tones and broken speech, the lyric aspect of the whole — all are designed to express fully the high pitch, the emotionalism, the irrationality of it all with its culmination in the inexplicable disappearance of Helen.

Orestes enters (1506). Despite its oft-noted grotesquerie, it is not extreme to see in the ensuing short debate (1506–26) a conflict between *philia* and *sophia* comparable in a twisted and ironic way to the earlier exchanges between Orestes and Menelaus. The major difference is that now *philia* has the dominant position, a fact which is not conducive to ordered discourse. What is more, there will follow another such debate between Orestes and Menelaus (1554–1624). The debate with the Phrygian differs in that the Phrygian is *sophia* incarnate: he just wants to get out with a whole skin. If this seems degrading or disgraceful, it is a condemnation which can be leveled at all *sophia*. The slave simply agrees with everything Orestes says, and Orestes' final words are noteworthy:

εὖ λέγεις· σῶζεῖ σε σύνεσις. (1524)

The irony is huge: just compare lines 395–96.

With the arrival of Menelaus, *sophia* and *philia* meet once again. Here too *philia* has the dominant position, but *sophia* can no longer take the path of least resistance. For no man, not even Menelaus, can be the complete σοφός. The demands of *philia*, of emotional ties of some sort, must impinge on us all. Helen is dead, he thinks, and he will, of course, have nothing of the miraculous or mysterious (1554–60). But Orestes appears with the sword at Hermione's throat (1575), and

Menelaus is forced to act. The structure of the dialogue is typical of scenes dominated by *philia*: one-line speeches (1576-97), then half-lines (1598-1617), and finally a pair of four line speeches (1617-24). Menelaus' view of Orestes' career is clear enough: ἐπὶ φόνῳ πράσσεις φόνον (1579). Orestes confirms the disappearance of Helen, but Menelaus does not believe him, for they operate in completely different spheres. Menelaus simply cannot believe that such a thing could happen. Orestes, chased by the Furies, recipient of Apollo's command and bow, has no difficulty in believing what he has experienced. He threatens to kill Hermione. "You can't escape," says Menelaus (1593). "We shall go down in flames," is the reply. *Sophia* cannot comprehend suicide (1595), but *philia* has no difficulty (1596). Menelaus makes his last attempt: "Kill Hermione, and you shall answer to me for it." "Done," says Orestes (1598) and Menelaus breaks down. Orestes' insane proposal is presented in the half-line speeches. Menelaus must attempt the impossible, for Orestes wants both life and rule. *Sophia* has reached the final impasse. It can do nothing. Were it not for the ties to Helen and Hermione, *sophia* would not even contemplate action, but there can be no such *sophia*. Menelaus' words: ἔχεις με (1617) are not an admission that Orestes has won the argument, or that he will try to fulfill Orestes' mad proposal. At this point, action of any sort is impossible for *sophia*. The words are a cry of sheer despair and frustration. But *philia* will not stop. Hermione will die; the palace will burn;³² all is ended — and Apollo appears.

This is no plot which a poet has lost control of, and which must be saved by the god on a machine. It is rather the propounding of a paradox, a miracle, and a fact. We have already enunciated repeatedly the hypothesis that the underlying symmetry of the play requires Apollo to appear and put a stop to the intentions of Orestes and Pylades, and this is just what Apollo does. The details of his speech are of no great moment; what is important is that he appears and puts things to rights. Nevertheless, one may feel with some justification that his appearance is too abrupt and that the audience has been cheated by the sudden fact of divine intervention. One can say that equilibrium and ironic symmetry are not enough. This contention might simply be denied, but fortunately there is more than aesthetic symmetry involved. The play is more than an exercise in dramatic equilibrium, for it deals with a real and profound issue in its opposition of *philia* and *sophia*. These are forces or motives in human life which are ever-present and unalterably opposed. They are incompatible, for one is frankly self-seeking, while the other at least claims to be altruistic. We may argue

that *philia* is delusive, but it at least takes the risks of strong conviction, while *sophia* is weak and often malevolent. And yet *sophia* remains perhaps the sole resource of men, for its goal of survival is the only one which can conceivably be a matter of common agreement. These are the issues dealt with in *Orestes* by Euripides, with the result that we have more than a simple rousing melodrama. Shall we say then that *Orestes* shows both *sophia* and *philia* to be inadequate? I believe so; but again this is not the whole story, for while all the issues have been exposed, they have not been properly combined. If, on the other hand, the contention is allowed that the conflict in *Orestes* between *sophia* and *philia* ought to be and is meant to be universalized, if it is allowed that the conflict does apply and is meant to apply to all men at all times, then the intervention of Apollo takes on a larger meaning. Viewed in this way, the presence of Apollo introduces into the affairs of men an ironic symmetry which is more than aesthetic and which may be termed a paradoxical equilibrium. Let us not imagine that Euripides approves of Apollo's role; he introduces it as a fact and not as a moral judgment. The totality of human affairs is extremely complicated, so complex in fact that we may well despair of ever achieving total comprehension. There is simply too much that we do not know; too many mysteries like pain, madness, guilt, and even joy exist to allow breaking the total process down to the simple opposition of *philia* and *sophia*. Were this all, the world would end; the palace would go up in flames, would have done so a long time ago. But the salient fact remains that life goes on somehow, by no rationale which is visible to man. It is a continuing process whose ethical aspects are obscure in the extreme, but the fact that it continues at all may be termed a paradoxical equilibrium of the highest order. I should like to think that this is what Euripides meant.

NOTES

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1. G. M. A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides* (London 1941) 395-96.
2. In the introduction to his translation of *Orestes* in the University of Chicago series, *The Complete Greek Tragedies* (Chicago 1953-1959).
3. A. W. Verrall, *Essays on Four Plays of Euripides* (Cambridge 1905) 257.
4. *Ibid.* 253-59.
5. Grube (above, n. 1) 396.

6. Ibid. 397.
7. V. Krieg, *De Euripidis Oreste* (diss. Hal. 1934) 13f.
8. Verrall (above, n. 3) 216.
9. Ibid. 200ff.
10. Grube (above, n. 1) 374.
11. Ibid. 397 n. 1. The reference to 1338 should be changed to 1388.
12. This explanation is not new. It was advanced by G. Perrotta, "Studi Euripidei," *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica*, N.S. 6 (1928) 102ff.
13. A. S. Way's translation in the Loeb edition is employed throughout for the sake of convenience. The Greek text is Murray's in *OCT*.
14. Verrall (above, n. 3) 217.
15. Compare the note of N. Wedd (Cambridge 1895) with that of N. Wecklein (Leipzig 1906).
16. See note 12 above.
17. It is unsettling to read Kitto's words regarding an interpretation of *Andromache*: "The chiasmus does not work, and if it did it would be no explanation, for the principles of dramatic construction are not those of landscape-gardening." *Greek Tragedy*² (London 1950) 230. I can only demur, and point out the prejudicial conception of propriety to be found in his own preceding sentence: "nor can we congratulate Euripides if the gallant Peleus is overwhelmed not for some sin but for the sake of an equilibrium."
18. Krieg (above, n. 7) 14 and note.
19. Verrall (above, n. 3) 259.
20. E.g., A. N. Pippin, "Euripides' *Helen*: A Comedy of Ideas," *CP* 55 (1960) 151ff; E. R. Dodds, ed., *Bacchae* (Oxford 1944); R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Euripides and Dionysus* (Cambridge 1948).
21. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 68.
22. See note 2 above.
23. See the discussion in J. Jackson, *Marginalia Scaenica* (Oxford 1955) 57f. I object strongly to the following: "the verse is an irrelevance: no answer to the one foregoing, which it ignores; no prelude to the one following, by which it is ignored" (58). Jackson has read the Greek so closely that he misses the point. Orestes breaks off the sophistic argument because he will have no more to do with it, while 425 is the beginning of a new segment in the discussion.
24. Verrall (above, n. 3) 224.
25. Verrall (above, n. 3) 228, calls these remarks part of a "movement of Tyndareus . . . to defend his dignity." There is no evidence to support this view.
26. These verses are repeated in 625-26. Despite the discussion of D. L. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1934) 104, they are not out of place here.
27. *Hercules Furens* 1215: φίλοισιν ὄμμα δεικνύναι τὸ σόν is the only parallel I can find in Euripides, and it is not helpful.
28. Wecklein (above, n. 15) note *ad loc*.
29. Four curious lines follow (1149-52):

If haply we achieve not Helen's death,
 Yon palace will we fire, and so will die.
 For of two glories, one we will not miss,
 To die with honor, or with honor 'scape.

The last line puzzles me, or rather the last word, *σεσφασμένοι*. The alternatives referred to are either the death of Helen or the burning of the palace. In neither case do the friends expect to survive. Cf. Orestes' words a few lines below: "I must in any wise give up the ghost" (1163). Page (above, n. 26) 50f has argued that lines 1618–20 referring to the burning of the palace are a histrionic interpolation. If this is true, then the embarrassing lines 1149–52 may also go, since they contain the only other reference to the burning of the palace. It can then be argued that the insertion of 1149–52 was triggered by the mention of ancestral halls in 1146. All this would be most convenient except that I wish to keep the burning of the palace in the play, a wish which I will defend in its proper place. I should still be very happy to find that 1152 is an interpolation, but I lack the ingenuity to prove it. I can only say that the text would not suffer by its omission, and that it makes no sense to me if it is retained.

30. Wedd (above, n. 15) p. xxx, note.

31. Verrall (above, n. 3) 249.

32. The crux of Page's argument (above, n. 26), 50f, that 1618–20 are an interpolation is that he interprets Menelaus' words in 1617 to be an admission of defeat. So they are, but it does not follow that Menelaus will attempt to fulfill Orestes' impossible request, and I have so argued in the text. Menelaus is not only defeated; he is paralyzed and cannot act in such an impasse. The burning of the palace then follows logically.

QVAESTIONES ERINNEANAE

BY DONALD NORMAN LEVIN

ANCIENT testimony concerning the Greek poetess Erinna is scanty and for the most part contradictory, unclear, or dubious. Was she Sappho's contemporary? Or did she live several centuries later? Was Lesbos her homeland? Was it Teos or Tenos? Or was it Telos or even Rhodes? Is it true that Erinna died at the age of nineteen and that the chief product of her very brief literary career was a mixed-dialect hexameter poem entitled Ἀλακάτα (*The Distaff*)?

Until about a generation ago scholarly endeavor to answer these and related questions was hampered by the almost complete disappearance of Erinna's actual writings. Apart from three epigrams ascribed to her in the *Palatine Anthology* (6.352, 7.710, 7.712), there remained only a few lines of hexameter quoted out of context by Stobaeus (4.50 and 51) and Athenaeus (7.283D). To make matters still worse, the latter grammarian doubted even that Erinna had written the verses which he was quoting. The lack of consensus among ancient authorities was inevitably duplicated rather than resolved in scholarship of a latter day.¹

I

Discovery at Behnesa in 1928 of a papyrus which contained hitherto lost writings of Erinna² occasioned reassessment of earlier scholarly pronouncements, but did not put an end to all controversy.³ The newly discovered remains (fr. 1B Diehl²)⁴ are both Sapphic in their intensity and Hellenistic in their preoccupation with the minutiae of everyday life.⁵ Those who have examined the papyrus are reluctant, however, to uphold any longer the theory derived from Suidas and Eustathius that Erinna was indeed a member of the circle of poetesses clustered around Sappho.⁶ What has proved more seductive is the conception of Erinna as one of the luminaries of the Hellenistic period.⁷ Note that she is praised by a number of epigrammatists, among them Theocritus' contemporary, Asclepiades of Samos. Theocritus himself may even have furnished the model for some of Erinna's writings. Significant coincidences are discernible.⁸ Note too that Antiphanes, the only ancient author whom we know to have uttered an unkind word about her, denounces Erinna together with Callimachus, portraying

both as leaders of a literary faction to which he is violently opposed (*AP* 11.322).⁹

Sober investigators are aware, nonetheless, that no ancient testimony, surely not that of any grammarian or chronographer, provides direct proof that Erinna lived in the Hellenistic era. The latest attestable date is that offered by Eusebius, who places Erinna's *floruit* in the one hundred sixth or one hundred seventh Olympiad, that is, shortly before 350 B.C. Inconsonant with this dating, though not necessarily with that which assigns her to the seventh century, is the report by Tatian that the sculptor Naucydes — Pliny the Elder (*NH* 37.50) tells us that his heyday was circa 400 B.C. — fashioned a bronze statue of Erinna.

When, therefore, did Erinna live? I am not convinced that this question will ever be answered with precision. The conflict of chronological testimonies is not really resolved through the ingenious assumption that Eusebius has confused the poetess with an obscure namesake.¹⁰ One could as plausibly argue — in fact somebody has — that the Naucydes said to have fashioned Erinna's statue was not the son of Polyclitus, but another and slightly later sculptor of the same name, son of Patrocles.¹¹

Hardly more conclusive is the internal evidence from fr. IB. To share Sappho's fire one need not be Sappho's contemporary. Conversely, where noteworthy resemblances occur between her verses and those of the Alexandrians it is possible that Theocritus and others follow Erinna's lead rather than Erinna theirs. Like a number of poets lauded or imitated in the age of the Ptolemies — one thinks immediately of Hesiod, Mimnermus, Euripides,¹² Antimachus — she could be Hellenistic in spirit without being Hellenistic in a chronological sense.

Hence they seem to have observed most sensibly who recognize in Erinna not a contemporaneous practitioner, but a forerunner, indeed, a much admired forerunner of literary Alexandrianism.¹³ Particularly worthy of attention is the statement of that scholar who, pointing to both the Hellenistic and the non-Hellenistic elements in her poetry, categorizes Erinna as one living "in a time of transition at the end of an epoch."¹⁴ I myself conclude that the likeliest date for Erinna's *floruit* must fall somewhere in the first or second quarter of the fourth century B.C. or, at the earliest, in the closing years of the fifth.

II

Unsolved still, despite the discovery of the papyrus fragments, is the problem of placing Erinna geographically. No new direct evidence

has become available to permit a decisive judgment on the rival claims of Teos and the several Aegean islands. On the other hand, scrutiny of the papyrus demonstrates at least that the old argument which favored Rhodes or Telos on the basis of dialect¹⁵ need no longer be taken too seriously. Whereas the epigrams of Erinna are undeniably written in Doric,¹⁶ fr. 1B displays the dialectal characteristics assigned to *The Distaff* by Suidas and Eustathius: its idiom is a mixture of Doric and Aeolic.¹⁷

Does this new linguistic evidence prove Erinna to have been Sappho's compatriot, at least, if not her contemporary? Hardly. The language of the papyrus fragments is not identifiable with any known local vernacular, surely not that of Lesbos. It is an artificial creation: a literary dialect, basically Doric, but with certain Aeolic features superimposed.¹⁸

Nevertheless, with or without an implication of contemporaneity with Sappho, the notion that Erinna should be called "Lesbian" or "Mytilenaeon" was very persistent in antiquity. It is mentioned by Suidas and Eustathius, who at the same time take note of alternative traditions favoring Teos, Telos, or Rhodes. Tatian's *Ἡρινναν τὴν Λεσβίαν* is quite unambiguous. In some instances, however, what appears to be a reference to geographical origin may have been intended otherwise. When an anonymous epigrammatist not only compares her literary achievements with those of both Homer and Sappho, but also likens Erinna to the bee which produces the "Lesbian honeycomb" (*AP* 9.190), this need not mean that the poetess was herself a resident of Lesbos. It could mean simply that her poetry was thought to be as sweet as Sappho's.¹⁹ Note that the honey-bee image is employed also by other epigrammatists who wish to commend Erinna for the delicacy of her poetic performance.²⁰

Far more puzzling are the problems which arise in connection with fr. 5. This is one of two funerary epigrams in honor of the very close friend Baucis, whom we now know, thanks to the papyrus finds, to have played a central role also in Erinna's writings in hexameter. Fr. 5 is accompanied by the following notice:

Ἡρίννης Μυτιληναίας εἰς Βαυκίδα τὴν Μυτιληναίαν Ἡρίννης δὲ συνεταίριδα.

Similarly "to Erinna the Lesbian" is the supscription attached to two epigrams (*AP* 7.713, 9.190) of which Erinna is not the author but the subject. In fr. 5, however, though *συνεταιρίς*, the word which appeared also in the supscription, denotes intimacy between Erinna

and Baucis, racially Baucis is identified as other than Lesbian or Mytilenaeon. Exactly what her γένος may have been is obscured by the unintelligibility of the received text at the opening of the final distich. Certain editors and scholars, remembering that Stephanus of Byzantium flatly declared Erinna (he did not mention Baucis) to be a Tenian of Tenos, have deciphered *τηιωιδωσειδωντι* (7) as *Τηνία, ὡς (δ') εἰδῶντι*.²¹ Others, insisting that *Τηλία*, not *Τηνία*, is the correct reading, call Suidas and Eustathius to witness.²² No longer very convincing, of course, is the choice of *Τηλία* on the simple ground that Telos is Dorian, Tenos not.

But why insist on either of the proposed emendations? Why not concede that the manuscript reading, garbled though it may be, suggests rather that Baucis and, by implication, Erinna were of Tean rather than Tenian or Telian birth? Here too sanction is to be found in Suidas and Eustathius. Indeed, the former says "*Ηριννα· Τεῖα*" before ever mentioning any alternative possibilities.²³

All that seems assured, therefore, is that the two friends, if actually compatriots from the start, were native to some place whose name started with "T." But need the poetess and her companion have stayed always in their homeland? Can it be that, as a nineteenth century scholar once suggested, γένος/*Τηία* or *Τηνία* or *Τηλία* (he prefers the last) in fr. 5 indicates origin, whereas *Μυτιληναία*, applicable to both Erinna and Baucis, is employed in the supscription because both had migrated to a new home?²⁴ Compare the case of Apollonius of Alexandria, who, reestablishing himself at Rhodes, became known as *ὁ Πόδιος*.²⁵

The likelihood of a common ethnic background for Erinna and Baucis is supported not only by evidence connected with the funerary epigram, but also by the fact that the papyrus fragments clearly point to a sharing of experiences in childhood. Specifically the repetitions of the word *χελύνα* ("tortoise") (fr. 1B.5, 7, 16) and the nature of the contexts into which the word is introduced hint some sort of description of the children's game *χελιχελώνη*.²⁶ A few lines later — if, as seems probable, *δαγύ[δ]ων* (21) has been correctly restored — there is likewise an allusion to playing with dolls. Still further on (25–27) occurs an apparent mention of the terror aroused by the bogey Mormo.²⁷

III

From Erinna's epigrams and hexameters we learn that Baucis, young newlywed, died very soon after the marriage ceremony.²⁸ Her

age at the time of decease is unspecified, however. Suidas and Eustathius report that Erinna herself died at the age of nineteen without having married. The same expressions, "virginal" and "nineteen-year-old," appear also in two epigrams written in the poetess' honor. Yet in neither is it stated unequivocally that Erinna was nineteen years old when she died. What receives emphasis in *AP* 7.11 and 9.190 is the astonishment occasioned by Erinna's precocity: in a comparative handful of verses written at age nineteen she has outdone the mass of poets and has challenged comparison with the most renowned Old Masters.

Very suspicious in this regard is another eulogistic epigram, *AP* 7.13, attributable to Leonidas or Meleager. That the author knew the epigrams for Baucis and knew them to be Erinna's is demonstrated in his final hemistich. *Βάσκανος ἔσσ' Ἀΐδα* (4) is an exact quotation from fr. 4 of Erinna. But whereas this apostrophe originally signified the poetess' desolation at the loss of her best friend, its citation by Leonidas or Meleager seems to be intended ironically: "Even as she uttered these words, young Erinna was rightly conscious of her own impending doom."²⁹ Yet what of the metaphorical declaration which precedes? "Hades carried her off to his nuptial" (3) — *Ἡπύων* (2) is the direct object of the verb — surely echoes the language of Erinna's lamentations for Baucis. I suspect that Leonidean (or Meleagrian) reminiscences of the final distichs of fr. 4 are likewise designed, as duplication of the apostrophe to Hades seems to have been, for deliberately ironic effect. Or can the allegedly biographical details in *AP* 7.13 and in other ancient eulogies of Erinna be traced ultimately to misunderstanding of the poetess' own words?

Among her own words are two, *ἐννέα* and *δέκατος*, which appear in the papyrus fragments (line 37) on opposite sides of a lacuna sufficiently large or small to justify the surmise that they were once bound tightly together by a connective. Hence the restoration *ἐννέα[καὶ]δέκατος*³⁰ is virtually a certainty. On the other hand, the significance of "nineteenth" in this passage remains obscure. Though the poetess' own name seems to have occurred in the very next verse (38),³¹ it is hardly certain that the numeral does not refer rather to Baucis. If the reference is to the latter, her exact age at the moment of death may have been established here.³² If, instead, Erinna is talking about herself, *ἐννέα[καὶ]δέκατος* might indicate her own age either at the time of the poem's composition or at the time when certain of the incidents described took place.³³ Or is it possible that the adjective has been introduced to perform a double function? Could it define both the age of the deceased and the age of the intimate friend who mourns her

tragically premature loss? Until the context in which it is embedded can be more fully pieced together, this new bit of evidence from the papyrus will aggravate rather than diminish the problems raised by Suidas' and Eustathius' statements concerning Erinna and by the epigrammatic tradition to which Suidas and Eustathius are so obviously indebted. Meanwhile one suspects again that Erinna's own utterances have been misapprehended by ancient authorities.

IV

The papyrus fragments are invaluable, nonetheless, in providing a clearer conception of what was or was not included in Erinna's complete works. That Erinna wrote both hexameters ($\eta\gamma\nu$ δὲ ἑποποιός, testifies Suidas) and elegiac couplets ($\epsilon\pi\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\epsilon$ δὲ καὶ ἐπιγράμματα, Suidas adds) was corroborated by the three entries under her name in the *Palatine Anthology* and by the several verses cited in the works of grammarians. Realization that the six badly mutilated remnants exhumed from the sands of Egypt had belonged originally together as three parallel columns of hexameters³⁴ further confirms Suidas' classification of Erinna as ἑποποιός. No primary evidence has yet been found, however, to substantiate a hint in the anonymous epigram *AP* 9.190 that Erinna employed lyric meters as well.³⁵

Before the unearthing of fr. 1B some scholars seriously doubted that Erinna had ever written a poem corresponding to what Suidas and Eustathius called *The Distaff*. Apart from the unresolved problem of dialect, no two of the three then extant hexameter fragments seemed to have a common range of interest. Moreover, what connection the tools or craft of spinning might have had with any of the three remained totally obscure.³⁶

Both the genuineness and the relevance of the two passages quoted by Stobaeus seem to be assured, however, now that the papyrus is available for comparison. Ejection of the puzzling word *παυρολόγοι*, which appears in Stobaeian manuscripts, in favor of the papyrus reading *πραῦλόγοι* ("soft-spoken") permits the welding together of the newly discovered fragments and the long familiar tradition of the grammarians. Thus the truncated line *πραῦλογοιοπο*[, quite unintelligible as it stands in the papyrus (fr. 1B.46), can be restored beyond reasonable doubt as *πραῦλόγοι πο*[*λ*ιαί, *ταὶ γήραος ἄνθεα θνατοῖς*]³⁷ ("softly speaking white-haired womenfolk, / to mortals the flower of old age"). Unfortunately the significance of this verse within Erinna's poem cannot be ascertained.³⁸

The other Stobaeon quotation (fr. 1A) has not, like the former, been combined with scraps of the papyrus to effect a sound restoration. Yet thematically fr. 1A and 1B seem closely related. When the poetess says, according to Stobaeus,

From here to Hades a bodiless echo penetrates: there is silence among the corpses; darkness floods the eyes,³⁹

perhaps it is with the intention of describing the departure of Baucis' spirit after her death.

Similarly Baucis may have been the "sweet friend" mentioned in fr. 2. In view not only of Athenaeus' doubts, but also of the painfully obtrusive alliteration, nowhere else a feature of Erinnean style, which dominates the passage in question it is hardly safe, however, to assert confidently that Erinna was its author.⁴⁰

If, then, with the possible exception of those preserved in Athenaeus' compendium, all extant hexameter verses attributed to Erinna are referable to a single work, it is obvious that this work must be the Aeolio-Dorian poem which Suidas and Eustathius call *The Distaff*. For the genesis of the traditional title several fairly plausible explanations may be cited. Renewed examination of the anonymous epigram (*AP* 9.190) apparently utilized as a source by Suidas suggests that the words ἔγραψεν Ἡλακάτην in Suidas' text (similarly Eustathius' ἔγραψε ποίημα Ἡλακάτην) represent a misreading of the epigrammatist's revelation that Erinna, frightened of her mother, stood at the distaff or at the loom and furtively composed her verses (5-6).⁴¹ Demonstrable only by analogy, yet worthy of consideration nonetheless, is the alternative possibility that the title was a conscious invention of Alexandrian literary scholars.⁴²

That Erinna may, after all, have chosen herself to entitle her poem *The Distaff* is not precluded, but, if anything, corroborated by the contents of the papyrus text. Grief over the loss of Baucis pervades the recovered fragments. Yet its direct expression is concentrated in periodic outcries (18, 31, 48, 54) which amount almost to a refrain.⁴³ What renders these ejaculations all the more startlingly effective is their intercalation between light-hearted recollections of childhood or adolescence.⁴⁴ Not only toys and games, but even household chores are apparently called to mind. An allusion to spinning under the mother's supervision — the very activity cited by the author of *AP* 9.190 — is probably to be discerned in the syntactical coupling of ἐρείθοις with the combination ἄ τε πὸτ ὄρθρον/μάτηρ (22-23).⁴⁵ At any rate fr. 1B includes

an occurrence of ἀλακάτα (39), Doric (perhaps also Aeolic) form of the word meaning "distaff."⁴⁶

Hence it is conceivable that the title was chosen to accord with the predominantly domestic character of a poem into which lamentation enters rather as a stabbing counterpoint. However, it is conceivable also that Erinna, if she herself designated the whole poem as Ἀλακάτα, did so with metaphorical intent.⁴⁷ In contrast to the ordinary distaffs employed in woolworking the symbolic distaff of the Muses serves to spin out the thread of a poem. Without vitiating the testimony of Suidas and Eustathius such an explanation would clarify also the semimetaphorical language of *AP* 9.190.⁴⁸

Those who object still that the threnodic element of fr. 1B takes precedence over the domestic and that therefore *The Distaff* is hardly an appropriate title⁴⁹ would do well to consider the words of another epigram, *AP* 7.12, likewise the work of an unnamed author. The latter writes that Fate, "mistress of the flax-spinning distaff," has driven Erinna into Acheron,⁵⁰ then adds, addressing the poetess by name (5-6):

Your excellent work in hexameters, Erinna, proclaims that you are not dead, but conjoined with the Muses' chorus.

If I have surmised rightly, there are thus three senses in which the traditional title is applicable to Erinna's poem. In addition to the rather obvious literal and almost as obvious metaphorical conceptions of the distaff respectively as household tool and as implement of the Muses — to be sure, the former has its metaphorical implications and becomes, so to speak, the symbol of feminine domesticity — there may be implied also an ironical reminiscence of the symbolism which pictures the distaff as the device for spinning out the tenuous thread of life. How appropriately, then, such a title as Ἀλακάτα would be supscribed to a poem in which consciousness of bereavement is again and again made manifest! When Erinna describes the mother and attendant woolworkers, does the reader perhaps witness instead their grimly ironic analogues, the goddesses whose collaborative task is not only to spin the thread of life, but also to measure and cut?

NOTES

This article is based upon a paper presented at a meeting of the American Philological Association in New York on December 29, 1959.

1. For bibliography of nineteenth century work on Erinna see O. Crusius, *RE* 6 (1909) 455. To that list add the brief but significant early twentieth century discussions of U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Textgeschichte der*

griechischen Bukoliker (Berlin 1906) 117 (hereafter cited as Wilamowitz I); *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin 1913) 228-30 (Wilamowitz II); *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos* (Berlin 1924) I 108-11 (Wilamowitz III).

2. The papyrus was unearthed by a group of Italian archaeologists under the leadership of E. Breccia.

3. Since 1928 a considerable bibliography has grown up around the papyrus I append a year-by-year listing. 1928: A. Vogliano, *Gnomon* 4 (1928) 455 (Vogliano I).

1929: P. Maas, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* N.F. 6 (1929) 116-17 (Maas I); *Papiri Greci e Latini della Società Italiana (PSI)* 9 (1929) xii-xiii (Maas II); A. Orvieto, *Marzocco* 24 Feb. 1929; L. A. Stella, *RendIstLomb* Ser. 2, vol. 62 (1929) 827-38; G. Vitelli (assisted by M. Norsa), *BSRAA* no. 24, N.S. 7.1 (1929) 9-16 (Vitelli I); *PSI* 9 (1929) 137-44 with plate IV (Vitelli II); A. Vogliano, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 171, 288 (Vogliano II).

1932: A. Körte, *ArchP* 10 (1932) 21-23 (Körte I); G. Perrotta, *Enciclopedia Italiana* 14 (1932) 216-17.

1933: C. M. Bowra, *New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature*, Third Series, ed. J. U. Powell (Oxford 1933) 180-85 (Bowra I); U. Lisi, *Poetesse greche* (Catania 1933) 7-17, 145-61.

1934: P. Maas, *Hermes* 69 (1934) 206-9 (Maas III).

1935: E. Diehl, ed., *Anthologia Lyrica* I² (Leipzig 1935) 207-13; P. Maas, *RE* Suppl. 6 (1935) 54-56 (Maas IV).

1936: C. M. Bowra, *Greek Poetry and Life* (Oxford 1936) 325-42 (Bowra II) = *Problems in Greek Poetry* (Oxford 1953) 151-68.

1938: J. M. Edmonds, *Mnemosyne* ser. 3, vol. 6 (1938) 195-203 and plate IV; A. Lesky, *BPW* 58 (1938) 913-17.

1939: A. Körte, *Gnomon* 15 (1939) 486-94 (Körte II).

1942: D. L. Page, ed., *Greek Literary Papyri* (London-Cambridge, Mass., 1942) I 486-89.

1943: A. Vogliano, *Athenaeum* N.S. 21 (1943) 32-37 (Vogliano III).

1944: P. Collart, *CRAI* (1944) 183-99.

1949: C. M. Bowra, *OCD* 338 (Bowra III).

1952: C. Gallavotti, *Lingua, tecnica e poesia negli idilli di Teocrito* (Rome 1951-1952) 28-34, 56-60.

1953: K. Latte, *NAkG*, philol.-hist. Kl. 3 (1953) 79-94.

1956: F. Scheidweiler, *Philologus* 100 (1956) 40-51.

I do not include G. Luck, *MusHelv* 11 (1954) 170-72 because Luck's discussion, admirable though it is, has been restricted rather to Erinna's performance as one of the lady-epigrammatists of the *Palatine Anthology*.

4. In subsequent references to Erinna's extant work I shall employ the numeration, though not necessarily the readings, of the second edition of Diehl's *Anthologia Lyrica* (above, n. 3). I.e., fr. 1A = Stobaeus 4.51; fr. 1B = *PSI* no. 1090 (Vitelli, II, above, n. 3) with modifications; fr. 2 = Athenaeus 7.283D; frs. 3-5 = *AP* 6.352, 7.712, and 7.710 respectively. On the relationship between the two epigrams from *AP* 7 see especially Wilamowitz I and II (above, n. 1). Cf. J. Geffcken, ed., *Griechische Epigramme* (Heidelberg 1916) 63-64; Luck (above, n. 3) 171-72.

5. Cf. Lisi and Gallavotti (both above, n. 3) 155ff and 34 respectively.

6. For a list of nineteenth-century supporters and critics of this view see

O. Benndorf, *De Anthologiae Graecae epigrammatis quae ad artes spectant* (Bonn 1862) 5-6.

7. Benndorf (above, n. 6) 7-8 argues that Erinna lived either during the ascendancy of Alexander the Great or within a few decades after. Cf. Bowra I (above, n. 3), who wanted to place Erinna's *floruit* in the first quarter of the third century B.C. Later Bowra modified his views (see below, n. 13).

8. See Bowra I (above, n. 3) *passim*.

9. On the significance of this juxtaposition see Gallavotti (above, n. 3) 59-60.

10. Nineteenth-century scholars, among them T. Bergk, ed., *Poetae Lyrici Graeci* III⁴ (Leipzig 1882) 141, discuss the possibility of such a solution; A. Kalkman, *RhM* 42 (1887) 505 affirms its truth. For a later and more sensible approach to the problem cf. C. Lippold, s.v. "Naukydes" (2), *RE* 16.2 (1935) 1966-67.

11. Bowra I (above, n. 3) 184, note 2, calls attention to the correspondence of name and profession, but does not press the point.

12. On resemblances between Erinna's writings and the dramas of Euripides see Stella (above, n. 3) 832-33.

13. So Lisi, Perrotta, Collart, Gallavotti (all above, n. 3) 8, 216, 193, 34, respectively. Even Bowra II (above, n. 3) 341 concedes that this view may be more correct than that which he held earlier.

14. Latte (above, n. 3) 94.

15. See Wilamowitz III (above, n. 1) 108.

16. "Überhaupt reinen dorischen Dialekt," explains Latte (above, n. 3) 81, "mit den übliehen Epicismen."

17. Distinctively Doric are *κάρως* (3), [λε]υκᾶν (15), τῦ (18; 31; 47), πότη (= ποτή) (22), τήνας (24), [τ]όκα (28). The Aeolic element is represented by the nouns *σελάννα* (6; 12) and *χελύννα* (5; 7; 16), as well as by the verbal first person singular γόημι (18), the infinitive ἐσίδην (33), the participles ἐοίσα[ς] (2), αἰοισα (50), κατακλα[ί]οι[σ]α (31), and — if these forms have been restored correctly — ἐ[σ]ορεῖ[σ]α (39) and [στονά]χεισα (18). For an even fuller listing see Maas I (above, n. 3) 117.

18. Cf. Perrotta and Collart (both above, n. 3) 216 and 195 respectively. Pindaric usage furnishes perhaps the closest parallel.

19. This is the explanation offered by Wilamowitz III (above, n. 1) 108 n. 4.

20. I.e., *AP* 2.108-110, 7.12.1, 7.13.1-2. See also H. Flach, *Geschichte der griechischen Lyrik nach den Quellen dargestellt* (Tübingen 1884) 677, who observes that both Erinna and Sappho are thus depicted. Citing Horace *Carm.* 4.2.27-29 and 31-32, Gallavotti (above, n. 3) 57 explains *κηρίον* in *AP* 9.190 as "appunto il lavoro esatto, pulito, minuto e minuzioso dell' ape."

21. So Pauw, Jacobs, Bergk, Hiller-Crusius.

22. So Welcker (below, n. 24), Diehl, and most recent investigators.

23. Wilamowitz II (above, n. 1) 230 insists, however, that the adjective is corrupt in Suidas' text.

24. F. G. Welcker, *Kleine Schriften* (Bonn 1845) 2.146: *Igitur Erinna ortu fuit Telia, commoratione Lesbica*.

25. See the ancient biographies affixed to the Scholia on Apollonius' *Argonautica*.

26. The details of the game are set forth by Pollux (9.125). See also the comments of Bowra I and II (both above, n. 3) 181 and 328 respectively.

27. φόβον ἄγαγε Μο[ρμ]ώ (suggested by Maas I and Vogliano II [both above, n. 3] 117 and 288 respectively) is, I think, the most likely restoration for the latter half of line 25. But cf. the objections of Vitelli II (above, n. 3) 142 and the alternative reading (Μοχ[χ]ώ) proposed by Edmonds *ad loc.* (his line 51).

28. Such, at least, is the conclusion of most scholars who have examined the evidence (i.e., fr. 4-5, as well as 1B.28ff). Luck (above, n. 3) 171 assumes that Baucis' death occurred before rather than after the wedding. Cf. Flach (above, n. 20) 521.

29. I take this to be the import of ἡ ῥα τὸδ' ἔμφρων/εἰπ' ἐρύμωσ ἀπαῖς (3-4).

30. First suggested by Vitelli's collaborator M. Norsa. She or Vitelli was also first to conjecture ἐνιαυτός at the end of the same line.

31. Unfortunately what remains of line 38 is too badly mutilated to allow more than diffident acknowledgment of the restorations Ἡρίνῃ and Ἡριννα[ν] urged respectively by Vitelli II (with the approval of Diehl and Edmonds) and by Bowra II.

32. Cf. Körte I (above, n. 3) 22.

33. These are the views respectively of Maas IV (above, n. 3) 55 and Collart (above, n. 3) 187 (if I have correctly interpreted the latter's remarks).

34. Only gradually did this realization come about. Consult in chronological order the various articles of Vitelli, Vogliano, and Maas listed in n. 3 above.

35. Wilamowitz III (above, n. 1) 108 n. 4 offers an eminently sensible explanation. The epigrammatist's assertion that Erinna surpasses Sappho in hexameters to the same degree that Sappho surpasses Erinna in lyrics (7-8) need not imply that Erinna actually attempted lyric composition. It may mean no more than that neither poetess would have been able to compete with the other in the other's own poetic medium. Cf. Collart (above, n. 3) 195.

36. In his edition Bergk (above, n. 10) printed all hexameters ascribed to Erinna under the heading Ἀλακάτα (his fr. 1-3). His "mistake" was decried by Crusius (above, n. 1) 458. The latter, suspicious of the traditional title (cf. below, p. 199, with n. 41), surmised that one set of hexameters (fr. 2 Diehl²) belonged to a propemptikon, another (Diehl's fr. 1A) to an epikedeion. R. Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolion* (Giessen 1893) 143 n. 1, generalized rather rashly from the hesitancy of Athenaeus as regards only one of the fragments (see above, p. 193, below, p. 199). He argued that all elegiacs, hexameters, and even lyrics (Wilamowitz' salutary comments did not come until later) associated with the poetess' name were really post-Erinnean forgeries and that this material was transmitted along with Erinna's genuine *The Distaff*. What Reitzenstein's astounding theory fails to explain is how or why the alleged forgeries survived while *The Distaff* perished.

37. This restoration was initially proposed by Vitelli I (above, n. 3) 10-11.

38. But see below, n. 45. A reference to hair (καὶ χαίταν) occurs in the preceding verse. There too, however, the context is lost.

39. In the second line I read καταρρεῖ, Hecker's emendation; see Bergk *ad loc.* (his fr. 3). But cf. the even bolder emendations (ῥσσα for ῥσσε, κατ' ἔρρει for κατέρρει) introduced by Wilamowitz III (above, n. 1) 109 and n. 1. Cf. also the translation based thereon ("Darum dringt in den Hades nur ein leerer Schall. Schweigen ist bei den Toten und die Stimme verliert sich in der Finsternis").

40. See, however, the attractive (though not entirely convincing) theory of genuineness and of relevance to Baucis enunciated by Miss Lisi (above, n. 3)

151 and n. 1. To some extent she is indebted to that earlier view which took the Athenaeus-quotation to be all or part of a propemptikon (cf. above, n. 36).

41. Cf. Crusius (above, n. 1) 458.

42. Consider also the performance of those modern editors and scholars who have assigned undocumented titles (*Eis Πομπίλον* to fr. 2) or generic labels (*Nenia* to fr. 1B). Cf. below, n. 49.

43. On the subject of lamentatory repetitions "not stylized into a formula" see Bowra II (above, n. 3) 337.

44. Cf. Körte II (above, n. 3) 493; Latte (above, n. 3) 86: "Die Antithese zwischen einer glücklichen Vergangenheit mit ihren kleinen Sorgen und dem bitteren Ernst der Gegenwart war offenbar ein zentrales Element im Aufbau des Gedichts."

45. The significance of *ἐρείθους* (even if it be granted that this is the correct reading) is much debated. If the reference is to hired woolworkers (cf. Bowra II and Collart [both above, n. 3] 331 and 186 respectively), possibly the persons in question are to be identified with the *πραυλόγοι πολυλαί* of line 46 (cited above, p. 198). But Latte (above, n. 3) 84-85 contends that the word here means "harvesters." His restoration of lines 22-23 consequently diverges not a little from Bowra's or from that of Edmonds. Though he and Bowra are rarely in agreement, Edmonds at least takes "spinners" to be the proper translation of *ἐρείθους*.

46. Maas IV (above, n. 3) 55 cautions against drawing any conclusions from the fact that Erinna employs this word. Except for the participle (*ἐ[σ]ορεῖ[σα]*, Maas [see above, n. 17]) or imperfect indicative (*ἐ[π]όρει*, Vitelli, or *ἐ[φ]όρει*, revived by Latte) which follows immediately, the rest of line 39 is totally lost. Nevertheless the presence of *ἀλακάτα* — or, to be more exact, of *ἀλακάταν* — should not be overlooked or minimized.

47. Cf. the proposal advanced by Vogliano II (above, n. 3) 171.

48. The metaphor becomes even more forceful if the word interposed between *Μουσέων* and *ἐφαπτομένη* in line 6 of the epigram is not *λάβρηι* ("secretively"), but *λάτρης* ("servant"). The latter is the received reading, the former Hecker's perhaps unnecessary emendation.

49. Whereas Vitelli classified the new find simply as "Frammenti della 'Conocchia' di Erinna," Bowra and Maas and, more recently, Scheidweiler have invented names (cf. above, n. 42) — "Erinna's Lament for Baucis," "Erinnae in Baucidem *nenia*," "Erinnas Klage um Baukis" — for which there is no authority other than the recurrence of lamentation within the fragments themselves.

50. Bowra II (above, n. 3) 339, misunderstanding the syntax of line 4, declares that the epigrammatist calls Erinna (!) *λυοκλώστου δεσπότης ἡλακάτης*. But this error is really a tribute to the ironic ambiguity which was, I think, intentional in the epigram.

UNITY AND DESIGN IN *AENEID* V

BY MICHAEL C. J. PUTNAM

FOR the most part, Book V is not one of the more powerful or dramatic sections of the *Aeneid*. Save for the burning of the ships and the journey to Cumae, little happens which forms a necessary link in the chain of epic story. Its two most prominent events, the funeral games and the death of Palinurus, seem to stand apart from the main narrative. The one appears as a bow to tradition; the other, a beautiful but mysteriously elusive and special creation of the poet's imagination. Since, in a superficial sense, neither episode furthers the tale, the book is often taken merely as an interlude which Virgil was forced to add to bridge the gap from the passionate encounter with Dido to the living death which the Sibyl demands in compensation for knowledge of the future. It is therefore frequently treated in cursory fashion.

As the clear parallels show, the model which Virgil had before him in the first part of *Aeneid* V is the twenty-third book of the *Iliad*. Any such reference to the Hellenic tradition inherited by him is usually conceived as a veiled insult to Virgil, servile imitator of Homer, forced, in the case of book V at least, by one of the long-established customs of the epic genre to add the equivalent of Achilles' funeral games in honor of Patroclus. As Servius phrases the objection, in anticipation of most modern critics, it is a book "cuius pars maior ex Homero sumpta est: nam omnia quae hic commemorat, exhibentur circa tumulum Patrocli, . . ." ¹ Here was Virgil's last chance to make such a break before the steady pace of the war in Latium began.

Book XXIII of the *Iliad*, therefore, offered Virgil a pattern to follow, and the commentaries are liberally scattered with references to its influence, to the point, generally, of leaving little room for any originality on the part of the Roman poet. There has never been any doubt that the description of the games has touches which are thoroughly Roman in coloring. Even the most ardent Homerist would admit that Virgil has individualized the portraits of his athletes (they need characterization, after all, for they are mostly minor figures who appear only rarely in later events), whereas the special personal traits of Homer's participants, such as Ajax or Odysseus, must be divined from elsewhere and then applied to the incidents of the games, not vice

versa. Beyond that, little attention has been paid to what is particularly Virgilian about the games of *Aeneid* V. The same must be said of the remainder of the book, even of the peculiarly moving death of Palinurus, a description close to the center of one of the poet's special symbolic clusters.

Another criticism leveled against Book V is that, since it supposedly lacks a unifying theme or focal idea, it misses the emotional propulsion and vitality which enliven Books IV and VI, both of which develop around one central event. The two occurrences elaborated at any length during the course of Book V, the games, which dominate its opening section, and the divinely inspired death of Palinurus, with which it draws to a conclusion, are indeed disparate, at least from the narrative point of view. Yet they are united by one theme, which lies just beneath the surface throughout the book — the necessity of sacrifice through suffering, sometimes even self-sacrifice, to reach for and on occasion to achieve the goals of heroism. The fact that during the course of the games the sacrifice is never actually forced to the point of life and death is what separates the games from the main narrative of the *Aeneid*, where death is the constant tragic condition of the hero's progress toward self-knowledge. The games offer a momentary relaxation from this particular tension. But, as Huizinga has brilliantly elucidated in his discussion of the meaning of play, the border-line which separates game from seriousness often appears narrow indeed.² Even within the movement of ritual, with which athletic events are usually connected, the *αἰών* may lead either way.

The connection with ritual is important. Dedicated to the honor of Anchises and celebrated near his tomb, the games of V are a religious rite, bounded, on the one hand, by the sinuous motion of the genial snake, as it coils and re-coils around the tumulus, on the other by the ordered regularity of the boys parading in formation before their elders' admiring eyes. The latter display, to be sure, is a *lusus* — and Virgil is at pains to demonstrate its aetiology — but its significance depends on the fact that it is no longer a contest but, enhanced by the irony which the youthfulness and discipline of the participants convey, a parody of the actualities of war which are to come. The reader becomes thus prepared for the sudden return to reality which soon occurs in the form of the burning of the ships.

In this sense, then, the games form a world apart. They are enclosed within the world of ritual which takes the story out of the violence of life and then, once more, leads back to it. This violence of the outside world, from which the games offer momentary escape, is associated

primarily with the figure of Palinurus the pilot. He is the central figure of the book's initial episode, and it is with his death that the book concludes. The sea-storm, which opens the book and whose unusual strength forces even Palinurus to cower in fear, is, as we shall see, closely related to the severity and suddenness of his death, and therefore serves to balance the beginning of the book with the end. And when at last the men gain land at Drepanum and prepare for the contests, it seems clearly to be but a momentary respite from powers which are uncontrollable. Death almost claimed the pilot, whose uselessness becomes briefly but sharply clear. The snake of Anchises, which appears from his tomb shortly after Aeneas reaches it, does little to dispel the notion of impending doom. A benign snake in classical literature is unusual; in Virgil, who constantly associates snakes with hidden, unwonted death, it is a singular rarity. Its importance here should not be underestimated, for it suggests, through association with ritual, the theme of religious awe which postulates escape out of "ordinary" life into the sphere of game. It also hints at lurking violence, violence which comes suddenly to life again, even while the games are yet in progress, with the mission of Iris and the firing of the ships. Even in this forceful return to reality, Virgil uses some of the imagery associated with the snake of Anchises to portray madness at last revived.³ From then on, as the book progresses, the tension reaches a higher and still higher pitch until its climax in the death of Palinurus.

Within this world apart, the world of game, the outside tragic sphere never imposes itself to the point that game becomes a matter of life and death. Elsewhere in the epic, the suffering and sacrifice which typify the particular heroism of the *Aeneid* lead in a series of tragedies to a culmination in Book XII, where death is the only possible outcome. In the games, life always seems to triumph after a brush with death, and the hero, as is the fashion in comedy, is absorbed back into the ranks of the society whence he was singled out to perform. Through the games, Virgil takes the reader aside and merely by so doing — by describing events which seem to have little or nothing to do with the epic story — offers a kind of relaxation from the tensions which form the real world of Aeneas. Their subject matter is seemingly remote and special, and the result of each event is always in some sense comic, by however narrow a margin. Yet, happily as they generally evolve, the games are a microcosm of the world at large. It is thus that they are interpreted here, first in terms of themselves, then in relation to the book as a whole, with particular emphasis on the figure of Palinurus,

whose role rises above its importance only in Book V to a symbolic significance related to the total epic.

Interea medium Aeneas iam classe tenebat
certus iter fluctusque atros Aquilone secabat
moenia respiciens, quae iam infelicis Elissae
conlucent flammis. quae tantum accenderit ignem
causa latet . . .

The opening lines of Book V pick up the narrative of Aeneas' adventures where it was dropped in order that the final moments of Dido's agony might be described in detail — *interea*, as if to emphasize that Aeneas' departure and her death are dissociable events in the mind of the hero. The flames, through whose gleam he sets his sails, consume her body and her love for Aeneas at the same time. The metaphorical wound of love he inflicted, the fire he ignited, become a reality as destructive of the past as it is ominous for the future. Aeneas even looks back, *respiciens*, as he did finally for Creusa, dying in the inferno of the sinking Troy.⁴ But here as there it is the glance of one ignorant of the necessary human suffering left scattered in the wake of his ideal journey.

Thus Dido dies by fire, thus Priam and his ancestral Troy are consumed in flames which destroy the past and, at the same time, seem only to spur Aeneas on his destined way. Fire is always quenched with water in these opening books of the *Aeneid*. Just as the sea voyage of Book III contrasts in this respect with the conflagration of Troy, so now the resumption of the ocean journey serves not so much to counteract the flames of ill-fated love as to equalize them in the scale of the total epic. Book III concluded with the death of Anchises, that symbol of purposeless, wandering Troy in transition, and in Book V we are not disappointed of a similar situation, where death is the required condition of progress. For Book V, though most of its action takes place on land, is a book wherein the imagination of the reader is always directed to the sea and hence to the character of the pilot, Palinurus, whom we find guiding the fleet as we plunge into the action, and with whose mysterious death the book concludes in lines of unsurpassed brilliance.⁵

The opening verses thus serve the same purpose as the two with which Book VI begins, in that they join the action of the previous book to the one which follows. Yet lines 1-7 have their own intrinsic interest. Though Aeneas may realize that Dido's death is the cause of the flames, the poet never makes this explicit, and hence he carries over

into words like *flammis* and *ignem* the ambiguous metaphor of fire become real, central to Book IV. The fire imagery is also important in another way, because it recalls Mercury's threat to Aeneas (IV, 566-67):

iam mare turbari trabibus saevasque videbis
conlucere faces, iam fervere litora flammis

were he not to leave Carthage straightway. Though the actual result is that she herself flames in their stead, Dido would be quite capable of burning the ships to detain Aeneas and even wreak her revenge.

Yet the sight offers a sad feeling of foreboding as the men ponder *furens quid femina possit* (l. 6). The curse which Dido utters against her deserting lover in IV, 661-62 —

hauriat hunc oculis ignem crudelis ab alto
Dardanus, et nostrae secum ferat omina mortis

— finds its fulfillment here. But there is a more far-reaching consequence, a consequence which does indeed accomplish the woeful presage of the sailors. It is not long hence in Book V that women who are similarly *actae furore* (l. 659), aroused with maddened rage, finally do burn Aeneas' ships as Dido also might have done. The *dolores* of Dido, Juno's emotional pawn, can be traced back ultimately to the suffering of the goddess herself. And still in Book V we find Juno (l. 608)

multa movens necdum antiquum saturata dolorem.

Through various wiles, Juno is the cause of both events.

It is only with line 8 that the past is left entirely behind, as the ships confront the violence of a new storm (ll. 8-11):

ut pelagus tenuere rates nec iam amplius ulla
occurrit tellus, maria undique et undique caelum,
olli caeruleus supra caput astitit imber
noctem hiememque ferens et inhorruit unda tenebris.

These lines parallel very closely Book III, 192-95, where the much-tried band of Trojans, setting sail for points known and yet unknown, runs headlong into a tempest. Then even Palinurus fails to distinguish day from night and loses his way amidst the raging tempest. Once more in V, Palinurus is at the helm (*gubernator puppi . . . ab alta*, l. 12) as the ships battle on their way. This time, however, the course is clearer. The pilot knows the direction but the gods or *fortuna* are against the journey. Palinurus seems to sense the irony of his own words when he says (ll. 17-18) *non . . . hoc sperem Italiam contingere caelo*. Though he undoubtedly means to speak for his comrades as a whole, his words

bear directly only on himself. The atmosphere of uncertainty and impending doom which surrounds the ships in III here comes to a climax and centers on Palinurus as he asks (l. 14), *quidve, pater Neptune, paras?* As he ponders the violence of the present storm in fear for his comrades, he cannot realize that, before many days are spent, the god of the sea will deliberately contrive death for him alone.

Similar as are these lines to those of Book III, there is one variation which leaves in the poetry an effect of studied ambiguity, the change from *tum mihi* in III, 194 (referring to Aeneas, the narrator), to *olli* in V, 10:⁶

olli caeruleus supra caput astitit imber . . .

Were Virgil literally transposing lines, the alteration from first person narrative to third might in itself postulate such a variation. Nevertheless, the word *olli* now remains equivocal — does it refer to Aeneas or to Palinurus? The distinction is important primarily because the conclusion of the book seems to offer a close parallelism between the two characters. Suffice to observe here that the imagery of line 10, let pass in Book III, is elaborated most carefully toward the end of Book V, relative to the figure of Palinurus. Neptune demands *unum caput* (we will later see why) before Aeneas can continue safely on his journey, and as Sleep-Death stands over the helmsman (*supra* of line 10 is altered to *super* in lines 855 and 858), it is his head (line 845) which he urges Palinurus to relax.⁷ Finally, in words which recall Palinurus' own utterance to Somnus that he would not let down his guard against the face and quiet flood of the peaceful sea or "put his trust in this monster" (*huic confidere monstro*, l. 849), Aeneas calls him *nimum caelo et pelago confise sereno* (l. 870). The cause of Palinurus' death appears to Aeneas as nothing more than a sudden storm, such as that which opens the book, which swept him overboard (death outside of nature is a consequence with which Aeneas is not prepared to bargain). There is much more to Palinurus' death than this. What is important to observe here is the careful and deliberate balance between these opening lines and those which conclude the book, for the imagery of the storm, through which Palinurus himself cannot pass, certainly reappears in the end as Sleep claims him for his own.⁸ And Aeneas, perhaps because he is so much a part of the event without knowing it, misinterprets the happening entirely.

With the winds against them and facing a driving storm through which even the pilot dares not pass, they steer once more to Sicily and the home of Acestes, and prepare to offer the homage of sacrifice

and funeral games on the tomb of Anchises, dead now one year (ll. 23–44). Aeneas proclaims the order of the celebration and, having poured the requisite libations and addressed his father's spirit with reverence, is greeted by an omen in the form of a huge snake which proceeds *adytis ab imis*, licks harmlessly at the offerings, and disappears whence it came, *imo tumulo* (ll. 45–93). The sign seems propitious, and Aeneas, though uncertain whether it is really his father or just the *genius* of the place, commands further offerings to Anchises (ll. 94–103).

But the description of the snake's appearance offers as much cause for uneasiness as for encouragement. In fact, the whole episode bears a marked likeness to the manner in which the two monstrous sea-serpents devour Laocoon in Book II, with the important difference that here the reptile appears innocent, there the two beasts have, from the start, a particularly destructive intention.⁹ The distinction is not quite so simple, however. In their external features, the parallels are extensive. The huge snake (*anguis*, l. 84; cf. II, 204), enormous in its breadth (*ingens*, l. 85; cf. II, 217), pulls its folds (*volumina*, l. 85; cf. II, 208) after it in circles. It glides around the altars (*lapsusque per aras*, l. 86; cf. II, 225). The serpents from Tenedos had surrounded Laocoon and his sons while the priest performed his sacred duties. In this lies the ambiguity of the picture — Anchises' snake embraces the tomb (*amplexus*, l. 86) and the twin creatures had, likewise, "embraced" Laocoon and his children (*amplexus*, II, 214; *amplexi*, 218) with desire not to cherish but devour. They lick their tongues (*lambebant*: II, 211) in anticipation and the snake from the tomb laps at the viands (*libavit*, l. 92). Then, as we read that the one leaves the altar upon which he had fed (*depasta altaria liquit*, l. 93), we are reminded that each of the sea serpents, in order to make short work of the two sons,

implicat et miseros morsu depascitur artus.

From one sight the Trojans flee in terror:

diffuginus visu exsanguis. illi agmine certo
Laocoonta petunt . . .

Before the present spectacle, the onlookers merely stand watching in amazement (ll. 90–93):

obstipuit visu Aeneas. ille agmine longo
tandem inter pateras et levia pocula serpens
libavitque dapes rursusque innoxius imo
successit tumulo . . .

Hence the great and obvious difference between the two episodes is not what the snakes do in each case but the manner and degree in which

their goal is accomplished.¹⁰ The snakes of Laocoon feed on people — and symbolize in their deed the total destruction of Troy by the twin sons of Atreus; the other makes its meal from offerings and embraces only what is already dead. In a sense, then, Aeneas offers sacrifice to Anchises as a propitiatory gift to the spirit of the years of wandering which are now almost concluded. In this his deed also prefigures the essential sequence of events in Book V, which consists of one kind of sacrifice after another and ends, to anticipate for a moment, in the gigantic offering of Palinurus to Neptune and for the future underworld journey. In fact the action of the priestess in VI, as she sacrifices to the gods of Hades before setting out (ll. 243–44, 247):

quattuor hic primum nigrantis terga iuencos
constituit frontique invergit vina sacerdos . . .
voce vocans Hecaten caeloque Ereboque potentem

is akin to the rites which Aeneas now accomplishes (ll. 96–99):

. . . caedit binas de more bidentis
totque sues, totidem nigrantis terga iuencos;
vinaque fundebat pateris animamque vocabat
Anchisae magni Manisque Acheronte remissos.

In brief, this offering to Anchises and his ominous snake is the first of a series which culminates only in the arrival of Aeneas himself in the underworld, like the bough which he carries, dead and yet very much alive.¹¹

In no way bothered by the omen, Aeneas immediately lists the order of the games and prepares the prizes. The first competition is the boat race, whose story lasts 171 lines (ll. 114–285) and is the most elaborate in detail of all the events, in fact a little tale all to itself.¹² Four ships (chosen *ex omni classi* — a part standing for the whole) start the race, but at its conclusion only two arrive unscathed. After Aeneas has set a rock well out to sea as the turning point (*meta*) of the course, the boats rush headlong over the waters, like chariots breaking forth from newly opened gates.

The first incident of the race centers upon the boat of Gyas. With all four competitors apparently pulling neck and neck, Gyas shouts to his helmsman, Menoetes, to cleave a path closer to the rocks of the goal (ll. 162–65):

‘quo tantum mihi dexter abis? huc dirige gressum;
litus ama et laeva stringat sine palmula cautes;
altum alii teneant.’ dixit; sed caeca Menoetes
saxa timens proram pelagi detorquet ad undas,

The result is that the ship of Cloanthus, choosing the way which the timorous Menoetes had feared, surpasses that of Gyas, who, in his wrath, hurls Menoetes overboard (ll. 175-77):

in mare praecipitem puppi deturbat ab alta;
ipse gubernaculo rector subit, ipse magister
hortaturque viros clavumque ad litora torquet.

This episode looks forward to the death of Palinurus, in the mock heroic, even comic, fashion whereby much connected with the games contrasts with the highly serious events which follow. The episode of Menoetes takes place *medio in gurgite* (l. 160), a phrase that would become clearer to the commentators were they to turn to the mention of *gurgis* in line 814 to denote the place where Neptune promises that the dead Palinurus will be found.¹³ The several prominent verbal repetitions point up the similarity of the two situations. Menoetes falls *in mare praecipitem* and Palinurus topples *in undas praecipitem* (ll. 859-60), Menoetes hurled from the lofty stern by Gyas, the same position held by Palinurus in line 12 and later taken by Somnus (ll. 841 and 858) for his violent dealings with Aeneas' helmsman. Gyas then undertakes the guidance of the ship as does Aeneas (*ipse ratem nocturnis rexit in undis*, l. 868), though in the end Gyas fails through lack of a *magister* (l. 224). Yet Aeneas also cannot very well plot the course of a ship bereft of its helm. He is sublimely, though unknowingly, in the hands of the gods.¹⁴

Thus Gyas commands Menoetes and Somnus Palinurus, although only Palinurus actually dies. Since Gyas, by taking over the direction of the ship after the helmsman's loss, also plays the role Aeneas assumes at the end, he combines what is separated in the situation of Palinurus. Aeneas, for his part, knows nothing of Sleep/Death, though in a sense it claims a share of him. The major difference in the two episodes, however, is the fact that Menoetes does not die. Instead (ll. 178-80),

at gravis, ut fundo vix tandem redditus imo est,
iam senior madidaque fluens in veste Menoetes
summa petit scopuli siccaque in rupe resedit.

The humor of the situation, well apparent to those watching the by-play, stands in marked contrast to Palinurus' own description of his death in VI (ll. 358-59, 361) where he tells how

... iam tuta tenebam,
ni gens crudelis madida cum veste gravatum ...
ferro invasisset praedamque ignara putasset.

The peril and escape of Menoetes anticipates just this tragic situation.¹⁵

As the first part of the race centered on a special clash between Cloanthus and Gyas, so now the remaining two boats, captained by Sergestus and Mnesteus, vie in overtaking the lagging, pilotless Gyas. This time the action centers on the *scopulus* itself, the sounding rock which all are striving to round. Here Mnesteus appears a type of minor Aeneas (he uses words which Aeneas does elsewhere in the book), urging on his men to overcome Sergestus. He attains his wish (ll. 202-4),

namque furens animi dum proram ad saxa suburget
interior spatioque subit Sergestus iniquo,
infelix saxis in procurrentibus haesit.

If the previous episode suggests a parallel with the death of Palinurus, this one looks to the final events of the book, which follow immediately upon the helmsman's loss. The danger caused by Aeneas' lack of a pilot is emphasized as the fleet approaches the treacherous rocks of the Sirens (ll. 864-66):

iamque adeo scopulos Sirenium advecta subibat,
difficilis quondam multorumque ossibus albos
(tum rauca adsiduo longe sale saxa sonabant) . . .

The final threat posed to Aeneas, the seafarer, of dying shipwrecked on the rocks of the Sirens before attaining his goal of Italy and Cumae, Sergestus confronts here and fails. *Spatioque subit Sergestus iniquo*, Virgil tells of the ill-fated boat, just as he describes Aeneas' fleet as it *scopulos Sirenium advecta subibat*. And, though Aeneas escapes, Virgil seems to be also here anticipating, in comic vein, the book's conclusion. Sergestus was maddened at heart, the passion of the moment leading him to forget the mean course which would win the day in the end. Thus, in striking too near the rocks, he fell victim to the opposite fallacy from that which proved the undoing of Menoetes (and with him Gyas), a desire to steer too far clear of the dangerous reef.¹⁶ Gyas is like Sleep, counseling that which Palinurus is unwilling to believe or to follow. Yet he must die, just as Sergestus, in following the opposite extreme must suffer shipwreck. Palinurus would avoid the Sirens' rocks; Aeneas must of necessity skirt them and come out unscathed through the workings of divine will.

And thus Mnesteus, surpassing Sergestus, comes into the final stretch, like a dove, at first frightened from her rocky nest, who in the

end glides quietly, cleaving the air on scarcely moving pinions (ll. 215-17):

fertur in arva volans plausumque exterrita pennis
dat tecto ingentem, mox aere lapsa quieto
radit iter liquidum celeris neque commovet alas . . .

Though the dove imagery is important for the archery contest which soon follows and for the descent of Somnus, it is the sequence of the simile itself which is of most interest here. The narrowness of the cave, the confinement of the rocky haunt wherein the dove has her nest, alludes to the closeness of Mnestheus' recent conflict with Sergestus. The whole setting, particularly the rocky den, offers a figure for the reef on which Sergestus grounds and the crags of the Sirens from which Aeneas' fleet is steered. Having escaped from its cave, the dove gradually loses its fear. Though *commota* and *exterrita* at the outset, in the end it does not even *commovet alas*. It is this new peace, itself reflected in the quiet air and liquid way, which leads back into the description of Mnestheus (ll. 218-19):

sic Mnestheus, sic ipsa fuga secat ultima Pristis
aequora, sic illam fert impetus ipsa volantem.

After the reef comes the calm freedom of the open air and sea, through which Mnestheus now glides without rowing as the boat cleaves its own way. It is likewise in the calm of night, with the ocean still as marble, that Sleep soon comes down to claim Palinurus, plunging him into the watery waves, while the very seas (*ipsa aequora*, Sleep says) bear the boat along. Here it is Mnestheus who suggests Aeneas, whose final hazard is the Sirens' crags. And Sergestus, whom Mnestheus now passes by, wrecked on the rocks and *frustra vocantem auxilia* (ll. 221-22) is but a small, comic shadow of Palinurus *socios nequiquam vocantem* (l. 860), as he dies in the calm sea of the final journey.¹⁷

The last part of the race, in the smooth waters near the end, remains between Mnestheus and Cloanthus, and the latter wins the day by vowing sacrifice to the gods of the sea. At this, Neptune intervenes on his behalf and, swift as an arrow, the boat *portu se condidit alto* (l. 243). So also, by the good offices of the god of the sea, Aeneas arrives safely at Cumae, at the very beginning of Book VI:

Sic fatur lacrimans, classique immittit habenas
et tandem Euboicis Cumarum adlabitur oris.

Near the end of Book V Venus prays to Neptune (ll. 796-97):

quod superest, oro, liceat dare tuta per undas
vela tibi, liceat Laurentem attingere Thybrim . . .

Neptune, aware of what is nearer at hand, answers her request by a promise (l. 813)

tutus, quod optas, portus accedet Averni.

Rome itself is less important to him than the last leg of the journey, to the land of the dead to learn of Rome. For Aeneas in actuality, as for Mnesteus and Cloanthus within the context of game, the *ultima aequora* are at hand.

Sergestus too escapes, though, like a snake run over or beaten by a passing wayfarer and left to languish on a rock, he seems at first half dead, pulling his coils after himself in vain (ll. 276-79):

nequiquam longos fugiens dat corpore tortus
parte ferox ardensque oculis et sibila colla
arduus attollens; pars vulnere clauda retentat
nexantem nodis seque in sua membra plicantem . . .

In the end, however, gaining motion like the dove, Sergestus enters the harbor under full sail. As in the case of the dove simile, ideas previously latent come to the fore through the imagery. The snake has been wounded by a *viator* and left on a rock¹⁸ in the same way that Sergestus went aground *saevo e scopulo*. Yet he manages to pull himself off, *revulsus* (l. 270), like the snake gradually moving forward, coiling in on itself. But the snake is half dead, for the ship appears (l. 271)

amissis remis atque ordine debilis uno . . .

Part lives on, part dies — the very fate of Aeneas' fleet with Palinurus *amisso* (l. 867), since he also dies *puppis parte revulsa* (l. 858), tearing part of the helm with him.

Thus, in brief, the various episodes of the first race suggest a comic microcosm of the final stretches of Aeneas' journey which embrace the loss of pilot, narrow escape from shipwreck, and final safe arrival at destination. The race thus serves further to unify the book and to some extent to polarize it around the figure of the doomed pilot.

The theme of victory by sacrifice, of achievement gained only through death, which in the games always ends in the comic relief of narrow personal escape, is the focal idea of the rest of the contests. Second comes the footrace, which is very briefly described (ll. 315-61). Its main interest lies in the misfortune of Nisus, who had at first led the field. It was as he neared the end, however, (ll. 328-30)

. . . levi cum sanguine Nisus
labitur infelix, caesis ut forte iuvenis
fusus humum viridisque super madefecerat herbas.

The motif of the offering of blood, which occurs again and again during the book's course, is here centered on the figure of Nisus, who could be said to offer himself (die, fall overboard: *labitur*, l. 329; *pronus*, l. 332; *concidit*, l. 333) for the sake of Euryalus, who wins the race. Even though Aeneas finds him "innocent" in the face of fortune's wiles (*insons*, l. 350; and cf. l. 841 where the same adjective is ascribed to Palinurus), once again, in mock contrast to the stirring drama at the book's end, the hero rises to gain one of the prizes of victory.¹⁹

On the victor in the boxing contest which follows, Aeneas prepares to bestow a bullock, *velatum auro vittisque iuvenum* (l. 366). Like the bullock which Ascanius promises to immolate should he subjugate Numanus (IX, 627), this one has horns adorned with gold and decked with the fillets of an offering. The theme of sacrifice, once established, is dropped during the course of the fight. We have only a hint of what may come in line 413 when Entellus displays his gloves which, he adds,

*sanguine cernis adhuc sparsoque infecta cerebro.*²⁰

At the beginning of the fight Dares seems first to be winning the day by a dexterity which the massive, less agile Entellus fails to possess, but soon the tide turns. Finally Aeneas, anticipating thoughts Somnus is soon to utter over Palinurus, warns Dares, *ex post facto*, to yield to a higher power, especially when it seems to have the backing of the gods (ll. 465-67):

‘infelix, quae tanta animum dementia cepit?
non viris alias conversa que numina sentis?
cede deo.’²¹

Death was again almost operative, but not quite. Dares is, as Entellus puts it, narrowly *revocatum a morte* (l. 476). His place is taken by the prize bullock against which Entellus swings his gauntlet and (ll. 480-81)

... effractoque inlisit in ossa cerebro:
sternitur exanimisque tremens procumbit humi bos.

Dares is spared through the sacrifice of the bull. But this comes closest of all events in the games to human sacrifice, and thereby forms another link in the chain which soon leads to Palinurus.²²

The next and final event of the games is archery, and the target, borrowed from Homer, is a dove hanging by a cord from the ship's mast. Here, at last, contest and fulfillment, sacrifice and purpose, have the same result — the death of the dove which becomes both goal and victim. The picture of the terrified bird itself is taken partially from

the comparison examined earlier of Mnestheus to a dove soaring forth from her hidden nest. At first, like the bird in the simile, it trembles *exterrita pennis* (ll. 215 and 505), and everything round about echoes with the noise (*ingenti sonuerunt omnia plausu*, l. 506). Is it the terror of the dove the poet is depicting (as lines 215 and 516 would lead us to believe) or the cheers of the onlookers? The ambiguity seems deliberate, for both thoughts are closely tied together now that death is the actual purpose, as it is in none of the other contests. Death in earnest, threatened against a living creature, has replaced mere vying for athletic honors. The dove is tied, and freedom, when it briefly comes, is soon cut off in death. When Mnestheus severs the cord which binds the bird to the mast, it has a momentary free flight, *atra volans in nubila* (l. 512), like the dove in the simile *in arva volans* (l. 215). But the arrow which released her from the mast, *nervo stridente sagitta*, aimed at death. Thus Virgil describes the actions of the Dira who brings death to Turnus, *stridens* like a poison dart, *nervo per nubem impulsa sagitta* (XII, 856), against whose wound there is no remedy. It is not long until Eurytion accomplishes the fated deed, and the dove (ll. 517-18)

decidit exanimis vitamque reliquit in astris
aetheriis fixamque refert delapsa sagittam.

She flutters dead, paralleling the trembling bull sacrificed shortly before by Entellus (*exanimis*, l. 481). Yet in the collapse of her lifeless body and the ascent of her spirit upwards, she anticipates the descent of the Sleep of death upon Palinurus (ll. 838-39):

cum levis aetheriis delapsus Somnus ab astris
aera dimovit tenebrosum et dispulit umbras

and its departure (l. 861):

ipse volans tenuis se sustulit ales ad auras.

In its very fall, the dove suggests Palinurus, helpless against a fate which is both incomprehensible and inescapable.²³

As if to alter the mood of doom present and to come, the poet seems to turn the arrow of Acestes, which now shoots heavenward and in its course catches fire, into an omen of good, just as he changes the fire in Book II from destructive to beneficent through the omen of Iulus' hair. In thus raising the tone, Virgil prepares for the end of the games, but here, as in the appearance of Anchises' snake, it is a total impression of violence and destruction which remains, not any final attempt to palliate it. Even though it appears of great value as presage of the

future, the *monstrum* is described in highly ambiguous language. Aeneas accepts the omen as propitious, but its significance in relation to the imagery of Book V could scarcely be so conceived. Acestes twists his shaft *aerías in auras* and (ll. 525-28)

. . . volans liquidis in nubibus arsit harundo
signavitque viam flammis tenuisque recessit
consumpta in ventos, caelo ceu saepe refixa
transcurrent crinemque volantia sidera ducunt.

Henry refers the sign to a future deification of Acestes.²⁴ I doubt, however, that Virgil's intention here was to convey, without further elucidation, a meaning which has nothing to do with the remainder of the *Aeneid* or even with the future course of Rome. Without broadening the search, a perfectly satisfactory explanation of the omen can be found in the events which follow in Book V, where, as a *monstrum*, it falls into the series of supernatural manifestations which make the book turn now to the past, now to the future through the disclosures of divinity. Henry is correct that "death" is involved. The dove, we remember from the lines shortly before, though her body plunged to earth, left her life *in astris aetheriis*. In a very similar manner (and at a time not too long distant) Somnus departs after fulfilling his baleful mission against Palinurus (l. 861),

ipse volans tenuis se sustulit ales ad auras.

Manifestly the line refers to the god betaking himself back to his starry realms, but Death has somehow taken possession of Palinurus and, although he tells us in Book VI of his struggle to gain the shore through the violent swell, his life, too, now makes its company among the winds, *tenuis*, almost unseen, like the ominous arrow of Acestes.

It is not only death which the symbolic arrow seems to predict but also destruction by fire, an anticipation, in fact, of the burning of the ships. But before this occurs, there is one final piece of entertainment, once more a mock exposition of the truth to come, in the parade of Iulus and his companions. The previous conflicts, only because they were supposedly entered upon in the spirit of a game, all ended short of death, often, as we have seen, by the narrowest of margins. Now little Iulus sets up his forces in mimic battle array (ll. 583-87):

inde alios ineunt cursus aliosque recursus
adversi spatii, alternosque orbibus orbis
impediunt pugnaeque cient simulacra sub armis;
et nunc terga fuga nudant, nunc spicula vertunt
infensi, facta pariter nunc pace feruntur.

They put on their show before the *ora parentum* and *oculos suorum* (ll. 553 and 577) — indeed, Virgil repeats emphatically, the boys mirror the *ora parentum* in their young faces. Yet the phrase recalls more sorrow, in relation to the total epic scheme, than joy for the present episode. For instance, in the reality of Book II, it was *ante oculos . . . et ora parentum* (II, 531) that Polites dies, pursued by Pyrrhus to the very feet of his father.²⁵

Irony surely lurks in the two similes used to enhance the description of the maneuvers of the warrior boys. The first, a comparison between their weaving course and the famous Labyrinth of Daedalus, occurs in lines 588–92:

ut quondam Creta fertur Labyrinthus in alta
parietibus textum caecis iter ancipitemque
mille viis habuisse dolum, qua signa sequendi
frangeret indeprehensus et inremeabilis error:
haud alio Teucrum nati . . .

This strange scene of the house of the Minotaur and others like it, products of the genius of Daedalus, are, of course, part of the scheme which decorates the temple of Apollo at Cumae described at the beginning of Book VI, of whose imagery it forms a brief but important part.²⁶ Hence this simile may look to the future, to the last and greatest of the *errores* of Aeneas.²⁷ The next picture certainly glances at what lies ahead. The boys also seem (ll. 594–95)

delphinum similes, qui per maria umida nando
Carpathium Libycumque secant luduntque per undas.

On the shield of Aeneas, in the final calm before the storm at Actium bursts, Virgil, in the place where Homer forges the eternal ocean of life which surrounds the world of Achilles and Hector, puts dolphins playing (VIII, 671–74):

haec inter tumidi late maris ibat imago,
aurea, sed fluctu spumabat caerulea cano,
et circum argento clari delphines in orbem
aequora verrebant caudis aestumque secabant.

The *maria umida* of Book V are transformed into the picture of the *tumidi maris*, but the sea creatures still cavort around and cut the waves as before. Yet a violent change occurs, for in the midst of this brief idyllic scene we suddenly come upon *classis aeratas* and a battle scene, *instructo Marte*.²⁸ Iulus has also reared his battle lines (*instruxit*,

l. 549) but only in mock imitation of war (*pugnae simulacra*, l. 585).²⁹ Here again, as in all the other episodes of the games, the seriousness of the future looms large in the happy present. And, as for Iulus himself, it must not be forgotten that it is his careless deed in VII which helps to start all the bloodshed.

This *lusus Troiae*, performed by Iulus, is an example of the order and perfection of game as seen in the gracefulness and exactitude of a set piece which cannot be broken without spoiling the mood entirely. This very perfection, however, focuses our attention back once more on one of the tensions developed within the sphere of game, namely, that it is beyond what is regularly human because death is avoided. The meaning of the *lusus Troiae* hovers between the two poles of complete escape and complete involvement with real life. It is like most games because it admits of no destruction or violence to its participants. And after all, only children are performing it under the watchful eyes of *magistri* and within limitations which demand precise order for their fulfillment. But even here there remains in the background the potentiality of war when fought by men whose goal is death, not stage play. The images never get beyond the labyrinth and the dolphins, but each looks potentially further ahead to future hazard, and one, as pointed out above, brought Virgil's mind directly to the clash at Actium over which Apollo presided like the *magistri* over the boys, but with a purpose far less benign. Orderly as is the *lusus*, it anticipates disorder of the most bloody sort.³⁰

The setting of the games is stylized and, in general, deliberately unreal. At line 604 we return, with sudden violence, to the world of the present.

The spirit of emotion, which appears somewhere in every book of the *Aeneid*, comes now in the person of Juno's minion Iris. Here she is scarcely more than a personification of Juno's *dolor*, as is Allecto in Book VII, whom she resembles in detail. The unhappy Troades offer the perfect prey for her wiles (ll. 618-19):

ergo inter medias sese haud ignara nocendi
conicit et faciemque deae vestemque reponit.

Ready to harm (as is Allecto in VII, 338), she hurls herself (*conicit*) into the midst of the women. The verb is important and forms, with the elaboration which accompanies its various appearances, the main metaphorical strand of the episode. Her suggestion is to burn the ships, and, claiming that Cassandra has appeared to her in a dream offering

ardentis faces and that Neptune abets her suggestion by furnishing *faces* on his altars nearby, she seizes a brand (ll. 642-43),

sublataque procul dextra conixa coruscat
et iacit . . .

The women in their turn, led by an aged dame not unjustly named Pyrgo, recognize the goddess and (ll. 659-62)

tum vero attonitae monstris actaeque furore
conclamant rapiuntque focis penetralibus ignem;
pars spoliant aras, frondem ac virgulta facesque
coniciunt . . .

The original metaphor of "hurling," inherent in *conicit* of line 619, here becomes a reality, for, just as Iris threw herself into the crowd of women (almost Acestes' *monstrum* of fire given human shape) and hurled the first brand, so now, driven by the madness which is Iris, they all join in tossing the torches upon the ships.

The parallels between this turn of events and the Allecto episode in Book VII are worthy of brief mention. As her first weapon to arouse madness (and one of Virgil's two favorite instruments of destruction) Allecto had used a snake, which she threw at Amata (*conicit*, VII, 347). The manner in which she operates on Turnus, her second victim, is more germane to the way Iris acts against both women and ships (VII, 456-57):

sic effata facem iuveni coniecit et atro
lumine fumantis fixit sub pectore taedas.

And of course the same rage seizes him as grasped Amata — a *furor* which the poet pictures as a fire which causes water to seethe in a cauldron and sends up billows of smoke toward heaven, much like the black ash which Aeneas now sees floating up in a cloud from the flaming ships (l. 666). Indeed the *furor* of the women (l. 670) is transferred to the raging fire which, with loosened reins (*immissis habenis*, l. 662) like a horse run wild, *furit* through the burning fleet. The torch is hence both physical and metaphysical at the same time. It is the actual instrument whereby the fire starts, and yet it also symbolizes the madness which Juno imparts through her servant. And when the women have finished their baleful deed and, losing their rage, turn back into their former selves, the poet adds that *excussaue pectore Iuno est* (l. 679). Though the image may refer to the throwing off of a bit, it seems even more apposite, when taken in conjunction with the passage dealing with the madness of Turnus quoted above, to find in it a

final reminiscence of the torch of Juno's madness, implanted in women and ships alike and then quenched.³¹

The ships now become almost human, lending another special touch to the imagery of fire. Like the flame of love which consumes Dido, imparting a silent wound which *vivit sub pectore* (IV, 67; cf. VII, 457, quoted above), the fire *udo sub robore vivit*. Furthermore, the flame, in the form of a *pestis*, creeps into the whole body (*toto corpore*, l. 683) of the ship as if it were a person, again like Dido, also the victim of a *pestis* (I, 712), or Turnus, pierced by the maddening torch of Allecto, likewise personified as a *pestis* in VII, 505.

The destruction of the ships, however, forms little more than an interlude in the total design of Book V. The sentiments which the women utter, that they have too long borne the *pelagi laborem* and would prefer to settle down on land with a city of their own, are those which must have been foremost in the mind of Aeneas and certainly bulk large in the subsequent episodes with Acestes and Anchises. The women burn the ships because they symbolize the years of seemingly fruitless wandering to which all have been subjected. When, not long after, Anchises appears in a dream to Aeneas, he urges his son to accept the suggestion of Nautes to found a city and people it with those (ll. 713-14), as Nautes puts it,

. . . amissis superant qui navibus et quos
pertaesum magni incepti rerumque tuarum est . . .

Nautes looks to the conclusion of the past and specifically to those who wish to remain in a world which is neither Troy nor Rome. Anchises' speech, as we shall see below, looks to the future. He urges Aeneas (ll. 729-31):

. . . lectos iuvenes, fortissima corda,
defer in Italiam. gens dura atque aspera cultu
debellanda tibi Latio est.

Those who make the final journey are to form a lot few in number, but nevertheless possessing *bello vivida virtus*. In other words, as the emphasis switches from former events toward those which are to come, there is a consequent and parallel shift from sea to land, from the dangers of an ocean voyage to the risks of war. The action of the women in burning the ships bridges the gap. The ships are no longer necessary and hence ought to be destroyed, as symbols of the past years of frustrated wandering. Aeneas, in setting sail on the final voyage to Cumae, slaughters animals to Eryx and the storms. Here the ships themselves are duly offered to Neptune. It was from the four

altars of Neptune that the women snatched their destructive brands, and four ships, in the end, were lost, victims of the fire-plague. A token bestowed on the god of the sea for the whole lot, they form one in a series of such offerings. The last and greatest is soon to come.

There are two episodes, brief in outline but important for what follows, between the burning of the ships and the death of Palinurus: the nocturnal visitation of Anchises, which results in the decision to leave the colony behind in Sicily, and the conversation Venus holds with Neptune, who promises Aeneas safe arrival in Latium.

Anchises, as noted, urges rest for the weary, but primarily he holds forth the prospect of war. Even before this comes about, however, Aeneas must visit the depths of Avernus and, seeking out his father, learn the subsequent history of his race and of the city his descendants will found (ll. 735-37):

. . . huc casta Sibylla
nigrarum multo pecudum te sanguine ducet.
tum genus omne tuum et quae dentur moenia disces.

The conversation with Anchises thus fulfills an important function in turning the mind of Aeneas (and of the reader) from looking at a fruitless past toward a view ahead with fixity of purpose. In particular, he shows clearly that what follows between this point in Book V and the opening lines of Book VI is indeed specifically the voyage to the Underworld. Aeneas is now to die in order to be reborn into a knowledge which becomes fact only at the end of Book VIII.

But first he must make the journey. He offers a new sacrifice, three bullocks to Eryx and a lamb to the tempests (ll. 774-76):

ipse caput tonsae foliis evinctus olivae,
stans procul in prora pateram tenet extaque salsos
proicit in fluctus ac vina liquentia fundit.

By making a vow to sacrifice a white bull *in litore* and to perform this very same action (ll. 237-38),

‘. . . extaque salsos
proiciam in fluctus et vina liquentia fundam’

Cloanthus had won his sea race. The course is only happily completed by a sacrifice to Neptune. And this, in so many words, is exactly what the god of the sea stipulates to Venus when he states (ll. 813-15):

tutus, quod optas, portus accedet Avernī.
unus erit tantum amissum quem qurgite quaeres;
unum pro multis dabitur caput.

Palinurus is this offering.³² The promised sacrifice of Cloanthus is a slight and comic version of the highly serious ending of the book. Nevertheless it does serve as further evidence of the unity between the earlier games and the remainder of the book. Neptune, *pater ipse* (the *genitor* of l. 817), pushes Cloanthus' boat into port (l. 243) and promises to do likewise for Aeneas (l. 813). It is perhaps no coincidence that the bevy of sea nymphs, which accompanies him as he stills the waves for Aeneas' safe journey (ll. 822-26), contains at least one member, *Panopea virgo*, from the chorus of Phorcus which joined him in aiding Cloanthus (ll. 239-40). Once the idea of the sacrifice of Palinurus has been decided, the sea must by necessity grow calm. It was rough, as at the opening of the book, only until the decision was made.³³

At this happy turn of events — a divine manifestation that his course is correct — Aeneas is pleased and orders that *intendi bracchia velis* (l. 829). Before the boat race the men stood with *intenta bracchia remis* (l. 136) in anticipation of their prompt beginning. But, unlike that of Gyas and Menoetes, the race for Palinurus and Aeneas is now in deadly earnest as the coming of night sets the stage for the book's final adventure.

As throughout Book III, Palinurus, the pilot, leads forth the fleet at the journey's start (ll. 833-36):³⁴

princeps ante omnis densum Palinurus agebat
agmen; ad hunc alii cursum contendere iussi.
iamque fere mediam caeli Nox umida metam
contigerat . . .

The reader's thoughts immediately return to the games. Palinurus is *princeps*, as Gyas had been (l. 160) before the loss of Menoetes. The imagery further hints at the idea of a race, now in earnest, especially the phrase *cursum contendere*, an echo of l. 291 where Aeneas prepared the prizes for those

hic qui forte velint rapido contendere cursu.

In line 834 the words could be translated as "set their course," but there remains, in the phrase *ad hunc*, the idea that Palinurus not only sets the pace for the fleet but also, like the rocks of the boat race, is the goal toward which all must strive. Ironically, he is not only the cynosure of all the ships behind him but about to be the special victim of Somnus and Neptune.

It is Virgil's habit to make the description of natural events, which grace the epic story, fit the special events at hand. The ambiguity of journey as race is also transferred to the image of Night, which now touches the *mediam caeli metam* (l. 835).³⁵ This is the only occasion where Virgil uses the image of the *meta* to describe the passing of night. But its appearance here could scarcely be more fitting, since Aeneas is indeed approaching the turning-point, the crucial juncture of the journey to Cumae. After Palinurus' death, the rocks of the Sirens, anticipated in the rocks which formed the *meta* of the boat race, must immediately be skirted and only then is all smooth sailing into the Sibyl's harbor.

Yet, as the previous lines have made clear, it is on Palinurus that all eyes are now focused, as he becomes the special target of Somnus. The particular aspect of the *mise en scène* described in lines 836-37 —

... placida laxabant membra quiete
sub remis fusi per dura sedilia nautae

— is a favorite of Virgil's, especially when something of a violent nature is in the offing.³⁶ On a previous occasion involving Palinurus, we were told of his liveliness while yet *fessos sopor irrigat artus* (III, 511) of the other men. It is the imagery inherent in the word *irrigat* which is elaborated now in lines 854-56, as Sleep exercises control over his victim:

ecce deus ramum Lethaeo rore madentem
vique soporatum Stygia super utraque quassat
tempora, cunctantique natantia lumina solvit.

Out of the many instances in the *Aeneid* which offer a similar situation, lines 250-53 of Book II seem most appropriate:

Vertitur interea caelum et ruit Oceano nox
involvens umbra magna terramque polumque
Myrmidonumque dolos; fusi per moenia Teucri
conticuere; sopor fessos complectitur artus.

Sleep is the central image of each passage. In one case it embraces, as the snakes had just grasped Laocoon and his sons. In the other, to fit the water imagery of the book, it is poured. The snakes sought Laocoon specifically (II, 213), but we soon find the army of the Atreidae *litora nota petens* with a purpose as quietly destructive as that of Somnus while he is *te, Palinure, petens* (l. 840). The soldiers are met by their confreres, *lapsi* out of the horse. Here it is Sleep who appears *delapsus ab astris*. The attributes, which are separated in the case of the snakes,

Atreidae and wooden horse, are combined in Book V and centered not on Troy but on the lone figure of Palinurus.

Laocoon was doomed to fail before the *monstrum* of the horse which, seemingly lifeless, teemed with a deadly burden. Palinurus confronts his *monstrum* (l. 849) in the form of the calm but treacherous sea. The snakes of death creep over the sea and enfold in their fatal embrace, fittingly enough, the priest of Neptune, who screams in vain for help which is not forthcoming, in the same manner in which we find Palinurus *socios nequiquam saepe vocantem*. Sleep has already long held them in its grip as it held the Trojans and now holds Palinurus. The *monstrum* is always opposed by someone who sees through it and nevertheless in the end dies in its power. Palinurus successfully opposed the sea in Book III, gave way before it at the opening of Book V, and now becomes its victim.

Palinurus has no will of his own as the Sleep of death descends with birdlike motion and then, paradoxically, assumes human shape, urging him to take his rest. *Pone caput*, Somnus commands, a phrase which ostensibly looks to sleep but in effect ironically reflects Neptune's decision that *unum caput* would be sacrificed for all the others. Likewise the *munera* (l. 846), which Somnus now claims he will enter upon for Palinurus, are not only his tasks as helmsman but also the rites of death, demanding as they do a gift or prize for Neptune. When Palinurus resists, the god shakes over him his magic bough.

The sprinkling with dew, as it appears again in VI, l. 230, is the lustration of those present at a funeral or the laying out of the corpse. Here the shaking of the bough seems also to symbolize the binding of the victim's temples in preparation for a sacrifice.³⁷ Certainly also the associations of words such as *Lethaeo* and *Stygia* suggest the Underworld as well as Neptune's realm. Palinurus is clearly a sacrifice to the past. He may well be also a propitiatory offering leading to life in the future.

Then Sleep flings him, with eyes swimming, into the sea, tearing with him a part of the ship (*puppis parte revulsa*) and dragging the helm as well. Sleep wings its way back into the heavens, and the fleet, putting trust in Neptune's words (l. 863, *promissisque patris Neptuni interrita*), glides safely onward. In his headlong plunge Palinurus not only leaves the fleet without a guide, he renders the ship useless by pulling the helm along with him. So when Aeneas assumes Palinurus' role, it is over a ship which is incapable of control. In his death and in his disfigurement of the ship, Palinurus demonstrates that there is no need either for helmsman or for the ship he navigates.

Since the direction of destiny had thus far remained unsure, Aeneas had set his sights on the world of the navigator, on the heavens and its pattern of stars, on the external, in a word, which must serve when inner conviction is lacking. The sea is, henceforth, to mean nothing more in the life of Aeneas, and Palinurus symbolizes in his person the death of that part of Aeneas which pertains to voyaging, to wandering, and to a meaningless search for a goal which has, almost until this very moment, remained unstipulated. The pilot is one thoroughly versed in the reality of the sea, as opposed to those charmed by its superficial beauties. Aeneas is not fated, like Captain Ahab or Mark Twain's river pilot, to penetrate into the deeper meanings of the ocean and its symbols. Palinurus, who is, must die by virtue of the knowledge and loyalty he symbolizes.³⁸

His death is, then, a figure for the death of a total concept or, better, sphere of existence. Fighting for what in his own terms he thought was correct, he must yield to a higher fate and a different world.³⁹ The reason that the women burn the boats earlier in the book is that the ships denote change of place, search, and the restless sea rather than stable life on land. Not that the future holds peace, but only that Aeneas' purpose becomes fixed.

In his sorrow, Aeneas prophesies to Palinurus that (l. 871)

nudus in ignota, Palinure, iacebis harena.

This particular description of form and place of death is one which recurred to Virgil at crucial and imaginative junctures. From the preceding books of the epic, two examples seem especially important. Aeneas, in his tale to Dido of the death of Priam, once monarch of all Asia, grieves that now (II, 557-58)

. . . iacet ingens litore truncus
avulsumque umeris caput et sine nomine corpus.

The head torn from the shoulders is replaced, in the case of Palinurus, by the rending of the boat, *parte avulsa*, but in other respects the descriptions are closely parallel.⁴⁰ These strange lines are in each instance partially divorced from their context and hence stand out in the narrative. As the death of Priam symbolizes for Aeneas himself the end of any connection with Troy, so with Palinurus dies the need for seafaring. And in each case the aftermath is the necessity of search for a higher goal.⁴¹

The burning of Troy, the first in a series of ordeals by fire for Aeneas, soon yields place to the second trial, the attempt by Dido to

seduce Aeneas from his fated way. She also dies, cursing her deserting lover (IV, 620):

sed cadat ante diem mediaque inhumatus harena.

The imprecation seems to point not so much to the future Aeneas, founder of the Roman race, as to Dido herself, who does indeed die *ante diem* (IV, 697), and to Palinurus, *nudus in ignota harena*, to the Aeneas who must leave her to continue further on his sea journey. Both Dido and Palinurus are parts of him which he must put behind as he plunges into the Underworld for the clarification of destiny. The last trial is the burning of the ships, intimately and symbolically connected with the death of the pilot who guides them. The loss of Priam and Anchises releases Aeneas from the historical past, from Troy and from the years of wandering, while the deaths of Creusa and Dido fulfill the same purpose on an emotional level. Aeneas is to a great extent released from any human attachment as he prepares to meet his destiny, the only exception being Iulus, who *is* the future.⁴²

Though the figure of Palinurus looks to the past, as sacrifice to Neptune, it also anticipates the future in its capacity as propitiatory offering to the Underworld. To understand this, and several of the niceties of Virgilian imagery, we must turn to the Homeric model for Palinurus, the ill-fated Elpenor who, like Palinurus, dies an untimely death and reappears shortly thereafter to his leader in the land of the dead.⁴³

The events take place in *Odyssey* X and XI, where Odysseus leaves Circe and sets out to visit the land of the dead. Meanwhile, Elpenor has fallen off a roof, unnoticed by his companions. It is therefore in an unburied state that, like Palinurus, he comes before his leader in hell, begging for the rites of burial. Virgil has taken note of more than the superficial aspects of the description. Circe allows Odysseus to depart, but makes a condition that he visit the Underworld and talk to Tiresias, the seer. But the hero, worried about the safety or even possibility of such a voyage asks (*Od.* X, 501-2):

“ ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γὰρ ταύτην ὁδὸν ἡγεμονεύσει;
εἰς Ἄϊδος δ' οὐ πῶ τις ἀφίκετο νηὶ μελαίνῃ.”

To calm his not unnatural fears, Circe replies (ll. 505-7):

μή τί τοι ἡγεμόνος γε ποθὴ παρὰ νηὶ μελέσθω,
ἱστὸν δὲ στήσας ἀνὰ θ' ἱστία λευκὰ πετάσσας
ῥῆσθαι· τήν δέ κέ τοι πνοιὴ Βορέαο φέρησιν.

Homer explicitly states that, though the ship may need a helmsman to keep it steady, it is the breezes themselves which will direct its course. The ship cannot, indeed must not, reach the land of the dead under human guidance. It is this thought which Virgil has borrowed and then refined in his own imagination from the Homeric portrait of Elpenor. Palinurus is no longer needed.

It is possible that Elpenor may have been the pilot in an earlier version of the *Odyssey*. Like Palinurus for Aeneas, he certainly seems to symbolize an aspect of Odysseus, perhaps his youth, which is now lost forever. And Aeneas himself is journeying to the dead in order to gain a renewal of life, but on a different level entirely. We have spoken before of his necessary inability to become deeply involved in the events through which he passes in the first five books of the epic. He is forced to exist only on the most superficial level. Hence his failure to understand the death of Palinurus, the man whose life involves a complete understanding of the sea. Though fostered by the meeting with Anchises in Book VI, Aeneas' actual rebirth into depth of purpose does not occur until he has made his way, in Book VIII, to the source of the river of life which is the primitive but beautiful village of Evander. Only then, braced by the tension between Evander's pastoral life and the heroism of Hercules, the tension which should be his own, is he fully prepared to put on the destiny which is his mother's gift.

And all this begins now, in Book V, in the magical journey on which Aeneas is about to embark. *Ferunt ipsa aequora classem*, Somnus says to Palinurus as his first inducement to relinquish his position. But the phrase rings true, in spite of the pilot's disbelief and innate mistrust, for the poet has just stated a few lines earlier that (l. 832) *ferunt sua flamina classem*. The breezes of the air and the very waves carry the ship along, a point the poet reiterates at the end of the book in proof of the fulfillment of Neptune's promise:

currit iter tutum non setius aequore classis.

The mysterious journey of life into death has begun for Aeneas, as it had for Odysseus, and no human agency is necessary to see it through to completion. Like Odysseus who, on his homeward journey from the land of the Phaeacians, was *θανάτῳ ἄγκιστα εἰκώς*, now Aeneas must die to arrive at the land of the dead as well as to be reborn into vitality of purpose. With this new atmosphere of divine control, Palinurus is out of place and, though he fights back, there can be no opposition to his appointed doom.

With the helmsman lost, the ships and Aeneas undergo a new trial (ll. 864-66):

iamque adeo scopulos Sirenum advecta subibat,
difficilis quondam multorumque ossibus albos
(tum rauca adsiduo longe sae saxa sonabant).

Into these three lines Virgil contracts an episode which takes up a considerable portion of the twelfth book of the *Odyssey*.⁴⁴ Since the basic counterpart of *Aeneid* VI lies in the journey which Odysseus has just completed before he must sail past the islands of the Sirens, Virgil has reversed the order of events with startling symbolic effect. There is a deliberate and necessary contrast between the knowledge (and hence kind of temptation) which the Sirens purvey and that provided by the *νέκυια* of *Odyssey* XI. The Sirens know all things and are parallel in this sense to the Muses. But they are Muses of the sea; their wisdom is barren and empty when compared to that which the goddesses of Helicon offer from their clear springs and Olympian heights.⁴⁵ Superficially they personify the hidden dangers of a calm sea, the *placidi pellacia ponti*, as Lucretius puts it, and it is against this that Palinurus is on his guard as he is drawn into their orbit. To Odysseus they do not so much present the attractions of false knowledge as they seek to lure him into everlasting involvement with the world of the sea. While he wanders, the hero, falling under the spell of Circe, Calypso, and an immense variety of other temptations, loses his existence in terms of Troy and Ithaca. He exists in a no-man's-land where his life remains unknown to those outside this sphere. The Sirens and the heap of bones which surround them typify the life and death of the individual within this strange context of nonexistence. Hence their real temptation consists in offering knowledge without experience, experience which can be gained only in the real world from which they offer perpetual escape.

On the other hand, the appearance of the corpses in *Odyssey* XI bestows true knowledge, the dead about the living, in the past and of the future. Indeed, they tell Odysseus, as the false seduction of the Sirens could not, that he is going to escape from the world of non-existence and wandering and regain the stabilized human sphere of war and peace, of Achilles' shield.

Why, then, should Virgil add that the boat of Aeneas begins to drift toward the rocks of the Sirens at this particular moment? Aeneas has been, up to a certain point, modeled on the wandering Odysseus. Since his destiny (and it is one much less certain to him than is

Odysseus') lies in a future vague both as to time and place, the temptation has been, and could at this one instant remain, to wander. The result would be to absorb a life which is unreal while escaping from that which is fated and to feed a romantic longing to dabble in all types of experience, leaving destiny to come when it may. Thus far Aeneas' knowledge has resulted only in negation. He has learned what he must not do — life has been a superficial series of adventures encountered and tests passed with purpose centered on fulfilling the thoughts and actions of the moment and with only a vague commitment to the future. There has been no deep spiritual understanding of the meaning of life and the involvements of existence.

Hence at the very end of this world the Sirens appear. They are the ultimate trial, and the ships drift inevitably toward them, for they offer, in the form of the white bones, an example of those who, perhaps in spirit alone, were tempted to cling too closely to an existence false to reality. The temptation of the Sirens — the boat drifting without a helmsman on a calm sea — must come to Aeneas before attainment of the spiritual meanings of the future. When understanding is present, there can be no further temptation. Hence this is a crucial moment in Aeneas' journey of life. He now presses on to the knowledge, revealed by his father in the Underworld, of a future which is not easy but hard and cruel, fraught with difficulties and yet clear and lending meaning and insight to a life which now turns away at last from the superficial and empty emotions of the moment toward the reality of Rome.⁴⁶

NOTES

1. Servius (ed. G. Thilo and H. Hagen, Leipzig 1881), on 5.1. He goes on, in the same sentence, "nisi quod illic curule exercetur, hic navale certamen."

2. J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (Boston 1955), ch. 1 *passim*.

3. Cf., e.g., 89 and 609, and see n. 11, below.

4. *Respexi*, 2.741. Cf. also *Geo.* 4.491 — Orpheus looking back at Eurydice.

5. We are in the fortunate position of having a fresh commentary devoted to Book V alone (P. Vergili Maronis, *Aeneidos, Liber Quintus*, ed. R. D. Williams, Oxford 1960), hereafter referred to as "Williams." For a supplementary up-to-date bibliography of literature on Book V see G. Duckworth, "Recent Work on Vergil (1940-1956)," *CW* 51 (1958) 154-55.

6. Servius proposes two meanings for the word *olli*, "aut tunc: aut illi," but the parallel with Book III seems to eliminate any possibility of an adverb here.

7. For other parallels, cf. *astitit* (l. 10) with *consedit* (l. 841), and with the phrase *noctem hiememque ferens* (l. 11) cf. *somnia tristitia portans* (l. 840). Somnus, of course, takes Palinurus' wonted position *puppi alta* (ll. 12 and 841). The

verb *incumbo* is also repeated in lines 15 and 858 (and cf. its menacing implications in l. 325). With the phrase *supra caput astitit*, cf. 4.702, where Iris stands over the dying Dido.

8. Since, as detailed above, the boat race offers other close parallels with Palinurus' situation, the book is unified in typically Virgilian fashion, with the opening lines proposing the themes and imagery which dominate the whole. In similar fashion, the initial description of the labyrinth in Book VI may reflect at least partially the course of Aeneas' underworld journey. Professor Pöschl has pointed out to me in conversation that there may consequently be a deliberate parallel between Daedalus/Icarus and Augustus/Marcellus. For a recent moderate approach to the sculpture of Daedalus and its role in Book VI, see P. J. Enk, "De labyrinthi imagine in foribus templi Cumani insculpta (Vergilii Aen. VI 27)," *Mnemosyne*, ser. 4, 11 (1958) 322-30.

9. Though the fire imagery changes from baleful to productive during the course of Book II itself, there is no such resolution of the snake imagery, and I doubt if it is to be found in Book V. On the imagery of Book II in particular, see B. M. W. Knox, "The Serpent and the Flame: The Imagery of the Second Book of the Aeneid," *AJP* 71 (1950) 379-400.

If Servius is correct that the seven circuits and the seven coils of the snake (l. 85) refer to the seven years of Aeneas' wandering (an interpretation which l. 626 perhaps abets), then we have another deliberate connection between the snake, Anchises, and the past.

10. There are other details which associate Aeneas' action in V with Laocoon, e.g., Laocoon comes to make his speech protesting the acceptance of the Trojan horse *magna comitante caterva* (2.40) in exactly the same manner as Aeneas arrives at his father's tomb (5.76).

11. The most striking feature of the snake itself is its brightness and sheen (ll. 87-89):

caeruleae cui terga notae maculosus et auro
squamam incendebat fulgor, ceu nubibus arcus
mille iacit varios adverso sole colores.

Here also the description suggests hidden violence, since the vivid imagery takes the reader out of this specific context and looks to the figure of Iris. She it was who had appeared during Dido's death and who comes once again in the course of Book V, this time on a mission of destruction. To the relief of Dido's tortured spirit she had arrived (4.701):

mille trahens varios adverso sole colores.

In V, she makes her way (l. 609)

... viam celerans per mille coloribus arcum . . .

to fulfill Juno's command to burn the ships. Departing as she had come, she (l. 658)

ingentemque fuga secuit sub nubibus arcum.

The parallels between her appearance and that of the snake cause further hesitation about the beneficent quality of the omen at Anchises' tomb. Propitious as the snake may seem to Aeneas for the moment, the two objects which

regularly come from an *adytum* in Virgil are oracles and fire. Usually it is holy fire, as in the case of 2.297, but here the vivid gleam which the snake throws off (we note especially the word *incendebat*) seems to point in sinister fashion toward the future. It is from the *focis penetralibus* (l. 660) that the women snatch the flaming brands with which to fire the fleet; and Iris, the very agent whereby this is accomplished, already gleams in the supposedly harmless snake, just as in IV she had prefigured the light which was soon to burn brightly from Dido's pyre.

Just as there are numerous connections between Iris and the snake, so both are, in turn, linked imagistically with the appearance of Somnus (cf., e.g., l. 657 with l. 861).

12. It is, of course, the major addition and change from Homer's games in *Iliad* XXIII, taking the place of the chariot race. Even so, most critics, among them W. F. Jackson Knight (*Roman Vergil*, London 1944) 84, find it somehow lacking.

On the games in general see W. H. Willis, "Athletic Contests in the Epic," *TAPA* 72 (1941) 392-417 and E. Mehl's appendix ("Die Leichenspiele in der Äneis als turngeschichtliche Quelle") to K. Büchner's essay on *P. Vergilius Maro*, *RE* 8 A 1487-93. On the relationship between Virgil and Homer, see R. Heinze, *Virgils Epische Technik* (Stuttgart 1957) 145-70; H. W. Prescott, *The Development of Virgil's Art* (Chicago 1927) 206-25; and the brief discussion of Williams, pp. xiii-xvi.

13. See *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*, with commentary by J. Conington, II (ed. 4 rev. by H. Nettleship, London 1884), on l. 160 ("'Medio' is not explained by the commentators; but it seems to mean 'half-way,' . . .") or Williams ("medio: 'at the half-way stage'"). Cf. the use of *medium* in l. 1.

14. One other similarity between Menoetes and Palinurus deserves elaboration. Gyas orders Menoetes to cling to the rocks (ll. 164-65)

. . . sed caeca Menoetes
saxa timens proram pelagi detorquet ad undas.

He is rebuked, we recall, and a moment later thrown overboard. Palinurus, pilot in the adventures of real life, behaves in much the same fashion when confronted with the perils of Charybdis (3.561-62):

. . . primusque rudentem
contorsit laevas proram Palinurus ad undas . . .

If the actual facts are disparate (a turn to port saves the fleet of Aeneas but would have been the unsafe, albeit daring, thing in the case of Gyas' ship), the nautical instincts are in each case the same. The fate of Menoetes awaits Palinurus, even though doom is postponed through all of Book III because the pilot is still necessary. Lines 555-59 of III, which describe the rocks and waves of the dangerous passage, look to the *caeca saxa* of the goal which Menoetes means to avoid. But ultimately they anticipate the *rauca saxa* of the Sirens which offer the closest brush with death by sea that the now pilotless Aeneas experiences. That Virgil was specifically looking back to Book III at this point in the boat race is shown by the many other reflections, e.g., of 3.560 in 5.189-90.

15. Cf. also 5.224, with 6.353.

16. Of the similarities in treatment between the two episodes, the recollection of l. 270 in l. 858 is perhaps the most interesting. Sergestus barely escapes (cf. the uses of *vix* in ll. 270, 847, and 857) while Palinurus dies, tearing the helm with him.

Jackson Knight's possible interpretation of Palinurus as "the steering will deranged by passion" (*Roman Vergil* 165) seems more applicable to Sergestus than to Aeneas' helmsman. Then again Sergestus ought to be considered, from the parallels between the section of the boat race which centers on him and the journey past the Sirens, the comic counterpart of the Aeneas who might have gone aground on the Sirens' rocks, had *furor* got the better of him. Whatever the case may be, the human element certainly enters into Sergestus' downfall in the same way that madness triumphs over moderation in the epic's final lines as Aeneas kills Turnus the suppliant.

17. This motif of frustration, which may find its Virgilian origin in the Orpheus and Eurydice story, is central to Book V. See n. 16 above for uses of *vix*. Among other occurrences, *nequiquam* may be found in lines 276 and 860, *frustra* in 27 and 221.

18. The use of *saxo* is more likely locative than instrumental.

19. One other point in this episode deserves notice. The crucial juncture of the race takes place when the men are tired, almost at the very goal itself (*sub ipsam / finem*, ll. 327-28). This holds true in the boat race (*ipso in fine*, l. 225) and is implied in the boxing contest (l. 463) where Aeneas imposes the end upon the tired Daes. This combination of nearness to goal, weariness, and even mishap just before the very end, is common between the games and the actual journey of Book V. The theme is first expressed in Aeneas' ambiguous statement of line 29, urging the men to make for the harbor of Acestes so he might *fessas demittere navis*. Yet, as Conington-Nettleship point out, this use of *demittere* in the sense of "land" is unparalleled. Rather, the adjective *fessus* looks to the whole expedition itself (l. 41), especially to the women (*fessas matres*, l. 715; and cf. l. 717) whom Aeneas leaves behind in Sicily. Hence the irony of the phrase *demittere navis*, as "land" but also "let go" in the sense almost of "destroy," for the tiredness of the women manifests itself in the burning of the ships, themselves also weary of wandering.

20. The deadly accuracy is not left unmentioned either, however, for he once left the champion Butes stretched *moribundum* (l. 374) on the sand.

21. The phraseology of l. 465 is drawn from *Geo.* 4.488, at the point where the lovers had almost successfully escaped *cum subita incautum dementia cepit amantem . . .*

22. The foot race and boxing contests look not so much to events within Book V as to the ultimate and most important conflict of the whole poem, the clash between Aeneas and Turnus in Book XII. Here what was done during the games of V in a spirit of sportive rivalry now recurs, overhung with impending death. The battle between the two heroes is indeed almost a parody of an athletic contest, fought out first by a duel with weapons, then on the race course, and finally by a violent display of strength, the last two paralleling the middle contests of Book V. Virgil deliberately conveys this tone, for at one crucial point in the proceedings he states (12.764-65):

. . . neque enim levia aut ludicra petuntur
praemia, sed Turni de vita et sanguine certant.

After much time spent in futile chase, Aeneas challenges Turnus (l. 890):

non cursu, saevis certandum est comminus armis.

But it is to the foot race that Virgil dedicates the majority of lines within the description of the last encounter. Aeneas decides the setting for the games in Book V as he makes his way (ll. 287-89)

gramineum in campum, quem collibus undique curvis
cingebant silvae, mediaque in valle theatri
circus erat . . .

In Book XII, by contrast, the Trojans and Latins give way to open up a place for the preliminary clashes, and around and through this space Turnus flees in the hope of escaping from Aeneas. But he cannot (ll. 744-45)

undique enim densa Teucri includere corona
atque hinc vasta palus, hinc ardua moenia cingunt.

The sea race anticipates the necessity of Palinurus' death. Here, in the reality of the final clash with all idea of game far behind, *fortuna* once more triumphs over innocence as Turnus falls victim to the future course of Rome.

The motif of the race is especially important, and R. W. Crutwell, *Virgil's Mind at Work* (Oxford 1946) 87-88 interprets it as a serious counterpart of the *lusus Troiae*, primarily because of the labyrinth image. The comparison is intriguing but, as interpreted above, the labyrinth simile seems equally to lead to Book VI. The many parallels between Books V and XII (e.g., 5.230 and 12.49; 5.456 and 12.501; 5.458 and 12.553) deserve separate elaboration.

23. We might also note that Eurytion *deiecit* (l. 542) the bird from the lofty heavens and Somnus *proiecit* (l. 859) Palinurus from the side of the ship.

24. J. Henry, *Aeneidea* (Dublin 1881) III 127-34, on 5.520-26.

25. And, ironically enough, it is Polites' son, named Priam for his grandfather, who is one of the leaders of the troop of boys (l. 564). Cf. also *Aen.* 6.308 (= *Geo.* 4.477).

26. See note 8 above, but cf. the just strictures of R. A. Brooks, "*Discolor Aura*. Reflections on the Golden Bough." *AJP* 74 (1953) 261 n. 2.

27. It may look also, momentarily, to the past. Throughout the *Aeneid* we are never allowed to forget Dido. She reappears in VI, the cold spirit of revenge. It is, ironically enough, a robe of Dido's weaving with which Aeneas drapes the bier of Pallas in 11.73-75. The death scenes of Camilla and Turnus are in large measure reenactments of her downfall. Here the horse on which Iulus rides is one which Dido gave as *sui monumentum et pignus amoris*. Gave to whom? Perhaps to Aeneas, but more likely it is the very animal little Iulus rides in Book IV. As we learn early in VI, the mistaken love of Pasiphae resulted in the Minotaur, that *Veneris monumenta nefandae*. It is possible that Virgil's mind jumped from one scene to the other through the liaison of the labyrinth image in V.

28. The poet leaves *in medio* (8.675) ambiguous. Does he mean in the middle of the ocean where the dolphins are playing or in the shield's center, at the place of the utmost importance? Since doubt remains, both interpretations should be accepted. The first is stressed here only for present purposes.

29. Cf. l. 674, where the irony is fully apparent. Much of the imagery is borrowed from *De Rerum Natura* 2.40ff.

30. In fact, if beauty of movement is the order of the day, the similes sometimes appear to give the lie even to that. In the labyrinth picture, the *signa sequendi* are broken by *ancipitem dolum*, which is synonymous with the deceptive error. To denote wandering and lack of purpose seems to be the latent but real motive of the simile and, though the picture of the dolphins which follows lends a lightness and gaiety to Daedalus' toilsome maze, there still remains an aura of insecurity which disrupts the initial precision. Finally, the parade begins to give way to a more realistic picture of the commotion of a field of battle (*fugas et proelia*, l. 593), yet all still remains within the context of a *lusus*.

31. The poet may have combined the metaphors of torch and bit here. For *excutio* and the imagery of the bit, cf. 6.78-79, 100-101.

32. Henry (above, n. 24) III 199, in his succinct commentary on l. 815, defines the episode as "The superstition of the scape-goat, or expiation by transference." The idea of pacification through human sacrifice, and then by images, is frequent enough to need no discussion here. See, e.g., Frazer's elucidation of the ceremony of the Argei in *Fasti* 5.621ff (Publii Ovidii Nasonis *Fastorum Libri Sex*, ed. Sir J. G. Frazer [London 1929] IV 74-109). Part VI of the original *Golden Bough*, entitled "The Scapegoat," is also a mine of information.

33. Lines 763-64 and 777-78 anticipate the action of Neptune.

34. The most perceptive piece of recent criticism on the figure of Palinurus is to be found in the epilogue of Cyril Connolly's *The Unquiet Grave* (New York 1957) 134-47.

35. This image is anticipated in Anchises' description of night in l. 738 — *torquet medios Nox umida cursus*. Night literally races through the sky, but the image of "twisting" is inherent in the boat race (ll. 165, 177), as, of course, is the *meta* (ll. 129, 159, 171).

36. Aside from Book II, other examples of a similar setting may be found at 6.520ff and 9.236ff. Although he attempts to fight off Somnus, Palinurus' position in l. 857 becomes much like that of the sailors in ll. 836-37.

37. It is thus that Sinon, the master of trickery, pretends that he was decked out in 2.132-33:

iamque dies infanda aderat; mihi sacra parari
et salsae fruges et circum tempora vittae.

He builds his fake story on the supposed demand that the prophet of Apollo makes for human sacrifice in order to speed the Greeks on their way across the sea — a sort of Iphigenia in reverse. And just as the journey of the Greeks is the opposite of what Sinon claims it will be, so Laocoon is the actual victim in place of the crafty Sinon. Both Palinurus and Laocoon die even though their positions in life were as close as possible to the god of the sea. The adventure of Sinon is a travesty on their sacrifice.

38. On Twain, see Leo Marx, "The Pilot and the Passenger: Landscape Conventions and the Style of *Huckleberry Finn*," *Am. Lit.* 28 (1956) 129-46. And we remember that Ishmael learns of life and evil from Ahab and the sea, escaping in the end by means of a coffin.

Not that Aeneas is hereafter without a guide. Palinurus, who offers allegiance to sea and stars, gives place to the Sibyl, the perfect *dux* through the period of

life-in-death. In Book VI, the past and years of wandering yield to the historical Roman future, water to land, uncertainty to at least some assurance regarding what is to come, individual heroism to involvement in corporate destiny which only in the end actually centers back on the personal and private hatred of Aeneas and Turnus. The almost-Roman Sibyl knows of the past and future, the world of the dead and that of the living. She comprehends that both must be a part of the heroism of Aeneas, that from the dead alone will come reassurance of the validity of future history. Yet, even before the end of VI, she, too, disappears suddenly without mention, being no longer of assistance once death has lent stability to life. From now on, Aeneas is the ruler of his own destiny.

In VI, as in II, Aeneas' emotional involvement (which in the end postulates suffering and loss) and the symbol of his experience are separated. In II, the downfall of Troy is, metaphorically, the headless corpse of Priam, reinterpreted by the simile of the aged ash gradually hewn to bits, but the emotional loss is the disappearance of Creusa. In the subsequent two books, emotion and symbol are combined in the figures of Anchises and Dido. Palinurus, too, falls into this pattern. Once more the past is "torn" from Aeneas, emotionally, in the person of the helmsman himself, symbolically in the useless boat, mutilated by the pilot in his fall. When we turn to VI, the separation is once more clear, between golden bough and Sibyl. Of the Sibyl (=Palinurus) as guide, we have spoken above. The golden bough parallels her — and this stage in the life of Aeneas — symbolically, for, being alive and yet dead, it looks both to past and future, and serves to betoken the hero's progress through a world of which he is only momentarily a part. Like Palinurus, it, too, is torn away (5.858, 6.143), clinging (*cunctans*, 5.856, 6.211) both to be and to fulfill a *munus* (cf. 6.142, 629, 637), this time to Persephone, the world of the dead, not Neptune, the interlude of journeying now past. The world of the dead must also be propitiated for a misuse of its regular purposes, just as the god of the sea demands an offering when his usefulness is over.

One need but briefly add that the change from Palinurus to Sibyl, as guide, is, in a sense, akin to that change Dante experiences when Virgil, personification of philosophy without revelation, must give up his position to Beatrice at the top of Purgatorio, for she alone, as theology, can lead him into and through Paradiso.

39. Looked at from another point of view, the death of Palinurus means the end of all anti-Roman sentiments in the epic and prepares the stage for the gradual evolution of Romanitas which comes in the seven books which follow. Everything connected with the sea was viewed with general suspicion by Roman authors. They were essentially a land people, as opposed to the Greeks, and though in this case land means war, nevertheless it was more important that the *casus* and *errores* of the sea give way before the stability of the Italian land and people.

40. For Priam, the imagery of the trunk is artistically elaborated in the simile of 2.626ff, which contains many overtones of the aged and wounded old man.

On a possible connection between the loss of the tiller and a similar event in the epic of Gilgamesh, see W. F. Jackson Knight, *Cumaeian Gates* (Oxford 1936) 25 and 41.

41. Aeneas' loss of his pilot before reaching his destination, whether physical or spiritual, is parallel to Marlow's loss of his native helmsman in the journey

up the river to find Kurtz, in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. (See Lillian Feder, "Marlow's Descent into Hell," *Nineteenth-Century Fiction* 9 [March 1955] 280-92.) An even closer connection exists with Conrad's *The Secret Sharer*, where growth into self-knowledge comes about by the appearance and disappearance of another self — coming like a "headless corpse" and going like a hat, bobbing up and down in the ocean's swell.

42. The later connection with Lavinia is one forged more by the fire of fate than of passion, and Aeneas' sorrow at the death of Pallas smacks as much of Augustus' relationship with Marcellus as of any sudden feelings of sympathy on the hero's part.

43. On the obvious parallels between Palinurus and Elpenor, see Williams, pp. 198-99 (on ll. 827f) with his references. The problem of the inconsistencies between the descriptions of Palinurus in Books V and VI has been well discussed by Jackson Knight (*Roman Vergil* 291-92) and P. Jacob, "L'épisode de Palinure," *Les Études Classiques* 20 (1952) 163-67.

44. *Odyssey* 12.154-200. This book as a whole was much in Virgil's mind as he wrote Book V (e.g., the model of ll. 8-11 is *Od.* 12.403-6).

45. See J. R. T. Pollard, "Muses and Sirens," *CR*, N.S. 2 (1952) 60-63.

46. I would like to express here my deep gratitude to Professors Wendell V. Clausen and Cedric H. Whitman and to Mr. and Mrs. Michael A. Post for help freely given, in this paper and elsewhere.

VAT. GR. 2181: AN UNKNOWN ARISTOPHANES MS

BY SETH BENARDETE

VAT. GR. 2181 (once Columnensis 20) is not listed by White in his catalogue of Aristophanes MSS (*CP* 1, 1906, 1-20), and as far as I know has never been examined. Its importance is limited: it takes away from Musurus, editor of the Aldine editio princeps (1498), most of the readings hitherto found only in his edition, and it adds to the MS tradition some modern metrical emendations.

The codex is written on paper, in size a quarto (29.2×19.5 cm.), whose watermarks place it in the last quarter of the fourteenth century,¹ as does the very clear writing, done by a careful scribe,² who wrote the whole MS except for some lines he omitted, and these a second hand of the same period added. There are 203 numbered folios (plus 1a, b, c, and 7a), with three unnumbered sheets at the end. Contents: letter of Peter Hypselas to Antonius Verrius (1c-4), which had been pasted in after the center of these four sheets was cut out so that the letter could be read on both sides; summary of Hephaestion (5r-6r), a frequent feature of late Byzantine MSS;³ proleg. XVII (ed. Dübner, *Scholia*) of Demetrius Triclinius, up to line 43 (πάθη) (6v-7r); *Plutus* (8r-29v), without arg. or dram. pers.; *Nubes* (29v-55r), arg. VIII, dram. pers.; *Ranae* (55v-80v), arg. III, dram. pers.;⁴ *Equites* (80v-104v), arg. I, 1-3, 5; II, dram. pers.; *Acharnenses* (105r-125r), arg. I, dram. pers.; *Vespae* (126v-153r), arg. II, I, dram. pers.; *Aves* (153r-183r), arg. IV, I, II (lines 1-38);⁵ *Pax* (183r-202v), arg. III (lines 1-12), I, II, dram. pers., omits 948-1011 (with *ΓPCB* Ald), 1228-end.

The letter of Peter Hypselas, a scribe known to have been working in Florence in the late fifteenth century (his copy of Pausanias is dated 1497),⁶ accompanies the Greek alphabet and the most common ligatures, which he believes will allow Antonius Verrius to write Greek like a Greek and serve as well as his own memorial.⁷ At the bottom of f8r is the designation: Io:CAR.D. SALVIATIS, apparently written in the same hand as that illustrated on plate 59 of *Specimina Cod. Graec. Vat.*² (coll. de' Cavalieri et Lietzmann). Cardinal Salviati, who died in 1553, was a Papal legate to Spain in 1525,⁸ and it is likely that he purchased there this codex, which Antonius Verrius once had and in which he had put Peter Hypselas' letter.

The number of plays and their order are unique; but as this order is

found in only two MSS and the Aldine (it has *Eccl.* as the ninth), all of which have nine plays — Vat Pal 67 P or V_{p2} and Havniensis 1980 H (Paris 2717 C has *Eq.*, *Ach.*, *Vesp.*, *Pl. Nu.*, *Ra.*, *Av.*, *Pax*, *Lys.*)⁹ — it is likely that Vat 2181 was copied from a mutilated MS that was once similar to P and H.¹⁰ Unfortunately it lacks scholia, but to judge from its occasional glosses, scholia, and variant readings, the MS it copied must have been more heavily annotated, and in all probability very much like the one Musurus used for his edition.

The MS has three constant features: α and ι when long are often marked, short syllables rarely, *syllaba communis* (Triclinius' sign) almost never;¹¹ strophe, antistrophe, epirrhema, σύστημα κατὰ περικοπήν, etc. are almost everywhere written (unlike V_{p2}, for example, which has them sporadically), and this makes it the only MS that mostly agrees in *Pax* with Aldine (as reported by Zacher); and colometric signs, the brackets around the last colon of a strophe, the coronis, etc., are again in all eight plays almost everywhere.

For the Byzantine triad, there is nothing in the *Plutus* that is not found in the mixed Triclinian recension (see Koster, note 11 below), except that the Aldine reading κᾶταλιπών 69 has been corrected here by a late hand: at κατα- (so: at τωδεῖ 45 in marg.); the Aldine attribution of 80 to Kα has been crossed out; 268 φράσσομαι, the reading of S^A, has the ss οι (i.e., φράσσον μοι), the reading of VΦS^{rel}; 380 φίλως RΦ, ss os VU²Ald; Canini's correction κατακλίνειν 411 is also found here, as is Kuster's πεινώσιν 504; 456 λοιδορεῖ RV¹AU has ss ἦ M² (although the frequency of writing η above ει throughout Vat 2181 makes it unclear whether this is a genuine variant, but the accent suggests that it is, for that is never done in the other cases); 550 φ (sic) εἶναι ὅμοιον, the scribe was about to write φατ' εἶναι RVAM². Glosses are: 458 ἄνδρες over ὦ (so 1176, ἱερεῖς over ὦ); 1099 ἦχεῖ; and in the margin, 1151 γνώμη abbrev.

Nubes: again it exhibits the Triclinian recension, reported by the Aldine in Coulon, but the MS it copied must have had variants and glosses; for 324 ἥσυχος AM²U has been changed into ἡσύχως RVM¹ (the reverse of the change effected in M); 614 πρίη RVM¹U has ss ω AMAld; 629 ἄπορον has the gloss ἀφυσῆ, 633 ἐξει the gloss ἐξελεθε; 671 τρόπω; as a question (Lenting); 967 βόαμα RVA has ss η MUS; 1031 εὐδοκίμηκεν RVA has ss σ MU. Otherwise it agrees with the Aldine except 182 Σωκράτην (also 1465, 1477): 310 -δαπαῖς ἐν (though it agrees with Ald 286): 427 νῦν: 756 τᾶργύριον: 811 ἀπολάψεις: 878 ὄν: has 884: 947 ἀνθρώπων: 1102 ἡττήμεθ': 1113 Χορ. om. (M): 1115 Χορ. τοὺς: 1184 αὐτῇ: 1214 τὸ.

Ranae: mostly it follows Triclinius, but it offers the following peculiarities. Variants: 957 στρέφειν ἐρᾶν punctuated as Fritzche does: 1313 ὑπορόφιοι V, ss ω RΦ. Glosses: 188 ἐλλιμενίζειν: 638 φροντίζαντα ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα: 685 ἡγουν αἱ ψίφοι (sic): 792 κριτής. In the margin: 72 εὐριπίδου ὁ στίχος ἐξ οὐνέος: 439, 736 παροιμία abbrev.: 1391 ἐξ ἀντιγονῆς: 1392 ἐκ νιόβης.

Equites. After the dram. pers. there follows the metrical note printed as first by Dübner, with the heading τὰ τῶν μέτρων ταῦτα ἐστὶ Δημητρίου Τρικλινίου, which appears to be lacking in other MSS; and in *Acharnenses* there is a similar heading before the same kind of note (also in Dübner as first schol.): τὰ περὶ τῶν μέτρων ταῦτα ἡμετερά ἐστι Δημητρίου τοῦ Τρικλινίου. In both cases, their position after dram. pers. is the same as in Ald.

Employing the scheme of D. Mervyn Jones (*CQ*, N.S. 5, 1911, 42), one finds that of the good conjectures found nowhere else except in the interpolated recentiores (Vat 1294 Vv5; Vat Pal 67 V_{p2}; Aldine; Paris 2715B), Vat 2181 only lacks those for lines 8 (Vv5 Ald), 34 (B), 764, 822 (Ald);¹² and of those good conjectures confirmed by other sources, it only lacks those for 438 (Ald), 535 (Ald), and 1087 (V_{p2});¹³ while of the other metrical corrections, it agrees with them except: 29 (B): 182 (CB): 274 (Ald B): 400 (V_{p2}): Arg. I, 1. 6 (Ald), while at 32 it agrees with Vv5V_{p2}B: 463 with Ald B: 635 with B: 742 τὸν στρατηγὸν ὑπεδραμῶν (sic) τὸν comes closest to V_{p2} Ald: 760 ἕξεις stands between ἕξει and ἔσει Ald: 869 with V_{p2} Ald: 1401 τὸ βαλανεῖον αὖ τὸ λοῦτρον πίεται.

Moreover, it has the following peculiarities: 836 ἀνθρώποις R: 1210 θεαταῖσιν R: 1318 καιναῖσιν ed. Basle, 1532: εὐτυχίαισιν Kuster: and 366 has the alternative χορὸς ἣν θεράπων (abbreviated), which is also found in Vat Pal 128 (ed. Velsen). It has in the margin: 195 δακτυλικοὶ στίχοι: 242 τροχαικοὶ στίχοι: 524 ἱαμβοὶ (written vertically): 1302 ἐξ ἀλκμαίωνος εὐριπίδου ὁ στίχος.

Acharnenses. I list its confirmations of either B or Ald's readings after Coulon (for other MSS I use Elliott's ed.); elsewhere it agrees with Bald.

Dram. pers.: exactly as Ald prints it. 101 ξυνίκαθ' ΑΓΒ: 104 ληψι Ald: 200 Ἀμ. χαίρειν κελεύω Ald v.l. Σ^{RAld}: 376 ψηφη-Σ^{II} B: 386 στρέφεις B: 434 Θέ· ἰδοῦ R^{Ald}: 447 ἐμπύπλαμαι B: 454 γε RAΓ Ald: 522 κἀπέπραθ' R^{Ald}: 608 ἡμᾶς B: 634 ἡμᾶς BS^{vsM}: 664 λακατα- B: 737 ἐπρίατο B: 744 τὰ δὲ ἅλδ Σ^{Ald}: 784 αὐτήγί ΑΓΒ: 790 ταυτοῦ Ald: 798 Ποτείδαν Ald: 810 ἀνειλόμαν Ald: 816 Ἐρμ' ἐμπολαῖε RAΓ Ald: 819 ἐκεῖν' Ald: 824 οἷδ' ἀγορανόμοι Ald: 869 καὶ τ' ἄνθεα Ald: 916 πολεμίων S^{Ald}:

943 ἔστιν Ald: 947 γέ RΓAld: 965 -σκίους λόφους Σ^RAld: 987 at first τὰ δ' Σ^{Ald}, then changed to τὰδ' Ald: 991 ἐμέ SAlD: 997 ὄρχον Ald: 1000 τὰς Ald: 1017 αὐτῷ γε B: 1023 πόθεν γ' Ald: 1089 ἔστιν Ald: 1103 τῷ κ AΓAld: 1112 μίμαρκυν AΓ: 1156 ὃν γ' Ald: 1195 αἰακτὸν ἂν οἰμωκτὸν ἂν Ald: 1196 γὰρ εἴ Ald: 1212 ἰὼ ἰὼ Ald: 1224 μ' ἐκ-Ald. At 347 it has ἄρα πάντες, a conjecture of Bekker's (Coulon prints Elmsley's ἄρ' ἅπαντες).

A number of places where it alone agrees with B or Ald are: 87 καὶ βανίτας B: 308 οὐδὲ βωμὸς οὔτε πίστις B: 323 γ' ἄρα Ald: 555 οἶσθ' B: 610 ἐν; ἦ Ald: 832 πολλὰ γ' Ald: 1146 ῥιγῶν τι Ald.

There are also a few glosses and variants: 87 gl. βαβαί: 113 ἀνακούει, 114 ἐπινεύει written as part of verses; in marg. ἰαμβικὰ μονόμετρα βραχυκατάληκτα: 730 σέ ss τὸ: 757 τί μήν ss σὰ μάν (784 it has τί μάν BHV_{p2}): 834 χωρὶς ss κᾶνις: 905 τοὺς θεοὺς ss τὼ σίω.

Vespaе. In addition to Coulon, I employ the readings of Cary and White, *HSCP* 30 (1919) 1-35, but typographical exigencies make it necessary to use for their class-symbols V_{p2}⁺ and V_{p3}⁺ the symbols V_{p2} and V_{p3}.

Arg. I: it agrees with Ald except: 12 τὸ πρ. εἶναι σπ. V: 20 ἀποκατα-V_{p2}V_{p3}: 23 διὰ τὸ V_{p2}V_{p3}: εἶναι V_{p2}V_{p3}: τοὺς V_{p2}: 26 δὲ ομ. V_{p2}V_{p3}: 27 κρίνει αὐτῷ V_{p2}V_{p3}: 33 προάγων γλαυκεῖς V_{p3}: πρέσβεις V: 39 τρεῖς all except RV.

Arg. II: ἀριστοφάνους γραμματικοῦ σφηκῶν ὑπόθεσις διὰ στίχων ἰάμβων (and written as such); again it agrees with Ald except: 2 θ' V.

Dram. pers. is the same as Ald.

Wherever Coulon reports the agreement of BAld, Vat 2181 follows them except: 200 ἔμβαλε RV: 326 ψευδο- RV: 642 αὐτοῦ Γ: 665 Χορ. V_{p2}V_{p3}: 821 χαλεπὸν RVΓ; and where they differ it has: 211 Οἶκ. Ald: 230 interrog. sign. B: 244 κολουμένους Ald: 254 κονδύλοις Ald: 316 Παί. Ald: 320 πάλαι B: 418 θεο-B: 480 Χορ. Ald: 538 γράφομαι γώ B: 606 εἰσήκονθ' ἄμα RΓAld: 710 πυαρίτη Ald: 718 ἔλαβεν B: 771 νυν εὐλόγως B: 820 ὦ νᾶξ Ald: 827 τί τις Ald: 852, 856, 859 Bδε. Ald: 886 εἵνεκα γε B: 888 ἡσθόμεσθᾶ Scaliger (ἡσθ-B): 903 Κῦ Ald: 922 Οἶκ. RΓB: 927 Κῦδ. Ald: 962 Θερ. V_{p2}: 979 κατὰβα quater B: 995 Φιλ. οἶμοι ποῦ Ald: 1076 εὐμενεῖς B¹: 1111 κυττᾶροις Ald: 1140 ἐγώ; Ald: 1161 κατὰ- Ald: 1324 καὶ V_{p3}: 1443 γ' οἶσω σε V_{p2}: 1454 μεταπέissetαι VB: 1458 φύσεος Ald: 1461 -εβάλλοντο Ald: 1464 ἄπεισιν B: 1489 Οἶκ. Ald (also 1491): 1494 νῦν RVB: 1500, 1504, 1507, 1510 Bδε. Ald. I have omitted those cases where it sides with RV(Γ) Ald.

To these can be added those readings where it agrees with few MSS

or none: 3 προύφειλες B: 109 ψήφον sic (ψηφον B): 152 πῖεζέ νιν (νιν Kuster): 168 δράσειεν B: 273 χοροῦ μέλος (μ. χ. Vp3): 348 ποιήμην B: 437 μεθήσης ΓB: 544 θαλο-B: 576 αὖ ταδὶ B: 599 καίτοι 'στὶν B: 623 φησιν RΠ: 664 μισθός; Bothe: 675 Κόννου om. B: 684 γε διδῶ B: 843 αὐτῶ Σ^{R2}B: 893 ἄρ' B (ἄρα V): 902 οὐ sic (οὐ Γ, οὐ B): 991 αὐτῇ 'ντευθενὶ RVB: 1036 φησιν RVB: 1037 φησίιν RVB: 1048 γνοῦσιν VB: 1119 λόγχμην Ald: 1232 μαινόμενος V¹Bald: 1265 δ' ἥδοξα 'μαυτῶ B: 1282 φύσεος Bentley: 1308 ἤκασεν RΓB: 1388 ἀρτοπώλης γυνή τις Σ^{RVAld}: 1417 ἀνὴρ τις εὐριπ. Σ^{RAld}: 1434 ἀν' ἀπεκρίνατο B: 1450 σε ΣΣ^{Ald}B: 1451 μετέστι C (μέτεστι B): 1474 πράγματα SBald: 1534 τοῖς Vp2.

In addition it offers the following variants: 1254 κατάξει RVΓ Vp3, ss π ν. l. VΓ mg B: 1295 πλευράς R²VΓ B² Ald, ss ηγ B¹: 1304 ἐνέπλητο RVΓAld, ss στο B. In the margin it has: 1288 λείπει στίχος: 1289 λείπει στίχος.

Aves. Holzinger makes four classes of readings in Vp2 B Ald where all or some have a true or important reading (op. cit., pp. 1-5). In the first class, where Vp2 B Ald all have a metrical correction, Vat 2181 has them as well — 85, 150, 155, 177, 248, 293, 373, 424, 500, 502, 701, 903, 1001, 1365, 1503, 1519, 1577, 1584, 1588 — and the same holds true for the next two classes, where either Vp2Ald — 342 (Vat has κλοπήs, an error for 'κκοπήs), 364, 375, 419, 547, 628, 885 (Vat has ἐλαῖᾱ with ε ss), 1118, 1389, 1465, 1636 — or Vp2B — 1343, 1693, 1728 — offers the better reading; but where B alone is correct, it agrees at 564 θεοῖσιν and 582 οἷσιν but not at 689.

To those one can add: 213 μέλεσιν BV_{p2}C: 222 αὐλεῖ τις BAld: 291 Εὐέλ. Vp2Ald (also 299, 301, 309): 308 ἀπειλοῦσιν Γ²: κεχήνασιν RB: 371 εἶσιν RB: 394 -μεσθα Ald: 479 Εὐέλ. Vp2 Bentley: 490 ἀναπηδῶσιν B: 533 ἐπικινῶσιν V¹Ald: 587 αὐτοῖσιν B: 592 Χορ. Vp2 Bergk: 652 ἐστὶν V¹: 756 ἐστὶν S: ὄρνισιν RVB: 986, 989 βιβλίον ΑΓ², A (but βυβλίον 980): 1028 ἐστὶν RV¹B: 1029 ἔστιν RVEB: 1070 ἔστιν Ald E₂: 1080 δείκνυσι Vp2Ald: 1236 εἶσιν AB (A¹ according to Cary-White): 1343 ὄρνισιν B: 1529 τι ἐστὶν R: 1601 διαλλαττώμεθα RV²E (also M according to Cary-White): 1607 ἄρξωσιν RUEB: 1697 θερίζουσιν RB: 1700 εἶσιν RVB.

Moreover, it offers the following: 448 Πεισθ. Σ^{RVAld}: 775 τιο quater plus τίγξ Dindorf, although it has been later erased partially: 965 οἰκῆσαι UΓ¹, ss ι RVAMΓ², with a dot under η (967 οἰκίσωσι M): 1341 αἰετὸς AMΓ¹, ss υ RVUΓ², but with caret below: 1623 ἀργύριον MΓ, ss δι RVAU, but with caret below.

In the margin it has: 368 παροιμία: 977 δακτυλοὶ: 988 δακτυλικοὶ β.

Readings peculiar to few MSS are: 291 ἡ 'πὶ Ald: 333 παρέβαλέν τ' B: 564 ο̃ Ald: 1328 ἐστὶν B: 1345 νομῶν B²: 1392 σου AB: 1556 ἦλθεν AB: 1612-1613 om. *Vp2*.

Pax. We have again for this play Holzinger's collection of readings peculiar to *Vp2CBAld* (all or some, pp. 95-105) — 219, 246, 281, 367, 385, 387, 390, 481, 499, 566, 640, 648, 661, 758, 822, 824, 840, 849, 866, 917, 1029b, 1054, 1069, 1079, 1111, 1226 — and of those Vat 2181 has all (with B's reading 402) except 453 γένειθ' RV. In addition, 265 ἥξει γε BAld was originally written only to have a dot placed under γε to indicate its expulsion; 733 λόγον B, with ss ω *reliqui*, dot under ο; 1127 ἥδομαι ἥδομαι Ald, written twice as in B but with dots under the first pair.

In the places where Zacher says the Aldine alone has νυν, Vat 2181 has it as well at: 195, 275, 670, 826, 857, 871 (gl. ss δῆ), 937, 1056, 1207.

Further, it offers the correct reading with few MSS at: 4 μᾶζαν RVAld: 16 τριῖβ' B: 51 ἀνδράσιν B: 98 ἀνθρώποισι VBald: 110 ἰοὺ ter Kuster: 255 Πολ. Ald: 263 Κυδ. Ald: 317 ἰοῦ ἰοῦ Ald: 396 ἱεραῖσι προσόδοις BAld: 467 Ἑρμ. Ald: 491 Τρυ. Ald: 494 Ἑρμ. Ald: 495, 500 Τρυ. Ald: 613 ἀντελάκτισεν RVB: 650 ἔστ' ἐκεῖνος RBald: 675 γ' RVAld: 689 γενησόμεθα RVB: 733 ἦν ἔχομεν RBald: 758 δ' Bentley: 873 Τρυ. Ald: 935 ἐσόμεθ' RVBAld: 942 ἔσθ' RBald: 943 Χορ. Ald: 1048 οὐτός γ' RV¹: 1050 κνῖσαν R: 1062 ἱερὰ RV^{pc} Ald: 1113 τᾶν RVP: 1158 τὰρώματα RB: 1184 αὐτὸν Ald: 1186 κἀνδράσιν RB: 1213 'κείνου Kuster.

Wherever BAld agrees, it agrees with them, except 1220 τᾶν; and when they differ it has: 40 Οἶκ. Ald: 43 ἔτε. Ald: 52 ὑπὲρ τοῦτοις RV Ald: 58 βουλευῆ B: 74 ἡνάγκαζεν B: 103 διανοῇ B: 118 ὅτι B: 120 πάπαν VAld: 143 τὸ πλοῖον δ' Ald: 153 κατωκάρα RB: 312 ἔχοντά γ' B: 493 Χορ. Ald: 527 pers. not. om. Ald: 528 Ἑρμ. Ald: 532, 543 Τρυγ. Ald: 557 γ' Ald: 565 μᾶζα B: 573 ὑμῖν B: 607 ἡμῶν RAld: 650 τις Ald: 695 πράττειν B: 732 χῶσα τε νοῦς αὐτὸς ἔχει Ald: 785 ὑπάσης B: 803 χορῶν ΓPC: 836 ὥστε γ' (ἦλθ' om.) Ald: 860 ἔση PCB: 864 φανείς CAld: 892 κεκάπνικ' ἄρ' B: 900 ἡνίκα δὲ Ald: 922 and following Χορ. Ald: 939 θεός om. Ald: 943 Χορ. Ald: 1016 Τρυγ. ΓPC: 1084 ἔτι om. B: 1133 οὐκ ἔδς PCald: 1140 Χορ. Ald: 1142 τί δ' ἂν B: 1147 σήμερον CB: 1152 καὶ κυδοιότα PC: 1184 ἔθει τὸ κακὸν Ald: 1200 κολλύαβουα sic: 1205 κ' ἄρ' (γ' ἄρ' Ald): 1210 Λοφοποιὸς ΓPC: 1217 αὐτὸν ΓPC.

In conclusion, one can say that Vat 2181 holds an intermediate position between B and Ald with more than a trace of kinship with *Vp2*. The frequency of its agreements with the Aldines, in the matter

of the speaker of the line, is noteworthy; as is its agreement with B in matters of spelling errors. Unfortunately, in the absence of scholia, it does not help to decide whether Holzinger was right in attributing to Triclinius metrical corrections in more than the triad and *Equites*; but at least one can say that Triclinius' teaching had become effective by the end of the fourteenth century.

NOTES

I am grateful to the authorities of the Vatican Library for allowing me to examine this MS.

1. Almost every folio has a watermark, most of them quite common, according to Briquet; they resemble, in his catalogue: No. 7454, Genoa 1358 (1a, b, 49, 54); No. 2940, Troyes 1382 (2, 4f, 7, 192f, 195, 198-200); No. 7643, Genoa 1358 (9f, 13f, 17f, 21f, 26-29, 35f, 158f, 161, 163f, 166, 170-73); No. 797, Lucca 1390-94; Siena 1392-99 (32, 39, 41, 46, 50-53, 72f, 78-81, 86, 97-106, 109-11, 131f); No. 8427, Pisa 1372 (58, 61, 66-69); No. 7349, Bologna 1342; Padova 1378 (64, 71, 177, 179f, 182, 184). If one allows a twenty-year spread (plus or minus) for watermarks (as Briquet advises), then the few sheets dating from the end of the century should not force us to conclude that the MS must be strictly assigned to that period: the last quarter of the century seems a safer guess.

2. What I mean by "careful" is that when the scribe committed an itacism, he usually corrected it.

3. Cf. C. Zacher, *Die Handschriften und Klassen der Aristophanesscholien* (Leipzig 1888) 559 (= *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie* Supplementband 16).

4. It should be noted that, contrary to Coulon, Urbinas 141(U) does contain both arguments II, I to *Ranae* (f145r). Arg. I: it agrees with the text as Coulon prints it except: 4 εἰς (for ὡς): 5 δι' ὧν: τὴν πορείαν ἐποίησε πρὸς: ὀλίγα: 6 τοῦτω om.: 17 μὲν οὖν: 19 Περσέφασαν: 25 περὶ τῆς om.: τραγωδίας διαλεγόμενος: 30 αὐτῶν: 37 δεύτερος om. 38 Πλάτωνι: 39 παρά-. Arg. II: versus non sunt distincti: ὑπόθεσις δράματος βατράχων ἀριστοφάνους: 4 δὲ: 7 προσέκοπτε.

5. After ἀρχῆς Vat 2181 has: πεποιήται τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων· τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας.

6. Cf. R. Devreesse, *Introduction à l'étude des Manuscrits grecs* (Paris 1954) 319; Vogel-Gardthausen, *Die griech. Schreiber d. Mittelalters u. d. Renaissance* (Leipzig 1909) s.n.

7. His letter is so preposterous in its language that it is worth reproducing just for that:

Πέτρος Ὑψηλὰς Ἀντωνίῳ τῷ Βερρίῳ

Μεντήσῃ εὐπράττει Αἰγινήτῃς

εἰώθαμεν τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡθικὰ φύσει τινὲς θεῖα ἐκ περιουσίας ἀσπάζεσθαι (in marg.), ὁ μὲν φιλοσοφίαν, ἡ οὐ μόνον κοσμίους ἡμῶς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου εἰς τέλος τέλειον τῶν ὄντων εἰσάγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν θείων ἱερῶν ἀπολαύεσθαι, ὁ δὲ μουσικὴν, ἥ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνίοτε βάρη καὶ ἁμαρτήματα μουσικῶς πῶς διορθοῦ, ἄλλος δ' ἄλλην κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀρετῶν ἀσπάζεται ὥς καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ εὐφύεστατε Ἀντώνιε Βέρριε, πάντων τῶν καθ' ἡμῶς σοφώτατε, ἐν τῇ Ἑλληνικῇ τε φημί καὶ Ῥωμαικῇ διαλέκτῳ, οὐ μόνον ἀπλῶς εἰς τὰ

ποιητικά τε καὶ ῥητορικά, ἀλλ' εἰς ἄκρον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ θεολογίας πολλῶ τῷ μέρει πάντας ἢ ὑπερέβαλες, παρὰ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς δῶρα, ἃ σοι ἡ φύσις δικαίως ἔδωρήσατο. ἀκμὴν γὰρ γλίχσαι καὶ τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῶν γραμμάτων Ἑλληνικῶν εἰδέναι τελείως, παρ' ὧν τυγχάνεις προηρημένος, ἵνα τὰ θεῖα οὐράνια καὶ τὰ τῶν ὄντων τοῦτοις κατὰ τὸ ὄν ἀρμόσειας εὐρύθμως· σκοποῦντί μοι οὖν τίνι τρόπῳ τοὺς τῶν γραμμάτων χαρακτῆρας τελείως καὶ ἀριθμῶς παντὶ τροπῇ χαράξεις (καίπερ ἄλλοτε πολλάκις σε τούτους ἐμμελῶς ἐδιδασκάμην), ὥστε ὁ ὄρων τοὺς σοὺς νῆ Δία χαρακτῆρας Ἑλληνικοὺς φήσῃ μᾶλλον σε Ἑλλήνα ἀεὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰβήρα εἶναι, ἔγνω τοντὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα τῶν ἐμῶν χαρακτήρων σοι δωρήσασθαι, ὃ οὐ μόνον τὴν τελείαν τῆς τῶν χαρακτήρων τάξεως καὶ ἀπλῶς καθ' αὐτῶν τέ σε εἰσάξει καὶ τὰς βραχέας καὶ λοξὰς ἐκείνας οἰμούς (i.e. ligatures) θαυμαστῶς πῶς σε πάντων ἀριστον ἐκτελέσειε, ἀλλὰ καὶ νῆ Δία μνημόσυνόν μοι διὰ παντός τοῦ βίου παρακείσεται σοι· ἔρρωσο.

8. L. Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste* (Freiburg im Breisgau 1899-1933) IV.2, p. 194.

9. Cf. K. Holzinger, *Vorstudien zur Beurteilung der Erklärertätigkeit des Demetrios Triklinios zu den Komödien des Aristophanes* (SBAkWissWien, phil.-hist. Kl., 217, abh. 4, 1939) 7.

10. Not only does the lack of arguments for *Plutus* and the abrupt end to *Pax* (12 lines from bottom) indicate a mutilated original, but in Arg. III *Pax* the omission of μέχρι-γίγνεται (8), the blank left after Λακ (10), the omissions of ἀνοθαρρεῖ (11) and ἐν ᾧ (11-12), and everything that follows γίγνεται (12). Now in *Γ* this Arg. ends at ἑνα- (8), in Ald at τινος (8). Thus some copy of *Γ*'s archetype (*V*) was copied by the MS which Vat 2181 used. The correct reading μετουκισαμένων (4), a correction of Dindorf's, is found here; otherwise it agrees with Ald against *V* or *Γ*, except that it has καθείρξας (6) where Ald has καὶ κ. (dittography) and VI εἰρξας; but later, where the copyist clearly had a very illegible codex before him, it reads: ἐπεὶ δὲ μεταπεμπομένων Παναθηναίων τοῦ Πολέμου (9), λέωνα (10) for Κλέωνα by haplography, which also caused it to read παρασκευῆς (12) for *V*'s περὶ κατασκευῆς. Note moreover that Arg. III is written before I and II, unlike the order in VI Ald, but it takes up the bottom of 183r; and that it has the designation: ἀριστοφάνους γραμματικοῦ ὑπόθεσις εἰρήνης, which indicates that in this line of descent there was once Arg. IV, which now only *V* has: he did the same for *Acharnenses*, labeling Arg. I as Aristophanes' work, since he did not copy Arg. III.

11. Cf. W. J. W. Koster, *Autour d'un manuscrit d'Aristophane écrit par Démétrius Triclinius* (Groningen 1957) 9.

12. How very deceptive a Triclinian correction is, 1346 ἡσθόμην shows; for Triclinius inserted the extrametrical τί φῆς; into the line, and hence had to rewrite the rest to get six feet: τοιαῦτα μ' ἔδρων; ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἡσθόμην, instead of ταυτὶ μ' ἔδρων, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἡσθόμην.

13. To those one might add: 201 κεν Vv5Ald: 292 μ' R: 557 ἄρμασιν RAld: 574 ἦτησ' RAld: 623 ἡδόμεσθᾶ VALd: 751 παρῶν' RAld: 1007 Ἀθηῶν MAld: 1022 κολοιοῖς RAld.

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D. (1961)

ANNE RUGGLES BROMBERG — Concordia: *Studies in Roman Marriage
Under the Empire**

IN investigating the problems of representations of marriage in Roman art, the chief considerations are the means by which Roman artists created formulae for actual events in the light of their knowledge of past forms and the tangible or intangible values of their society. As much of Roman art is consciously allegorical — that is, it uses forms for intellectual as well as sensuous ends — ideology plays an important part in an analysis of its monuments. Poetry has a parallel problem, in reducing the vast complexity of experience to an emotional order. This thesis is an attempt to ascertain some of the differing means by which artists and poets during the Empire solved the problem of transmuting the values and realities of marriage into art.

The Introduction states the questions to be investigated, and gives the literary evidence for the various types of Roman marriage and the events at the wedding ceremony. At this time, free marriage was the predominant type of wedding, and none of the ceremonies seem to have been a legal necessity; law and custom were separate considerations.

The first chapter deals with the period from ca. 50 B.C. to A.D. 50, and discusses the various attitudes toward marriage found in the Stoic writers, Augustus' circle (where the ideal is represented in art by the Ara Pacis, on which the dignity of family life is joined to the dignity of the state), and the epigraphic evidence. In all of these cases, the vision is one of chastity, fecundity, and a concern for family life as a moral basis for the state. This ideal is only tentatively expressed in art, as Augustan art tends to emphasize the dynastic aspects of the ruling family, rather than their role in a marital allegory. It is expressed in poetry, not only in Horace's paeans to Old Roman Virtue, but in Propertius 4.11 and in the epithalamia of Catullus, in which the harmony of marriage (or its lack) is related to a larger harmony of gods and country.

The wedding poems of this time are comparable in style to such

* Degree in Classical Archaeology.

works as the Aldobrandini Wedding, and perhaps the frescoes in the Villa dei Misteri and Boscoreale, as well as the cameo in the Boston Museum with the Wedding of Cupid and Psyche, all of which utilize the types of Greek art for decorative ends. In this tradition, which goes back to fourth-century Greek vases, art is an ornament of ordinary life, and the mythical prototypes of marriage, or the semidivine figures such as Hymenaeus, Eros, and Venus which are associated with it, are civilized amusements indicating the culture of the Roman patron. At their best they are a triumph of sensuous imagination, not religious images of great moral force.

The second chapter deals with the period from the Antonines to Septimius Severus, in which a complete allegorical treatment of the Roman virtues is achieved in the biographical sarcophagi. Here *Virtus*, *Clementia*, *Pietas* and *Concordia* are, according to Rodenwaldt's theory (which I am inclined to accept), represented by scenes showing the conquest of barbarians, the commander's mercy toward his captives, a sacrifice to Jupiter, and the wedding of the deceased. The marriage scene is quite clearly related to the idea of *Concordia* on the Antonine coin types, which are related to the marriage of Marcus Aurelius and Faustina. The type formulated is the *dextrarum iunctio*, in which the high point of the union is expressed, and the human *pronuba* has an allegorical as well as a realistic function, in representing concord.

The ceremonial wedding scenes on sarcophagi in San Lorenzo, the Hermitage, the Belvedere, and the Sala della Muse, which are related to this type, are even fuller pictures of Antonine virtue and humanity, as it was elaborated under the early part of Severus' reign. They should be seen in the light of Plutarch's marriage treatise, as well as formal decorative descriptions such as those in Statius' epithalamium or in Apuleius' *Metamorphosis*. They include mythological elements related to those of the early empire and to the early Antonine Peleus and Thetis sarcophagus in the Villa Albani: Venus, Hymenaeus, Eros, and perhaps the Graces. But the romantic and mythical metaphors are combined with figures from the scenes of sacrifice and triumph, such as are found on the biographical group. The formula of *dextrarum iunctio* combined with sacrifice as a center of the composition handsomely expresses the piety and concord, the loving equality and familial duty, which was the rather middle-class ideal of Antonine society.

As a group, the second-century reliefs represent an achievement comparable to the imperial reliefs of the same period, and are significant as adaptations of the imperial style to private life. The fusion of human figures and allegorical divinities into a rich and touching whole

is gained in part by the aristocratic marble technique, with its virtuoso textures and expressive psychology, and in part by the pervasive sense of participation in a rite by which Roman virtues are upheld. Divinities such as Venus are merely aspects of the psychological reality of the portrait figures, so that the scene is at once a unique historical moment and a timeless ritual.

The third chapter discusses the third century, during which these formulae are reduced to single units, which become parts of architectural settings in company with other allegorical figures. A few reliefs, such as the "Balbinus" sarcophagus in the Museo Pretestato or the Annona sarcophagus in the Museo della Terme, carry on the tradition of the second-century reliefs, but the composition is reduced to a paratactic heraldry comparable to the architectural reliefs, and reality is subordinated to symbolism. In the architectural group, the associated types are the Dioscuri, Muses and Philosophers, the Graces, and the Seasons, all of which may be regarded as symbolic aspects of marriage, representing a shift to an emphasis on the intellectual and religious aspects of private life, a shift perhaps anticipated by the San Lorenzo sarcophagus, with its Poet, *Fortuna*, and *Hora*. It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which funerary art was influenced by the religious and philosophical speculations of the time, but at the least, the civic virtues of the earlier reliefs become less important, and there are intimations of an intellectual immortality.

Christian marriage sarcophagi, which are discussed in the fourth chapter, complete the change to discrete composition and symbolic figures. They take over many pagan types, such as the group of Reader and Listener (here an evangelist and catechumen?), Orpheus, the tomb portal, the *dextrarum iunctio*, even the Dioscuri and a Victory. The married couple are generally mere substitutes for portrait busts, such as are found on numerous sarcophagus medallions. Only at the end of the fourth century does the *dextrarum iunctio* appear in elaborate sarcophagi, carved on the other three sides with Christian scenes, which are comparable to the pagan biographical sarcophagi, though the virtues are timeless, not secular. Christian art does not echo the raging controversies on the subject of marriage found in the Church Fathers, but is a visual equivalent of the many inscriptions testifying to a happy Christian married life. Secular works like the Secundus and Proiecta silver casket in the British Museum, which includes a Christian inscription and pagan mythological figures, indicate the complexity of aristocratic life in the later fourth century, when a noble might be a nominal Christian, but equally well might luxuriate in the sensuous tradition

of pagan art. The epithalamia of this time are similar to the gilt glass plates and silver work in their decorative extravagance: and for them Venus is very much a presence, if not a divinity. Many of the married couples buried in these late sarcophagi must have been devout believers for whom the inscription "live in Christ" was a vital thing and for whom marriage was a sacred duty, but many others were like the Probus of Valentinian's court, for whom death brought the Christian formalities, but marriage was probably a livelier affair. What survives from the pagan tradition in both cases is the equality and devotion of man and wife, who desired to live in peace and concord and mutual happiness.

SANFORD GRANT ETHERIDGE — *Plutarch's De Virtute Morali: A Study in Extra-Peripatetic Aristotelianism**

In the history of Aristotle's influence and of Peripatetic ethical theory in general Plutarch's *De virtute morali* constitutes a major problem. Interest in the treatises of Aristotle was revived by the edition of Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century B.C. With Andronicus also begins the long series of commentators. The earliest commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* which we have is that of Aspasius, second century A.D. (preserved only in part). Little is known of the Peripatetics of the first century A.D. This fact alone makes Plutarch's essay interesting; yet the essay has remained comparatively neglected.

It could never seriously be questioned that Plutarch in his exposition of moral virtue follows, at the very least, either a Peripatetic source or a source close to the Peripatetics (such as Posidonius). Earlier generations had taken it for granted that Plutarch knew his Aristotle. In more recent times, however, scholars have almost unanimously agreed that Plutarch follows a secondary source or sources.

In chapter I it is pointed out that while Plutarch is our authority for a large number of fragments of Aristotle's lost works, Aristotle is rarely claimed as a source for any of Plutarch's writings. The *De virtute morali* is seen to fall into two parts, (1) on moral virtue, and (2) polemic against Chrysippus' theory of the passions and virtue. The thesis is concerned primarily with the first part. The question is, was Plutarch inspired directly by Aristotle or only by secondary sources?

Chapter II is devoted to a critical examination of the source research to date, the result of which has been, in effect, a denial that Plutarch

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knew the *Nicomachean Ethics* at first hand. Among possible sources, the most prominent contender has been Andronicus, put forward first by Ringeltaube in his dissertation of 1913 and adopted in substance by Pohlenz in his edition of the *De virtute morali* and even more confidently in his book *Die Stoa*. A review of the evidence forces the conclusion that the theory of Andronicus as source is without foundation. Important initial concessions are made to the theory: for instance, it is assumed that the name Andronicus stands in a work of Galen where all the editions have it but none of the MSS; and the method, which employs highly dubious combinations, is not questioned until my own negative result is obtained.

Are there any indications, apart from the *De virtute morali*, that Plutarch was familiar with Aristotle's *Ethics*? This question is pursued in chapter III. In *Adversus Colotem* (1115 B) Plutarch names several of Aristotle's works in which Plato's theory of ideas is attacked, among which *ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν*. The value of the incidental references to the *Ethics* is not absolute, since Plutarch does not tell us that he has read the works he mentions, but they are an important piece of circumstantial evidence. In particular, the passage in *Adversus Colotem* is hardly understandable on the assumption that Plutarch was not familiar with the works he there mentions.

The analysis of the first part of the essay, in chapter IV, attempts to show that Plutarch's exposition follows, within reasonable limits, that of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The greatest difficulty is perhaps Plutarch's own independence of treatment; but this independence would also seem to indicate that he is not merely following a Peripatetic handbook. With such a handbook, which lacks the abundance of the original, only a certain degree of expansiveness is possible. Plutarch's treatment is not only independent and expansive, but sometimes even erratic. On the other hand, we see that he observes some of the finer distinctions in Aristotle which the handbooks — what we have of them — do not bother to make. What is most important, Plutarch seems to have been the first to observe a development in Aristotle; his observation is not quite in the full sense of Professor Jaeger's development theory, but is an important confirmation of it. Plutarch asserts that Aristotle at first followed Plato in his tripartite psychology, but *later* changed to a bipartition of the soul (rational, irrational parts), then he goes on to elaborate the theory of moral virtue according to this bipartition theory which is also the psychological foundation of Aristotle's ethics. Aristotle still uses the tripartite theory in his early *Topics*. I have used an entry in the Lamprias catalogue of Plutarch's works (no. 56) — for

whatever it is worth — to corroborate what should be clear enough anyway, namely that Plutarch was familiar with Aristotle's *Topics*. In any case, the fact that Plutarch interprets a fundamental discrepancy in doctrine between two treatises of Aristotle as a philosophical development over a period of time implies an intimate acquaintance with those works.

Chapter V aims to complete the picture by a short analysis of the second part of the essay, in which Plutarch undertakes to refute Chrysippus' theory that virtue and vice reside in only one part of the soul, which is either completely virtuous (if reason prevails) or completely vicious (if passion prevails); in other words, that reason and passion, or the rational and irrational, are mutually exclusive. The ground work was laid in the first part, where the irrational part of the soul was shown to be the seat of the moral virtues. But, on the face of it, there would seem to be no common ground here; the Stoic theory cannot be refuted from psychological premisses which, for the Stoics at least, are not valid. Thus the *De virtute morali* might seem to be a failure, an unhappy attempt to combine two heterogeneous essays.

Nevertheless, the work does exhibit a strict unity of composition. This unity is shown in chapter VI. The key to the whole essay lies in one concept which emerges near the end of the first part, the "transition," and dominates — under the surface — the whole second part. It is the concept of the incontinent man, the ἀκρατής, in whom both passion and reason are present simultaneously. Thus it is by a simple appeal to experience — the example of the ἀκρατής — that Plutarch refutes Chrysippus; to experience, not theory (on which no common basis could have been found), because Aristotle's concept ἀκρατής (as also ἐγκρατής) is neutral as far as the theory is concerned: ἀκρασία is not a vice, nor ἐγκράτεια a virtue.

The ultimate purpose of the essay is seen to lie in the polemic, not in the first part, which only lays the foundation. But Aristotle provides the *key* to the whole; and it is difficult to believe that Plutarch, who is heart and soul in his subject matter, would have been content to use some Peripatetic *passe partout*.

KENNETH FALK — *Lucretius as an Epicurean Poet**

This thesis undertakes a consideration of the content, structure, and form of the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius in relation to the extant

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remains of Epicurus and evidence from other Epicurean writers, notably Philodemus. The first chapter attempts to reconstruct, from the works of Epicurus himself and other ancient evidence, an outline of the ethical doctrines of Epicurus. The view is expressed that to Epicurus, and to most later Epicureans, these ethical doctrines were of primary importance and that the physical doctrines of Epicurus, to which Lucretius devotes so much of his attention, were never important to Epicurus and the majority of his followers except as a necessary framework for their ethical speculations.

The second chapter considers the *De Rerum Natura* in the light of Epicurean ethical theory. The conclusion is reached that, although there are certainly considerable traces of Epicurean ethical doctrine in the poem, Lucretius is not primarily concerned with the pertinence of such doctrine to the problems of his own age but is much more interested in the exposition of the physical system. Thus, although Lucretius is a strictly orthodox Epicurean, he is not a typical one; and unlike most Epicureans, who were preoccupied with ethical problems, Lucretius was mainly concerned with translating the physical system of Epicurus into Latin verse. This attempt met with little sympathy in his own time and accounts for the indifferent reception of his poem in Rome.

The third chapter deals with the so-called Canon and the epistemology of Epicurus; it examines the relationship between the Canon and the scientific methodology of Epicurus and later Epicureans as it appears in the works of Epicurus himself and, most especially, in the *De Signis* of Philodemus. Certain sections of the *Letters* on physics are analyzed to show the application of this methodology in Epicurus. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the significance of Epicurean scientific theory and its value as a contribution to the philosophy of science.

The fourth chapter is devoted to an analysis of the *De Rerum Natura* and the influence on the poem of the methodology discussed in the previous chapter. The argument is advanced that Epicurean method had an especially strong influence on the structure of the poem, and that in general Lucretius aimed not only at reproducing in verse the physical system of Epicurus but also at preserving, in this reproduction, the integrity of Epicurean scientific method. The point is also made that this deliberate fidelity of Lucretius to Epicurean method accounts for many of the apparent disorders and illogicalities in the text.

The fifth chapter continues the examination of the poem and its construction with a discussion of how Lucretius modified — or refused to modify — the physical theory as he received it from Epicurus.

Again his fidelity to his sources is stressed, though with the admission that he sometimes temporarily abandons his sources to answer Stoic objections and bring the physical theory up to date.

The sixth chapter deals mainly with the repetitions in the text of the poem. These repetitions are divided into two classes, the "doctrinal" repetitions which derive from the nature of Epicurean method itself, and the stylistic repetitions which are peculiarities of Lucretius' manner of composition. Certain of the longer repeated passages in the poem are analyzed, and some consideration is given to his reuse of language in various contexts throughout the poem.

The last chapter discusses the incompatibility of Epicurean ethical theory with the physical theory and the reflection of this contradiction in the *De Rerum Natura*. The success of Lucretius in reconciling traditional poetic techniques with the demands of Epicurean methodology is discussed next. Certain passages in the poem are examined with a view to determining the relation of familiar poetic resources like the use of simile and metaphor to Epicurean scientific techniques like the use of analogy as a tool for investigation of natural phenomena. The thesis concludes with an attempt to assess the accomplishment of Lucretius through an evaluation of his success in reconciling and uniting poetic and scientific modes of thought.

ROBERT FISHER HEALEY, S.J. — *Eleusinian Sacrifices in the Athenian Law Code**

The Law Code of Athens was revised and inscribed in the last decade of the fifth century B.C. Eleven fragments, with a total of twenty-six passages, have been recovered. The largest fragment was published by J. H. Oliver in *Hesperia* 4 (1935) 5-32. It has not been edited since. The text presented herewith takes advantage of work done in the interval by S. Dow, W. S. Ferguson, A. Körte, and F. Sokolowski. Like most of the other fragments, this one is opisthographic: the later side was filled solely by the great Calendar of Sacrifices. The Third Column of the later side of the largest fragment is the subject of the present study. The passage in question is not divided into parts by any rubric for different days. Hence it is all one festival, and the first problem is to identify the festival.

The names of the festivals are not given explicitly in the Calendar, and so must be established indirectly. The evidence, in the present

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instance, is, first, the Eleusinian character of the entries; Demeter, Pherrephatta, four of the six hero-kings of Eleusis found in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (lines 153-55 and 473-77), are all present; so too is the γένος of the Eumolpidae, who were in hereditary charge of the *sacra* of Eleusis. Secondly, the Third Column falls under a principal rubric which states explicitly that the sacrifices are biennial. These requirements are met by the Eleusinia itself.

The thesis next assembles what is known about the Eleusinia from the authors and inscriptions, establishes its trieteric and penteteric sequences, the former in the first and third, the latter in the second, years of the Olympiad, and assigns a probable date of celebration early in Metageitnion.

The Third Column is divided into two separate series of sacrifices by an intervening ἐκ-rubric which gives a new legal source for the latter half of the Column (the ἐκ-rubric for the first series is not extant). Chapter Two gives a line-by-line commentary on the first series. There are eleven entries in this series, followed by a concluding rubric assigning the sacrificial officials, and an ἀπόμειτρα of 100 drakhmai to a priestess, which is set off from the series proper by a *paragraphos*. The series is made up of Themis, Zeus Herkeios, Demeter, Pherrephatta, and seven male heroes, three of whom appear under cult, rather than proper, names. The three are as follows: Threptos, who can be identified with Demophon, Demeter's nursling of the *Hymn*, in whose honor the Eleusinian Games were reputed to have been founded (for which reason he receives a more costly victim than the other heroes); Melikhos the Hero, who can be tentatively identified with Eubouleus, the Eleusinian swineherd; and Arkhegetes, who may be Eleusis, the eponymous hero of the place. Eumolpos, the eponym of the Eumolpidae, is given the first place of honor immediately after the goddesses, and the Eumolpidae are put down in the concluding rubric as the sacrificial officials of the series. Triptolemos and Dolikhos of the *Homeric Hymn* lists are notably absent; presumably, Nikomakhos found them cared for elsewhere.

The first series represents the ancient πάτρια of the Eumolpidae (with revisions by Nikomakhos; both series show signs of this), and is one of the few examples of gentile sacrifice that we possess. Themis is present as a personification of their old sacred law, Zeus Herkeios as the general guardian god of the Attic γένη, Demeter and Pherrephatta as their gentile deities, and the Eleusinian kings as their heroic ancestors. The priestess who receives the large ἀπόμειτρα can be identified as the priestess herself of Demeter and Kore.

The second series, which is treated in the commentary of Chapter Three, begins with a source-rubric, ἐκ τῶν στ[ηλῶν], which specifies one of the sources for the Calendar mentioned by Lysias (30.17). We possess what may well be a copy of this "stele" in *IG I², 5*, which is actually an old cult-table from Eleusis. Its inscribed list of sacrifices shows close similarity with the second series of the Calendar. There are nine entries extant in the series and four more can be restored with some certainty from *IG I², 5* (at least one more entry is required according to the indications of the stone). The first entry of a pigling, hitherto puzzling, is shown not to have been offered to any specified deity; it is a preliminary purificatory offering before the sacrifices. Hestia, who begins the list, may represent Ge of *IG I², 5*, with whom she was sometimes identified. Athena is present as the patroness of Athens, and can be restored in a lacuna in *IG I², 5*. Hermes and the Kharites are the θεοὶ προπύλαιοι of the Propylaia to the sacred enclosure at Eleusis, as they were known to be at the Propylaia to the Akropolis (Paus. 1.22.8), the former being an exact copy of the latter. Hermes' epithet Enagonios connects him to the Games (he also occurs under another epithet later in the series). Herakles and the Dioskoroï (mostly restored) seem to have come next; they were connected with the Eleusinian legend, and are present as international patrons of the Games for Panhellenic purposes. Artemis, Poseidon, Triptolemos, and Telesidromos (a little-known Eleusinian agonistic hero) are missing and, on the basis of *IG I², 5*, should probably be added to the end of the list.

This second series represents subsequent legislation to take care of the subsidiary deities of the Eleusinian circle and the Games, as the source rubric at the beginning of the series indicates. The series probably concluded with a rubric assigning the sacrificial officials, as did the first series. They are known to have been the ἱεροποιοί from Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 54), and are also found in *IG I², 5*.

The list of deities of the two series includes practically all of the deities of the Eleusinian circle, major and minor. They are carefully arranged in order of preference. At first sight the passage as a whole appears to be the main portion of the sacrifices of a major festival (the only one apparently preserved in the extant lines of the Code), and everyone so far has considered it to be such. Careful study, however, of the amounts of money prescribed to be spent on the victims reveals only 311 drakhmai worth of sacrifices. This is too small a sum for a major festival. Moreover, the victims involved are all minor ones. A comparison with other sacrificial inscriptions, especially that of the

Marathonian Tetrapolis, *IG* II², 1358, also shows that the Third Column entries cannot be the main sacrifices of the festival.

IG I², 5, supplies the solution; the sacrifices recorded there, which resemble the second series of the Calendar, are marked as *προτέλεια* of the festival; other, larger ones are prescribed in the concluding lines as being sacrificed *ἐν τῇ ἐορτῇ*. A *προτέλεια* is a sacrifice before something else, here the Games. In the course of or after the Games, the main sacrifice would take place; the second series of the Calendar, then, is only a preliminary sacrifice, and the first series, which precedes it in the Third Column, must also be in the nature of a *πρόθυμα*, although originally it was doubtless the main sacrifice.

This means that the lawgiver Nikomakhos (cf. Lysias 30) has made a revision in favor of the new democracy, but has retained the older sacrifices out of a spirit of religious conservatism, although he put them in a subsidiary position.

Three appendixes, one giving the complete text of the Calendar in continuously numbered lines, the second, that of the Third Column, and the third, *IG* I², 5, are added.

MARY ROSENTHAL LEFKOWITZ — *Τῷ καὶ ἐγώ: A Study of First Personal Statements in Pindar**

The intention of this thesis is to show that choral first-personal statements do not occur in Pindar's epinician odes. Attempts to approach the problem in the past have been inconclusive principally because they have been too dependent on the often unreliable evidence of the scholia and the scanty historical data now available. In this study the emphasis has been placed instead on stylistic evidence, that is, on the characteristics of first-personal statements, both by the chorus and by the poet, and the contexts in which they occur.

The opening lines of *O* 2 ("what god, what man, what hero shall we sing?"), for example, serve both as an introduction to the ode and as a means of indicating that the speaker is a poet. In the *epinikion* first-personal statements act as transitions to new themes, and by their content identify the speaker in his professional capacity as a composer of *epinikia* and as a guest-friend of the victor and his patrons. This is in keeping with the well-established practice of bardic song, where a reference to the bard's controlling presence indicates a change of subject, or the beginning or ending of a theme. Even in odes where

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Pindar speaks about himself with intense subjectivity, referring specifically to events in his own life, his deeply personal remarks, like his relatively impersonal "I" statements, serve as transitions to new themes and as expressions of Pindar's professional duties, for example, his *xenia* for the victor.

The function of choral "I" statements in some respects is not dissimilar: in a choral song the chorus' first-personal statements act both as a transition and as a means of identifying the speakers in their professional capacity as singers and dancers. But the concerns of the chorus, in their first-personal statements and throughout their song, are more immediate and topical than the poet's. They describe themselves in specific physical detail, while the poet tends to describe himself only in terms of his art. Furthermore, the subject matter of the pure choral song is more narrowly restricted than that of an *epinikion*, so that it would seem that the type of speaker was associated with a particular type of subject matter.

A study of choral poetry reveals that all choral first-personal statements are similar in style, character, and function. The choruses of Pindar's choral songs tend to describe themselves or the characters that they portray, and to identify themselves as the performers, the singers and dancers of song. Moreover, each of these songs is composed for a communal occasion and seems to be concerned only with events of local significance. Choral self-description is characteristic of all song in which the chorus is speaker, in ritual song like Alcman's *partheneia* (also performed at communal celebrations), in folk song, and in the choral odes of Attic comedy and tragedy. Therefore choral "I" statements may be distinguished from the poet's epinician "I" statements simply by means of subject matter. Furthermore, in all pure choral song, the chorus speaks throughout, with no intrusion by the poet (except in the *παρὰβόσεις* of Attic comedy, but here a commentary by the poet/chorus-leader was expected). Therefore if choral first-personal statements occur in Pindar's odes, not only should we expect the choral speaker to express primarily choral concerns and to describe and characterize himself and his actions, but it would seem that he should speak throughout the ode, and the song itself should be intended specifically for a communal celebration.

In Pindar's *epinikia* first-personal statements are concerned with the poet's professional role. When he speaks of his official duties, such as leading the celebration, offering a prayer, and expressing his *xenia* for the victor, his language is simple and explicit. But when he speaks of his ability as a poet and his general artistic purpose, his language is

complex and metaphorical. In his earlier poems Pindar speaks of his song in distance imagery to express the power of poetry to join together events separated by space and time. But in his later works his imagery places increased emphasis on himself and his controlling powers, rather than on his song per se, on his ability to speak what is appropriate morally and artistically to the occasion (*κατὰ καιρόν*), and on the fame brought to the victor by his song. However, Pindar uses metaphorical language only in the first-personal statements of his *epinikia*; in dedicatory odes intended for religious occasions, his first personal statements are simple and explicit, like those of the Homeric bards. In his use of metaphorical language to express the extraordinary powers of his imagination, Pindar seems to be unique. Bacchylides relies primarily on the traditional vocabulary of the bards, except where he is consciously imitating Pindar. Since Pindar's emphasis on his poetic ability and ultimate artistic aims imparts to his odes a peculiarly subjective tone, his early *epinikia*, even though performed by a chorus, bear more resemblance to monodic elegy than to pure choral song.

The similarity of *epinikion* to elegy becomes more pronounced in Pindar's later poems, where his first-personal statements become even more subjective. These personal statements, in spite of their specific references to the poet's private concerns, are never digressions but always concerned with the expression of the poet's official duties or with his artistic ability. As in his earlier odes, statements about *xenia* and the like are in simple, explicit language, but passages concerned with poetry are in complex metaphors. By means of such long subjective statements the *epinikion* may be virtually transformed into a personal apology, or into a poetical letter. The function of first-personal statements is the same in all Pindar's *epinikia*, but in his later odes the poet chooses to emphasize the personal rather than the communal aspects of his art.

Conclusion. Every first-personal statement in Pindar, choral, bardic, or personal, has the same basic functions, serving both as an introduction to a new theme and as an indication of who is speaking. By analyzing this second function it is possible to determine whether poet or chorus is speaking in a given song. Moreover, the chorus' and the poet's "I" statements seem to occur in different types of song, the former in songs composed for communal occasions, the latter in *epinikia* composed for individual men, and concerned with praising the deeds of one man in relation to the deeds of others. The occasion of the song seems to determine whether the speaker is the poet or the chorus. Therefore if there were any choral "I's" in Pindar's *epinikia*

they could be distinguished by means of their content, since the speaker would describe his physical appearance and choral actions. In addition, these choral statements would occur in odes where the chorus speaks throughout, and the tone of these songs and the occasion for which they were composed would be specifically communal in nature. In none of the passages attributed to the chorus by the scholiasts can these requirements be met. All of these statements occur in proper epinician odes, and their content is better suited to the poet as personal expressions of *xenia* than to the chorus. Moreover, the very idea of the epinician choral "I" seems to have no foundation in ancient tradition, but seems to be based on sheer guesswork by the scholiasts. There is no choral "I" in Pindar's epinician odes.

BROOKS EMMONS LEVY — *The Bari Type of Beneventan Script:
Manuscripts from Apulia**

E. A. Lowe, in *The Beneventan Script*, showed that Beneventan was written in southeast Italy and Dalmatia in a "special rounded form," which he called the "Bari type." This type (of which there are no known examples older than the 11th century) is closer in appearance to "formative" Beneventan (9th–10th century) than is the angular script developed at Monte Cassino during the 11th century, and adopted by other southwestern centers. The special features of the Bari type nearly all appear in earlier Beneventan mss.; but in the late 10th or early 11th century, the scripts of southwestern and southeastern Italy entered on a period of separate development, in which each retained some features of the formative script and discarded others. Two historical factors may explain this divergence: first, Monte Cassino then had few dependencies in Apulia, and none in Bari, the center which produced the most distinctive and calligraphic Apulian mss.; second, the Cassinese scriptorium was not important enough, in about A.D. 1000, to affect distant centers where the abbey had neither dependencies nor influence.

Independent development from formative Beneventan may also have produced rounded scripts, resembling the Bari type, in areas other than Apulia and Dalmatia. A calligraphic rounded script developed on the Campanian coast — possibly in Naples — even before the 11th century. (Naples' prosperity and cultural activity continued in the late 9th and 10th centuries while much of southern Italy, including Monte

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Cassino, was ravaged by Saracens; it is plausible that Beneventan should have flowered early there.) Later, Monte Cassino's influence caused the adoption of angular Cassinese Beneventan. In the Abruzzi, a rounded Beneventan hand was still used in the 12th century; the development is apparently indigenous, perhaps influenced by the rounded "ordinary minuscule" written to the north.

The assigning of Beneventan mss. by style is thus complicated by the existence of codices written in a script intermediate between the Cassinese and Bari types. Generally, attribution on paleographical grounds alone is now felt to be unsatisfactory; furthermore, many paleographers have recently emphasized that the *Bibliotheksheimat* of a ms. provides questionable evidence for its origin. (Monte Cassino, for example, has attracted mss. as well as lost them.) The safest evidence for a manuscript's origin lies in its contents; such evidence has alone been relied on in placing the Beneventan mss. discussed in this essay.

Monte Cassino acquired considerable property in Apulia after the mid-8th century. Most of it lay in northern Apulia; the evidence for property in Bari itself is doubtful. Many holdings were lost after the abbey's destruction in 883, though Monte Cassino perhaps controlled the monastery of S. Benedict in Conversano, near Bari, till the mid-10th century. The first evidence of a Cassinese dependency in Bari itself appears in papal documents of the Desiderian era (1058-1087) and after; they repeatedly confirm "S. Benedict in Bari" to Monte Cassino. Petrus Diaconus made a special point of this Cassinese claim in his *relatio* of 1137 to the Emperor Lothair. But documents and chronicles of Bari always speak of S. Benedict as independent; they do not even hint at a controversy. In view of this, it is doubtful whether Monte Cassino ever actually controlled a priory in Bari.

It is usually assumed that Monte Cassino's scriptorium was responsible for developing and perfecting the Beneventan script; this assumption (like the once-current view that Monte Cassino controlled all Benedictine foundations in southern Italy) deserves examination. In fact it is unreasonable to suppose, considering the historical vicissitudes of the abbey, that Cassinese influence remained equally strong at all times during the five centuries of the script's existence. Probably Monte Cassino was important during the "tentative" period of Beneventan (8th-9th century); its influence during and after the Desiderian period is unquestionable. But one may doubt the strength of this influence in the 10th and early 11th centuries, when the Cassinese were displaced from their abbey or occupied in recovering lost properties. Only six of about seventy Beneventan mss. written before

1000 can be proved, on other than paleographical arguments, to have originated in Monte Cassino. Historical testimony to writing activity is vague before the abbacy of Theobald (1021-1036), concerning whom the *Chronicon Casinense* gives its first full inventory of the mss. produced under a single abbot; yet the known Theobaldan codices are marked by uncertainty and carelessness of execution. This suggests that the Cassinese scriptorium may not have been stable and flourishing in the 10th/11th century; thus the Bari type began to develop independently of Cassinese influence.

Bari flourished during the Byzantine occupation of Apulia (875-1071), but its real prosperity began with the arrival of S. Nicola's relics in 1087, sixteen years after the Normans had taken the city. Nicola's cult was established by Elias, abbot of S. Benedict in Bari and later archbishop; it is the most notable among many contemporary cult-revivals in Apulia. Bari now became a goal of pilgrimage and an embarkation point for crusaders. It declined after the sack of William II in 1156, although the basilica of S. Nicola continued to be favored by Normans, Swabians, and Angevins.

Despite Bari's prosperity, evidence for intellectual activity during the "Beneventan" period is slight, as is that for scriptoria and libraries. The cathedral and S. Nicola must have had libraries; for the cathedral there is no documentary evidence (though it now possesses four Beneventan liturgical rolls), while S. Nicola has inventories dating from 1133/4 to the 18th century. About twelve extant mss., rolls, and fragments can be assigned an origin in Bari by liturgical evidence, *ex libris*, and so forth; certain features distinguish their script from that of other mss. of the Bari type. Twelve more mss. may be ascribed with probability to Apulia outside Bari (excluding Troia); all are of the Bari type, but no two resemble each other enough to suggest that they are from the same scriptorium. Beneventan was evidently widely used in Apulia. Manuscripts from Troia, in northwestern Apulia, show many influences — Cassinese, Apulian, and central Italian — reflecting the city's geographic and historical situation. Troia contained Cassinese dependencies; hence it appears that the presence of Cassinese elements in the Beneventan of a certain area depends on the strength of Cassinese interests there.

It has been suggested that other areas may have produced a script resembling that of Apulia. Certain mss. have been too quickly ascribed to Apulia on the evidence of surface resemblance, for example, Vat. Lat. 10673, Pisa Exultet II, the Payerne-Zurich-Lucerne missal fragments. These mss. are possibly Campanian; others now tentatively

assigned to the Bari type may be from the Abruzzi, for example, Vat. Barb.Lat. 160. An 11th/12th century ms. from Cava (Cava 6) is written by numerous hands, both Bari-type and Western; this may be explained by the fact that Apulian monks were professed at Cava. All these examples illustrate the dangers of attributing mss. by style alone.

The development of Beneventan now reveals a greater complexity than has been previously supposed for it. A more detailed knowledge must rest on the secure attribution of Beneventan mss. to their places of origin. Lowe's achievements leave little to add; but something may still be learned through investigation of areas often untouched by the paleographer: the documentary scripts of the region under study, the contents of liturgical mss., and the style of miniature and initial decoration. All these have been useful in the investigation of Apulian Beneventan.

HARLAN BERKLEY PEABODY, JR. — *Hesiod's Works and Days:*
*An Exemplar of the Ancient Greek Oral Style**

This study consists of a synthesis of the results of numerous investigations into the nature of ancient Greek oral composition, exemplified specifically in the text of Hesiod's *Works and Days*. The criteria of formula, theme, and enjambment developed by Milman Parry in his work on Homer and on oral composition in the Balkan area, while providing nearly conclusive proof of the fact of oral composition of our earliest Greek texts, nevertheless are empirical analytic devices that offer no convincing explanation of how the practical difficulties of such complex forms as the hexameter were handled at high compositional speed. They are, moreover, difficult of precise application. The text of the *Works and Days*, falling statistically between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, has therefore been anatomized to form the basis for a kind of grammar of form and function for the structural fact of ancient Greek oral texts. The emphasis throughout is on the traditional aspects of composition rather than on the specifically Hesiodic.

Since the earliest of our Greek texts represent the very end of a long tradition, it has been necessary to work by indirection in postulating the probable background of the formal facts that we find embodied in our texts. This has been accomplished by means of a triangulation from the evidence of the fact of the Greek text, which at all points is faced fully without compromise as basic authority; from the evidence

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of oral compositional techniques actually practiced and observed in the Balkan area; and from the evidence of comparative metrics, using the ancient Iranian and Indian material, the related metrics closest in time to those of ancient Greek.

For expository convenience the background material for the hexameter, its structure and its use, has been presented in terms of a developmental sequence found implicit in the investigations undertaken, without insistence on a specific historical orientation for this sequence.

Just as the observable basic rhetorical principle of structure in the Greek epos is parallelism, so the original generation of metrical speech would seem to have lain in patterns of words that through ceaseless repetition eventually established their own form as a measure for other words. This basic form is a simple set measure of syllabic count, still observable as a complete form in Japanese metrics. By continual repetition the most characteristic division of syllabic groups within the measure tended to become established as a formal element, the caesura. An incremental tendency toward using the measure in contextual groups, the couplet or verse, and the larger compound stanza, also developed. This stage of form is found in the Avesta. In Vedic, the same measure with more limited and regular observance of the caesural and verse-stanzaic patterns is found. Quantitative definition of certain syllables within the measure also begins to appear. Sequent to Vedic, the establishment of quantitative definition of syllables throughout the line, the avoidance of hiatus, the gradual introduction of the equivalence of $\cup\cup$ with $-$, and the establishment of compound verse-line forms may be observed in the Indian tradition. The Greek line is seen to correspond directly, in measure, caesurae, and so forth, to such a type of compound verse-line form. In addition, there is a noticeable tendency toward metrical contraction of the compound line form toward a syllabic measure typical of ancient single line form and closely equivalent to the Greek trimeter.

The Greek epic line consists functionally of four cola or syllabic groups, two to each hemistich. The long form of the final colon sometimes functions in two sections, producing a five-colon line. Each colon of the line possesses an exclusive pattern of quantitative definition or type. These regular cola are coincident in form with the great predominance of epic vocabulary usages and constitute the formulaic unit. The nature and function of compound cola as well as occasional irregular colonic forms are fully considered.

In addition to the colon formula, formulae also occur in hemistich

form. These consist regularly of a single grammatical element or "word," though physically compound, a noun and modifier, verb and modifier, or correlative pair, and function rhetorically exactly as does the single colon unit.

Oral composition of the hexameter, accordingly, consists of joining at the most five formula-word units of exclusive form in grammatical connection. The only requirement for accomplishing this is a sense of the colonic type and length of the traditional vocabulary words.

Just as the word, colon, and formula are coincident forms, so the rhetorical unit, the clause, is found to be coincident with the ancient line unit, the hemistich in the Greek tradition. The clause cluster tends by means of nonfinite verbal constructions to become a single grammatical sentence coincident with the stanza, thereby producing the patterns of enjambment characteristic of oral composition. The basic internal parallelism of the form, however, generates such rhetorical flowers as rhyme, assonance, alliteration, chiasmus, zeugma.

Just as the Greek line is a compound form reinterpreted as a single line, so stanzaic structure in the Greek epos is dualistic. At times the couplet functions still as a stanza of four rhetorical units. At times the stanza is built of full-line units, and the couplet functions as a verse of two rhetorical units. These two patterns of constructive motion are accommodated by the colon formulas and the hemistich formula respectively. About seven-eighths of the text consists of stanzaic patterns of regular type. The remainder either consists of blocks clearly showing similar underlying structure fused in Siamese-twin fashion or involves certain limited formulaic rhetorical devices of enjambment or abbreviation particularly characteristic of narrative contexts. The sequent development of the strongly stanzaic elegiac couplet for nonnarrative exposition is interesting in this regard.

The text is further analyzed to show the manner by which stanzas are linked to form paragraphs, paragraphs to form sections, and sections whole works, thereby proving by consistency of structure the essential unity of the text of the *Works and Days* as we have it. Such structure consisting of a network of parallel responses of many types is shown to be as present in the narrative context of Homer as in the predominantly nonnarrative context of the exemplar text. The larger paragraph and section units, although constructed on exactly the same principles as the stanzaic unit, are typically highly irregular in formal bulk.

The oral practicality of the style would seem to depend on the fact that at any given point the bard is faced with only one or two possibilities of constructional choice. The material that realizes these choices

is the traditional language of the epos. For one who had learned this language, epic composition in itself would have presented few problems. To be a bard of the sophistication of Hesiod is another matter.

The study concludes with statistical tables of metrical and rhetorical analyses of the text.

CHARLES PAUL SEGAL — *Reason, Emotion, and Society in the Sophists and Democritus**

The men dealt with in this thesis belong to a crucial period in the history of Western thought, a period characterized by the full emergence of the individual personality, conscious of itself and its powers, and becoming aware of the forces within itself which motivate its actions and responses. The Sophists here treated (Democritus, though not technically a "Sophist," nevertheless fits intelligibly into the rationalistic movement represented by the Sophists) are central to this development, for as practical "educators" and thinkers they are concerned with action, with man's impact upon the external physical and social world. They all begin with a positive assumption about the formative power of reason and man's ability to apply it to plan his cities and control his environment. Yet, almost paradoxically, some of them come to a keen awareness of the inner life, the emotional forces within man, and are able to expand their rational systems to include this non-rational aspect of the psyche as well. Thus the moral order which is initially apprehended as pervading the outside world is internalized, brought within the psyche. There is a development too from Protagoras' practical concern with man's active remolding of the external world to a more reflective attitude. From Democritus on, these thinkers — with the significant exception of Antiphon the Sophist — seem to stand, as it were, in wonder and admiration at man's ability to re-form the world, and begin to speculate on the internal forces which motivate and enable man to do so. They also begin to examine the validity of the ends toward which he directs this formative power. Some of them, like Democritus and the Anonymus Iamblichii, accept (and expand) the Protagorean belief in the validity of the established social order as the proper framework for and object of these formative energies; others, like Antiphon the Sophist and Hippias, seek a broader framework of action beyond society. They all share, however, in some form of the recognition that the internal world of the psyche constitutes a quasi-

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tangible entity to be reckoned with seriously. The compatibility and interplay of the emotional forces in the psyche with man's rational nature and his social environment form the recurrent theme traced throughout the *disiecta membra* which remain of the thought of these men.

Their thought is thus treated in the context of the developing individualism of the latter half of the fifth century, and a roughly chronological order of presentation is adopted. Protagoras is concerned primarily with the power of rationality, as embodied in the political structure of the community, to control and order man's social and physical environment. The task of the *sophistes* in his view is the maintenance and improvement of man's hard-won capacity to live in civilized communities. In the fully developed *polis* the *sophistes* continues through education the process of civilization which began in man's early history (the period of the Myth of Plato's *Protagoras*) and made possible his survival and progress. With the aid of the *sophistes* men can plan and create whole new communities (the founding of Thurii) and, confident in reason and order, can overcome *amechania*. The Protagorean *antilogiai* serve as a tool for this end; they have not merely an eristic, rhetorical function, but help clarify logical relationships by isolating the central issues. The position of Democritus lies between the *physika* of Ionian science and the social and ethical orientation of the Sophistic and Socratic movements in Athens. He believes in a unified physical process pervading all the phenomena of the cosmos: the chaotic random movement of atoms is being continually reorganized into intelligible and ordered shapes. This process operates on the social and individual, as well as physical, levels in the evolution of human society and the re-forming of one's personal *physis* through education. Democritus thus continues and expands Protagoras' emphasis on the formative power of reason to restructure the external world; but he stresses equally the importance of restructuring the internal world of the psyche, of attaining a harmonious order within the self, eliminating the disruptive effects of violent emotions. Yet his treatment of the psyche is more complex than a rationalistic moralism, for he approaches psychic phenomena at least in part in terms of his atomic theories and seems to have left a place for extraordinary psychic states like dreams, visions, and poetic inspiration. There is, nevertheless, no sharp break in the rational continuity of his system. Society is a creation of reason, an ordered *kosmos*; and despite his emphasis on the psyche and individual *euthymia* he continues to recognize the importance of social coherence. Gorgias acknowledges

still more fully the autonomy of the inner world of the psyche and the significance of the emotions in determining human action; and he develops a system of freeing and directing these emotions to desired ends through man's aesthetic and emotional response to the formal qualities of the rhetorical *logos*. *Logos* and persuasion are thus defined in emotional rather than rational terms, as was the case for Protagoras and Democritus. It is only through his rational *techne*, however, that the rhetor manipulates these emotions; and the ends for which they are employed may still be consistent with the good of society as a whole.

Antiphon the Sophist breaks decisively the link between individual and society, but still does not reduce human existence to chaotic anarchy; rather, he seeks the principles for human action in the broader framework of the physical and biological "truth" (*aletheia*) of *physis*. He too recognizes the autonomous existence of man's emotional life, but he suggests a fusion between reason and emotion on the level of the primary instincts, wherein "pleasure" and "advantage," emotional affect and rational objective, function together and are in harmony with one another. This inherent rationality of man's instinctive drives under *physis* makes possible an attitude centered about an experiential participation in the world of *physis* rather than the manipulative control advocated by Protagoras and Democritus. Critias also utilizes the awareness of the independence of the emotional life and its amenability to control and manipulation that Gorgias developed, but applies it now to the purely repressive function of restraining injustice by means of fear which holds down and constricts the life of the psyche rather than expanding and enhancing it. The Anonymus Iamblichi attempts a restatement of the Protagorean and Democritean ideals of communal coherence by emphasizing the benefits which the individual derives from the well-ordered state and the compatibility of man's emotional needs with a firm social moral order. Finally the implications of some of the late fifth-century developments toward individualism (as in the Anonymus Iamblichi) and authoritarianism (as in Critias) are traced into some fourth-century views concerning the individual and society, primarily those of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates. A summary of results and conclusions is given in the final chapter.

The difficulty posed by the fragmentary state of the remains of the Sophistic writings is obvious. In general an attempt has been made to interpret each system from within and arrive at a picture of its logical coherence (or incoherence) as a whole. In so far as possible the *ipsissima verba* of each writer are utilized and special attention is paid to terminology for the psyche, the emotions, and the rational faculties. Extra-

polations from the fragments have, of course, been necessary; and contemporaneous material — the early Hippocratic writers, Herodotus, Thucydides, the tragedians, Aristophanes — has been employed where there seemed to be a significant relationship. Matters of chronology and biography are discussed at the beginning of each chapter and constitute in part the rationale for treating the thinkers in that order.

PETER WESTERVELT — *Pindar's Poetic Craft and Purpose**

Though we have no dates for many of Pindar's poems, we can sense his poetic response to two historical events and their consequences, the Persian invasion early in his career and the aggression of Athens toward the end of his life. One notes in the few poems before Salamis Pindar's delight in the uncomplicated and joyful life of an untroubled Dorian community. Yet as early as 485 in the fine proem of *Nemean* 5 Pindar is reaching out to a wider audience than the confines of his small world would offer. We can follow in the poems two trends. On the one hand we note a steady development in style, a deepening sense of the relevance of myth and hero and a growing skill in pointing myth and imagery toward a single end. On the other hand we see Pindar's increasing involvement in the affairs of many parts of the Greek world, his own Thebes and Aegina, Athens and Sicily. In the years after Salamis, as his poetic form reaches a new perfection, he speaks of his craft in terms of *kairos*, at once an artistic harmony and an ethical or moral principle. In these poems he has indeed broken beyond the bounds of the Dorian community as he reaches a Panhellenic audience.

The most striking development in Pindar is in his use of the myth. Though in the earliest odes he tells the story at length as purely of narrative interest and the relevance to the rest of the poem is at best strained, as early as the Lampon poems before Salamis we note the poet's greater skill in subordinating various parts of a poem about the myth for a single effect. The world of the heroes is relevant in a local sense as intimately connected with the greatness of Aegina; the celebration which honors city and heroes takes on a religious character. As prototypes of achievement they offer the victor the hope of similar if not equivalent renown. The political suggestions of the myth in *Isthmian* 6 reflecting the friendship between Pindar and his Aeginetan host opened the way for the strong political overtones of the poems after Plataea. The inclusion in *Isthmian* 5 of the victory at Salamis as

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the culmination of mythic achievement introduced into the epinician ode the vigorous world of the present.

The Sicilian odes show through their myths a more complicated world. Human life is seen as an uncertain thing against the bright shapes of the divine. Yet in the figures of Pelops or Philoctetes or the Labdacids we see triumph emerging from disappointment. The Sicilian myths present universal patterns of behavior; the stories have been wrested from the local context; their prime purpose is no longer to celebrate the city but to suggest by good and bad examples the way human life must be lived. The mythic narrative in these poems is often elaborate and very beautiful. The poet's narrative skill is never an end in itself; through the myth he tries to see human life raised to an absolute, freed from the confusions of the present.

Yet it is partly the wresting of the myth from its local roots, the deepening relevance of myth as symbol in the poet's imagination, that brought on the severe criticism of the middle period. His affection for Athens as revealed in the famous and beautiful dithyramb was well known. The increasing difficulty of the poems, the increasing suspicion in which his political sympathies were held because of his wider use of local myths, and his seeming failure to use the myth for local praise started off a hostility in Thebes and Aegina and even in Syracuse which we meet in not a few odes. Pindar's confidence in himself, in his poetic craft and outlook, met this criticism firmly and without change of purpose.

Though Pindar was reaching at this time toward a universal audience, was striving to present a universal ethic, his poems were still strongly rooted in the community. Indeed the hearing on which he depended was intimately bound to the general acceptance in the community of the values he propounded. If criticism of poetic method and poetic style could be met without difficulty, the result of Athenian aggression after 460, the shattering of the old community and community acceptance of ancient standards brought the deepest challenge. In earlier poems the poet had seen in the mythic heroes shining examples of success. Now in a darker world of myth he becomes aware of a timeless excellence freed from the uncertainty of the present. As terrible as is the irrational evil which befell Ajax, his ultimate heroism is assured by the poet and the supernatural harmony of Apollo. Myth as narrative has been replaced by myth directed toward a single impression — in *Pythian* 11 of poignancy and sadness, in *Nemean* 8 of violence and deceit, in *Pythian* 8 of sorrow crowding upon joy.

We note Pindar's change in emphasis. In the reaching out to broader

horizons of *Nemean* 5 the poet is confident that through his poem the prowess of Pytheas will reach to the ends of the earth. In spite of the unity of impression of this poem the goals of poetry are external ones, the reputation of the moment. Yet even in the fine seventh *Nemean* more than ten years later, where Pindar states most fully the poet's power to insure the immortality of the hero and the victor, his statements of the validity of his poetry are based on two things, his reputation abroad and the skill with which he writes poetry. The poems after *Oenophyta*, stressing each the poet's private quest, bring him to the deepest consciousness of the individual, not seen as sharing in the community but as separated from it, in whose world of private joy or disappointment the community cannot really share. Pindar's role is no longer merely to add to the joy of a festal occasion but to sing of timeless ideals now largely forgotten in a shattered world.

In chapter 1 I have traced the development of imagery and emphasis in *Nemean* 5 and *Isthmian* 6 and 5 in the last years before Salamis. In chapter 2 I have considered some of the strongly political poems of the years after Plataea: *Isthmian* 8, *Isthmian* 3-4 (compared with the much later *Isthmian* 1), and *Pythian* 1. Here I have discussed the idea of *kairos* in terms of *Pythian* 9 and *Nemean* 1 and 9. Chapter 3 deals with the poems of this period where Pindar answers criticism: *Paeon* 6 and *Nemean* 7, *Nemean* 4, and *Pythian* 2. Chapter 4 shows Pindar's reaction to Athenian aggression in Aegina and Boeotia in *Isthmian* 7, *Pythian* 11, and *Nemean* 8. Chapter 5 considers *Pythian* 8 as the final statement of the lines followed in this thesis and ends with some general conclusions.

DAVID S. WIESEN — *St. Jerome as a Satirist**

The task of this study is to demonstrate that the same satiric spirit which animates the works of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal lives and flourishes once again in the writings of St. Jerome. The focal point of our investigation is a Christian writer's adaptation of a pagan literary genre and his transformation of this genre into a suitable vehicle for Christian propaganda. We here consider satire not in the narrow and earlier sense of a particular form of verse composition but in its broadest meaning, as the literary expression of a mordantly censorious attitude toward men and society. Our justification for thus defining the word *satiric* is Jerome's own use of *satura* to mean the

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embodiment of a particular point of view toward life, without regard to the structure of the work in which this point of view is set forth.

In chapter I we investigate how the spirit of pagan satire was transmitted to a Christian ascetic writing at the very end of antiquity. After the death of Juvenal, both the creation of original satire and the study of the products of the classical satirists appear to have lapsed. But suddenly in the fourth century we find that Horace, Persius, and Juvenal are being eagerly read and frequently quoted. This revival of interest in satire may be interpreted as the expression by a decadent society of a newly critical attitude toward its own moral problems. Indeed, the most vigorous of all censors of pagan civilization, the Christian apologists, had long used satire as a powerful weapon in their ridiculing attack on the commonly accepted religion and morality. As the spiritual heir of the apologists and as a scholar thoroughly versed in the literature of the pagans, St. Jerome naturally adopted a satiric form of expression in excoriating those features of society of which he could not approve. Of course Jerome's own personality perfectly fitted him for his role as a satirist, for he was by nature intolerant of the faults of humanity, extremely quick to anger and violently contentious toward his own critics.

Chapter II treats St. Jerome's general attack on his age. As a Christian moralist, Jerome's attitude toward contemporary society was necessarily ambiguous. He gladly recognized the constantly increasing strength of the Church. Yet he thoroughly shared the pessimistic view of humanity common to most satirists. As a leader of the growing ascetic movement, Jerome completely rejected the secular society of his day. He mercilessly took his age to task for its widespread gluttony, greed, luxury, and sexual immorality. However, Jerome's mordant lampoons of the *tempora et mores* pose an extremely difficult and delicate problem: to what extent is his trenchant satire the result of his independent view of men and morals and to what extent the product of his acquaintance with traditional satiric attitudes? It is impossible to read Jerome's denunciations of his society without realizing that he was heavily under the influence of pagan satire. The contemporary faults which he attacks, such as legacy-hunting or the building of luxurious edifices, also figure among the traditional topics of the pagan satirists. On occasion Jerome's choice of subjects for satiric treatment is so unreal that we must conclude that he is writing in a traditional and rhetorical manner.

In chapter III we find that it was not the evils of secular society alone which Jerome exposed to vitriolic ridicule. He realized that the Church

had failed in its task of working a complete spiritual transformation of pagan civilization and instead had been corrupted by its compromise with "the world." As a representative of the monastic movement Jerome ceaselessly lampooned the arrogant, ignorant, avaricious, and gluttonous bishops who, he claimed, were rapidly polluting the Church. Yet he was compelled to censure the mundane and unworthy sybarites whom the unhappy events of a dying world were driving into the shelter of the monasteries.

The task of chapter IV is to show that the same harshness which Jerome had brought to bear against contemporary society as a whole, both secular and ecclesiastical, he also applied to the behavior of women in particular. Jerome's misogyny and misogamy represent the confluence of two streams of antifeminism. The ascetic tendencies to be found in the writings of St. Paul had been developed under Gnostic influence into the extremely severe ethic of monasticism which looked upon women as sensuality incarnate. At the same time the powerful strains of antifeminism had sounded throughout much pagan literature. The common misogyny of pagan and Christian morality made it both easy and natural for Jerome the monastic leader to borrow heavily from pagan writers in his acid lampoons of women and marriage.

As the fiery champion of adamant orthodoxy, St. Jerome naturally turned his satiric talents against the major enemies of the Church, heretics, Jews, and pagans. In chapter V we see that of these three he devoted by far the greatest attention to the first, for in his day it was the heretical sects which posed the most serious threat to Christian strength. He expresses his boundless animosity toward heretics by subjecting them to furious abuse. Against the Jews Jerome hurls virtually the same vituperation as against the heretics, in spite of the tremendous intellectual debt which he owed to Jewish learning. The pagans suffer too from Jerome's mockery. The common belief that paganism was left untouched by his barbs cannot be sustained. Nonetheless it is true that Jerome was too deeply involved in the internal conflicts of Christianity to devote much attention to its moribund external enemies.

Thus far we have seen Jerome's satire to be aimed chiefly at those elements in society which in his opinion were opposed to the best interests of the Church. Chapter VI demonstrates that acid ridicule and furious invective were also his chief weapons in the long series of violent personal quarrels which beset his life. Jerome's indulgence in the most unrestrained invective in replying to his critics exposes him to the charge of employing his satiric gifts for purely private ends. Yet

Jerome did not readily distinguish his own personal foes from those of the Church. On the contrary, he was in the habit of identifying his private antagonists with the enemies of right religion. He felt justified, therefore, in attacking individual heretics as personal enemies and, conversely, in lampooning personal enemies as the opponents of orthodoxy.

In considering Jerome's methods of satire in these six chapters we see that he was well endowed with the keenness of observation and power for detailed description on which all satire is based. However, Jerome is often unable to sustain a high level of satiric writing. Very frequently his satire gives way to mere vituperation and abuse. Furthermore, much of his satire is unoriginal. Jerome was a mosaic artist who delighted in joining together bits of satiric phrases culled from other writers. He had a particular penchant for composing satiric centos made up of a combination of vivid expressions drawn from pagan authors and the Bible. Moreover, his satire is repetitious to the point of monotony. He is inordinately fond of plundering his own works. Over and over again the same mordant descriptions of worldly society are found, even in works separated by a lifetime. We can often tell that his satire is not based on autopsy or on sudden and irrepressible moral wrath because at the time he is writing he had long been living in a monastery where he could not possibly have witnessed such scenes as he depicts and because his endless repetitions reveal him to be relying on trite and stereotyped material. The conclusion to be drawn is that on many occasions Jerome's acid censure of his age arises more from his need to support ascetic doctrines than from any keen sense of ethical outrage experienced at the moment he is writing.

In chapter VII we come to a consideration of Jerome's own views on satire. From references to be found in his writings, we may infer that Jerome considered satire to be a painfully truthful portrayal of life, naturally virulent and harsh because it paints with extreme accuracy and with great detail all the incongruous and absurd details of human behavior. The purpose of satire is essentially therapeutic: it cures while hurting. Contrary to the opinion of some, Jerome is not afraid to be known as a satirist. On the contrary, he openly acknowledges that the censorious spirit of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal inspires much of his writing. However, one may gather from his constant deprecation of malice that Jerome felt extremely uneasy over the unchristian harshness and malevolence of his satire. He was well aware that within his nature was a strong tendency toward virulence and malice. We may attribute this propensity to an innate want of charity for human failings

which was intensified and sharpened by the defeat of his personal ambitions. Jerome himself splendidly exemplifies that characteristic which he declares to be common to human nature: *Minore enim studio virtutes laudamus, quam vitia reprehendimus*. When we consider the decadent age in which he lived, the innate irascibility of his own temperament, and the thoroughness of his acquaintance with pagan and Christian literature, we may agree that St. Jerome could justly apply to himself the words of Juvenal: *difficile est saturam non scribere*.

EDWARD CHARLES WITKE — *Latin Satire: The Classical Genre and its Medieval Development**

This dissertation may best be described as an examination of the normative function of the literary genre satire. It deals specifically with two literary epochs, the classical and medieval. It seeks to ascertain two distinct but related sets of facts about certain kinds of poems: first, in depth, the formal possibilities or characteristics of ancient Latin satire; and second, in time, the persistence this fixed mode of expression exhibits in the continuing history of Latin literature in Europe. The first range of facts tells us what semantic and technical conventions, *topoi*, devices of rhetoric and style, mark satire off from other ancient genres. The second enables us to see how a genre changes, by extension and contraction of its limits. Accordingly the poems discussed are treated in two ways: formal analysis establishes what techniques are operating in a given poem, and critical evaluation investigates the work of art as a poem organizing and patterning itself conceptually after an abstract model, the genre itself as apprehended by a given poet. The first or classical part of this investigation primarily but not exclusively discovers and analyzes into components the marks of the genre and hence may be called a study in poetics. The second or medieval part is more a work of criticism, of critical *praxis*, though obviously critical theory is subsumed in the discussion of medieval practice of the genre satire.

The method is that of analysis of texts. The satires themselves reveal what they are, and how and why they are that way. No discussion of the origins of *satura* the word or *satura* the thing is offered. The Menippean, since it offers special problems and generated a separate tradition, does not figure much here. Lucilius plays a part only when extant satires suggest the utility of comparison.

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The satiric poet's self-image as *vates* and everyman is central to an understanding of satire's use of *sermo pedester* for serious purposes. It is shown in detail how satire's representational techniques grow out of this use of *sermo pedester*. Horace's sixth satire of Book II is analyzed at length to demonstrate the great role played by *Icherzählung*, narration of the poet's outer public life and of his inner private existence. The satirist considers everyday reality highly problematical, and accordingly its poetic representation bifurcates into outward description and revelation of inner moral states.

Persius' greatest achievement is seen as success in giving outward dramatical form to inner struggles and self-debates. Personification and allegory, significantly borrowed from more formal types of discourse, are his chief tools. His willful obscurity is related to his position vis-à-vis contemporary Roman stoicism. His realism is revealed as intellectualized, not rooted in the creatural and everyday, as is Horace's.

Juvenal conceives of the inner moral state as static. He concentrates his energy upon outward description as an access to inner motivation. Hence the everyday looms even more important in his satires, and rhetorical skills, especially *amplificatio*, play a large role. The commonplace comes to have a life of its own, and generates the energy for its own monumentalization. When it is seen under its problematical aspect, the everyday is set forth in *sermo humilis*. When it is valued for itself alone and approaches the function of a symbol it is represented in a brilliant verbal picture in a relatively elevated style.

The problem of satire's usefulness as a vehicle for moral teaching is also discussed in reference to the stoic and cynic philosophers' public activities in Rome of the earlier Empire. Persius' relation to the diatribe, best seen in his intense preoccupation with the dramatic, is also examined. Satire's repertory of devices for reaching and holding an audience, its reputation for telling the truth, the authority with which it clothes its exponent, all combined to make it a useful tool for Christian apologists.

The first extensive analysis of medieval satire is of Theodulf's *Paraenesis ad iudices*. It is proved that it organizes itself around the older principles of the genre satire, yet effectively deals with contemporary ethical situations, and is a valid extension into the didactic meter, the elegiac. While it looks to the past for its meter, the poems of Hugh Primas of Orléans and Walter of Châtillon are in rhythmic Latin verse. They converted the ancient genre into its true medieval form. The tight control imposed by the genre through its meter relaxes. The formal possibilities offered by the ancient genre are of course repre-

sented in these twelfth century extensions. But the pragmatic nature of this literary form reasserts itself more strongly in these poems than any since Lucilius. The medieval satirist has finally apprehended the social and cultural situation as new and distinct from that of antiquity. The ancient stock no longer forms the poem, but nevertheless it exerts a shaping influence. This is the more interesting in view of the great differences of education and moral orientation separating Hugh and Walter. Finally the abiding influence of the genre is explained by examining its audience's education and taste.

Since analysis can bring to light only the points which mark a genre's boundaries, synthesis is needed in order to gain some idea of satire's topography. Hence a final section discusses the cartographical charting's results: the possibilities, formal and topical, offered by satire are used as evidence for the general nature and function of Latin satire. The formal techniques delimiting satire are shown to be interwoven with the genre's continuous pragmatic function.

NOTE

The Editors recommend the abbreviations and forms of style set forth in the *American Journal of Archaeology* 62 (1958) 1-8. Copies of this style sheet are available free from the editors of *AJA*, McCormick Hall, Princeton, New Jersey.

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